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CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING

REFUGEES FROM HUNGARY

WITHIN

THE TURKISH DOMINIONS.

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CONFIDENTIAL.

Correspondence respecting Refugees from Hungary within the Turkish Dominions.

No. 1.

Sir Stratford Canning to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received September 9.)

(No. 257.)

My Lord, *Therapia, August 25, 1849.*

STATEMENTS unfavourable to the Hungarians have obtained credit here since the arrival of the post from Vienna yesterday. Advices from Bucharest had previously reported the arrival of General Dembinski, with two or three other distinguished fugitives, at Orsova. More recent communications from Vienna and Belgrade are said to assert that the Austro-Russian forces have gained a decisive victory near Temesvar, and that a considerable number of prisoners and several pieces of artillery have fallen into their hands. Long before this despatch can reach your Lordship, the truth, whatever may be its character, will no doubt have found its way to Her Majesty's Government, and therefore I abstain from entering into particulars, which, however probable in substance, rest on no certain foundation, though the Austrian Minister very naturally exerts himself to accredit and circulate an impression that the cause of Hungary is completely lost.

Meanwhile the want of any recent intelligence favourable to the Hungarians, the approach of the main body of the Austrian and Russian forces towards Transylvania, and the dissatisfaction expressed at the Porte's endeavours to maintain a neutral attitude, encourage those who are adverse to Reshid Pasha's administration, and who look forward to the triumph of Russia as a good opportunity for effecting his overthrow.

The Grand Vizier and his friends are evidently apprehensive of an impending crisis, with respect not only to the possession of ministerial power, but to the still more important question of external policy. The former of these dangers may be deemed to have received a temporary check by the arrest of two persons suspected of being engaged in a plot for the restoration of Reshid's adversaries, and more particularly of Riza Pasha, to the Sultan's favour. I am assured that the examination of their papers has furnished proof of the intrigue, and that the chief agent in carrying it on was employed as a spy by the Russian Legation. But the Sultan appears to be accessible to secret information, and he is always more or less fearful of Russia. Nor does the fairness with which he has lately acted towards his Ministers afford any strong security against the sudden changes to which an undecided character is liable in critical circumstances. Any joint demand addressed to His Majesty by the Cabinets of Vienna and St. Petersburgh, while their armies, flushed with victory, remain in the neighbourhood of Turkey to perpetuate the submission of the Hungarians, would be sure to find advocates here, and a timid

course of policy adapted to base interests, and supported by artful counsels, would be but too likely to prevail.

I have the Grand Vizier's personal assurance that no departure from the principles so often declared to me by the Porte is yet in contemplation, and therefore my object in addressing your Lordship on this occasion is mainly prospective. Events, however, press on with so much rapidity in the present state of Europe, that what is now a matter of speculation may easily prove to be one of reality before I can receive your Lordship's answer. The general impression and indeed the apparent probability is, that the Emperor of Russia will not be inclined to withdraw his troops before he obtains some guarantee for the maintenance of Russian interests, as well with respect to the permanent repression of free principles of government as to the extension of his influence over the population of Sclavic origin settled under various names between the confines of his empire and the eastern shore of the Adriatic. The future position of Austria is also viewed with uneasiness. Not only is it feared that the obligations contracted by that Power will entail upon it the necessity of serving Russian interests, with little regard to any other consideration, but in the opinion of some, the territories of the Sultan may not impossibly be looked to as affording the sole convenient means of compensation due from Austria to her northern auxiliary.

Indications of an endeavour to get up a case of complaint against the Porte are not wanting. The Austrian Minister has been of late particularly active in calling for decided measures with respect to the refugees in Wallachia. To-day he has presented a strong official note* to Aali Pasha, containing a formal protest against the Porte's unwillingness to act according to his requisitions, and demanding the extradition of all refugees, Poles and Hungarians, without entering into any distinction of political and criminal offences. The Russian Envoy has occasionally seconded the Internuncio's remonstrances, and it is emphatically given out that his Court is greatly dissatisfied with the conduct of the Turkish Cabinet, and particularly of the Grand Vizier.

Your Lordship need not be told that if the Porte were eventually convicted of having been slow to execute any stipulations of her treaties with Austria as to the extradition of fugitives, she would have much to plead on the score of humanity, of the manner in which she has been committed against the Hungarians by the Russian forces in Moldavia, and of the manifest difference between a whole nation in arms and a band of marauders or deserters. In point of fact, however, the Porte's neutrality has been sacrificed in a far greater degree to the military operations of Russia and the unfortunate necessities of Austria, than to any partiality which her Ministers may have entertained for a people having many traditional claims to their sympathy and good will.

The Ottoman Government has never been remarkable for the clearness or consistency of its proceedings, and its natural desire to combine a fair regard for its own interests with a proper attention to the claims of humanity and to the obligations of treaty, may possibly have betrayed it into some occasional irregularities. But its constant endeavour, on the whole, has been to maintain that neutral position which under your Lordship's instructions I have uniformly recommended, and in aid of which the French Minister has more than once joined with me in persuading the Porte to pursue a course prescribed by the same principle. Under these circumstances I only anticipate your Lordship's opinion, when I submit that the Ottoman Ministers are fairly entitled to support in continuing to carry out a principle which it has been my duty, and to all appearance that of General Aupick also, to inculcate with reference to the war in Hungary.

The probable and almost inevitable results of any marked disappointment in that respect must be as clear to your Lordship as to myself. In the new state of things consequent on the supposed reduction of Hungary to the condition of an Austrian province, by means of Russian intervention, the Porte will find it difficult enough to maintain the degree of independence which it has hitherto preserved. If its Ministers be left to

* See Inclosure in No. 2.

vindicate by their own unassisted efforts the course which they have pursued, they will soon despair of success, and abandon the conduct of affairs to those who would join with subserviency to Russia, the indulgence of a reactionary spirit in all that relates to administrative improvement and commercial liberality.

Imperfect as the present barrier of encroachment has shown itself to be, its removal would virtually undo whatever was effected in 1841 by the Great Powers of Europe on behalf of Turkish independence, and every interest involved in what is emphatically termed the Oriental question, would be exposed to dangers infinitely greater than any which have threatened the independence of this empire since the last days of Sultan Mahmoud.

If the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh be sincere in its declaration of disinterestedness, it will not easily take umbrage on learning that it is expected to redeem its pledge. On any other supposition the alternative which offers may have its inconvenience; but there can be little doubt of the choice, when it lies between the maintenance of a great European interest and the abandonment of a position for which so many exertions and sacrifices have been hitherto made.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

No. 2.

Sir Stratford Canning to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received September 9.)

(No. 258. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Therapia, August 25, 1849.*

INCLOSED herewith is the translation of a despatch addressed by Prince Schwarzenberg to Count Stürmer, and presented to-day by this Representative to the Ottoman Secretary of State. It has been sent to me confidentially by Aali Pasha, with a request that I would communicate to his Excellency any observations which a perusal of it might suggest to me. The answer to be given to it will be verbal.

It is the document of which I have made mention in another despatch of this date, under the designation of a note. I have only had time to take a hasty perusal of its contents.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

Inclosure in No. 2.

Prince Schwarzenberg to Count Sturmer.

(Traduction littérale.)

M. le Comte, *Vienne, 14 Août, 1849.*

EN réponse aux rapports de votre Excellence du 1er Août, concernant la conduite de la Porte à l'égard des rebelles Magyares qui le 26 Juillet ont été forcés de se réfugier en Moldavie, j'ai l'honneur de vous faire connaître ce qui suit.

La Porte, dans l'instruction donnée au mois de Février à son Commissaire, Fuad Effendi, a déclaré qu'elle considère les Magyares comme des rebelles. Elle a également reconnu que des individus en état de rébellion contre l'autorité légitime de Sa Majesté l'Empereur d'Autriche ne doivent pas se soustraire aux mains de la justice, en passant sur le territoire Ottoman, et que si quelques uns d'entre eux devaient franchir la frontière, ils ne pourraient pas être admis, d'après la teneur de l'Article XVIII du Traité de Belgrade. Nonobstant tout ceci, la Porte fut d'avis que si de pareils individus trouvaient moyen de se sauver sur son territoire, ils devraient ne pas être renvoyés mais seulement désarmés et éloignés des frontières.

La contradiction dans laquelle elle tombe ici avec elle-même, saute aux yeux, et nous ne pouvons de notre côté que protester de la manière la plus formelle contre une pareille ligne de conduite suivie envers les insurgés Magyares ou Polonais qui se réfugient sur le territoire Ottoman.

Outre l'Article XVIII du Traité de Belgrade, nous pouvons alléguer en notre faveur la circonstance, que le droit de jurisdiction sur les sujets Autrichiens dans les Etats Ottomans est exclusivement réservé, en vertu des traités, à la Mission et aux Consulats de Sa Majesté Impériale. C'est pourquoi le Gouvernement Ottoman se rendrait coupable aussi d'une violation manifeste de ce droit, s'il cherchait à s'opposer à une mesure judiciaire que les autorités Autrichiennes jugent nécessaire d'employer à l'égard de leurs nationaux compromis.

Vû l'existence de ce droit de jurisdiction consacré par les traités, il serait de toute impossibilité à la Sublime Porte, ainsi qu'on a eu dernièrement l'occasion de le lui faire observer, de chercher à faire valoir la théorie des réfugiés politiques nouvellement surgie dans quelques Etats de l'Europe Occidentale. Nous la rendons encore une fois attentive aux conséquences qui découlent en dernier résultat d'une pareille théorie, ainsi qu'à la nécessité où se sont trouvés même des Gouvernemens Républicains, tels que la France et la Suisse, d'avoir recours aux mesures les plus sévères contre d'aussi dangereux intrus.

Or, les inconvéniens que la présence des réfugiés politiques a fait naître dans les pays se feraient sentir infailliblement et avec encore plus de célérité en Turquie, où les mesures de police sont si défectueuses, et où il ne se trouve déjà que trop d'élémens de trouble et de soulèvement parmi les différentes nations qui en forment la population.

D'ailleurs, ceux des insurgés Valaques qui ont figuré à la tête de la dernière révolte ont été exilés hors du pays, tandisque dans le cas présent l'on voudrait transférer dans l'intérieur du pays des rebelles provenant d'un Etat étranger, dans le but de ne point les livrer à leur autorité; nouvelle contradiction, digne de figurer à côté de la précédente.

Enfin la Porte ne saurait non plus s'autoriser de la conduite tenue par l'Autriche à l'égard des fuyards arrivés du territoire Ottoman, car il est généralment connu que les autorités Impériales sur la frontière de la Croatie, où la question du traitement à faire subir à ces réfugiés a été le plus souvent agitée à cause des troubles fréquens de la Bosnie, ont toujours reçu l'ordre de repousser des frontières ceux parmi les Bosniaques que se seraient trouvés en état de révolte armée contre leur Souverain, et auraient cherché un refuge chez nous uniquement pour échapper à la punition méritée.

Votre Excellence aura donc, en s'étayant des argumens qui précèdent, à insister auprès de la Porte sur l'extradition de tous les rebelles Magyares ou Polonais, et surtout de leurs officiers, lesquels ont déjà passé sur le territoire Ottoman ou y arriveraient par la suite.

Vous voudrez bien nous faire connaître, M. le Comte, par la première occasion, le résultat de vos démarches et en faire part aussi à l'Agent Impérial à Bucharest, qui a reçu l'ordre de faire les mêmes représentations à Fuad Effendi.

Recevez, &c.
(Signé) SCHWARZENBERG.

No. 3.

Viscount Palmerston to Sir Stratford Canning.

(No. 229.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, September* 24, 1849.

I HAVE received your Excellency's despatch No. 257, of the 25th ultimo, containing observations on the effect likely to be produced at Constantinople by the late successes of the Austrian and Russian forces in Hungary; and I have to state to you that it is not unnatural that the Turkish Government should entertain the apprehensions which you have

mentioned, as to the use which Russia is likely to make of the military success which her armies have gained in Hungary; but Governments may sometimes fall into error by being over suspicious as well as by not being so enough.

It would indeed be blindness not to see that the success of the Russian arms in Hungary must give to Russia for much time to come, a considerable degree of political ascendancy over the Government of Austria; but there does not seem to be any reason for supposing that the Emperor of Russia means to take at present any undue advantage of the position in which the termination of the Hungarian war has placed him; and the circular which has lately issued from the Russian Government, and of which a copy was inclosed for your Excellency's information, in my despatch No. 220, of the 6th instant, announces that the Russian troops are to retire without delay into the Russian territory. The Turkish Government, however, must feel that the advice which has been invariably given to it by Her Majesty's Government, to remain strictly passive and to preserve a neutral position between the contending parties, was sound and wise; for if the Turks had given way to their natural impulse, and had manifested an active partiality for the Hungarians, while on the one hand they would not have turned the scale in favour of Hungary, they would, on the other hand, upon the defeat of the Hungarians, have remained exposed to the well-founded resentment of the two Imperial Governments. As it is, the Turkish Government has only to pursue the same steady course which it has hitherto followed, and it can have no cause to fear attack either from Austria or Russia.

I am, &c.
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 4.

Viscount Palmerston to Sir Stratford Canning.

(No. 230.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, September* 24, 1849.

WITH reference to the despatch from Prince Schwarzenberg to Count Stürmer, of which a copy is inclosed in your Excellency's despatch marked confidential, of the 25th ultimo, and wherein the Austrian Government demands from the Porte the extradition of the persons who have lately come from Hungary to take refuge within the Turkish dominions, I have to observe to your Excellency that even if the XVIIIth Article of the Treaty of Belgrade, of which a copy is annexed, did properly apply to the officers and soldiers of the Hungarian army who might be driven to seek shelter within the Turkish territory, that Article does not contain any engagement on the part of the Porte to give such persons up to the Austrian Government; and the utmost that could be demanded would be that they should not be allowed to reside permanently in the Turkish Empire.

But the XVIIIth Article of the Treaty of Belgrade obviously relates to cases of a very different kind from that of the war which has just ended between Austria and Hungary; and it would be a strained interpretation of that Article to construe it to apply to the officers and soldiers of the Hungarian armies who have been fighting for the constitutional rights of Hungary against the armies of Austria and Russia. Such officers and soldiers cannot be deemed to be the persons intended to be described by the expression "ces sortes de gens," or to be classed with "voleurs et brigands."

It is to be observed, however, that the demand of the Austrian Government was made before the surrender of Georgey to the Russian General-in-chief was known at Vienna; and the demand seems to have referred principally to the Hungarian detachment which was driven into Wallachia from Orsova on the 17th of August; and it is to

be expected that now that the war is over, a demand of this kind will no longer be pressed, but if it is pressed, it ought certainly not to be complied with.

I am, &c.
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

Inclosure in No. 4.

Extract from the Treaty of Belgrade, signed September 18, 1739.

ART. XVIII.—On ne donnera plus désormais asile et retraite aux méchants, aux sujets rebelles et mécontens; mais chacune des Parties Contractantes sera obligée de punir ces sortes de gens, ainsi que tous les voleurs et brigands, quand même ils seraient sujets de l'autre Partie.

No. 5.

Sir Stratford Canning to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received September 26.)

(No. 262.)
My Lord, *Therapia, August* 27, 1849.

AT an audience which took place this morning in the Palace of Beylerbey, I had the honour to present Her Majesty's reply to the Sultan's letter. The Sultan gave me a most gracious reception, and expressed his earnest wish to draw still closer the bonds of amity which unite the two countries.

I availed myself of the opportunity to enforce the terms of Her Majesty's letter, and to encourage the Sultan in a steady adherence to that line of policy which under your Lordship's instructions I have uniformly recommended; I am the more solicitous on this point, because any appearance of change in the Sultan's inclination would greatly promote the success of those intrigues which, helped on secretly by Russian agents, are directed to the overthrow of the present Ministry.

A just and benevolent system of administration extending to all classes; a careful selection of public functionaries; the punishment of those who, like Nejib Pasha, dare perseveringly to act in opposition to the Sultan's commands; a continued and more active attention to all improvements productive of general prosperity and national strength, together with the encouragement of commerce on principles of well-considered liberality, are the leading points which I represented as tending more than any others to promote a cordial understanding not only between the Sovereigns of Great Britain and Turkey personally, but also between their respective Governments and nations. I gave the Sultan to understand that in proportion as these views were carried out with effect and consistency, the sympathies which already operated so favourably on the relations of the two countries with each other, would acquire new force, and increase the power of Her Majesty's Government to realize, in case of emergency, those friendly sentiments which they never cease to entertain towards the Turkish Empire.

With respect to the Porte's foreign policy and the military operations on its north or north-western frontier, I expressed a hope that with the preservation of peace would be combined a firm maintenance of the Porte's neutral position, and a generous regard for the just claims of humanity.

In alluding to recent occurrences, though I confess that my approval as to several proceedings of late is little more than comparative, I thought it best for future objects to intimate a favourable opinion of Reshid Pasha's administration, and I was happy to observe that my remarks in that sense appeared to be agreeable to the Sultan; nor is it necessary to add, that the Grand Vizier, on learning their tenor from Aali Pasha, who was present, expressed to me the most grateful satisfaction.

There is more goodness of feeling and right-mindedness, than energy, quickness, or grasp of understanding in the Sultan's character, nor has nature endowed His Majesty with an easy elocution. But in spite of personal disadvantages, he conveyed to me by his manner, countenance, and language, the impression that for the present at least his policy continues to be that of a friendly intimate connexion with England, and that whatever may be the necessities of the present anxious period, or the compliances which may be extorted from him by intrigue and intimidation, he looks eventually to Her Majesty's Government for support in the hour of need, and wishes meanwhile that the relations between his Minister and Her Majesty's Embassy should be those of real confidence and cordiality. He listened with every appearance of interest and assent to my remarks concerning the internal administration of his empire, and assured me emphatically that the sentiments which I had expressed were to their full extent identical with his own.

Referring to the Queen's visit to Ireland, the Sultan manifested a marked degree of pleasure on learning with what enthusiasm Her Majesty had been welcomed to that part of her dominions, and a lively hope that Her Majesty's presence there would be followed by a return of prosperity as useful to Her Majesty's Government as to Her Majesty's Irish population.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

No. 6.

Sir Stratford Canning to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received September 26.)

(No. 267.)
My Lord, *Therapia, September* 3, 1849.

THE discomfiture, by defeat, surrender, or dispersion, of so large a part of the Hungarian armies, anticipated as a probable final result, but in fact most unexpectedly sudden, has brought a number of refugees into the Ottoman dominions, and given importance to the claim of extradition which had already been raised by the Austrian Cabinet. The distinguished names of Kossuth, Dembinski, Bem, Perczel, and Mezzaros, stand out from among the crowd of exiles, and make it difficult either for the Porte to give way or for the two Imperial Governments to forbear. The whole number of compromised individuals, Hungarian and Polish, who have escaped from the seat of war and entered Wallachia by Orsova, amount to upwards of eighty. They were amicably received by the Turkish authorities, and they were subsequently forwarded under escort to the fortress of Widdin, where they still remain, with an exception or two, awaiting the Porte's decision as to their ulterior destination. The leaders are detained on their parole, and the others, as I am informed by a young officer just arrived from Widdin, are left almost entirely to themselves.

The Russian and Austrian Representatives both here and at Bucharest continue to insist on the extradition of the whole number respectively; though it is probable that they would be satisfied if the more distinguished individuals were given up to them. The Internuncio rests his demand on the XVIIIth Article of the Treaty of Belgrade. The Russian Envoy appeals in support of his claim to the IInd Article of the Treaty of Kainardji. It is remarked that in point of tone and language the Internuncio is the more peremptory of the two.

On grounds of humanity not unmixed with considerations affecting the Porte's character and future policy, I have not hesitated to advise a decided resistance to the demand of extradition. I have further endeavoured to dissuade the Turkish Ministers from pledging themselves to any measure of restraint not clearly prescribed by the terms of treaties, and from contracting any engagement not leaving a certain latitude of action for the future.

I was happy to learn from General Aupick that his view of the matter was entirely similar to my own, and we have in consequence acted upon the same line and received assurances of the same tenour from the Grand Vizier and Aali Pasha.

We should have been better pleased to take even a higher position, and to recommend a more generous treatment of the unfortunate exiles; but the treaties, though pushed beyond the strict letter of their obligation, and the example afforded on other occasions by the claimants themselves, give, nevertheless, a certain degree of weight to the Austrian and Russian demands, taken in their more limited extent, and impose, for the sake of peace, a necessity of acting with much prudence and consideration for these Powers.

While this question was still pending I saw the Grand Vizier in private, and left him disposed to take a right course on the main point of extradition.

The Council met on the 30th ultimo, and decided that the Porte could not without dishonour give up the refugees, though in maintaining its refusal every practicable exertion would be made to assuage the resentment which that proceeding might create. Aali Pasha, in sending me a message to this effect, added, that in a few days a vessel would be sent to receive the refugees on board at Varna, and convey them to some island in the Archipelago, Rhodes for instance, or Candia, most probably the latter.

I have reason to believe that in case of being urged to give up the refugees by pressing and reiterated demands, the Porte will ultimately make an appeal to the leading Powers, and abide by their opinion.

There are persons, my Lord, who apprehend that the Emperor Nicholas having obtained such complete success in Hungary, and having his armies in movement from one end of Russia to the other, will strike into a bolder line of policy than heretofore, and take some decided step towards realizing that scheme of aggrandizement which has long been a favourite though distant object of ambition at St. Petersburgh. Her Majesty's Government are the best judges of this probability. I will only take the liberty to remark that the conjectures founded many months ago on the attitude assumed by Russia, as indicative of much larger views than the mere occupation of the Principalities, have been fully realized by the event; that no slight degree of trickery as well as of dictation has been employed to obtain the partial concurrence of the Porte; that the Court of St. Petersburgh, entertaining a fixed aversion to free principles of government, professes to aim at the restoration of order disturbed throughout Europe by the propagation of those principles; that the movement manifested among the Sclavonic population out of Russia threatens to operate as a check on Russian influence, if not appropriated in time to Russian purposes; and that the credit of securing a national compensation for so many sacrifices required from his people and army, may fairly be presumed to have its natural place in the Emperor's calculations. On the whole, it is but reasonable to expect that the present successes will be used to promote the great objects of Russian policy throughout the East, and that endeavours will be made under the impressions created by victory, to draw the Turkish Government into a more complete subserviency to the political views of that Power. How far the Cabinet of Vienna may be disposed or obliged to act as an auxiliary to Russia in carrying out these views; whether, as some believe, the question of extradition has been raised for sinister purposes; and what measures of intimidation or aggression may follow upon the Porte's continued refusal to give up the refugees, the course of events will best serve to show. But I should fail in my duty if I did not again solicit your Lordship's attention pointedly to this subject, and declare my conviction that, with every exertion on the part of Her Majesty's Government and Embassy, it will henceforward be more difficult than ever to keep the Sultan and his Ministers in that course of policy which they have lately pursued with tolerable pretensions to steadiness in their way; and further, that without stronger guarantees than any I have heard of as already existing, it will hardly be safe to

overlook the inducements which, naturally enough in the present state of Europe, may prevail with the Russian Cabinet to bring the Porte into its views by force, if persuasion fails, even in defiance of public opinion elsewhere.

The importance of preparing Her Majesty's Government for the worst is so evident, that I hope to be excused for adding on this occasion, that notwithstanding the mild tone of M. de Titoff's ostensible notes, indications of impatience and resentment have lately appeared in the language of the Russian Ministry and of its agents; nor can it be concealed that the striking change of opinion throughout these countries in favour of Turkish principles of government, as compared with those of Russia, must be in no small degree mortifying and even alarming to the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

No. 7.

Sir Stratford Canning to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received September 26.)

(No. 268. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Therapia, September 3, 1849.*

REFERRING to my despatch of this date concerning the refugees from Hungary whose extradition is demanded by Austria and Russia, I have the honour to inclose herewith for the further information of Her Majesty's Government, copies of the official notes respectively addressed to Aali Pasha by Count Stürmer and M. de Titoff.

I take this opportunity to mention that although the representations respecting Hungary are presented separately by those Ministers, their Excellencies are in constant communication with each other, and have every appearance of acting, as might be naturally expected, in concert on all that relates to that question.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

Inclosure 1 in No. 7.

Count Sturmer to Aali Pasha.

M. le Ministre, *Constantinople, le 29 Août,* 1849.

J'AI eu l'honneur de communiquer à votre Excellence il y a un couple de jours, une dépêche de son Altesse le Prince de Schwarzenberg, dans laquelle M. le Président du Conseil proteste formellement, sur la base des traités, contre le refuge accordé aux insurgés Hongrois sur le territoire Ottoman, et insiste à ce qu'ils soient livrés aux autorités Impériales.

Votre Excellence a bien voulu répondre à cette communication, en me déclarant qu'elle se proposait de développer dans une dépêche qu'elle adresserait à M. Musurus, les motifs qui guident la conduite de la Sublime Porte dans cette circonstance.

Il ne m'appartient de préjuger ces motifs, mais je ne saurais me dispenser de faire observer à votre Excellence, que les événemens marchent avec une telle rapidité, que la question est devant nous toute brûlante de réalité; déjà les principaux chefs de la révolte Hongroise suivis d'un grand nombre de leurs adhérens se trouvent sur le sol de l'Empire Ottoman.

Dans cet état des choses c'est un devoir impérieux pour moi de presser la décision de la Sublime Porte à ce sujet. Je sais que le Commissaire Extraordinaire de Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan en Valachie, par suite des démarches que l'Agent Impérial d'Autriche, M. de Timoni, était chargé de faire de son côté pour obtenir l'extradition des réfugiés Hongrois, lui

a donné l'assurance qu'ils seraient étroitement gardés par les troupes Turques, en attendant les instructions positives qu'il avait demandées d'urgence de la Sublime Porte. Il n'y a, par conséquent, pas un instant à perdre, et je me plais à croire que des ordres catégoriques vont incessamment mettre Fuad Effendi à même de satisfaire au vœu du Gouvernement Impérial. Je n'appuierai plus sur les considérations qui dans l'intérêt de son propre repos devaient y déterminer la Sublime Porte. C'est un sujet que je crois avoir épuisé dans mes communications journalières avec votre Excellence, et dernièrement encore dans les conférences que j'ai eu l'honneur d'avoir avec elle et avec son Altesse le Grand Vizir.

Le moment actuel est grave et solennel pour nos deux empires; leurs relations futures vis-à-vis l'un de l'autre dépendraient de la conduite que la Sublime Porte tiendra dans cette circonstance. J'abandonne à votre sagesse, M. le Ministre, et à celles des autres Conseillers de Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan, d'en calculer d'avance toutes les conséquences.

Veuillez agréer, &c.
(Signé) STURMER.

Inclosure 2 in No. 7.

M. de Titoff to Aali Pasha.

Buyukdéré, le $\frac{15}{18}$ Août, 1849.

M. le Ministre,

LE Commissaire Extraordinaire de Sa Majesté le Sultan dans les Principautés n'aura pas manqué de porter à la connaissance de votre Excellence, la demande que son collègue de Russie, M. le Lieutenant-Général Duhamel, venait de lui adresser par sa note officielle du $\frac{1}{13}$ Août pour réclamer l'extradition et la remise aux autorités Russes de dix Polonais désignés nominalement dans la liste annexée à la dite note, comme fesant partie des rebelles qui, après la déroute des insurgés en Hongrie, se sont rendus aux préposés Ottomans de la frontière Valaque.

Son Excellence Fuad Effendi, en annonçant par sa réponse au Général Duhamel, que tous les réfugiés en question seraient strictement gardés par les troupes Turques, l'a informé que pour ce qui concerne l'extradition il se trouvait obligé d'attendre les ordres supérieurs.

En prenant acte de l'assurance donnée par le Commissaire Ottoman sur la vigilance qui serait mise à tenir les réfugiés sous bonne garde, jusqu'aux ordres attendus de Constantinople, M. le Général Duhamel m'a communiqué la correspondance précitée pour y fixer la juste attention du Ministère Ottoman, et presser de sa part les ordres nécessaires à la réalisation de la demande formée auprès de l'Amedji Effendi.

Cette demande étant à la fois des plus urgentes et des mieux fondées sur les stipulations positives des Traités établis de longue date entre la Russie et l'Empire Ottoman, je me fais un devoir empressé de requérir l'obligeante coopération de votre Excellence pour l'expédition des ordres nécessaires, afin que les Polonais, sujets de l'Empereur mon auguste maître, que réclame aujourd'hui le Général Duhamel, ou qui viendraient par la suite se mettre au pouvoir des officiers Ottomans dans les Principautés, soient consignés à nos autorités.

Les nombreux exemples du loyal empressement de la Sublime Porte à satisfaire les demandes de cette espèce, chaque fois que nos autorités frontières du côté d'Europe ou d'Asie eurent à revendiquer ici des déserteurs ou autres délinquans, sujets Russes, suffiraient à en autoriser un forme espoir de voir émanés promptement les ordres désirés pour la gouverne de Fuad Effendi. Mais il existe à cet effet un autre puissant motif. Il ne saurait échapper à la sagacité de votre Excellence, et dès le printems dernier je me suis trouvé appelé par ordre exprès de ma Cour à le soumettre aux plus sérieuses méditations des Ministres de Sa Hautesse. C'est l'extrême importance qu'il y a pour la Sublime Porte, à éviter à ses autorités la moindre apparence de faiblesse ou de tolérance pour la faction révolutionnaire, qui, après avoir compromis le repos des Principautés et ensanglanté la Transylvanie et la Hongrie, ne tarderait

pas à convertir la Turquie en un foyer permanent de troubles, si, contre toute attente, les chefs et adhérens de la révolte y trouveraient une imprudente protection, fatale pour la stabilité intérieure de l'Empire Ottoman, et préjudiciable aux Puissances voisines, lesquelles en conséquence ne sauraient jamais y rester indifférentes.

J'attendrai donc avec un vif intérêt les notions que votre Excellence voudra bien me donner en réponse au contenu de la présente, pour l'information de ma Cour, et je saisis, &c.

(Signé) TITOFF.

No. 8.

Sir Stratford Canning to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received September 26.)

(No. 269. Most Confidential.)

My Lord, *Therapia, September 3*, 1849.

AALI PASHA has communicated to me confidentially the draft of his answer to M. de Titoff's note respecting the refugees from Hungary, with a request that I would suggest any amendments that might occur to me on perusing it. Inclosed herewith is a copy of the draft, with my suggestions in the parallel column, such as they have been adopted by his Excellency. Had the Pasha entirely followed my advice, he would have omitted, or at least recast, the concluding paragraph. But he thought it necessary for conciliation; and as it now stands, my objection lies more against the form than the substance. I need not remark to your Lordship, that in counselling a Turkish Minister when there is any immediate danger of Russian resentment, I am obliged to take largely into account the character of the client as well as the merits of the case. Aali Pasha will no doubt give me a complete copy of his note, when approved by the Sultan and given in to the Russian Envoy. The most satisfactory part of it is perhaps that which shows in how many instances both Russia and Austria have declined to give up refugees claimed by the Porte. The answer to M. de Stürmer's note will of course not differ materially from that addressed to M. de Titoff. I have not however seen it; and I may take this opportunity to state, on Aali Pasha's authority, that the allusion made by Prince Schwarzenberg, in his instruction communicated by Count Stürmer, to certain assurances received from the Porte in the commencement of the late operations in Wallachia, is founded on a complete misapprehension of what really passed on the occasion.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

Inclosure in No. 8.

Draft of Aali Pasha's Note to M. de Titoff.

Alterations suggested by Sir Stratford Canning and adopted by Aali Pasha, in lieu of the passages underlined in the text.	*Draft of Aali Pasha's note to M. de Titoff.*
	I HAVE received your Excellency's note, dated $\frac{13}{25}$ August, requesting that prompt instructions might be sent to Fuad Effendi, in pursuance of the treaties between the two Governments and of the official communication addressed to him by General Duhamel for the

delivery up to the Russian Government of certain Russian subjects who had taken part in the Hungarian insurrection, and have lately sought refuge in the Ottoman States.

It is a well-known established fact, needless to dwell upon, that the Sublime Porte has at all times afforded proofs of an earnest desire to respect treaties and to strengthen the bonds of amity and good understanding with the Imperial Government of Russia.

The present question is however an exceptional one. Your Excellency is aware that peculiar rules have for a long time been established among European nations, with reference to political refugees, and that the principle having been either totally, or in part, admitted by all the Great Powers, has acquired the force of treaty. The Imperial Government could therefore never give a friendly assent to its violation by the Porte, or to her assuming an exceptional position to the general rule.

The Sultan's Ministers have however taken into their consideration, how far existing treaties are applicable to the question at issue, as well as to the principles of international law in such matters; and I have received His Majesty's commands to communicate frankly to your Excellency the result of their deliberations, and the objections sincerely entertained by them, as follows:—

Firstly, the offenders whose extradiction or expulsion from the country in which they may have taken refuge is stipulated in the IInd Article of the Treaty of Kainardji, relative to the extradition of refugees, must be *bonâ fide* subjects of one of the Contracting Parties. Let us suppose, for instance, that the individuals in question are *bonâ fide* Russian subjects. The provisions of the Treaty of Kainardji do not even in that case stipulate for the mere extradition of refugee subjects; but that they should be at least sent out of the country in which they had taken refuge, in order that no coldness or frivolous discussion should ensue between the two Governments on account of such evil-disposed persons; so that according to this,

prevailed

generally admitted
an international obligation.

while the text of the Treaty is without any meaning, and destroys itself, it is beyond a doubt at the option of the Government in whose territories such persons may have sought refuge, to adopt whichever of the two courses it may choose with respect to them.

It is needless also for me to state to your Excellency, that since the conclusion of the Treaty of Kainardji several distinguished subjects of the Porte, both Mussulmans and Christians, having sought refuge in the Russian territory, for political causes and offences, the Russian Government, animated by feelings of good will and friendship towards the Porte, prevented them from causing any injury to this country; and that although they were kept under surveillance, she did not consent to the extradition of those among them who were claimed.

Examples like these have been afforded before by other Governments, equally bound by treaty for the extradition of refugees. Above all by the Government of Austria, who, in spite of the repeated official demands made by the Sublime Porte for certain rebel subjects who had gone over into her territory, refused to give them up, and kept them there.

The exception made in favour of political refugees has, as above stated, been long admitted as a general principle throughout Europe, and they have been everywhere received. As it is therefore unnecessary for the Porte to enter upon any discussion on this subject, it is needless to dwell upon it.

With reference to the question of the importance attached by Russia to the personal punishment of the refugees, and of the desire entertained by those Governments who are friendly to peace and tranquillity, to see the rebellion in Hungary brought to an end, the combined revolutionary movement in question has been quelled and subdued by the military power of the two empires, while those who advocated it, and took an active part in it, have come to a knowledge of their (real) strength, and met with their punishment. No greater lesson could be taught to those who excite trouble and disorder in every part

restrained from doing further mischief.

omitted

have experienced the consequences of this movement."

of the world. The importance, therefore, attached to the punishment of the refugees falls naturally to the ground, and there can be no doubt that the sole object of the Imperial Government, animated as it is by a spirit of liberality acknowledged by all the world, in claiming the individuals, was to put it out of their power to commit further evil and to expose mankind afresh to the horrors of war and bloodshed. In order that no doubt may be entertained concerning the accomplishment of this object within the States of His Majesty the Sultan, the Emperor's sincere friend, it may be stated, that supposing the fact as to the individuals in question being at this time Russian subjects, they shall be sent out of the Ottoman States according to treaty; or, if at the same time, in order that the Russian Government may feel more secure on this subject, that is to explain as the refugees will not be under any restraint in Europe, should they after a time tender their submission, if in order that it may be out of their power to depart, it should be desired that they should be detained in Turkey, in that case, conformably to the friendly relations which happily subsist between the two Governments, and in accordance with the internal police regulations of the Ottoman States and with the declaration made with the Porte at the commencement of the Hungarian insurrection, it was strictly forbidden that the Turkish territory should be made the theatre of trouble in any way whatsoever, by the revolutionary partisans seeking refuge in it, and there cannot be a doubt that the Porte will (now) consider it a duty to take measures for preventing them from doing any harm, and for removing them to a distance from the frontier, and keeping them under constant surveillance, so that it may be out of their power to commit evil.

His Majesty the Sultan entertains a hope that the Imperial Government of Russia will appreciate and accept these explanations, &c.

by a true spirit of liberality,

omitted.

No. 9.

Sir Stratford Canning to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received September 26.)

(No. 270.)

My Lord, *Therapia, September 5, 1849.*

LATE the night before last I learnt from Aali Pasha that Count Stürmer, at his own particular request, was to have an audience of the Sultan next morning, in order to receive from His Majesty's own lips an assurance that the refugees should be "internés" and "surveillés" by the Porte. This arrangement took me by surprise. The concealment of the proposal from me till after it had been settled was not entirely in keeping with the confidence professed towards me by the Grand Vizier, and I saw in it much actual awkwardness and eventual embarrassment for the Sultan. I consequently sent Mr. Alison next morning to Reshid Pasha, with directions to make known my impressions to his Highness, to ascertain more exactly the nature of his views in obtaining the proposed audience, and to persuade the Sultan, through him, not to commit himself beyond some general expression within the terms of the note proposed as an answer to M. de Titoff's application. The Grand Vizier excused himself by saying that Aali Pasha had been directed to acquaint me with Count Stürmer's request, and that he hoped the audience would prove a facility to the acceptance by Austria and Russia of the Porte's intended course of proceeding as to the refugees. He consented at the same time that Mr. Alison should see the Minister for Foreign Affairs before Count Stürmer's audience, with a view to advising the Sultan to confine his answer to a general assurance that the refugees would be removed from the frontier and prevented from doing any further harm. Mr. Alison was in time to communicate with Aali Pasha at the Palace, and he had reason to believe that a suitable intimation was submitted at once to the Sultan.

At an early hour yesterday an Austrian steamer arrived from the Danube. It was saluted by one of the Russian vessels of war lying off the residence of the Russian Envoy at Buyukdery, and having hoisted a Russian flag at the foro, with the Austrian colours as usual, proceeded down the Bosphorus. I learnt at a later hour that Prince Michel Radzivil was on board, with a letter from the Emperor Nicholas to the Sultan, and that, accompanied by M. de Titoff, he had waited on the Grand Vizier, where Aali Pasha had subsequently arrived to take part in the conference.

This morning, by my direction, Mr. Alison saw the Grand Vizier, and M. Pisani saw Aali Pasha, in order to ascertain from those Ministers the precise nature of what had passed at Count Stürmer's audience and at the Russian conference at Reshid Pasha's.

With some slight shades of difference in the two reports, it appears that the Sultan declared himself to act, with respect to the refugees, on the sole ground of humanity, intending to send them into the interior, and to order that care should be taken to prevent their doing any kind of harm to Austria or Russia. It further appears that Count Stürmer had endeavoured to persuade the Sultan that principles of humanity did not apply to persons who, like these refugees, had occasioned so much disorder and bloodshed.

With respect to the Russian communications, it appears that they are couched in very strong language.

The Emperor's letter announces the conclusion of the war in Hungary, and demands the extradition of the refugees.

Count Nesselrode's instruction requires an immediate and categorical answer as to the refugees, declaring that the future relations of the two empires with each other will depend upon its purport.

In addition to those communications, M. de Titoff and Count Stürmer have declared that the escape of a single refugee will be taken for a declaration of war.

Before I had received the reports of Mr. Alison and M. Pisani, the French Minister had sent his first interpreter to inform me of the object of Prince Radzivil's mission and the menacing nature of the Russian communications, as related to him by the Ottoman Secretary of State.

The Grand Vizier has since repaired to the Palace to apprize the Sultan of what took place at yesterday's conference; and Prince Radzivil is to have his audience to-morrow for the presentation of the Emperor's letter.

It is probable that the note previously prepared in answer to the Russian Envoy will be cancelled, and a General Council is to be assembled on the subject of the pending requisition in the course of two or three days.

In the meanwhile there is no indication of a change in the intentions of the Porte, though the serious, not to say alarming, nature of the position is deeply felt. The Sultan's firmness will however be put to a severe trial, and so will that of his enlightened Minister; nor can I pretend to say what counsels will ultimately prevail. The first impression of every one is, that the Porte is placed in a most painful and dangerous dilemma between the conflicting sentiments of honour and humanity on the one side, and of timidity, the natural result of its present isolation, on the other. The resource of an appeal to Europe may sustain its courage for the present; but the ultimate issue will naturally depend upon the prospect of support from England and France.

Your Lordship cannot possibly require any further observations from me on the character of the present demand and its eventual consequences, whether it be reluctantly complied with or steadily refused.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

Inclosure 1 in No. 9.

Memorandum of Mr. Alison's Conversation with the Grand Vizier.

Therapia, September 5, 1849.

THE Grand Vizier stated to me this morning, that pursuant to my communication with Aali Pasha yesterday at the Palace of Beylerbey, the Sultan had expressed himself in vague terms towards the Internuncio on the subject of the Hungarian refugees. His Majesty is reported to have dwelt on the interest which he felt in the welfare of Austria, and to have stated that the refugees should be removed to a distance from the frontier; and that endeavours should be made to take care (de les garder), so that they should cause no inquietude to the Austrian Government either by correspondence or in any other manner. The Grand Vizier added that Aali Pasha would give your Excellency every information on what took place at the audience in question.

His Highness then informed me that at the conference held yesterday at his house with M. de Titoff and Prince Radzivil, the Russian Minister had demanded in peremptory menacing terms, the prompt extradition of the Polish refugees; and had declared that the future relations between the two Governments would depend upon the solution of this question, to which he called upon the Porte to give a categorical answer,—yes or no. The Grand Vizier assured me that both he and Aali Pasha had confined themselves strictly, in their reply, to stating that the matter should be submitted to the Council, in spite of the earnest desire of M. de Titoff to elicit something from him favourable to his demand. The menacing tone in which this was conveyed has created a very painful impression on his Highness's mind, although he said nothing to warrant the belief that the Porte would deviate from the line of humane policy which is so strongly entertained on this subject by the Sultan and his advisers. M. de Titoff had commenced by censuring the conduct of the Porte for having admitted the refugees at all within the Turkish territory.

(Signed) C. ALISON.

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Inclosure 2 in No. 9.

M. Pisani to Sir Stratford Canning.

M. l'Ambassadeur, *Therapia, ce 5 Septembre*, 1849.

J'AI l'honneur de rendre compte à votre Excellence de ce que je viens d'apprendre d'Aali Pacha.

L'audience du Sultan que le Comte Stürmer avait demandée a eu lieu hier d'une manière tout-à-fait privée. Le Comte s'est efforcé à persuader Sa Hautesse que les sentimens d'humanité dont elle a d'ailleurs donné des preuves envers des malheureux, ne sont guères applicables envers des individus qui ne sont pas des malheureux dignes de compassion, mais des réfugiés qui cherchent un abri après s'être rendus coupables de grands crimes, tels que violer leur serment de fidélité, causer une très-grande effusion de sang, et avoir fait des choses qui ont été sur le point de faire naître un bouleversement complet en Europe. Le Comte Stürmer a parlé toujours dans ce sens à l'appui de sa demande.

Le Sultan a répondu au Comte: "Ma conduite envers les réfugiés n'est nullement basée sur des motifs politiques; elle n'est que l'effet des sentimens d'humanité et de compassion qui m'animent. Les Gouvernemens de l'Europe ont donné des exemples de pareils sentimens envers des réfugiés. Mon intention est d'interner les réfugiés dont il s'agit, et d'ordonner que l'on prenne soin à ce qu'ils n'ayent aucun moyen de faire du mal ni à l'Autriche ni à la Russie."

Le Comte Stürmer a répliqué, quant à la question des exemples qu'on a vus en Europe de clémence usée envers des réfugiés, qu'il entrera en détail sur ce point avec les Ministres de Sa Hautesse. C'est ainsi que l'audience est finie.

Aali Pacha m'a parlé aussi de l'arrivée hier du Général Russe Prince Michel Radzivil.

"Hier," dit son Excellence, "M. de Titoff et le Général sont venus au Jalli du Grand Vizir et je me suis trouvé aussi à cette entrevue. Le Général est porteur d'une lettre de l'Empereur Nicolas et d'une instruction du Comte Nesselrode à M. Titoff. L'Empereur annonce la fin de la guerre de Hongrie, et demande l'extradition des réfugiés. L'instruction à M. Titoff est conçue dans des termes très forts. Il y est dit que la Russie demande l'extradition des réfugiés, qu'il faut que la Porte donne sans délai une réponse catégorique, c'est-à-dire, oui ou non; que de la solution de cette question dépendent les relations futures des deux Gouvernemens."

Demain le Général Radzivil présentera au Sultan la lettre de l'Empereur.

M. Titoff et le Comte Stürmer ont déclaré à la Porte que si un seul des réfugiés s'échappe, cela sera pris comme une déclaration de guerre à la Russie et à l'Autriche.

J'ai l'honneur, &c.

(Signé) FREDK. PISANI.

No. 10.

Sir Stratford Canning to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received September 26.)

(No. 271. Secret.)

My Lord, *Therapia, September 5*, 1849.

I HAVE obtained, I might say with more propriety smuggled, a copy of the Emperor Nicholas' letter to the Sultan brought by Prince Radzivil yesterday. It is inclosed herewith for the information of your Lordship and of Her Majesty's Government; but I have to request that the communication may be considered as strictly confidential and secret.

Prince Radzivil appears to have come direct from Warsaw.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

Inclosure in No. 10.

The Emperor of Russia to the Sultan.

14 *Août*, 1849.

CONNAISSANT les sentimens de votre Majesté, je ne saurais douter de la part qu'elle prendra à l'heureux dénouement de la guerre acharnée qui a si longtems ensanglanté la Hongrie; j'ai hâte de lui annoncer le grand événement auquel mes armées ont pris une part si active. Il servira, j'en ai l'espoir, à inaugurer une ère nouvelle, à mettre un terme aux calamités que le vertige révolutionnaire a entraîné dans le monde moral et politique.

Toutes ces convulsions anarchiques si gratuitement provoquées ont accumulé tant de ruines, ont créé tant de misères et de souffrances, que les peuples désabusés commencent à espérer aujourd'hui un retour de l'ordre, de la confiance, et de la sécurité. L'insurrection Madjar menaçait non seulement l'existence de l'Empire d'Autriche, dont l'intégrité constitue un élément essentiel de l'équilibre politique, mais encore pour la solidarité que la rattachait aux différens centres révolutionnaires établis sur le continent, et particulièrement à la propagande Polonaise. Cette formidable insurrection s'attaquait aux bases de l'ordre social, auquel il ne restait plus que la force armée pour dernière ancre de salut. Dès-lors je ne pouvais hésiter à apporter dans la balance le poids des forces disponibles de mon empire. La Russie est intervenue en Hongrie en vertu du même principe conservateur qui a présidé à l'assistance armée que je me suis fait un devoir d'offrir spontanément à votre Majesté l'année dernière pour rétablir son autorité ouvertement méconnue dans les Principautés du Danube, où un parti factieux se flattait d'accomplir des plans subversifs, à la faveur de la dissolution générale qui à cette époque se manifestait de toutes parts en Europe. La Divine Providence a béni mes efforts. Au de-là du Danube, comme dans les plaines de la Theiss, la Russie a rempli avec abnégation sa mission réparatrice. Ses armées sont apparues dans ces pays pour y assurer le triomphe du bon ordre et de la légitimité.

Je charge le Général Prince Radzivil, qui aura l'honneur de remettre la présente à votre Majesté, de lui rendre compte des détails de tout ce qui s'est passé en dernier lieu en Hongrie. Je me félicite d'autant plus de l'heureuse issue de cette guerre, que le rétablissement de l'ordre en Hongrie exercera nécessairement une influence salutaire sur la pacification morale des provinces Ottomanes du Danube, qui renferment tant de germes révolutionnaires dans la situation précaire où elles se trouvent encore par suite des troubles qui les ont agitées. Plus je considère la gravité de cette situation, plus j'approuve l'attitude sage, ferme, et correcte des délégués de la Sublime Porte, lors de l'invasion à main armée tentée par Bem en Moldavie, dans le but hautement avoué d'y provoquer un soulèvement.

Les principes qui président à l'alliance cimentée entre nos deux empires, qui ont été mis au jour avec tant d'éclat par les autorités Ottomanes sur le Danube, dans leur conduite à l'égard des bandes Madjars qui se sont jetées sur le territoire Ottoman, me donnent l'intime conviction que votre Majesté recommandera à l'attention la plus sérieuse de ses Ministres, une question qui me tient vivement à cœur. Elle fera l'objet des démarches que je charge mon Représentant de faire auprès de la Sublime Porte, relativement à quelques réfugiés Polonais qui, après s'être rendus coupables de haute trahison envers mon Gouvernement, ont en dernier lieu pris une part si criminelle aux événemens qui ont désolé la Hongrie. Dans le désir sincère qu'aucun nuage ne puisse s'élever entre nos deux empires, j'attache un prix particulier à la solution satisfaisante de cette affaire. En comptant sur l'accueil favorable que trouveront les représentations de M. de Titoff auprès du Gouvernement de votre Majesté, je la prie, &c.

No. 11.

Sir Stratford Canning to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received September 26.)

(Private.)

My dear Lord Palmerston, *Therapia, September* 5, 1849.

I SEND you a letter which I have received from Kossuth. He wrote in the same sense to General Aupick and Aali Pasha. From feelings of respect towards an illustrious man of high talent, though perhaps of rather an equivocal character, I wrote him a civil and tranquillizing answer, of which I think it right that you should know the purport. A copy of it is therefore inclosed for your information.

Since I wrote it, his prospects of escaping from this country are not a little overclouded; but I hope you will not think that my consideration for misfortune has led me too far.

With respect to my public reports of this date and of the 3rd, I have reason to think that my French colleague is not at all behind me in his apprehensions of danger and his sympathies with the Porte, opposed, on the side of humanity, to Russia. He feels with me that the Porte has shown too much leaning towards Hungary, to give up Kossuth and his colleagues to the executioner, without the deepest dishonour and loss of all remaining hold on European opinion.

I hope you will feel yourself at liberty to support us and that speedily.

I have sometimes dreamed of your finding a barrier against the two Emperors in a cordial understanding or alliance between England, France, and Prussia. The language of my Prussian colleague becomes daily more anti-Austrian.

Believe me, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

P.S.—I have communicated your instructions* to Lord Ponsonby in copy to Aali Pasha. He will talk your suggestion over with his colleagues, but conceives the Porte to be hardly in condition to give advice.

Inclosure 1 in No. 11.

M. Kossuth to Sir Stratford Canning.

Excellence, *Widdin, le* 22 *Août*, 1849.

APRES avoir noblement et, avec la grâce de Dieu, victorieusement combattu pour sa juste défense contre la trahison la plus révoltante et l'oppression la plus tyrannique de l'Autriche qu'on a jamais ouï dans l'histoire, la Hongrie, ma malheureuse patrie, abandonnée dans sa sainte lutte par tout le monde, tombe sous les coups redoublés de l'alliance Austro-Russe, aidée encore par la trahison de ses propres fils.

Je prie Dieu que ma nation soit la seule sacrifice de ces événemens inouïs, et que les vrais intérêts de la paix, de la liberté, et de la civilisation, ne partagent les conséquences de son malheur.

Moi, le soussigné, Gouverneur de la malheureuse Hongrie, après avoir en bon citoyen et honnête homme, rempli mes devoirs jusqu'au dernier moment, je me vois aussi forcé de quitter ma patrie, en choisissant, comme bon Chrétien, l'inexprimable douleur de l'exil au lieu de la tranquillité de la mort.

Je suis passé dans la Turquie, où un nombre considérable de mes malheureux compatriotes m'avait déjà devancé. Le Pacha qui commande les troupes dans la Petite Valachie, ainsi que ses officiers, nous ont reçus avec l'entière générosité des sentimens les plus loyaux, et nous ont accordé une sauvegarde jusqu'à Widdin, où son Excellence le Gouverneur Gia Pacha nous a accueillis avec une égale générosité, mais nous a en même temps

* Respecting mediation in Hungarian Question.

informés, que pour la continuation de notre route nous devons attendre des ordres ultérieurs de Constantinople.

Votre Excellence aura la bonté de juger comme ce retard doit nous affliger. Nous sommes tous, moi-même aussi (je le confesse avec une sorte de fierté), des pauvres exilés, qui n'avons emmené avec nous de notre patrie que l'amour intarissable pour elle, et c'est pour cela qu'un délai prolongé pourrait ajouter au malheur de l'exile même celui de l'indigence.

Je me permets donc d'adresser à votre Excellence, de vouloir bien, au moins par égard à l'humanité, faire valoir son influence auprès de la Sublime Porte en contrepoids des suggestions Austro-Russes, qu'on nous n'empêche pas de partir sans délai pour Constantinople, afin de nous y embarquer et porter notre malheur, sans éclat et sans ostentation, dans de lointains parages.

Je crois me pouvoir permettre aussi la remarque qu'une pareille permission accélérée pourra même contribuer à débarrasser la Sublime Porte de ces difficultés et inconvéniens qui pourraient peut-être assurgir avec le temps. En cas contraire, je me permets de faire appel au nom de l'humanité, sinon pour moi, au moins pour mes compagnons de malheur, à la protection directe de votre Excellence, en la priant de nous l'accorder pour sauver les exilés.

Dieu veuille que la politique du Gouvernement de la Grande Bretagne n'abandonne pas entièrement la malheureuse Hongrie à l'anéantissement dont elle est et a été menacée par l'Autriche dès le commencement de cette guerre infortunée. La nation Hongroise n'a pas mérité d'être rayée du nombre des nations vivantes, et si elle perd son existence nationale comme Etat basé sur une histoire de dix siècles, cela ne renforcera pas l'Empire Autrichien, mais lui sera plutôt une source de faiblesse continuelle, si on laisse la Hongrie anéantie par l'Autriche, qui à son tour n'a pu conserver son existence que par le bon plaisir de Sa Majesté le Czar et par des armes Russes, et l'Autriche est tombée pour jamais de son rang indépendant.

Agréez, &c.
(Signé) LOUIS KOSSUTH.

Inclosure 2 in No. 11.

Sir Stratford Canning to M. Kossuth.

Monsieur, *Constantinople, le 2 Septembre*, 1849.

J'AI reçu la lettre que vous m'avez fait l'honneur de m'adresser de Widdin. Sans entrer à l'heure qu'il est sur le terrain de la politique, je puis vous assurer de tout l'intérêt de ma part que vos talens et vos malheurs méritent. Dans tous les pays et dans tous les tems, l'humanité revendique ses droits, et ce n'est pas actuellement l'occasion de les méconnaître. La Porte connait mes sentimens à cet égard, et je ne crois pas devoir douter des siens. Selon toute apparence, on tiendra bon contre la demande de l'extradition. De même que vos compagnons d'infortune, vous aurez peut-être encore des ennuis à supporter, mais je crois qu'il n'y a rien de plus à craindre.

Je désire de tout mon cœur, Monsieur, que cette réponse vous soit agréable dans la position inquiétante où vous vous trouvez pour le moment.

J'ai l'honneur, &c.
(Signé) STRATFORD CANNING.

No. 12.

Viscount Palmerston to Sir Stratford Canning.

(Private.)
My dear Sir Stratford, *Foreign Office, September* 26, 1849.

I HAVE received your private letter of the 5th instant, inclosing copies of a letter which you had received from Kossuth, and of your reply.

If you should be able to solve these questions between the Porte and the two Imperial Governments, by giving a passage on board any British vessel to any of these Hungarian or Polish exiles, you have my authority to do so.

Yours, &c.
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 13.

Viscount Palmerston to Sir Stratford Canning.

(No. 236.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, September* 28, 1849.

I HAVE to acquaint your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government entirely approve the language which you held to the Sultan in the interview which you have had with His Imperial Majesty, as reported in your despatch No. 262 of the 27th ultimo.

I am, &c.
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 14.

Viscount Palmerston to Mr. Buchanan.

(No. 243.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, September* 28, 1849.

I INCLOSE, for your information, a copy* of a despatch which I have addressed to Sir Stratford Canning on the subject of the demand made by Government of Austria for the surrender of the persons who have lately taken refuge from Hungary within the Turkish dominions.

I am, &c.
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 15.

Sir Stratford Canning to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received October 1.)

(No. 275.)
My Lord, *Therapia, September* 7, 1849.

PRINCE RADZIVIL had an audience of the Sultan yesterday and presented the Emperor of Russia's letter to His Majesty. M. de Titoff accompanied him. Aali Pasha was the only Turkish Minister present.

The Russian Envoy addressed the Sultan at some length, urging the extradition of the Polish refugees, and enlarging upon the danger to which their continuance in Turkey would expose the tranquillity of His Majesty's empire.

The Sultan comprised his reply in a few words. He said that he had

* See No. 4.

learnt with satisfaction the successes obtained by the Russian armies in Hungary, and that the question of extradition was under the consideration of his Ministers.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

No. 16.

Sir Stratford Canning to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received October 1.)

(No. 276.)

My Lord, *Therapia, September 10, 1849.*

THE General Council which sat the day before yesterday at the Porte on the subject which at present almost exclusively occupies the attention of the Turkish Government, came to no final decision. Though Reshid Pasha was supported in his view of the question, which continues to be unfavourable to the Russian demand, by most of his colleagues, and particularly by the Sheik-ul-Islam or Grand Mufti, he experienced such opposition from others, influenced probably by the hope of overthrowing his Ministry, that he thought it advisable to obtain an adjournment of the meeting. It was therefore agreed that the Russian Envoy should be invited to an interview by Aali Pasha or the Grand Vizier, and that before the Council adopted any final resolution, the Porte's objections to the proposed extradition should be fully stated to his Excellency.

Reshid Pasha and M. de Titoff met in consequence last night at the former's house. A statement explanatory of the Porte's sentiments respecting the question at issue was made by the Grand Vizier. The Russian Envoy, after listening for some time to his Highness' explanation, abruptly broke in upon it by exclaiming, "The Porte then intends to refuse!" Reshid Pasha, in reply, disclaimed the inference, and urged his right to expect that the Porte's well-founded objections should be submitted to the candid consideration of the two allied Emperors. M. de Titoff retired, after having said that he would talk the matter over with his colleague the Austrian Internuncio.

In the course of this afternoon another meeting of the Council took place; and no further communication having been received from either of the Imperial Envoys, it was decided that a direct representation should be made to the Emperor himself at Warsaw, and that neither the assent nor the refusal—the "yes" or "no" demanded by Russia—should be given to Prince Radzivil.

I am assured that the difference of opinion exhibited at the previous meeting of the Council was no longer apparent. On that occasion the Sheik-ul-Islam reprobated the required act of extradition as a breach of hospitality opposed to the law of Mahomet. The opposition originated with the Hekkim-Bashee, the Sultan's state physician, who is a member of the Ulema, and accused of being devoted to Russian interests.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

No. 17.

Sir Stratford Canning to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received October 1.)

(No. 277.)

My Lord, *Therapia, September 13, 1849.*

THE Porte has adopted secretly the intention of sending Fuad Effendi with a letter of explanation from the Sultan to the Emperor of Russia, and of addressing an explanation of similar purport to the Emperor of Austria through its Representative at Vienna. This attempt to deprecate the resentment which its refusal to give up the refugees may occasion, was not suggested by me, though it may possibly be the result of my

general recommendation to accompany a firm adherence to the principles of humanity and honour with every suitable demonstration of good will and friendly deference. The Porte, in sending Fuad Effendi to Warsaw, exposes itself to the risk of having him sent back without being received; but the advantage of manifesting a readiness to explain its objections, of putting Russia more completely in the wrong as to public opinion, and of gaining time, appears to outweigh in its conception the fear of that humiliation. It is hoped that the Emperor of Russia will be conciliated by a mission bearing in some respects the character of a complimentary tribute to the successes of his army in Hungary.

Prince Radzivil is to have his audience of leave on the 15th instant and to take his departure on the ensuing day. He will be the bearer of a formal answer from the Sultan to the Emperor, referring to the more explicit letter which Fuad Effendi is charged to present to His Imperial Majesty.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

No. 18.

Sir Stratford Canning to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received October 1.)

(No. 279.)

My Lord, *Therapia, September 16, 1849.*

THE pending question between Russia with Austria on one side, and the Porte on the other, has assumed not only a serious aspect, but a character of immediate urgency. It would seem that the former two Powers are determined to obtain possession of the refugees, with the intention no doubt of consigning the most illustrious among them to the executioner, or at least that their Representatives are prepared to go the full length of diplomatic intimidation, in order to force the hands of the Porte. Count Stürmer and M. de Titoff, after expressing their regret at the decision of the Council and their hope that the Turkish Ministers had well considered its consequences, and after having endeavoured to undermine the firmness of Aali Pasha and the Grand Vizier by the insinuations of their secret agents, have sent in official notes repeating their previous peremptory demand of the extradition of the refugees, and suspending their diplomatic relations with the Porte from after this evening, unless a categorical and satisfactory answer be given to them in the meantime.

The notes were presented yesterday morning, and M. Pisani, to whom they were shown by Aali Pasha, describes them as being written in peremptory terms, with this difference, that Count Stürmer grounds his demand on treaty, and extends it to all the Hungarian refugees in Turkey; while the Russian Envoy limits his demand to such "rebels" as are Russian subjects, and alleges as its motive that the restoration of good order cannot be complete without their being given up to the Russian authorities.

Though something of this kind was to be expected from the first, the Turkish Minister was considerably alarmed by the intimation thus pointedly conveyed to him; and the more so, as it was accompanied with a refusal on Prince Radzivil's part either to attend the appointed audience or to take charge of the Sultan's answer to the Emperor's letter. He confined himself however in his reply, to a verbal assurance that the notes should be brought to the knowledge of his Government.

There is some reason to doubt whether the threatened suspension of diplomatic relations must be considered as a step taken under express instructions from the two Imperial Governments. The Ottoman Envoy at Vienna had written by the preceding post to inform his Court that Prince Schwarzenberg in a discussion which had taken place between them on the subject of the refugees, had expressed a preference for their being sent into the interior rather than turned out of the country, from

which it was inferred that Austria would not pertinaciously insist upon their being given up. The message sent to Aali Pasha by the two Envoys, on learning the decision of the Council, did not announce any intention on their part of taking so serious a step as the suspension of their diplomatic relations with the Porte. It is at all events manifest that the demand of the Allied Courts, whatever may be its real motive or eventual limitation, is too seriously entertained to warrant any line of conduct in resistance to it not formed in contemplation of the worst. Nor would it be reasonable to wonder at any degree of embarrassment or apprehension excited by the more immediate approach of a danger against which there is little security, and that of a precarious or contingent nature. Your Lordship will not be surprised to learn that, under these circumstances, the members of the Council are again divided in their opinions; that the Sultan himself is perplexed; and that the Grand Vizier and his more immediate friends in the Government are doubtful of the result and anxious to obtain all possible support from the British and French Representatives.

Persuaded as I am that in this instance the Porte could not, without discredit, give way to anything short of palpable necessity, especially at a moment when the Sultan's direct appeal to the justice and friendly sentiments of the Emperor of Russia is actually on its way to Warsaw, I have no hesitation in adhering to the opinions which have hitherto guided my advice to the Porte. I have not hurried to press them again upon the Turkish Ministers and their Sovereign, because I thought it better to show confidence in their steadiness, to avoid raising any unnecessary excitement, and to abstain without urgent motives from volunteering pledges which it might be difficult to redeem. The principal members of the Government, and indeed the Sultan, who is finally the Government itself, were already in possession of my sentiments. I should have thought myself highly to blame if I had concealed from them my conviction that they were bound by no specific engagement of treaty to give up the refugees to Russia and Austria; that in offering to send them out of the country or to place them in the interior under guard, they did all that could be fairly expected of the Porte; that by submitting to the imperious demands addressed to them in so dictatorial a form, they would dishonour themselves and their country, violate the common principles of humanity, and entangle themselves in a system of policy of which they had hitherto struggled to keep clear, and which they could hardly adopt without chilling the sympathy of their friends and gradually estranging their most cordial supporters.

These opinions, taking them as a whole, are not entertained by me alone. They are singularly prevalent among all classes of persons, whether native or foreign. I have more particularly found them where I felt most interest to look for them,—in the language of my colleague the French Minister; and I know that his Excellency has not been backward on his side in conveying them to the knowledge of the Grand Vizier and other leading members of the Government. I may venture indeed to state that on more than one occasion I have found General Aupick inclined to stimulate my exertions, though at the same time declaring his readiness to follow rather than precede me in the course prescribed by humanity and sound consistent policy.

Though several attempts were made in the course of yesterday to learn my sentiments as to what was considered to be a new stage of the pending question, it was not till a very late hour last night that I received a direct application from Aali Pasha. The purport of his Excellency's message was that the Council was to deliberate to-day on the question raised by Russia and Austria; that he was anxious to know my opinion on several points connected with that question, and that upon my answer would principally depend the decision of the Council, many of whose members were intimidated by the prospect of a rupture with the two empires immediately bordering on Turkey. This message was accompanied with a paper of queries which I was requested to communicate to the French Minister. Of this paper a copy is herewith inclosed, together with copies of my answers and of the instruction which I addressed this morning to the interpreter charged with conveying them to Aali Pasha.

The French Minister, with whom I lost no time in communicating, agreeably to the Pasha's request, entirely concurred with me in the answers and instruction. We went over the ground together with a full sense of the importance and responsibility of the proceeding, and we expressed our joint opinions according to the best of our knowledge and judgment, intending to support the Sultan's Government in what appears to us to be a right though anxious course under the circumstances, in so far as we could do so without committing our respective Governments, or resting the confidence of the Porte on fictitious foundations.

We are both decidedly of opinion that those European interests involved in what is usually called the Eastern Question, are seriously menaced by the present dictatorial demand, and that if the Porte be abandoned to her own resources on a question of humanity, right, and honour, her counsels will hereafter be directed by those whose avowed policy will be an intimate connexion with Russia, to the exclusion of all sounder influence, and the extinction of a reviving spirit of independence in the Turkish Empire.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

Inclosure 1 in No. 18.

Queries put by Aali Pasha to the Representatives of England and France, and their Answers.

Demandes faites par son Excellence Aali Pacha aux Représentans d'Angleterre et de France.	*Réponses des Représentans.*
1. D'après les Traités de Kaïnardji et de Belgrade, conclus entre la Sublime Porte, la Russie, et l'Autriche, la Sublime Porte est-elle absolument tenue à rendre les réfugiés dont il est question?	1. Nous sommes de l'avis que non.
2. Si elle donnait une réponse négative, est-ce une infraction aux Traités?	2. Il s'ensuit de la première réponse, que non.
3. La Russie pourrait-elle considérer cette négative comme une infraction aux Traités de la part de la Porte, et déclarer la guerre?	3. Ce serait faire une injustice à la Russie que de lui attribuer d'avance une conduite aussi arbitraire et difficile à justifier.
4. Les Traités ne lui donnant pas le droit ni le motif, si elle déclarait la guerre, de quelle manière serait-elle envisagée par l'Angleterre et la France; et dans ce cas la Porte pourrait-elle compter sur un concours efficace de la part de ces deux Puissances?	4. Il est évidemment à présumer que les deux Gouvernemens condamnerait la conduite supposée de la Russie, et ne laisseraient pas la Porte sans appui au besoin.
5. En supposant que l'Empereur de Russie n'irait pas jusqu'au point de déclarer la guerre, et qu'une froideur seulement s'ensuit entre les deux Puissances, l'Angleterre et la France promettent-elles d'intervenir diligemment pour l'apaiser?	5. Nous sommes convaincus que les deux Puissances ne manqueraient pas d'employer avec zèle leurs bons offices dans le cas supposé.
6. Considère-t-on les réfugiés qui se trouvent à Widdin comme sujets Russes?	6. Il se peut que parmi les réfugiés à Widdin il y en ait qui soient ou qui aient été sujets Russes, mais à ce titre même, et encore moins dans les circonstances actuelles, les Traités en question n'imposent pas l'obligation de les livrer.

Inclosure 2 in No. 18.

Sir Stratford Canning to M. Pisani.

Therapia, September 16, 1849.

Sir,

AT a late hour last night I received from his Excellency Aali Pasha the paper of queries annexed to this instruction, with a request that I would communicate it to the French Minister, and return him an early answer this morning.

I have in consequence had an interview with his Excellency General Aupick, and the accompanying paper contains the answers which we agree to return to the questions proposed to us by the Ottoman Secretary of State.

This paper you will convey in concert with the French interpreter to Aali Pasha, and in consigning it to his Excellency's hands you will say that, although the menace of suspending the diplomatic relations of the Russian and Austrian Legations with the Porte was among the contingencies to be foreseen, and makes no real difference in the question of extradition, I have not hesitated to reply as distinctly as the circumstances of the moment permit, to his inquiries; and I trust that the Sultan's Ministers, ready, as they doubtless are, to provide for the essential object of extradition by other less objectionable means, and having referred directly to the Emperor of Russia himself, will not depart from their previous decision, involving the highest considerations of humanity, honour, and policy, without the most mature and comprehensive deliberation. I mean by "comprehensive," that which embraces the future position of the Porte as to its relations of confidential policy, and a knowledge of the opinion entertained on the point at issue by other friendly Governments.

You will proceed from Aali Pasha's house to the Porte, and keep yourself in readiness to communicate with his Excellency, and to inform me of the result of the Council with the least practicable delay.

I am, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

No. 19.

Sir Stratford Canning to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received October 1.)

(No. 280. Confidential.)

Therapia, September 16, 1849.

My Lord,

HAVING obtained confidentially a copy of Count Nesselrode's instruction to M. de Titoff concerning the extradition of the refugees, as communicated by him to Aali Pasha, I avail myself of this opportunity to forward it herewith for your Lordship's more complete information.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

Inclosure in No. 19.

Count Nesselrode to M. de Titoff.

Varsovie, le $\frac{13}{25}$ *Août*, 1849.

Monsieur,

NOUS venions de recevoir la nouvelle que les réfugiés Polonais, Bem, Dembinski, Wysocki, et Zamoyski, qui ont joué un rôle si important dans l'insurrection Magyare, voyant aujourd'hui cette cause définitivement perdue, se sont hâtés de se sauver en Turquie pour se soustraire au châtiment qu'ils méritent.

Nous avions lieu de nous attendre à cette fuite; car c'est là la manière d'agir que pratiquent invariablement dans tous les pays ces

champions de l'anarchie, qui, après avoir attisé les passions révolutionnaires, fait éclater l'émeute ou la guerre civile dans quelque contrée ou sous quelque prétexte que ce soit, ont toujours soin, à l'heure de la défaite, de mettre leurs personnes en sûreté, abandonnant à leur triste sort les malheureux qu'ils ont entraînés par leurs excitations.

Un intérêt de morale, de bon ordre et de justice, engage l'Empereur à prescrire à votre Excellence d'exiger de la Porte avec énergie, que non seulement elle n'accorde pas asyle dans ses Etats aux réfugiés Polonais ci-dessus dénommés, mais encore qu'elle les fasse immédiatement arrêter et livrer à nos autorités militaires dans les Principautés du Danube.

Ces individus sont des sujets de l'Empereur, qui, après s'être rendus coupables de révolte envers lui, viennent de se compromettre de nouveau de la manière la plus grave, en prenant le commandement des forces militaires d'une insurrection formidable, qui a mis non-seulement en danger l'existence de l'Empire d'Autriche, mais qui, par le projet avoué d'étendre la guerre et la sédition à tous les pays dont se composait l'ancienne Pologne, menaçait également la sécurité et le repos de nos propres possessions.

En réclamant l'extradition des individus dont il s'agit, votre Excellence aura soin de formuler cette demande de manière à faire comprendre de prime abord, qu'il n'entre pas dans les intentions de l'Empereur d'engager une controverse sur les principes de fausse philanthropie que la Porte s'attache à professer à l'égard des réfugiés politiques. Ces principes, au sujet desquels nous nous sommes plus d'une fois franchement expliqués envers le Cabinet Ottoman, sont d'ailleurs, comme le démontre l'évidence des faits reçeus, généralement abandonnés en pratique par celles des Puissances Européennes qui en ont fait le plus parade. Ce que nous demandons à la Porte, c'est une détermination nette et décisive; il s'agit d'un oui ou d'un non.

Votre Excellence est invitée à poser la question en ces termes, et à mettre le Gouvernement Ottoman en demeure de se prononcer; elle aura seulement soin d'engager les Ministres du Sultan à péser avec maturité les graves conséquences qu'entraînerait un refus opposé à la légitime réclamation de l'Empereur, refus qui, vû la haute importance que Sa Majesté attache à obtenir la satisfaction qui lui est dûe, réagirait nécessairement de la manière la plus préjudiciable sur l'avenir des relations politiques de la Russie avec la Porte.

Agréez, &c.

(Signé) NESSELRODE.

No. 20.

Sir Stratford Canning to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received October 1.)

(No. 281.)

Therapia, September 16, 1849.

My Lord,

I HAVE just received information on which I can rely, that the Porte has determined to adhere to its previous intention respecting the extradition of the refugees demanded by Russia and Austria.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

No. 21.

Sir Stratford Canning to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received October 1.)

(No. 282.)

Therapia, September 17, 1849.

My Lord,

HAVING no vessel of war at my disposal, I gladly avail myself of the steamer attached to the French Legation to inform your Lordship without delay, and up to the latest moment, of what is passing here. This duty I

cannot better perform than by transmitting to your Lordship the accompanying report addressed to me yesterday by the first interpreter of Her Majesty's Embassy, and what is more important still, the report of the Council which sat in the afternoon at the house of the Seraskier Pasha. This last-mentioned paper M. Pisani received from the hands of Aali Pasha at a late hour of the evening. It was accompanied with an expression of thanks on the part of the Council, composed of twenty-four members, who voted unanimously, the Sultan's state physician, who had led the opposition on a former occasion, having kept away.

Copies of the Sultan's letter to the Emperor Nicholas, and of the notes which have passed between Aali Pasha and the Representatives of Russia and Austria, will probably be sent to me in the course of the day, and they shall be forwarded to your Lordship by the first opportunity.

In the meantime, although it was too late for the Russian and Austrian interpreters to receive last night the final note prepared for them by Aali Pasha, there is no doubt that the diplomatic relations are at this moment interrupted between the Porte and the two Legations.

I do not apprehend that either Count Stürmer or M. de Titoff think of going away without further instructions, though I cannot state anything with certainty on this point. Prince Radzivil, if he did not embark last night in a steamer which seemed to be held in preparation by the Russian Envoy, will I presume lose no time in returning to his Sovereign.

It was reported yesterday that the Emperor of Russia had left Warsaw on his return to St. Petersburgh. This circumstance, if it be true, may occasion some little delay in the transmission of instructions; but it is by no means impossible that Fuad Effendi may be detained on the Russian frontier, and at all events the Emperor's determination with respect to the present state of things here will probably not be long in reaching us.

Allow me to add, my Lord, that in proportion as I admire the courageous firmness with which the Sultan and his Government have determined to make this stand in the cause of humanity and of the fair rights of honour and dignity, against a demand alike objectionable in substance and in form, I feel a deepening anxiety for the result of their resistance, and for the degree of support which Her Majesty's Government and that of France may find themselves at liberty to afford, not only in the first instance, but in still graver circumstances, should the present partial rupture unfortunately assume a more serious and menacing character. It is evident that no time is to be lost; and I cannot for a moment doubt that Her Majesty's Government will sympathize with the Sultan, and be earnestly disposed to rescue him, if possible, in some way or other, from the necessities of his present dangerous position. In all probability His Majesty's firmness will be still more severely tried than yesterday, and such is the nature of the question at issue, and such the manner in which it has been mooted by Russia, that without the intervention of other Powers, it seems to admit of no solution but an increase of estrangement between the parties, to speak of nothing worse, or an unqualified submission on the side of Turkey. Had it been otherwise, I should have deemed it my bounden duty to open some confidential communication with Count Stürmer and M. de Titoff, in the hope of mitigating or delaying the present emergency; but the door was evidently closed against any such attempt, and I had no choice but either to support the Turkish Ministers or to abandon them altogether.

I cannot conclude without repeating my conviction that if the Porte be left in this strait to its own resources, there will be a complete and perhaps an unavoidable break down of all that it has been hitherto the object of British policy to maintain, beyond its ordinary relations, with this empire. I am unwilling to contemplate the possibility of hostilities; but whether the parties be prepared or not to push their difference to that extreme, the moral effects of a fresh exhibition of the Porte's weakness and want of sufficient support from without, can hardly fail of being attended with consequences fatal alike to our influence and to the independence and improvement of Turkey.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

Inclosure 1 in No. 21.

M. Pisani to Sir Stratford Canning.

M. l'Ambassadeur, *Thérapia, le 16 Septembre,* 1849.

CONFORMÉMENT aux instructions que votre Excellence m'a données ce matin, je me suis réuni à mon collègue le premier drogman de l'Ambassade de France, pour aller ensemble remettre au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères la réponse aux questions qu'il avait transmises hier à votre Excellence et à M. le Ministre de France.

Aali Pacha nous avait fait savoir qu'il nous attendait au palais du Grand Vizir.

Après avoir pris connaissance de la réponse des deux Représentans, Aali Pacha nous a chargés de ses remercîmens, et de vous faire savoir que le Conseil était assemblé au palais du Séraskier, Mehemet Ali Pacha, beau-frère du Sultan, pour délibérer sur un projet de note à remettre aujourd'hui aux Légations d'Autriche et de Russie; il nous a exprimé le regret de ne pouvoir que de mémoire nous donner connaissance de ce projet. Il est rédigé en langue Turque.

Mon collègue le drogman de France et moi nous avons pris des notes à mesure qu'il parlait, et après avoir confronté ces notes, nos souvenirs et nos traductions respectives, nous reproduisons ici la substance de ce projet de note, ainsi qu'il suit.

Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères rappelle, en commençant, qu'avant l'arrivée de l'Aide-de-camp de l'Empereur, il avait dans ses communications avec les deux Légations d'Autriche et de Russie, établi que les traités et les précédens pris dans l'histoire de l'Autriche et de la Russie, constataient le droit de la Porte de ne pas livrer les réfugiés de Widdin.

Qu'après l'arrivée du Prince Radzivil et la réception de la lettre de l'Empereur au Sultan, la Porte, par déférence, a cessé de discuter, et s'est déterminée à une démarche directe du Sultan envers l'Empereur dans le but d'obtenir de lui qu'il consentît à ce que les réfugiés fussent internés et confiés à la garde du Gouvernement Ottoman.

Aali Pacha trouve moyen de rappeler, tout en disant qu'on a renoncé à discuter, tous les argumens contenus dans la note qui avait été préparée, et dont l'arrivée de l'Aide-de-camp et de la lettre de l'Empereur avait fait suspendre la remise.

Il ajoute: "Dès que vous saurez le vrai sens de la décision que nous avons prise, nous espérons fermement de votre bienveillance éprouvée, que vous ne jugerez pas convenable de ne pas attendre aussi la réponse de Sa Majesté l'Empereur à la lettre du Sultan, au lieu de mettre dès à présent à exécution la mesure affligeante [la rupture de relations] que vous vous seriez cru obligé de prendre dans le cas où un refus de la Porte vous eût été signifié. Nous croyons aussi fermement que, dans le but de correspondre aux efforts sincères de la Sublime Porte pour fortifier les rapports amicaux entre les deux Puissances et leur faire produire leurs précieux résultats, nous pouvons compter que cette fois encore vous montrerez le zèle, la sollicitude, et l'esprit conciliant qui vous distinguent."

Il finit en disant que: "Dans tous les cas la Porte ne peut pas permettre que l'on considère comme une réponse négative le parti qu'elle a pris de demander à l'Empereur de garder elle-même les réfugiés.

Le projet de note est identique pour la Légation de Russie et pour celle d'Autriche, sauf deux points que les reproches de l'Internonce et de son Gouvernement ont forcé la Porte à traiter:

1°. L'Autriche a taxé de récriminations la citation faite à diverses reprises par le Gouvernement Ottoman des cas où elle a refusé à la Porte l'extradition de divers réfugiés.

2°. Elle a accusé la Porte de vouloir gagner du temps.

Ces deux reproches sont repoussés par le projet de note.

Au moment où j'écris ces lignes il est en délibération. Tel qu'il sortira de la discussion il sera immédiatement après soumis à la sanction du Sultan et remis ce soir aux deux drogmans d'Autriche et de Russie

appelés à cet effet à la maison de campagne du Ministre des Affaires Etrangères. C'est au même endroit qu'Aali Pacha nous a donné rendez-vous après huit heures du soir, pour nous faire savoir les résultats de la discussion, et l'examen du Sultan et l'exécution de sa décision suprême.

J'ai l'honneur, &c.
(Signé) FRED. PISANI.

Inclosure 2 in No. 21.

Report of the Council.

16 *Septembre*, 1849.

NOUS avons examiné les notes qui ont été données par les Légations de Russie et d'Autriche, portant que si on ne leur donnait pas une réponse favorable, leurs relations diplomatiques avec la Sublime Porte devaient être considérées comme rompues. Or, dans notre Conseil c'est là une des éventualités que nous avons prévues et acceptées. Il n'y a donc pas lieu de changer de décision et d'intention; d'autant plus que les réponses et les assurances de MM. les Représentans de la Grande Bretagne et de France, à l'occasion des questions qui leur ont été adressées, ont été considérées par nous comme prouvant que la raison est du côté de la Sublime Porte. C'est pourquoi nous avons unanimement jugé convenable de persister dans notre résolution précédente.

(Suivent 24 Signatures.)

N.B.—Cette décision du Conseil est revêtue de la sanction du Sultan.

No. 22.

Sir Stratford Canning to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received October 1.)

(No. 283.)

Therapia, September 17, 1849.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith the copy of a despatch which I have this day addressed to the Commander-in-chief of Her Majesty's naval forces at Malta with reference to the suspension of diplomatic relations between Austria and Russia and the Porte.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

Inclosure in No. 22.

Sir Stratford Canning to Vice-Admiral Sir W. Parker.

(Confidential.)

Therapia, September 17, 1849.

Sir,

IT is my duty to inform your Excellency that diplomatic relations are formally suspended between the Porte on one side and the Russian and Austrian Legations on the other, in consequence of the Turkish Government not having complied with a peremptory demand for the extradition to these Powers respectively of the Hungarian and Polish subjects who in considerable numbers have taken refuge in Turkey. It is difficult to say where this difference may stop, considering the very delicate nature of the point at issue, involving as it does a question of humanity and honour; nor would it be prudent for any Government which takes an immediate interest in the independence and welfare of this empire, to be unprepared for those contingencies to which so precarious a state of things may immediately lead. The Porte is engaged, while maintaining

its position, to remove by suitable explanations any adverse feelings which may be engendered at Vienna and St. Petersburgh, and no official application has hitherto been addressed to me in apprehension of any urgent danger. But it is unfortunately not improbable that the two Allied Cabinets may be prepared to insist in more threatening forms on an immediate compliance with their demands; and in that case the Porte, being reduced to the alternative of unqualified submission or material resistance, will naturally look for support to other more friendly Powers, and particularly to England, as enjoying the largest share of the Sultan's confidence.

Under these circumstances it will be satisfactory for me to know that a part at least of Her Majesty's Mediterranean squadron might be available for any purposes of demonstration in the Archipelago; and it would be still more so, if you felt yourself at liberty, without bringing attention on the real object, to place it at once in somewhat nearer communication with Her Majesty's Embassy, or at all events to furnish me for the present with some additional means of steam communication.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

No. 23.

Mehmed Pasha to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received October 1.)

Milord, 1, *Bryanston Square, le 1 Octobre*, 1849.

JE viens de recevoir les dépêches de mon Gouvernement, et je m'empresse de mettre sous les yeux de votre Seigneurie la lettre que m'adresse son Excellence le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères.

Cette lettre instruira votre Excellence de l'état véritable de la question des réfugiés.

De même que mon Gouvernement, je ne doute pas, my Lord, que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique ne soit prêt, ainsi que le dit son Excellence Aali Pacha, à soutenir moralement et matériellement la Sublime Porte dans une question où elle s'expose à de très-grands dangers pour obéir à des sentimens d'honneur et d'humanité. Votre Excellence comprendra toutefois le désir du Gouvernement Impérial de bien connaître le parti que prendra le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique, sur l'amitié duquel il est habitué depuis si longtems à compter, ainsi que la mesure dans laquelle il pourra l'appuyer dans cette circonstance.

J'ai l'honneur, &c.
(Signé) MEHMED PACHA.

Inclosure in No. 23.

Aali Pasha to Mehmed Pasha.

(Traduction.)

VOUS savez déjà que lorsque la question de Hongrie est arrivée à son terme, plusieurs chefs Magyars et Polonais se sont successivement réfugiés auprès de l'armée Impériale en Valachie; ils ont été de là conduits provisoirement à Widdin. Le Gouvernement Russe, s'appuyant sur un texte de traité, demande l'extradition des Polonais; l'Autriche demande celles des Hongrois. Le Prince Radzivil, envoyé par l'Empereur de Russie pour presser cette affaire, est arrivé à Constantinople, porteur d'une lettre autographe du Czar pour Sa Majesté le Sultan.

Le Conseil des Ministres s'est alors réuni; et comme la demande de la Russie est basée sur l'Article II du Traité de Kaïnardji, par lequel les deux Gouvernemens de Russie et de Turquie s'engagent à se livrer réciproquement ceux de leurs sujets qui se réfugieraient sur l'un ou l'autre territoire, ou à les bannir de ce territoire, on a décidé dans le Conseil, que les réfugiés seraient renvoyés du territoire Ottoman, ou

qu'ils seraient transportés, si l'Autriche et la Russie le veulent, dans u lieu situé à l'intérieur de l'empire, sous la surveillance du Gouvernement.

La résolution du Conseil a été communiquée à MM. Titoff et de Stürmer. Ils ont répondu que, leurs instructions étant décisives et catégoriques, ils ne pouvaient délibérer sur cette question. Cependant ces réfugiés ont mis leur vie sous la protection de Sa Majesté le Sultan notre auguste maître, et l'on ne peut douter de la peine qui les attend s'ils sont rendus. Le cœur clément de Sa Majesté ne pouvait consentir à les livrer ainsi, sans difficulté, sans hésitation. Les rendre d'ailleurs ne serait pas plus conforme à l'honneur qu'à l'humanité du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté. Enfin, à des époques antérieures plusieurs personnages importans, sujets de Sa Majesté, s'étaient réfugiés sur le territoire Russe. le Gouvernement Russe refusa leur extradition, et donna ainsi le premier l'exemple de ne pas observer le sens du Traité. La mission de faire valoir ce précédent et de faire comprendre au Ministère Russe dans un langage amical, les motifs qui ont décidé le Gouvernement Ottoman, a été confiée à Fuad Effendi, Grand Référendaire du Divan Impérial, et Commissaire Extraordinaire en Valachie; il est chargé de se rendre à Varsovie comme Ambassadeur, avec une lettre autographe de Sa Majesté. En conséquence il a été déclaré à MM. Titoff et de Stürmer qu'on différerait de répondre à leur demande jusqu'à l'arrivée des communications de Fuad Effendi: Aujourd'hui sont arrivées à la Porte des dépêches de ces deux Ambassadeurs, dans lesquelles ils déclarent que leurs instructions étant décisives et catégoriques, ils attendront jusqu'à demain Dimanche au soir; si d'ici là il ne leur est pas répondu par un oui ou par un non formel, ils rompront leurs communications avec la Sublime Porte.

Nous délibérerons et nous examinerons les conséquences de ces dépêches; en attendant nous vous écrivons cette lettre pour vous tenir au courant de ce qui s'est passé.

Tout le monde doit reconnaître que pour conserver son honneur et pour rester fidèle aux lois de l'humanité, le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté s'est grandement exposé dans cette question. Il est en même tems bien évident qu'il ne désire nullement voir surgir une guerre avec la Russie et l'Autriche; mais dans cette affaire une réponse contraire à leur demande les irritera. Je vous prie donc de bien dire à son Excellence Lord Palmerston que le Gouvernement Ottoman ne doute nullement que le Gouvernement Anglais, son ami sincère et son véritable allié, ne se tienne prêt à lui prêter, au besoin, un appui moral et matériel.

No. 24.

Sir Stratford Canning to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received October 3.*)

(No. 284.) *Therapia, September* 19, 1849.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith to your Lordship copies of the Sultan's answer to the Emperor of Russia's letter concerning the termination of the war in Hungary and the extradition of the Polish refugees. Copies of the official notes respectively addressed to Aali Pasha by the Russian and Austrian Envoys, announcing their eventual intention to suspend their diplomatic relations with the Porte, and of his Excellency's replies, are also herewith inclosed.

After what I have already transmitted or written upon the subject to which these papers refer, it is unnecessary for me to trouble your Lordship with any comments upon them. I will only state on this occasion, that the note prepared for M. de Titoff before the arrival of Prince Radzivil, of which a copy was transmitted confidentially to your Lordship with one of my preceding despatches, has not been sent to that Minister, and that the arguments which it contained are only repeated with brevity, and not developed at length in the note now addressed to him, because it was to be apprehended that a more complete examination of the question would have been deemed at variance with the categorical nature of the answer

required by Russia; and that Aali Pasha's note might perhaps in consequence have been rejected. There are passages in the Sultan's letter alluding to the policy of an intimate connection between the two Sovereigns, as founded on past transactions between Russia and the Porte, which will not escape your Lordship's observation.

After the departure of Prince Radzivil, another attempt was made by Count Stürmer and M. de Titoff to attain the object of their respective Courts. They sent a message to Aali Pasha, offering to continue their diplomatic relations with the Porte, on receiving from his Excellency an assurance that if the Emperors insisted on their demand, notwithstanding the Porte's explanations, the refugees should be given up.

The Pasha declined in positive terms giving any such assurance; and the interpreters consequently declared that the diplomatic relations of their respective Ministers with the Porte were actually interrupted.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

Inclosure 1 in No. 24.

The Sultan of Turkey to the Emperor of Russia.

(Traduction.)

Le 26 Shewal, 1265. (*14 Septembre*, 1849, N.S.)

J'AI exprimé de vive voix au Prince Radzivil la satisfaction que j'ai ressentie au fond de mon âme de la lettre amicale dont il a été porteur de la part de votre Majesté Impériale, ainsi que des nouvelles joyeuses que la lettre renfermait; et ces sentimens je les ai énoncés aussi dans la lettre que j'ai écrite en réponse à la vôtre, et que j'ai envoyée en la consignant entre ses mains.

Mais indépendamment de cela, comme j'ai vu dans l'envoi exprès du Prince auprès de ma personne loyale, un nouveau trait de cette amitié sincère dont j'ai eu de tous tems des preuves de votre part, j'ai expédié à votre Majesté Impériale Fuad Effendi, un des principaux membres de mon Gouvernement, Amedji de mon Divan Impérial, et chargé présentement d'une mission spéciale en Valachie et en Moldavie, en qualité d'Ambassadeur Extraordinaire et Plénipotentiaire, pour lui témoigner directement aussi ma satisfaction et ma reconnaissance à cette occasion, et pour lui faire parvenir la présente lettre.

J'ai aussi donné des ordres à l'Effendi susmentionné, d'expliquer avec franchise et en détail aux Ministres de votre Majesté Impériale, mes pensées au sujet des individus qui par suite de l'heureuse issue des événemens dans la Hongrie ont fui et se sont réfugiés dans mes Etats.

Jamais on ne pourra oublier les preuves effectives d'amitié sincère que dans chaque occasion votre Majesté Impériale a données à ma Sublime Porte; et Dieu m'est témoin que comme le plus sincère et le plus réel de mes désirs est de voir s'augmenter et se resserrer de plus en plus l'union qui heureusement existe entre nous, je cherche toujours des occasions de vous prouver la sincérité et la réalité de ce désir. C'est pourquoi je ne saurais exprimer combien il m'est pénible de ne pouvoir faire exactement ce que M. Titoff a eu ordre de me faire savoir relativement aux réfugiés dont il s'agit. Ce qui seulement me console sont les égards tout particuliers de votre Majesté Impériale pour ma dignité; c'est ma confiance dans son amitié sincère.

Je ne doute pas que votre Majesté Impériale n'accueille favorablement une demande que je lui fais d'après le principe qui a été le motif du secours amical qu'elle a donné autrefois à mon père, de glorieuse mémoire, à moi-même, et dernièrement à Sa Majesté l'Empereur d'Autriche; c'est à dire, au nom de l'honneur qui se rattache à la souveraineté, au nom de cette amitié réciproque, solidement et sincèrement établie entre nous.

J'assure votre Majesté Impériale, ainsi que Fuad Effendi le fera aussi, que ma Sublime Porte mettra toujours, et ne cessera jamais de mettre ses soins à garder dans mes Etats, et à surveiller les réfugiés en question, de

manière à ce qu'ils soient dans l'impuissance d'oser tramer désormais des desseins séditieux.

Enfin, tant que ces individus se trouveront hors de vos Etats, le repos dans votre empire cessera entièrement, par la mesure ci-dessus énoncée, d'être menacé, et par conséquent le mal qui pourrait naître des derniers événemens pour votre Majesté Impériale est prévenu et paré. J'ai donc l'espoir fondé que votre Majesté Impériale voudra bien sauvegarder l'honneur de ma Sublime Porte, et me donner par là une grande preuve d'amitié et de bienveillance.

Je saisis, &c.

Inclosure 2 in No. 24.

Count Stürmer to Aali Pasha

Péra, ce 14 Septembre, 1849.

M. le Ministre,

EN possession depuis le 24 du mois dernier, c'est-à-dire depuis trois semaines, d'une dépêche de M. le Prince de Schwarzenberg qui m'enjoignait d'insister sur la prompte extradition des rebelles réfugiés sur le territoire Ottoman, je n'ai pas perdu un instant pour en faire part à la Sublime Porte. J'ai ajouté à cette communication tous les développemens qu'elle m'a paru exiger, en appuyant sur le droit que nous donnent les Traités, sur les motifs impérieux qui ne nous permettent pas de voir de sang-froid dans un empire voisin une agglomération d'élémens combustibles qui pourraient d'un instant à l'autre rallumer l'incendie à peine éteint dans nos provinces limitrophes; sur l'intérêt de la Sublime Porte elle-même et les dangers auxquels la présence de ces rebelles l'expose; sur l'amitié enfin qui a uni jusqu'ici les deux Gouvernemens et qui doit les porter à se prêter un secours mutuel en toute occasion.

Cette communication est restée sans réponse. Votre Excellence a bien voulu me faire dire qu'on s'expliquerait directement avec mon Gouvernement dans une dépêche qu'on adresserait au Ministre du Sultan à Vienne et dont on me remettrait une copie. L'expédition de cette dépêche ayant été différée d'un jour à l'autre, malgré mes pressantes sollicitations, et le cas étant devenu plus urgent encore par l'arrivée de nouvelles masses de rebelles sur le territoire Ottoman, j'ai eu l'honneur d'adresser une note à votre Excellence, dans laquelle j'ai été jusqu'à lui annoncer, sans détour, que la décision de la Porte déterminerait la nature des relations futures entre les deux Etats. Mais encore une fois point de réponse, si ce n'est des protestations verbales de bonne volonté, mêlées de récriminations sur la conduite de l'Autriche envers ce pays dans des cas prétendus semblables, mais qui, examinés consciencieusement, n'ont aucune analogie avec celui dont il s'agit; enfin une série de raisonnemens portant à faux, parce qu'ils reposent sur une fausse base et cachent mal l'arrière-pensée de gagner du tems, triste expédient par lequel la Sublime Porte paraît se flatter d'atteindre un but dont on la leurre, et qui reculera devant elle quand elle croira y toucher.

Afin d'épuiser tous les moyens en mon pouvoir pour remplir les ordres de mon Gouvernement, je fis prier le Sultan de me permettre de lui exposer moi-même l'état des choses. Sa Majesté Impériale daigna en effet m'admettre à une audience dans laquelle je crois m'être acquitté scrupuleusement de cette tâche. Sa Majesté ne pouvait entrer en controverse avec moi; je ne l'avais ni désiré, ni attendu. Elle s'exprima avec sa bienveillance ordinaire, mais en termes généraux, et il fut convenu que ce serait à ses Ministres à approfondir la question et à s'entendre avec moi.

Dix jours se sont encore passés depuis, sans que je sache à quoi m'en tenir. Dans l'entretemps, la Russie est venue se placer sur la même ligne que l'Autriche pour réclamer l'extradition des sujets Russes qui se trouvent parmi les réfugiés. Des ordres péremptoires ont été adressés à ce sujet à M. de Titoff, et pour donner encore plus de poids à ses démarches, l'expédition de ses ordres a été suivie de près de l'envoi d'un Aide-de-

camp de l'Empereur de Russie, porteur d'une lettre de ce Monarque pour le Sultan. Mais M. de Titoff n'a pas été plus heureux que moi jusqu'ici, et aucun résultat n'a été obtenu, si ce n'est des propositions tendantes à ajourner la décision indéfiniment.

La poste de Vienne arrivée aujourd'hui m'apportant l'ordre de redoubler d'efforts pour arriver au but, et l'opinion publique se prononçant en Autriche avec une force toujours croissante dans le sens de mes instructions, je ne pourrai, sans assumer sur moi une immense et redoutable responsabilité, reculer plus longtemps devant la pénible nécessité de déclarer ce qui suit.

Tout délai ultérieur sera considéré par moi comme un refus de satisfaire mon Gouvernement, et si après demain au soir, où je devrai expédier une estafette à Vienne, je ne reçois pas l'assentiment de la Sublime Porte de nous livrer les rebelles réfugiés sur son territoire, je la prie de considérer mes relations diplomatiques avec elle comme interrompus jusqu'à nouvel ordre. Personne ne sent plus vivement que moi la gravité de cette démarche, mais les conséquences en retomberont de tout leur poids sur ceux qui l'auront provoquée.

Agréez, &c.
(Signé) STURMER.

Inclosure 3 in No. 24.

M. de Titoff to Aali Pasha.

M. le Ministre, *Buyukdéré, 7/8 Septembre*, 1849.

VOTRE Excellence a bien voulu me prévenir confidemment par l'interprète de la Légation Impériale, que après mure délibération sur la demande que je me trouve appelé à poursuivre par ordre exprès de ma Cour, afin d'obtenir l'extradition des Polonais, sujets de l'Empereur, qui, après avoir figuré en dernier lieu dans la guerre civile de Hongrie, se sont réfugiés dans les Etats du Sultan, la Sublime Porte ne trouve pas possible d'accéder à cette demande, mais que Sa Majesté le Sultan, désireux de ne point répondre par un refus à une question qu'il a recommandée à l'attention particulière de ses Ministres, selon les instances directes et pressantes de l'Empereur, avait l'intention de s'adresser en droiture à Sa Majesté Impériale, pour exposer les scrupules que lui impose la délicatesse et la gravité de cette conjoncture.

Plus je dois de respect aux sentimens élevés qui caractérisent le Sultan, ainsi qu'à cette haute et amicale confiance qui a si heureusement distingué jusqu'ici les relations entre les deux Augustes Monarques, et plus la circonstance actuelle et les suites qu'elle est de nature à faire rejaillir sur les rapports entre les deux empires, m'imposent de franchise envers votre Excellence. Les devoirs de cette franchise sont quelquefois douloureux à remplir; mais tout ce qu'ils offrent de pénible ne saurait être mis en balance avec mon zèle à empêcher que des nuages ne viennent obscurcir la sérénité des relations entre nos deux pays, relations dont la sauvegarde est confiée, j'oserais le dire, en grande partie à la fidélité scrupuleuse et aux soins prévoyans des Ministres respectifs.

Invariablement fidèle à ces devoirs, et habitué à les mettre au-dessus de tout scrupule, de toute susceptibilité secondaire, je repousse la pensée d'attribuer la communication précitée de votre Excellence au désir d'éluder le fond de la question, ou bien d'assujétir à de longs délais la solution d'une affaire où le Cabinet Impérial a exprimé avec autant de force et de clarté, combien il lui tient à cœur d'atteindre un résultat prompt et décisif.

Il ne saurait entrer dans mes vues de m'appesantir aujourd'hui sur les fâcheux antécédens qui ont amené cette insistance. Votre Excellence se les rappelle aussi bien que moi, malgré que l'on doive reconnaître qu'une partie de ces antécédens est antérieure au Cabinet où elle occupe une place si éminente. Il me suffira d'assurer itérativement la Sublime Porte, que ce n'est pas sans de très puissans motifs que Sa Majesté l'Empereur s'est

décidé à faire valoir dans toute son étendue, un droit qui nous est dévolu par les traités,—celui de réclamer en Turquie l'extradition de nos réfugiés politiques. L'exercice de ce droit dans une époque où il ne s'agit de rien moins que de laisser incomplète, ou d'achever et d'assurer pour un long avenir, la pacification des provinces dont le repos était mis en péril par la révolte Magyare, est un devoir auquel l'Empereur ne saurait se soustraire. Sa Majesté Impériale le doit à la sécurité de ses propres États, à celle de la monarchie Autrichienne, dont la force intérieure est un des gages de l'équilibre universel; enfin, et peut-être avant tout, à cette constante et loyale sollicitude qui l'anime pour le repos et la stabilité de l'Empire Ottoman.

Ces motifs ont été longuement développés dans mes entretiens réitérés avec votre Excellence; c'est pour la dernière fois que je prends la liberté d'y rappeler l'attention éclairée de la Sublime Porte. Vous y puiserez, M. le Ministre, la conviction que le Cabinet Impérial ne saurait se contenter d'aucune réponse vague et dilatoire donnée sur cet objet par la Sublime Porte.

Guidé par des instructions péremptoires, je dois considérer de mon côté toute tentative de ce genre comme équivalent à un refus de satisfaire à la juste réclamation dont je suis chargé. La Cour Impériale, déçue dans sa légitime attente, en ressentira d'amers regrets. Après m'être vainement consacré à les lui épargner dans une question d'une gravité aussi majeure, il ne me reste qu'à clôturer mes explications en déclarant à votre Excellence qu'elles sont désormais épuisées, et que si jusqu'à Dimanche soir, la Sublime Porte n'est pas en mesure de m'annoncer son assentiment à nous livrer tous les rebelles, sujets Russes, réfugiés sur son territoire, je serais dans la pénible nécessité de la prier de considérer mes relations diplomatiques avec elle comme interrompues jusqu'à nouvel ordre.

Nul ne déplore plus que moi cette triste éventualité. Nul ne reconnait mieux tout ce qu'elle a de sérieux. Mais les suites n'en sauraient retomber que sur ceux qui l'auront amenée. J'adjure le Ministre Ottoman de l'empêcher. Cela dépend en ce moment de sa sagesse, de sa prudence; et je me féliciterai le premier de pouvoir regarder le présent avertissement comme non avenu.

Les deux jours écoulés sans l'adhésion désirée, il ne me restera que le regret de l'avoir donné en vain.

(Signé) TITOFF.

Inclosure 4 in No. 24.

Ali Pasha to M. de Titoff.

28 *Shewal*, 1265. (16 *Septembre*, 1849, N.S.)

J'AI eu l'honneur de recevoir votre note en date du $\frac{2}{14}$ Septembre courant, par laquelle votre Excellence nous fait savoir qu'si jusqu'à ce soir, la Sublime Porte ne donne pas une réponse favorable sur la question de l'extradition des réfugiés, vous avez résolu de rompre les relations diplomatiques avec elle.

La scrupuleuse attention de la Sublime Porte à exécuter les traités, et son ardent désir de rendre de jour en jour plus étroites ses relations amicales avec l'illustre Cour de Russie, étant des choses constatées par des faits et généralement connues, il n'est plus nécessaire d'entrer dans de nouveaux détails à cet égard.

C'est pourquoi la Sublime Porte a vu avec une véritable peine, que votre Excellence s'est vue obligée de prendre la résolution qu'elle annonce; et quoique le point qui est en contestation ait été longuement discuté jusqu'à présent entre nous, dans les conversations que nous avons déjà eues, nous avons jugé que c'est un devoir de poser ici aussi la question dans son véritable jour.

Entrons donc en matière. Peu de tems avant l'arrivée, par l'intermédiaire de son Excellence le Prince Radzivil, de la lettre de Sa Majesté l'Empereur à Sa Majesté le Sultan, votre Excellence avait donné sur

cette question une note. Cette note a été méditée; on a examiné jusqu'à quel point votre demande pourrait s'appliquer aux traités existans, et les Ministres de la Sublime Porte ont considéré la question sous toutes ses faces. Or, le résultat de cet examen a été que d'après l'Article 11 du Traité de Kaïnardji, il était loisible aux deux Parties Contractantes de restituer ou d'expulser; que les coupables à restituer ou à éloigner doivent être incontestablement des sujets de celle des deux Puissances qui les réclame; et qu'il faut que ces réfugiés soient sortis du pays de la Puissance qui demande leur extradition, et venus dans celui de la Puissance de laquelle on les demande. Or, que telle est aussi l'opinion de la Cour Impériale sur le Traité précité, le refus, bien longtems après la conclusion du Traité susmentionné, de rendre plusieurs personnages sujets de la Sublime Porte, Turcs et Chrétiens, qui s'étaient rendus coupables de crimes politiques ou autres, et qui se sont réfugiés dans les États de l'Empire de Russie, en offre une preuve de plus. Et c'est pour cela qu'on était sur le point de vous faire savoir que si l'on ne trouvait pas à propos d'expulser, conformément au Traité, les réfugiés dont il s'agit, on allait les interner dans les Etats de l'Empire Ottoman, et fixer leur demeure dans un pays convenable, lorsque la lettre de l'Empereur et la dépêche de son Excellence le Comte Nesselrode sont arrivées. Alors, et par respect pour la communication directe de Sa Majesté Impériale, la Sublime Porte mettant de côté toute discussion sur le Traité et sur les exemples, a dit qu'elle prenait engagement de parer à tout le mal qu'on pourrait craindre pour l'avenir de la part des réfugiés, et en même tems elle a voulu qu'ils fussent laissés en Turquie, et que l'honneur et la dignité de la Sublime Porte fussent ainsi mis à couvert. Mais on n'a pas prêté l'oreille à cette communication, et l'on a demandé une réponse catégorique si la Porte aussitôt en refusait. Vû les motifs qu'il y a pour ne pas accepter la mesure qui a été proposée, mais vû aussi que Sa Majesté le Sultan, mon bienfaiteur et maître, n'a pas jugé à propos, d'après la haute estime et la véritable amitié qu'il professe pour Sa Majesté l'Empereur, de donner un refus, et vû la confiance du Sultan en la grande équité et justice de l'Empereur, Sa Hautesse a trouvé convenable de s'adresser directement à l'Empereur, au nom de l'intime amitié qui existe entre les deux Cours. En conséquence, son Excellence Fuad Effendi a été nommé Ambassadeur Extraordinaire pour aller complimenter l'Empereur sur les événemens de la Hongrie, aussi bien que pour donner des explications sur l'affaire en question.

Cette mesure n'étant autre chose que un recours de la part d'un Padichah illustre à l'équité et à la droiture bien connues de son ami et allié, la Sublime Porte ne peut en aucune manière permettre que l'on donne à ce recours le sens d'un refus. Nous avons donc l'espoir fondé que dès que votre Excellence aura appris au juste la véritable portée de cette décision, elle ne mettra pas à exécution la mesure affligeante qu'elle a annoncé d'être obligée de prendre, conformément à ses instructions, même dans l'état actuel de la question; qu'elle ne jugera pas à propos de ne pas attendre aussi la réponse que le Sultan lui-même attend de la part de l'Empereur; et qu'elle ne manquera pas à cette occasion non plus d'employer ce zèle et cette sollicitude qui conviennent à votre caractère conciliant pour aider au succès des efforts de la Sublime Porte, qui tendent à resserrer de plus en plus les relations amicales entre les deux Gouvernemens; et je saisis, &c.

No. 25.

Sir Stratford Canning to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received October* 3.)

(No. 285. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Therapia, September* 19, 1849.

I CALLED upon the Grand Vizier yesterday, and in a private interview submitted to him the importance of taking some precautionary measures in the present state of the Porte's relations with Russia and Austria, on the principle of providing for the worst without giving way to

exaggerated apprehensions, or attracting evil by a display of preparation. I urged him in particular to remove the refugees from Widdin at once, and to make a safer disposition of the Turkish troops in Wallachia. I told him that although an immediate declaration of war appeared to be out of the question, if justice, reason, and established usage were still to be respected by Russia, an attempt to seize the refugees by force, or to take more complete possession of the Principalities, might possibly be resorted to in a moment of disappointment and irritation; and that on this account it was desirable that the Porte should diminish the chances of collision by an early adoption of suitable measures in the least offensive manner. It would be preferable, I said, to remove all the refugees without exception; but if that were too inconvenient, it was at least necessary to remove those who were more particularly marked for vengeance by their eminent services in the defeated cause. I recommended that they should be removed by land at least as far as Adrianople, if not into Asia, but I observed that their removal to Candia, as originally intended, might create a suspicion of escape which it would be imprudent to hazard at present.

With respect to the forces in Wallachia, which Reshid Pasha reckons at 20,000, I suggested that half should be at once brought into Bulgaria, and that the remainder, excepting only a portion necessary to support the police at Bucharest, should be stationed near Giurgevo, with means of conveyance, in case of emergency, across the Danube to Rustchuk. I further advised that those measures should not be adopted clandestinely, but that a communication, simultaneous with their execution, should be made to the Russian local authorities, with an assurance as to the refugees that their removal into the interior was intended as an additional security for the public peace, and that it would make no difference as to the question of their ulterior disposal; and with respect to the army, that the change of positions had no other motive but a desire to diminish the expenses of the occupation; and that it was to be hoped, without pretending to prescribe any rule of conduct to Russia, that the same consideration, added to the restoration of quiet in Transylvania and the advanced period of the season, would be no less appreciated by the Court of St. Petersburgh than by the Porte itself.

The Grand Vizier, as the French Minister had done before, agreed with me in this view of the subject, and he is to take the sense of the Council upon it to-day. He had indeed asked my opinion respecting the Wallachian army several days ago; and the removal of the refugees into the interior had been pressed upon him at a much earlier period, and even before their arrival in Turkey, so as to occasion surprise respecting the cause, whatever it may have been, of his neglecting so obvious a measure of precaution.

In the course of my conversation with the Vizier I learnt with satisfaction that the intention of the Sultan and his Government is to maintain the present position throughout; that he has staked his official interests upon the question; that having gone so far, he feels the necessity of striving once for all to emancipate the Porte from its moral dependence on Russia; and that the means at his disposal are sufficient, even in the as yet improbable case of hostilities, to defend the capital and frontier against the immediate impression of a first attack.

I need not add that although it may be argued, not without truth, that the Porte would stand higher in general estimation and European sympathy, by resisting on a question of humanity and honour till overcome by physical force, so great a hazard could not be incurred with any prospect of ultimate success except under a well-founded expectation of timely assistance from abroad.

The usual Turkish squadron is still at anchor in the Bosphorus, and between 40,000 and 50,000 troops, the Grand Vizier says 60,000, are quartered in this immediate neighbourhood.

The Sultan has deferred an excursion which he contemplated in company with a part of his fleet to the Archipelago; and a grand review which was also to have taken place about this time is dropped for the present.

Upon the whole I venture to hope that in the perilous contingencies

which now threaten the Porte, a more than usual degree of prudence, as well as of firmness, may be reasonably counted on; but the final issue, whether it be one of emancipation or of increased submission with its necessary consequences, will mainly, if not entirely, depend upon the degree of support and eventual assistance to be expected from England and France, and more especially from England.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

No. 26.

Sir Stratford Canning to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received October 3.)

(Private and Confidential.)

My dear Lord, *Therapia, September 19, 1849.*

WHEN Fuad Effendi's instructions were forwarded to him under the impression that he would find the Emperor of Russia at Warsaw, I wrote to Colonel Du Plat, conceiving that the Turkish Commissioner, or rather Ambassador, for such is the character with which he is invested, might derive some advantage from communicating with that officer on terms of confidence. The letter which I addressed for this purpose to Her Majesty's Consul explains concisely the state of the affair which has taken Fuad Effendi to Warsaw, and I have now the honour to inclose a copy of it for your Lordship's information, though, if it be true that the Emperor has returned to St. Petersburgh, no use can be made of it.

One of my colleagues has just informed me, on the strength of some expressions which dropped from one of the Russian Attachés in his hearing, that the Russian Legation is greatly embarrassed by the Porte's resistance; and this appearance, for it is no more than an appearance, tends to confirm the prevailing impression, which I have difficulty in entertaining, that in the late proceedings here, M. de Titoff has been rather pushed on by Count Stürmer than Austria by Russia.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

Inclosure in No. 26.

Sir Stratford Canning to Colonel Du Plat.

(Confidential.)

Sir, *Constantinople, September 14, 1849.*

THE Sultan's Commissioner in Wallachia, Fuad Effendi, proceeds to Warsaw charged with a letter from His Majesty to the Emperor of Russia. It is by him that I propose to forward this letter to you. It may be desirable, I think, for you to make his acquaintance, and to know what is the immediate object of communication between the two Sovereigns.

Prince Radzivil, of whose mission you are probably informed, has not succeeded in obtaining the Sultan's consent to the extradition of the Polish refugees. The Sultan and his Ministers are unanimously of opinion that with every sentiment of deference and goodwill towards the Emperor of Russia, they cannot with any degree of honour or humanity accede to His Majesty's demand. To the Austrian Internuncio, who has applied for the surrender of the Hungarian refugees, the same reluctant objections have been made.

It is not easy to conceive how they could have taken any other course. They are bound by no treaty, with respect to political offenders received in Turkey, to do more than to send them away or to remove them from the frontier. One of these two things they profess themselves ready to do, and if so, after the complete overthrow and submission of the Hungarian insurgents and the dispersion of their leaders, the two Imperial Governments can hardly be supposed to have any motive derived from

their own safety for insisting on the extradition of the refugees. As an example, the execution of those unfortunate men would be superfluous. Their utter discomfiture, flight, and exile, seem to suffice for that purpose.

Surely the Porte cannot be expected to set aside every consideration of honour, humanity, consistency, and regard for the prevailing opinions of the greater part of Europe, in order to gratify a spirit of vengeance with which she has no sympathy, or to enter into a system of policy which would change prejudicially the position she has hitherto studied to maintain. She had adopted the resolution of not giving up the refugees before Prince Radzivil's arrival here; and the means of intimidation which have been since employed to frighten her Ministers out of that resolution, could only have succeeded with a Government lost to every sense of its own dignity and independence. No discussion was to be allowed; no objections were to be heard; the demand of surrender was peremptory,—a "Yes" or a "No!" Observe, too, that a manner of proceeding so dictatorial and humiliating is fast becoming a habit with Russia in its dealings with this country; a habit not easy to reconcile with that solemn recognition of the Sultan's rights and deference for his dignity and independence declared by the Treaty of 1841, to which the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh was a party in common with the other Great Powers of Europe.

It may be hoped that the Emperor of Russia is too just and too generous to persist in trying to force the hands of the Porte on a point from which its principles, its sentiments, and its interests alike forbid it to recede. Even if His Majesty were not to be satisfied with the explanations offered by the Sultan, it is difficult to conceive that he would feel himself justified before Europe in adopting any measure involving an act of hostility, or even an interruption of the usual diplomatic relations.

At all events I am anxious to do what little depends upon me to favour the chances of a satisfactory solution, by putting you into personal communication with Fuad Effendi, whom on several occasions I have found worthy of confidence, and whose firmness in the present instance may be put to severe trials. He has long been on terms of friendly and confidential intercourse with Her Majesty's Consul-General at Bucharest. Whatever may be the result of his visit to Warsaw, I need not urge the importance of my being made acquainted with it as soon as possible. Her Majesty's Government will also be anxious to have early information upon the subject. My impression, I cannot say more on this occasion, is that they will enter fully into the Porte's insuperable objections to extradition, and see with deep regret any important change in the friendly relations subsisting between Russia and Turkey. I have had no communication whatever with my Russian and Austrian colleagues on the pending question. Prince Radzivil paid me the compliment of a visit, which I returned; but we have not met, and I understand that he has his audience of leave to-morrow, and goes away on the following day, with a letter of compliment to the Emperor of Russia, in return for the one which he brought.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

No. 27.

Viscount Palmerston to Sir Stratford Canning.

(No. 238.)

Foreign Office, October 5, 1849.

Sir,

I HAVE received from the Acting British Consul at Bucharest a despatch of which I inclose a copy for your Excellency's information, containing copies of a correspondence which has passed between Mr. Grant and Fuad Effendi respecting three Englishmen detained by the authorities at Widdin.

I inclose a copy of a despatch which I have addressed to Mr. Grant on this subject.

I am, &c.
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

Inclosure 1 in No. 27.

Acting Consul Grant to Viscount Palmerston.

My Lord, *Bucarest, September 14, 1849.*

HAVING learned from a source on which I could rely, that three Englishmen were detained amongst the other refugees from Hungary, by the authorities at Widdin, I considered it my duty (in the uncertainty as to the decision which might be taken by the Porte respecting the refugees generally) to require from Fuad Effendi that these Englishmen should be immediately delivered over to Her Majesty's Consul at Varna.

I inclose for your Lordship's information, copy of my note on the subject to Fuad Effendi, as well as his Excellency's reply.

I trust that I have not overstepped the limits of my attributions in making this demand to the Sultan's Commissioner. My sole motive for doing so, was the fear I entertained lest the Porte, finding herself compelled to yield to the demands for extradition of the refugees, should make the surrender indiscriminately, and thus place the Englishmen out of the reach of any of Her Majesty's Agents.

I must mention to your Lordship, that in my interview with the Ottoman Commissioner on this subject, his Excellency gave me the most positive assurances, that whatever decision the Porte might take regarding the other refugees, he, Fuad Effendi, would guarantee to me the safety of the British subjects.

I have, &c.
(Signed) EFFINGHAM GRANT.

Inclosure 2 in No. 27.

Acting Consul Grant to Fuad Effendi.

Sir, *Bucarest, September 12, 1849.*

I AM confidently informed that three individuals, subjects of Her Britannic Majesty, viz., Richard Guyon, William Longworth, and John Macdonald, are kept under restraint by the Turkish authorities at Widdin.

As the Sultan's Commissioner in the Danubian Provinces, I address myself to your Excellency, requiring that the above-named three individuals, subjects of Her Britannic Majesty, be immediately sent forward to Her Majesty's Consul at Varna, under whose jurisdiction Widdin is comprised.

I trust your Excellency will lose no time in giving the necessary instructions to this effect to the proper authorities, and take every measure for insuring the safety of the said Richard Guyon, William Longworth, and John Macdonald.

I must likewise beg your Excellency to give the same orders in favour of any other persons claiming British protection.

I have, &c.
(Signed) EFFINGHAM GRANT.

Inclosure 3 in No. 27

Fuad Effendi to Acting Consul Grant.

Monsieur, *Bucarest, le 25 Septembre, 1849.*

J'AI reçu la note que vous avez bien voulu m'adresser en date du 12 Septembre, sub No. 1062, pour réclamer que les trois sujets de Sa Majesté Britannique, savoir, Richard Guyon, William Longworth, et John Macdonald, actuellement retenus à Viddin, soient consignés au Consul de Sa Majesté à Varne.

L'affaire de tous les prisonniers qui sont à Viddin étant déjà soumise à la décision de la Sublime Porte, je m'empresserai de mettre sous les yeux des Ministres de Sa Majesté Impériale la demande que vous m'avez adressée, et de solliciter des instructions à ce sujet.

Recevez, &c.
(Signé) FUAD.

Inclosure 4 in No. 27.

Viscount Palmerston to Acting Consul Grant.

(No. 7.)

Foreign Office, October 5, 1849.

Sir,

I HAVE received your despatch No. 78 of the 14th of September, containing copies of the correspondence which has passed between you and Fuad Effendi, respecting three Englishmen detained by the authorities at Widdin; and I have to acquaint you that I approve of your proceedings in this matter.

British subjects serving in the Hungarian army, would, if taken prisoners in Hungary, of course be liable to be kept and dealt with as prisoners of war, either by the Austrian or by the Russian troops; but there is no ground whatever upon which either the Austrian or Russian Government could require the Porte to deliver up to them British subjects who are within the Turkish territory.

I am, &c.
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 28.

Viscount Palmerston to Sir Stratford Canning.

(No. 241.)

Foreign Office, October 6, 1849.

Sir,

YOUR Excellency's despatches to No. 285 of the 19th ultimo inclusive, have been received at this office and have been laid before the Queen; and I have to signify to you the entire approval of Her Majesty's Government of the conduct which you have pursued in regard to the discussions which have taken place between the Porte and the Ministers of Austria and of Russia, on the subject of the demands made by the Austrian and Russian Governments for the surrender of the Hungarians and Poles, who, after the termination of the war in Hungary, have taken refuge within the Turkish territory.

The Austrian and Russian Governments found their demands upon the Treaties of Passarovitch in 1718, and of Belgrade in 1739, between Turkey and Austria, and upon the Treaty of Kainardji of 1774, between Turkey and Russia. But it seems clear from the Articles of those Treaties which relate to refugees, and of which I annex copies, that the Porte is not bound to comply with these demands. The XIVth Article of the Treaty of Passarovitch, and the XVIIIth Article of the Treaty of Belgrade, make no mention whatever of any mutual surrender of refugees; and the IInd Article of the Treaty of Kainardji gives the choice of an alternative, leaving it optional for each Party either to deliver up refugees, or to expel them from its territory. The Porte has it seems taken this view of the engagements contained in these Treaties, and deeming itself under no treaty obligation to deliver up the persons who have been claimed, it has refused to do so; conceiving that to give them up without being obliged by treaty so to do, would be an act inconsistent with the laws of hospitality, repugnant to the feelings of humanity, disgraceful to the Turkish Government, and derogatory to the honour, the dignity, and independence of the Sultan's Throne. The Turkish Government appears to have asked your Excellency and General Aupick, whether you concurred in the interpretation which they had placed upon the treaties.

Her Majesty's Government concur with your Excellency in the opinion which you gave, that the treaties contain no obligation which requires the Porte to give up these refugees.

Her Majesty's Government have received in regard to these matters from the Turkish Ambassador at this Court, the communication of which I send your Excellency a copy,* containing a short statement of the circumstances of the case, and saying that in face of the difficulties in which the Sultan is placed, and in contemplation of those greater difficulties which by possibility may follow, the Turkish Government requests the moral, and if necessary the material support of Great Britain.

Her Majesty's Government thus appealed to, cannot hesitate to comply with such a request. The close relations of friendly alliance which for a long period of time have connected the two Crowns; the great political and commercial interests which are involved in the maintenance of the independence of the Turkish Empire; and the solemn declarations by which, no longer ago than July 1841, the Five Powers recorded their desire and determination to respect the inviolability of the sovereign rights of the Sultan; the nature of the demands now made upon the Porte; and the strength of the reasons assigned by the Porte for declining to comply with those demands; all these circumstances and considerations have led Her Majesty's Government to determine that your Excellency should be instructed, as you are hereby instructed, to state to the Porte, that Her Majesty's Government will comply with the request contained in the application transmitted to me by the Turkish Ambassador.

As the French Ambassador at Constantinople has been consulted on these affairs by the Porte in the same confidential manner in which the Porte has communicated with your Excellency, it is to be presumed that the Porte has made to the Government of France an application similar to that which it has made to the Government of Great Britain; and Her Majesty's Government have every reason to believe that the French Government will be as ready as the Government of Her Majesty to grant he support which is asked for.

It is therefore the intention of Her Majesty's Government to enter immediately into communication with the French Government, in order to concert a common course of proceeding. That which Her Majesty's Government intend to propose is, that the two Governments shall without delay make earnest but friendly representations to the Governments of Vienna and Petersburgh, to induce them to desist from their demands for the surrender of the Hungarians and Poles who have taken refuge in Turkey; and Her Majesty's Government cannot but indulge the hope that so reasonable a request preferred by Great Britain and France may be attended with success.

In the meanwhile, with a view to guard against possible accidents, Her Majesty's Government mean to propose that the British and French squadrons in the Mediterranean shall proceed at once to the neighbourhood of the Dardanelles, to be ready to go up to Constantinople if the Sultan should, by a written application from his Ministers to your Excellency and to General Aupick, invite them so to do, either for the purpose of giving the Turkish Government that moral support which their presence in the Bosphorus may be calculated to afford, or to assist in defending the Turkish capital or territory from attack; and instructions will at once be sent off to Sir William Parker to go with his squadron to the Dardanelles, and to make known his arrival there to your Excellency.

In thus authorizing your Excellency to assure the Turkish Government of the support of Great Britain in the just and honourable resolution which the Porte has taken not to deliver up the Poles and Hungarians who have sought shelter within the Turkish dominions, I am convinced that it is unnecessary for me to add that your Excellency should carefully impress upon the Turkish Ministers how necessary it is that they should not allow themselves to be led by this assurance of support to depart from that line of prudent and conciliatory conduct which they have hitherto so wisely pursued in their dealings in this matter with the two

* No. 29.

Imperial Governments; and that while, on the one hand, they should remain firm in their purpose, they should, on the other hand, avoid everything, either in word or in deed, which might give reasonable ground of offence to Austria or to Russia. It is essentially necessary, in order to continue to receive the support of Great Britain, that the Turkish Government should continue throughout to be, as it has hitherto been, in the right in these affairs.

With reference to these considerations it might perhaps be politic, with a view to settling this matter by negotiation in an amicable manner, that the British and French squadrons should not be brought up through the Dardanelles, unless there were a real necessity, military or political, for their passage through the straits; but the decision upon this point must depend upon many considerations belonging to the place and the moment, in regard to which your Excellency and General Aupick and the Turkish Government, will no doubt exercise a sound discretion.

It is difficult, however, to understand why the Turkish Government has not taken that step which seems so obviously calculated to have relieved it from the embarrassment created by the demands of the two Imperial Governments.

The demand made is for the surrender of persons within the Turkish territory; and as long as those persons remain within that territory this demand may continue to be pressed, and to be made the subject of discussion; but if those refugees, or at least those who, being the chief persons among them, are the principal objects of the demand, had quitted the Turkish territory, the discussion would have ceased to have had any practical purpose, inasmuch as the Porte would then have been asked to deliver up persons who would no longer have been within the territory of Turkey.

It cannot be supposed that such refugees can be otherwise than desirous to quit the Turkish territory; or that they would think it any hardship to be requested to pass on, and to choose some other country for their place of residence. And if there were no other means of conveyance available for them, Sir William Parker would no doubt be able to assist them in making their passage towards some other part of Europe, if the Porte should not have entered into any engagement with the two Imperial Governments which would be at variance with such an arrangement.

With regard to the main body of Hungarian refugees, consisting of persons of less note and consequence, it is clearly the duty of the Porte to relieve the Austrian Government from that apprehension and uneasiness which the presence of such persons in the neighbourhood of the Hungarian frontier might be calculated to inspire. And no time should be lost in removing them to some other place of residence.

I am, &c.

(Signed) PALMERSTON.

Inclosure 1 in No. 28.

Extract from the Treaty of Peace between Austria and Turkey, signed at Passarowitz, July 21, 1718*.

(Translation.)

ART. XIV. It shall also be unlawful hereafter to give shelter or support to rebels or malcontents; and both parties shall be obliged to give condign punishment to such wicked men, and all robbers and freebooters whom they shall apprehend in their dominion, of whichsoever Party they are subjects; and if they cannot be apprehended, they shall be described to the Captains and Governors of the places where they are known to skulk, which Captains or Governors shall have it in command to punish them; and if these fail in their duty of punishing such miscreants, they shall incur the displeasure of their respective Emperor, or be turned out of their offices, or be punished themselves for the guilty persons. And

* Treaties, 1732, vol. iv., p. 409.

for the better providing against the mischiefs of such villains, neither of the Parties shall be allowed to entertain freebooters and kidnappers, and such wicked kind of people as are not in the pay of either Prince, but live by rapine; and both they and those who maintain them shall have condign punishment; and such wicked wretches, although they pretend amendment of their lives, shall not be credited nor tolerated near the confines, but removed to other remoter places.

Inclosure 2 in No. 28.

Extract from the Treaty of Peace between Austria and Turkey, signed at Belgrade, September 10, 1739*.

ART. XVIII. Il sera désormais défendu de donner asyle et retraite aux méchants, aux sujets rebelles et mécontens; mais chacune des Parties Contractantes sera obligée de punir ces sortes de gens, ainsi que tous les voleurs et brigands, quand même ils seraient sujets de l'autre Partie, si elle les surprend dans les terres de son obéissance. Que si on ne peut pas les saisir, on indiquera aux Capitaines et aux Gouverneurs, les lieux où ils se cachent, et on leur donnera ordre de les punir; que si ces officiers négligent de punir ces sortes de scélérats, ils encourront l'indignation de leur Empereur, ils seront dépouillés de leur emploi, ou ils seront punis pour les coupables; et afin qu'il y ait plus de sûreté contre l'insolence de ces méchants, il ne sera permis à aucune des Parties Contractantes d'entretenir ce qu'on appelle des Haydons, espèce de brigands, qui, n'étant à la solde de personne, vivent de rapine. Ces sortes de gens, ainsi que ceux qui les nourriront, seront punis; et quoiqu'ils promettent de s'amender, on ne les en croira point, on les éloignera des confins et on les transférera dans les lieux plus reculés.

Inclosure 3 in No. 28.

Extract from the Treaty of Peace between Russia and Turkey, signed at Kainardji, $\frac{10}{21}$ *July*, 1774†.

ART. 11. Si après la conclusion du Traité et l'échange des ratifications, quelques sujets des deux empires, ayant commis quelque crime capital, ou s'étant rendus coupables de désobéissance ou de trahison, voulaient se cacher ou chercher asyle chez l'une des deux Puissances, ils n'y devront être reçus ni gardés sous aucun prétexte, mais immédiatement livrés ou du moins chassés des Etats de la Puissance chez laquelle ils se seraient retirés, afin que pour de tels malfaiteurs il ne s'élève aucun refroidissement ou contestation inutile entre les deux empires; à l'exception cependant de ceux qui dans l'Empire de Russie auront embrassé la religion Chrétienne, et dans l'Empire Ottoman la religion Mahométane. Pareillement, au cas que quelques sujets des deux empires, soit Chrétiens ou Mahométans, ayant commis quelque forfait ou délit ou pour quelque cause que ce soit, passent d'un empire dans l'autre, ils seront immédiatement livrés dès que la réquisition en sera faite.

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* Wenck; vol. i., p. 361.

† Martens, vol. iv., p. 611.

No. 29.

Viscount Palmerston to Lord Bloomfield.

(No. 1.)

Foreign Office, October 6, 1849.

My Lord,

HER Majesty's Government have learnt with deep concern the difference which has arisen between the Russian and the Turkish Governments, upon the subject of the application made by Russia to Turkey for the surrender of the Poles, who, upon the termination of the war in Hungary, took refuge in the Turkish territory, and threw themselves upon the protecting hospitality of the Sultan.

The Turkish Government not having, at the date of the last accounts which we have received from Constantinople, succeeded in satisfying the Russian Minister at that Court that the Sultan could not, without dishonour, comply with the application which had been made to him; and the Russian Minister having thereupon officially declared that he must suspend his diplomatic intercourse with the Porte, the Turkish Government, distressed at the unfriendly tone of the Minister of a Power which has hitherto professed so sincere a desire to maintain the integrity and to uphold the independence of the Ottoman Empire, have addressed themselves to Her Majesty's Government, to request the assistance and support of Great Britain, in the painful situation in which the Porte has thus been placed.

Her Majesty's Government, sincerely anxious that the difference which has thus arisen, should not lead to further estrangement between two Powers, in the maintenance of whose friendly relations with each other Great Britain takes a deep interest, have readily determined to comply with the request of the Porte; and I have in consequence to address to you the present instruction.

Her Majesty's Government understand that the grounds upon which the Russian Government has applied for the surrender of these Poles, are the stipulations contained in the 11nd Article of the Treaty concluded on the 10th July, 1774, between Russia and Turkey, at Kainardji.

Now Her Majesty's Government readily admit that the stipulations of that Article entitle the Russian Government to make the application which they have made; but Her Majesty's Government would beg to submit, for the friendly consideration of the Government of Russia, that this same Article distinctly gives to the Sultan an alternative which he is equally entitled to choose; for by the stipulations of that Article each of the Contracting Parties is at liberty either to surrender refugees, being subjects of the other Party, or to expel them from its own territory. It is clear, therefore, that the Sultan is not bound by treaty to comply with the application made to him by the Russian Minister at Constantinople for the surrender of the Polish refugees; and that he would fulfil to the very letter the obligations of the Treaty, by requiring those Polish refugees to depart from his dominions.

This being the case, the question arises, whether the Sultan is called upon by international usage or by the duties of good neighbourhood, to do that which he is not obliged by treaty to do.

Now if there is one rule which more than another has been observed in modern times by all independent States, both great and small, of the civilized world, it is the rule not to deliver up political refugees, unless the State is bound to do so by the positive obligations of a treaty; and Her Majesty's Government believe that such treaty engagements are few—if indeed any such exist.

The laws of hospitality, the dictates of humanity, the general feelings of mankind, forbid such surrenders; and any independent Government, which of its own free will were to make such a surrender, would be deservedly and universally stigmatized as degraded and dishonoured.

It appears then to Her Majesty's Government, that the Sultan, being bound by no treaty engagements in this respect, was compelled by a due regard for his own honour and for the dignity of his Crown, to decline to

comply with the application which was made to him for the surrender of the Poles.

But the Sultan has duties of good neighbourhood to fulfil towards Austria; and those duties require that he should not permit his territory to be made use of as a place of shelter, from which communications should be carried on for the purpose of disturbing the tranquillity of any of the States which compose the Austrian Empire.

The Sultan is therefore bound to prevent these Polish refugees from hovering upon the frontiers of Hungary or Transylvania; and he ought to require them either to leave the Turkish territory, or to take up their residence in some part of the interior of his dominions where they may have no means of communicating with the discontented in the Austrian States.

This duty, Her Majesty's Government are informed, the Sultan is willing and ready to perform; and Her Majesty's Government would beg to submit to the friendly consideration of the Russian Cabinet, that the Sultan, by so doing, would fulfil all the obligations which the circumstances of the case impose on him, in this matter, towards the Emperor of Austria, while at the same time he would be procuring for the Austrian Empire that security from molestation, the attainment of which seems to have been the main object for which the surrender of the Polish refugees was applied for.

To require from the Porte more than this would be to infringe upon the independence of the Sultan. But Her Majesty's Government think too highly of the sense of justice which must animate the Russian Government, to believe that Russia can desire to impair that independence; and Her Majesty's Government are persuaded that the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh cannot think that it would be sound European policy to do so.

It was indeed no longer ago than July 1841, that Russia, in conjunction with Austria, France, Great Britain, and Prussia, recorded and proclaimed to the world in the preamble of a solemn treaty concluded between the Five Powers and the Sultan, her desire and determination to respect the inviolability of the sovereign rights of the Sultan.

Her Majesty's Government cannot believe that the sentiments and the policy which then guided the Russian councils in regard to Turkey, do not equally prevail at St. Petersburgh at the present time; and Her Majesty's Government therefore confidently hope that as the Sultan has expressed his intention of making such arrangements in regard to these Polish refugees as must relieve the Austrian Government from uneasiness on their score, the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh will not press upon the Porte any demands which could not be complied with consistently with a due regard to the honour of the Sultan and the independence of his throne.

As the best mode of conveying these sentiments and wishes of Her Majesty's Government to the Government of Russia, your Lordship will read this despatch to Count Nesselrode, and you will give him a copy of it.

I am, &c.

(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 30.

Viscount Palmerston to Viscount Ponsonby.

(No. 142.)

My Lord,

Foreign Office, October 6, 1849.

HER Majesty's Government have learnt with deep concern the difference which has arisen between the Austrian and Turkish Governments upon the subject of the application made by Austria to Turkey for the surrender of the Hungarians, who, upon the termination of the war in Hungary, took refuge in the Turkish territory, and threw themselves upon the protecting hospitality of the Sultan.

The Turkish Government not having, at the date of the latest accounts which we have received from Constantinople, succeeded in satisfying the Austrian Minister at that Court, that the Sultan could not, without dis-

honour, comply with the application which had been made to him; and the Austrian Minister having thereupon officially declared that he must suspend his diplomatic intercourse with the Porte; the Turkish Government, distressed at the unfriendly tone of the Minister of a Power which has hitherto and for a long course of time been considered as one of the firmest and stanchest allies of the Ottoman Empire, have addressed themselves to Her Majesty's Government to request the assistance and support of Great Britain in the painful situation in which the Porte has thus been placed.

Her Majesty's Government, sincerely anxious that the difference which has thus arisen should not lead to further estrangement between two Powers, in the maintenance of whose friendly relations with each other Great Britain takes a deep interest, have readily determined to comply with the request of the Porte, and I have in consequence to address to your Excellency the present instruction.

It appears that the application for the surrender of these Hungarians is founded upon the stipulations contained in Article XIV of the Treaty between Austria and Turkey at Passarowitz on the 21st July, 1718, and upon Article XVIII of the Treaty concluded between those same Powers on the 18th September, 1739, at Belgrade.

Now Her Majesty's Government would beg to submit to the consideration of the Government of Austria, that those Articles of those Treaties contain no engagement whatever by which either of the Contracting Parties can be required by the other to surrender persons of any kind who have taken refuge in its territory. Those Articles contain no engagement for mutual surrender of fugitives or refugees, though they do contain other stipulations as to the manner in which such persons are to be dealt with.

It is clear therefore that the Sultan is not bound by Treaty to comply with the application made by the Austrian Minister at Constantinople for the surrender of the Hungarian refugees.

This being the case, the next question which arises is, whether the Sultan is called upon to do so by international usage and by the duties of good neighbourhood.

Now if there is one rule which more than another has been observed in modern times by all independent States, both great and small, of the civilized world, it is the rule not to deliver up political refugees, unless the State is bound to do so by the positive stipulations of a treaty; and Her Majesty's Government believe that such treaty engagements are few,—if indeed any such exist.

The laws of hospitality, the dictates of humanity, the general feelings of mankind, forbid such surrenders; and any independent Government, which of its own free will were to make such a surrender, would be deservedly and universally stigmatized as degraded and dishonoured.

It appears then to Her Majesty's Government, that the Sultan being bound by no treaty engagement in this respect, was compelled by a due regard both for his own honour and for the dignity of his Crown, to decline to comply with the application which was made to him for the surrender of the Hungarians.

But the Sultan has duties of good neighbourhood to fulfil towards Austria; and those duties require that he should not permit his territory to be made use of as a place of shelter, from which communications should be carried on for the purpose of disturbing the tranquillity of any of the States which compose the Austrian Empire.

The Sultan is therefore bound to prevent these Hungarian refugees from lowering upon the frontier of Hungary or Transylvania, and he ought to require them either to leave the Turkish territory, or to take up their residence in some part of the interior of his dominions, where they may have no means of communicating with the discontented in the Austrian States.

This duty, Her Majesty's Government are informed, the Sultan is willing and ready to perform; and Her Majesty's Government would beg to submit to the friendly consideration of the Austrian Cabinet, that the Sultan by so doing would fulfil all the obligations which the circumstances

of the case impose upon him in this matter towards the Emperor of Austria. To require from the Porte more than this would be to infringe upon the independence of the Sultan; but Her Majesty's Government think too highly of the sense of justice which must animate the Austrian Government, to believe that Austria can desire to impair that independence; and Her Majesty's Government are persuaded that the Cabinet of Vienna cannot think that it would be sound policy for Austria to do so.

It was indeed no longer ago than the month of July 1841, that Austria in conjunction with France, Great Britain, Prussia, and Russia, recorded and proclaimed to the world, in the preamble of a solemn treaty concluded between the Five Powers and the Sultan, her desire and determination to respect the inviolability of the sovereign rights of the Sultan.

Her Majesty's Government cannot believe that the sentiments and the policy which then guided the Austrian Councils in regard to Turkey, do not equally prevail at Vienna at the present time; and Her Majesty's Government therefore confidently hope, that as the Sultan has expressed his intention of making such arrangements in regard to these Hungarian refugees, as must relieve the Austrian Government from uneasiness on their score, the Cabinet of Vienna will not press upon the Porte any demands which could not be complied with consistently with a due regard to the honour of the Sultan and the independence of his Throne.

As the best mode of conveying these sentiments and wishes of Her Majesty's Government to the Government of Austria, your Excellency will read this despatch to Prince Schwarzenberg, and you will give him a copy of it.

I am, &c.
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 31.

Viscount Palmerston to Sir Stratford Canning.*

(No. 244. Confidential.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, October 6, 1849.*

I INCLOSE for your Excellency's information, a copy of a letter which I have addressed to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, signifying Her Majesty's commands that Sir William Parker should proceed at once with the squadron under his command to the neighbourhood of the Dardanelles, and conveying instructions for his future guidance.

I am, &c.
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 32.

Viscount Palmerston to the LordsCommissioners of the Admiralty.

My Lords, *Foreign Office, October 6, 1849.*

THE Turkish Government having applied to the Government of Her Majesty for support and assistance in regard to the differences which have arisen between the Turkish Government and the Governments of Austria and Russia upon the subject of a demand made by those two Governments for the surrender of the Hungarians and Poles who, upon the termination of the war in Hungary, have taken refuge in the Turkish territory; and Her Majesty's Government having determined to comply with the request thus made; I have to signify to you Her Majesty's pleasure that instructions should be sent to Sir William Parker to proceed at once with the squadron under his command to the neighbourhood of the Dardanelles, in order to be ready to take his squadron up to Constantinople, if he should be invited by the Sultan, through Her Majesty's Ambassador at Con-

* Similar despatches to Lord Ponsonby, No. 144, and to Lord Bloomfield, No. 3.

stantinople, to do so, either for the purpose of affording to the Sultan that moral support which the presence of the British squadron in the Bosphorus might afford him, or for the purpose of assisting to defend Constantinople or any other part of the Turkish territory from attack.

Sir William Parker should, on arriving at the Dardanelles, lose no time in communicating with Sir Stratford Canning at Constantinople.

It is probable that the French Government may order the French squadron in the Mediterranean to proceed likewise to the Dardanelles for the same purpose. If that should be, Sir William Parker will consider the French squadron as the force of an allied Power, co-operating with Her Majesty's Government for the attainment of the same objects, with a view to which Sir William Parker is thus instructed to act; and he will therefore place himself in that case in friendly and confidential communication with the French Admiral, so that the two Admirals may concert together, as far as may be possible, the movements and proceedings of the two squadrons.

If the Turkish Government should, through Her Majesty's Ambassador, require the presence of Sir William Parker and his squadron in the Black Sea to assist in the defence of any part of the Turkish territory, Sir William Parker will be at liberty to comply with such requisition, if he should see no professional objections thereto, and if he should think the necessity to be real and urgent; but he should bear in mind that the purposes for which he is to proceed up the Mediterranean are defensive, and not offensive; and that consequently wherever he may be, he should confine himself to the defence of Turkey, and should not undertake any offensive operations against the Russian territory or fleet.

If the Turkish Government should express a wish to have the assistance of some British naval officers to aid in organizing or manœuvring the Turkish fleet, Sir William Parker should be authorized to comply with such request, if he should have the means of doing so without impairing the efficiency of his own squadron.

It is possible that the Turkish Government may wish to relieve itself from the embarrassment occasioned by its present discussion with Austria and Russia, by assisting the chief men among the Hungarian and Polish refugees to leave the Turkish territory, and pass on to take up their residence in some other part of Europe. The ordinary steam-packets which ply in the Mediterranean would probably afford to such persons the means of leaving Turkey; but if any difficulty should arise in this respect, Sir William Parker should be authorized to afford such facilities as the ships under his command may enable him to give, for conveying such persons, whose numbers cannot be great, to such port in the Mediterranean as may be fixed upon for the purpose by himself and Sir Stratford Canning.

I am, &c.
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 33.

Viscount Palmerston to the Marquis of Normanby.

(No. 466.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, October 6, 1849.*

I INCLOSE for your Excellency's information, copies* of instructions which I have addressed to Her Majesty's Ambassadors at Constantinople and at Vienna, as well as to Her Majesty's Minister at St. Petersburgh, on the subject of the difference which has arisen between the Governments of Russia and of Austria, and the Porte, respecting the surrender of the Poles and Hungarians who have taken refuge in the Turkish territories.

I also inclose copy† of the instructions which have been addressed by command of Her Majesty to the Lords of the Admiralty, and have been by them communicated to the Commander-in-chief of Her Majesty's naval forces in the Mediterranean.

* See Nos. 28, 29, and 30. † See No. 32.

I have to desire that you will communicate these several instructions to the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, and that you will invite the French Government, if they should think fit, to address instructions of a similar tenor to their Ministers at Constantinople, Vienna, and St. Petersburgh, as well as to the Commander-in-chief of the French naval forces in the Mediterranean.

I am, &c.
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 34.

The Secretary to the Admiralty to Mr. Addington.

Sir, *Admiralty, October 6, 1849.*

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to send you herewith for the information of Viscount Palmerston, copy of a letter from Vice-Admiral Sir William Parker, dated the 20th ultimo, No. 275, at Corfu, transmitting a copy* of a despatch addressed to him by his Excellency Sir Stratford Canning, and reporting his proceedings and the intended movements of the squadron under his command.

I am, &c.
(Signed) W. A. B. HAMILTON.

Inclosure in No. 34.

Vice-Admiral Sir W. Parker to the Secretary to the Admiralty.

Sir, "*Caledonia*," *Corfu, September 20, 1849.*

I REQUEST you will inform the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty that Her Majesty's squadron, consisting of the ships named in the margin,† quitted the port of Argostoli in Cephalonia, on the morning of the 18th instant, and arrived at this anchorage yesterday, where we found the "Queen" and "Thetis" lying.

The Lord High Commissioner being very anxious to return for a short time to Cephalonia, in consequence of accounts he had received from the Resident and Military Commandant of that island, and not having either of the Ionian steamers available, the "Rosamond" was allotted for his Excellency's conveyance, and proceeded with him at 5 P.M., having arranged to return on the 29th instant.

The squadron had scarcely anchored, when I received also a communication from the Lord High Commissioner, that the Greek Consul, at the earnest desire of His Hellenic Majesty, requested, if possible, that means might be afforded of conveying intimation to his Queen not to enter the Bocca de Cattaro, where Her Majesty was expected to arrive on the 25th or 26th instant at the latest, on her way from Trieste to Athens.

The reason for this application is not explained, but great importance was attached to the early delivery of a letter sent by the Greek Consul for the Queen.

Considering that Her Majesty's Government would wish such a request to be complied with, and as no time was to be lost, the "Odin" proceeded at 2 P.M. to convey to Her Majesty the letter in question.

I inclose for their Lordships' information a copy of the orders which I have given to Captain Pelham on the occasion, and I further instructed him verbally to be cautious in communicating with the shore, or in any measure which might subject the "Odin" to quarantine, in the event of the cholera having made its appearance in the direction of the Bocca de Cattaro.

* See Inclosure in No. 22.
† Caledonia, Howe, Prince Regent, Powerful, Vengeance; steam-vessels, Odin, Rosamond.

At 1 o'clock this morning I was joined by Her Majesty's steam-vessel "Merlin," which was sent express by Rear-Admiral Harvey, to deliver a confidential despatch from Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, of which I transmit a copy.

The departure this morning of one of the Austrian Lloyd's steam-packets for Trieste, gives me the opportunity of apprizing their Lordships that in consequence of Sir Stratford Canning's application, and a further intimation of his earnest desire to have a large steamer sent to Constantinople, it is my intention on the return of the "Odin," to dispatch her thither, to remain in communication with his Excellency, until I can receive their Lordships wishes on this subject and the movements of the squadron.

The "Dragon" will join my flag, after touching at Malta.

In the meantime I shall (under present circumstances) probably continue between the Ionian waters and Athens, and when in the vicinity of the latter the fleet will occasionally anchor in Salamis Bay, and keep in communication with the British Legation at Athens.

I have, &c.

(Signed) W. PARKER.

No. 35.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received October 8.)

(No. 238. Confidential.)

Vienna, October 2, 1849.

My Lord,

YOU are certainly fully acquainted with what has taken place at Constantinople, and I hasten to inform you that having spoken to Prince Schwarzenberg upon that subject, I can assure you that there will be nothing worse as its consequence than the expression of dissatisfaction on the part of Austria. No strong measure will be taken.

I believe that the conduct of M. Titoff and that of the Internuncio has been thought precipitate.

It is not necessary that I should trouble your Lordship with details which you will get from Constantinople, but it may be of some interest to you to learn that the Hungarian refugees in and about Widdin, amounting it is said to something like 5000 men, have expressed the wish to go home and be hanged rather than remain in Turkey, and that the Austrian Government has sent an officer to acquaint them that they are at liberty to return to their own country; that, however, they must be subjected to trial as others have been. Prince Schwarzenberg added, "They shall not be punished." This applies to the common soldiers and the officers of no great rank, not to the Generals or Political Chiefs.

The Russian Minister here has received the account that Bem and fifteen other Poles have embraced the Mahometan religion.

I have, &c.

(Signed) PONSONBY.

No. 36.

Viscount Palmerston to Sir Stratford Canning.

(No. 246.)

Foreign Office, October 9, 1849.

Sir,

I INCLOSE, for your Excellency's information, a copy of a despatch from Her Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Brussels, communicating the substance of a despatch addressed by the Belgian Chargé d'Affaires at Constantinople to his Government on the present state of affairs at the Porte.

I am, &c.

(Signed) PALMERSTON.

Inclosure in No. 36.

Mr. Waller to Viscount Palmerston.

(No. 13. Confidential.)

Brussels, October 5, 1849.

My Lord,

THE Secretary-General of Foreign Affairs has read to me confidentially a despatch from the Belgian Chargé d'Affaires at Constantinople, dated September 15, in which he draws a lively picture of the alarm felt in that city as to the consequences of the mission of General Radzivil, which he considers as in some degree the result of the evident partiality shown by the Porte for the Magyar cause during the late contest in Hungary.

After adverting to the position taken by General Aupick, and the still stronger line of conduct adopted by Sir Stratford Canning, M. Blondel expresses his belief that the Porte must ultimately give way to the pretensions of Russia, and then proceeds to say that he thinks the Porte has done unwisely in accepting a discussion, on the ground of the stipulations of the Treaty of Koutschouk Kainardji, the letter of which, taking into consideration the light in which political offences were considered at that time, he judges to be favourable to the Russian claims, when she might have drawn a better argument and a recent precedent from the refusal of Austria to give up Prince Ypsilanti, at the demand of the Turkish Government, during the Greek revolution, alleging, with apparent justice, that as Russia acted as an auxiliary to Austria, she can put forward no separate and independent claims on the Turkish Government, and can only participate in such concessions as the Power which was principally interested in the war can claim of her own right, the alleged rebellion having been directed, not against the Russian, but against the Austrian Government.

I am not prepared to express any opinion upon M. Blondel's arguments, but I thought it might be interesting to your Lordship to know the opinion of a foreign Minister on this question, who, though of no great diplomatic experience, has made his way entirely by his own abilities, and has had the advantage, inasmuch as that bears on the subject, of a long residence in the East.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. W. WALLER.

No. 37.

Sir Stratford Canning to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received October 10.)

(No. 289.)

Therapia, September 25, 1849.

My Lord,

FOR your Lordship's further information, I have the honour to inclose herewith a copy of the Sultan's letter to the Emperor of Austria on the subject of the refugees from Hungary, which M. Musurus is charged to present at Vienna, and also a copy of Aali Pasha's reply to Count Stürmer's note already communicated to your Lordship in one of my preceding despatches.

These papers were not communicated to me till several days after I had received those of a similar purport already transmitted to your Lordship.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

Inclosure 1 in No. 37.

The Sultan to the Emperor of Austria.

26 *Sheval*, 1265. (14 *Septembre*, 1849.)

D'APRES l'étroite liaison et l'amitié qui existent entre ma Sublime Porte et l'illustre Cour d'Autriche, la durée de la prospérité et l'intégrité de votre empire ont de tout temps été l'objet des vœux les plus ardens de mon Gouvernement et de ma nation. Tout ce qui peut y porter atteinte nous fait une peine extrême, comme tout ce qui peut les consolider nous cause une vive satisfaction.

Par conséquent, les grands événemens qui ont fait disparaître les traces des troubles et des divisions des Etats de votre Majesté Impériale, m'ont comblé de joie, et je m'empresse de vous en féliciter.

Je prie de tout mon cœur le Maître de l'Univers de faire que désormais vos Etats soient en paix et heureux sous votre autorité légitime, et que votre règne soit pour votre empire et pour vos sujets une nouvelle ère de repos et de tranquillité.

J'ai chargé mon Ministre auprès de votre Majesté Impériale d'entrer en détail avec votre Ministère sur le parti que j'ai pris de garder, de manière à ce que dorénavant ils soient dans l'impuissance d'intriguer et de former des projets séditieux, les quelques individus qui par suite de la cessation de la lutte en Hongrie se sont réfugiés dans mes Etats, et sur mes raisons pour me dispenser de les rendre.

Je prie votre Majesté Impériale, au nom de l'ancienne amitié qui existe entre les deux Cours, au nom de l'honneur de la souveraineté qui doit vous être cher aussi, d'écouter en toute confiance et d'une manière favorable, les communications que mon Ministre fera.

J'ai l'espoir que votre Majesté appréciera équitablement mes justes excuses et mes intentions pures; et je saisis, &c.

Inclosure 2 in No. 37.

Note from the Porte to Count Sturmer.

(Traduction.) 28 *Sheval*, 1265. (16 *Septembre*, 1849.)

J'AI eu l'honneur de recevoir la note de votre Excellence en date du 14 Septembre courant, nouveau style, dans laquelle il est dit, qu'attendu que la réponse aux communications que vous avez faites relativement à la consignation à la Cour Impériale des Hongrois qui se trouvent à Widdin a tardé, si aujourd'hui jusqu'au soir on ne donne pas une réponse comme quoi la demande a été accordée, les relations diplomatiques avec la Porte doivent être considérées comme rompues. La note renferme aussi quelques autres réflexions amicales.

La note de votre Excellence a fait à la Sublime Porte une peine qui est au-dessus de toute expression.

Tout le monde, et par expérience votre Excellence surtout, connait l'amitié sincère de la Sublime Porte pour l'illustre Cour d'Autriche; la promptitude et le désir que le Gouvernement de Sa Hautesse a de tout temps montrés à exécuter à la lettre ses Traités avec les Puissances amies; et le premier de ses vœux qui est de maintenir, à présent et à l'avenir, ferme et inébranlable l'édifice de l'amitié et de l'union entre les deux illustres Cours; édifice fortifié par des preuves de loyauté et de cordialité qu'elles se donnent mutuellement depuis bien des siècles. Certes, jamais la Sublime Porte ne jugera à propos de commettre un acte vraiment et réellement contraire à ces vœux, et il serait superflu de donner à cet égard de nouvelles assurances.

Il est vrai en effet, que la réponse définitive aux communications que votre Excellence s'est fait attendre jusqu'à présent; mais ce retard, ce

n'est pas la Sublime Porte qui l'a causé à dessein; c'est une conséquence de ce que l'affaire a eu diverses phases. D'abord, nous avons considéré minutieusement la dépêche de son Excellence le Prince Schwarzenberg, puis la note que vous m'avez présentée subséquemment en date du 29 Août. Mais lorsqu'il s'agit, entre Gouvernemens bien réglés (et il n'est pas nécessaire de l'observer à un homme aussi éclairé que votre Excellence), de questions difficiles et sérieuses, si les Gouvernemens réciproquement intéressés à ces questions ne s'échangent point franchement leurs idées et leurs réflexions, il devient impossible de maintenir la bonne intelligence, et de resserrer les liens d'une étroite amitié entre eux. C'est uniquement pour se conformer à cette règle, et en faisant fond sur l'ancienne amitié qui règne entre les deux Gouvernemens, que j'avais reçu l'ordre de Sa Hautesse d'exposer loyalement à votre Excellence sur le point qui est en contestation, les considérations de la Sublime Porte qui suivent.

La Sublime Porte étant l'amie et la voisine de l'Autriche, il est tout naturel qu'elle désire plus que tous les autres, de voir la tranquillité bien établie dans les Etats de l'Empereur; c'est là une vérité incontestable.

Si la Porte Ottomane n'avait pas réellement les moyens, comme son Excellence le Prince Schwarzenberg le pense, de garder d'une manière efficace les opposans réfractaires qui se sont réfugiés auprès d'elle, et de les empêcher de commettre des actes séditieux, elle se serait abstenue de donner des assurances à cet effet. Mais non, avec l'aide de Dieu, elle n'est pas hors d'état, et elle l'a déjà déclaré, de prendre des mesures pour les éloigner des frontières, et pour les empêcher de commettre le moindre désordre; et sa parole n'est pas de nature à ne pas s'y fier; ses promesses ne sont pas inexécutables.

Il est effectivement vrai que d'après les Traités, les sujets du Gouvernement Impérial dans les Etats de Sa Hautesse, se trouvent, comme il est dit dans la dépêche précitée du Prince Schwarzenberg, sous la surveillance de la Légation et des Consuls. Reste seulement à savoir si ce principe est ou n'est pas applicable au cas qui est le sujet de la contestation.

Le système suivi à l'égard des réfugiés politiques est devenu en Europe une règle générale; il a parmi les nations force de loi. Et comme il y a des exemples que le Gouvernement Impérial a aussi suivi ce système, ce même Gouvernement ne trouvera pas à propos qu'à cet égard la Sublime Porte seule soit considérée comme se trouvant dans une position exceptionnelle.

La ligne de conduite tenue par le Gouvernement de Sa Hautesse dans cette question, n'est pas hors de la sphère des réponses de la Haute Cour d'Autriche aux instances réitérées qui lui avait faites la Sublime Porte, qui demandait l'extradition de quelques sujets rebelles qui se sont réfugiés, il y a quelque temps, à l'autre côté; elle ne s'éloigne pas non plus du sens qui a été donné au Traité de Belgrade.

Les individus qui viennent à présent de se réfugier en Turquie seront immédiatement éloignés du voisinage des Etats Autrichiens, et gardés de manière à ce qu'ils se trouvent dans l'impuissance d'intriguer et de tramer des desseins séditieux d'aucune sorte. Cela étant, le véritable but du Gouvernement Autrichien, savoir, celui d'empêcher leurs mauvais desseins, aura été atteint en Turquie. Voilà, M. le Ministre, ce que j'avais à vous exposer; mais vous avez commencé par dire que vous n'aviez pas des ordres d'entrer en pareilles discussions, et avez demandé une réponse si la Porte accepte ou refuse.

Vû les motifs pour s'excuser de satisfaire à cette demande, vû que le Sultan, mon bienfaiteur et maître, n'a pas jugé à propos, d'après sa déférence sans bornes et son amitié pure et sincère pour Sa Majesté l'Empereur, de donner une réponse négative; vû, aussi, la confiance du Sultan dans l'insigne équité de l'Empereur, Sa Hautesse a jugé convenable de s'adresser directement à Sa Majesté Impériale, au nom de l'amitié qui existe entre les deux Cours, au nom de l'honneur de la souveraineté; et en conséquence il a été résolu qu'une lettre lui sera envoyée de la part du Sultan, laquelle renfermera, avec des félicitations sur les événemens en Hongrie, des explications sur l'affaire en question.

Cette démarche n'est autre chose sinon un appel de la part d' u illustre Padichah à la justice et à la droiture de son ami et allié; et le Gouvernement de Sa Hautesse ne consent nullement et en aucune manière à ce qu'elle soit prise pour un refus. La Sublime Porte espère fermement que dès que vous aurez appris la véritable portée de cette décision, vous ne voudrez pas, même dans cet état de choses, mettre à exécution la mesure affligeante que vous avez annoncée être obligé, d'après vos instructions, de prendre en cas qu'on eût donné une réponse négative; que vous ne trouverez pas convenable de ne pas attendre la réponse de l'Empereur, que le Sultan lui-même attend; que vous ne manquerez pas, cette fois-ci non plus, de seconder avec votre zèle, votre énergie et votre caractère conciliant, les efforts de la Sublime Porte tendant à resserrer de plus en plus les relations amicales entre les deux Cours. Voilà à quoi l'on s'attend de votre bienveillance et de votre sagacité bien connues par expérience à la Sublime Porte, et dont elle a été à chaque occasion témoin.

Si j'ai parlé du système que le Gouvernement d'Autriche a de tout temps adopté et suivi à l'égard des sujets Ottomans réfugiés dans les Etats Autrichiens, ce n'est pas, comme votre Excellence l'a pensé, pour soulever cette question ou porter des plaintes; j'ai voulu dire que le système qui est suivi par le Gouvernement de Sa Hautesse est précisément ce même système que l'Autriche a adopté et qu'elle a de tout temps suivi.

Quant au recours fait directement à l'Empereur, ce n'est ni pour gagner du temps, ni dans aucun autre but; mais purement et uniquement pour démontrer que la mesure proposée par la Sublime Porte n'est pas moins conforme à l'honneur qu'aux intérêts de toutes les parties: c'est une démarche qui prend sa source dans la confiance de la Sublime Porte en la modération et en la justice de Sa Majesté Impériale.

Je saisis, &c.

No. 38.

Sir Stratford Canning to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received October 10.)

(No. 290.)

My Lord, *Therapia, September 25, 1849.*

REFERRING to my despatch No. 285 of this year, I have the honour to inform your Lordship that the Ottoman Council has not adopted the suggestion of removing the principal refugees from Widdin at present. Several of the members appeared to be afraid of giving additional umbrage to Russia and Austria by such a proceeding, and the Grand Vizier was unwilling to press the question to a vote.

Inclosed herewith is a list of all the refugees who have come in from Hungary and are detained by the Turkish authorities. They amount to about 5000. Others with better fortune have passed through the Ottoman dominions without being detained. Of these, one of the most distinguished is M. Szemery, the late President of the Hungarian Council, who was here in secret a few days ago.

The Porte thinks of sending the Italians to their respective countries with such assistance as their necessities require, and of authorizing Omer Pasha to procure for the Hungarian and Polish private soldiers an amnesty under which they may return home without danger of punishment. In the meantime they are to be stationed, if not stationed already, at Schumla and in its environs. Consulted by Aali Pasha on this subject I have given my suffrage in favour of the arrangement, provided its execution be attended with safety to the individuals.

With respect to the troops in Wallachia I am informed that the Porte is actually preparing to withdraw half of them into Bulgaria, and I hope that a prudent distribution will be made of the remainder.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

57.

Inclosure in No. 38.

List of Refugees at Widdin.

Hongrois 3,666 parmi lesquels il y a

Généraux	7
Colonels	9
Chefs de Bataillon	17
Majors	67
Capitaines	76
Lieutenans	36
Médecins	2
Soldats	3,401

Polonais.

Généraux	2
Colonel	1
Lieutenant-Colonel	3
Chefs de Bataillon	12
Majors	32
Capitaines	38
Lieutenans	146
Médecins	5
Prêtres	2
Soldats	630

Italiens.

Colonel	1
Chefs de Bataillon	2
Capitaines	6
Lieutenans	16
Médecins	3
Armuriers	7
Soldats	429

No. 39.

Sir Stratford Canning to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received October 10.)

(No. 291.)

My Lord, *Therapia, September 25, 1849.*

BEING informed by Her Majesty's Acting Consul at Bucharest, Mr. Grant, that three Englishmen are detained with the refugees at Widdin, and that having applied to Fuad Effendi for their liberation, he had been referred, from want of instructions, to the Porte, I have addressed myself formally to Aali Pasha, requiring a Vizierial letter to the Pasha of Widdin for their immediate enlargement. The names of the individuals in question are Guyon, Longworth, and Macdonald.

The Ottoman Secretary of State has returned a favourable answer: and as soon as the Sultan's sanction can be obtained, I hope to receive the order for which I have applied, and to effect the release of those gentlemen with the least practicable delay.

I have reason to believe that the French Minister has also applied to the Porte for three individuals among the refugees who appear to have claims on his protection. One is Count Zamoyski, who, as I am assured, is naturalized in France; another is a person of high distinction having a French passport under the name of Dubois; and the third is also stated to have a French passport, having been sent several months ago into Hungary by the then Minister for Foreign Affairs at Paris.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

No. 40.

Viscount Palmerston to Sir Stratford Canning.

(No. 248.) *Foreign Office, October 10, 1849.*

Sir,

I HAVE received your Excellency's despatch No. 291, of the 25th ultimo, in which you report that you had applied to the Porte for a Vizierial letter to the Pasha of Widdin for the immediate enlargement of three Englishmen detained at that place, and I have to state to your Excellency that I approve of your proceedings in this matter.

The Porte can have no right or pretence whatever to detain British subjects on account of acts done by them in Hungary; and neither the Austrian nor Russian Governments can have the slightest right to demand that the Porte shall interfere in any way with the freedom of these British subjects.

I am, &c.

(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 41.

M. Kossuth to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received October 10.)

Widdin (Turkey), September 20, 1849.

My Lord,

YOUR Excellency is no doubt already informed of the fall of my country—unhappy Hungary, assuredly worthy of a better fate.

It was not prompted by the spirit of disorder nor the ambitious views of faction. It was not a revolutionary leaning which induced my native country to accept the mortal struggle, maintained so gloriously, and brought by nefarious means to so unfortunate an end.

Hungary has deserved from her Kings the historical epithet of "generous nation;" for she never allowed herself to be surpassed in loyalty and faithful adherence to her Sovereigns by any nation in the world.

Nothing but the most revolting treachery, the most tyrannical oppression, and cruelties unheard of in the records of history, nothing but the infernal doom of annihilation to her natural existence, preserved through a thousand years, through adversities so numerous, were able to rouse her to oppose the fatal stroke aimed at her very life, or to enable her to repulse the tyrannical assault of the ungrateful Hapsburgs, or to accept the struggle for life, honour, and liberty forced upon her.

And she has nobly fought that holy battle, in which, with the aid of Almighty God, she prevailed against Austria, whom we crushed to the earth, standing firm, even when attacked by the Russian giant, in the consciousness of justice, in our hope in God, and in our hope, my Lord, in the generous feeling of your great and glorious nation, the natural supporter of justice and humanity throughout the world.

But this is over. What tyranny began has been by treachery concluded. On all sides abandoned, my poor country has fallen; not through the overwhelming power of two great empires, but by the faults, and I may say the treason, of her own sons.

To these untoward events I pray God that my unhappy country may be the only sacrifice, and that the true interests of peace, freedom, and civilisation through the world may not be involved in our unhappy fate.

Mr. Francis Pulszky, our Diplomatic Agent in London, has received ample information as to the cause of this sudden and unlooked-for change in the affairs of Hungary, and is instructed to communicate it to your Excellency, if you are graciously pleased to receive the same.

It is not antipathy to Austria, though so well merited at the hands of every Hungarian, but a true conviction, which makes me say that even Austria has lost far more by her victory, gained through Russian aid, than she would have lost in merited defeat through honourable arrangement. Fallen from her position of first-rate Power, she has now forfeited her self-consistency, and has sunk into the obedient instrument of Russian ambition and of Russian commands.

Russia only has gained at this bloody game. She has extended and strengthened her influence in the East of Europe, and threatens already in a frightful manner, with outstretching arms, not only the integrity but the moral basis of the Turkish Empire.

May it please you, my Lord, to allow me to communicate to your Excellency a most revolting condition which the Turkish Government, at the suggestion of Russia, is about to impose on us poor homeless exiles.

I, the Governor of unhappy Hungary, after having, I believe, as a good citizen and honest man, fulfilled to the last my duties to my country, had no choice left me but between the repose of the grave and the inexpressible anguish of expatriation.

Many of my brethren in misfortune had preceded me on the Turkish territory. I followed thither in the hope that I should be permitted to pass to England, and there, under the protection of the English people—a protection never yet denied to persecuted man—allowed to repose for a while my wearied head on the hospitable shore of your happy island.

But even with these views I would rather have surrendered myself to my deadliest foe, than to cause any difficulties to the Turkish Government, whose situation I well knew how to appreciate, and therefore did not intrude upon the Turkish territories without previously inquiring whether I and my companions in misfortunes should be willingly received, and the protection of the Sultan granted to us.

We received the assurance that we were welcome guests, and should enjoy the full protection of His Majesty the Padishah, who would rather sacrifice 50,000 men of his own subjects than allow one hair of our heads to be injured.

It was only upon this assurance that we passed into the Turkish territory, and according to this generous assurance we were received and tended on our journey, received in Widdin as the Sultan's guests, and treated through four weeks, whilst waiting from Constantinople further orders as to the continuation of our sad journey to some distant shore.

Even the Ambassadors of England and France, to whom I ventured in the name of humanity to appeal, were so kind as to assure me of their full sympathy.

His Majesty the Sultan was also so gracious as to give a decided negative to the inhuman pretensions of our extradition set forth by Russia and Austria.

But a fresh letter from His Majesty the Czar arrived in Constantinople, and its consequence was the threat and the suggestion sent to us by an express message of the Turkish Government, that the Poles and Hungarians, and in particular myself, Count Casimir Batthyany, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Hungary under my government, and the Generals Messaros and Perczel (all present here), would be surrendered unless we chose to abjure the faith of our forefathers in the religion of Christ and become Mussulmans.

And thus 5000 Christians are placed in the terrible alternative either of facing the scaffold or of purchasing their lives by abandoning their faith.

So low is already fallen the once mighty Turkey, that she can devise no other means to answer or evade the demands of Russia.

Words fail me to qualify these astonishing suggestions, such as never have been made yet to the fallen chief of a generous nation, and could hardly have been expected in the nineteenth century.

My answer does not admit of hesitation. Between death and shame the choice can be neither dubious nor difficult. Governor of Hungary and elect to that high place by the confidence of 15,000,000 of my coun-

trymen, I know well what I owe to the honour of my country even in exile. Even as a private individual, I have an honourable path to pursue. Once governor of a generous country, I leave no heritage to my children. They shall at least bear an unsullied name. God's will be done. I am prepared to die; but as I think this measure dishonourable and injurious to Turkey, whose interests I sincerely have at heart, and as I feel it a duty to save my companions in exile if I can from a degrading alternative, I have replied to the Grand Vizier in a temporizing manner, and took also the liberty to apply to Sir Stratford Canning and General Aupick for their generous aid against this tyrannic act.

In full reliance on the noble sentiments and generous principles of your Excellency, by which as well as through your wisdom you have secured the esteem of the civilized world, I trust to be excused in inclosing copies of my two letters to the Grand Vizier and Sir Stratford Canning.

I am informed that the whole matter is a cabal against the Ministry of Reshid Pasha, whose enemies would wish to force him to our extradition in order to lower it in public estimation and render impossible its continuance in office. It is certain that in the Grand Council held on the 9th and 10th of September, after a tumultuous debate the majority of the Council declared in favour of our extradition, the majority of the Ministry against it. No decision was come to in consequence of the altercation which took place, but notwithstanding, the Ministry thought fit to make us the revolting suggestion I have named.

This mode of solving the difficulty would not, I am convinced, save the Ministry, because a protection only given in contradiction of the Sultan's generous feeling, at the price of 5000 Christians abandoning their faith, would be revolting to the whole Christian world, and prove hardly calculated to win sympathies for Turkey in the event of war with Russia, which in the opinion of the most experienced Turkish statesmen is approaching fast.

As to my native country, Turkey does, I believe, already feel the loss of the neglected opportunity of having given to Hungary at least some moral help to enable it to check the advance of the common enemy. But in my humble opinion it appears to me that it would be a very ill-advised mode of gaining Hungarian sympathies by sending me to an Austrian scaffold, and forcing my unhappy companions to abjure their religion or accept the same alternative.

No friends to the Turkish Government would spring up from my blood shed by her broken faith, but many deadly foes.

My Lord, your heart will I am sure excuse my having called your attention to our unhappy fate, since it has now assumed political importance.

Abandoned in this unsocial land by the whole world, even the first duties of humanity give us no promise of protection, unless, my Lord, you and your generous nation come forward to protect us.

What steps it may be expedient that you should take, what we have a right to expect from the well-known generosity of England, it would be hardly fitting for me to enter on.

I place my own and my companions' fate in your hands, my Lord, and in the name of humanity throw myself under the protection of England.

Time presses. Our doom may in a few days be sealed. Allow me to make an humble personal request. I am a man, my Lord, prepared to face the worst, and I can die with a free look at heaven as I have lived.

But I am also, my Lord, a husband, son, and father. My poor true-hearted wife, my children, and my noble old mother, are wandering about Hungary. They will probably soon fall into the hands of those Austrians who delight in torturing even feeble women, and with whom even the innocence of childhood is no protection against persecution.

I conjure your Excellency, in the name of the Most High, to put a stop to these cruelties by your powerful mediation, and especially to accord to my wife and children an asylum on the soil of the generous English people.

As to my poor, my loved, and noble country, must she too perish for

ever? Shall she, unaided, abandoned to her fate, and unavenged, be doomed to annihilation by her tyrants. Will England, once her hope, not become her consolation? The political interests of civilized Europe, so many weighty considerations respecting England herself, and chiefly the maintenance of the Ottoman Empire, are too intimately bound up with the existence of Hungary for me to lose all hope.

My Lord, may God the Almighty for many years protect you, that you may long protect the unfortunate and live to be the guardian of the rights of freedom and humanity.

I subscribe, &c.
(Signed) L. KOSSUTH.

Inclosure 1 in No. 41.

M. Kossuth to Sir Stratford Canning.

Widdin, le 20 Septembre, 1849.

Excellence,

J'AI l'honneur de reconnaître la réception de votre lettre du 2 Septembre dans laquelle vous, Monsieur, m'assurez, moi et mes frères d'infortune, des sentimens de compassion et d'humanité, lesquels faisaient toujours et dans toutes circonstances la gloire de votre Gouvernement, qui a trouvé en vous un si digne représentant.

Votre lettre nous a donné une grande consolation dans notre adversité.

Recevez-en mes remercîmens bien sincères.

Invoquant vos sentimens si loyalement nous assurés, je ne puis que vous rapporter une circonstance bien inattendue et tout-à-fait en contradiction avec l'espoir que vous avez eu la bonté dans votre lettre de faire voir de la part de la Sublime Porte.

C'est que le même Colonel Ture qui m'apportait comme courier votre lettre annonçait en même tems verbalement à moi et à mes compagnons d'infortune, de la part de Grand Vizir, du Séraskier Pacha, et encore de deux autres Ministres, qu'en conséquence d'une demande autographe de Sa Majesté le Czar, les Polonais devaient être délivrés à la Russie, et les Hongrois, surtout moi, le Ministre Comte Batthyany, les Généraux Mezzaros et Perczel, à l'Autriche, et que la Sublime Porte seulement dans ce cas ne nous délivrerait pas si nous abjurerons notre religion et passerons à la religion Musulmane.

Il n'est pas nécessaire de dire d'avantage sur une demande nous plaçant dans l'alternative d'une mort sûre et par cela forcée et révoltante.

Mais je ne puis pas me dispenser de toucher sur les circonstances suivantes.

Moi et mes compagnons d'infortune nous ne nous avons pas livrés aveuglement et sans garanties à l'arbitraire du Gouvernement Ture.

Avant mon entrée sur le territoire Ture j'avais envoyé un agent pour m'assurer si le Gouvernement Ture nous prendrait sous sa protection ou non?

Si l'on avait répondu négativement ou seulement d'une manière douteuse, nous aurions eu le choix ou de tâcher nous sauver incognito et personnellement sur un autre chemin, ou de nous joindre à Georgey, ou de traiter avec les Généraux Autrichiens, ou de tomber glorieusement dans une lutte désespérée.

Mais les officiers et les employés Tures avec lesquelles nous avons à faire, le Commandant du camp d'Orsova, si bien comme Mehemet Pacha et plus tard Zia Pacha, déclaraient à nous le même que Omer Pacha au deux bataillons Szeckler qui étaient sorties par le passage du Rothenthurm, et avait assuré à différentes reprises, surtout à moi, que Sa Majesté le Padichah nous accorde sa protection comme à des hôtes bien aimés, et suivant ses nobles sentimens et sa religion, il préférait de sacrifier 50,000 hommes, plutôt que de nous laisser heurter un poil sur nos têtes.

Seulement sur cette assurance nous sommes entrés sur le territoire

Turc, et nous nous avons placés sous la protection du Grand Seigneur, et pendant quatre semaines on nous a traités comme des hôtes.

Confiant sur la sainteté de la parole et de l'action du Sultan, nous n'avons profité, depuis ce tems, d'aucune occasion de nous sauver; seulement huit individus se sont éloignés.

Moi-même, muni d'un passport du Consul Anglais de Belgrade, aurais pu tâcher le même chemin, mais comme on m'avait assuré de la protection au nom du Sultan, je l'aurais trouvé déshonorant pour moi, incompatible avec mon caractère, et offensant pour le Sultan, de montrer de la défiance envers sa parole, et de préférer la fuite à sa protection.

Nous restions donc, moi et mes compagnons, et supportions avec patience pendant quatre semaines la situation la plus fâcheuse.

Enfin, voilà la résolution qui nous donne seulement le choix de la lâche abjuration de notre religion pour nous sauver de l'extradition ou de l'échafaud.

Je ne trouve pas des mots pour qualifier cette démarche, mais j'avoue que chaque battement de mon cœur s'en révolte.

Pauvre Turquie! moi, le pitoyable exilé, je dois avoir pitié d'elle qu'elle soit tombée si bas.

Je crois que c'est plutôt une question de l'honneur et de la gloire personnelle du Sultan que de la politique.

Et pour cela je prie votre Excellence de vouloir bien exprimer dans une audience personnelle à Sa Majesté le Sultan, votre opinion et les sentimens de votre Gouvernement qui sur ce point d'humanité ne peut pas être douteux, et d'empêcher par votre puissante médiation que l'honneur et la gloire du Sultan ne tombe pas avec notre mort à la proie des intrigues de palais.

Même du point de vue politique je dois vous faire les remarques suivantes.

Qu'est-ce que peut gagner la Turquie par cette démarche sans exemple? Est-ce qu'elle pourra éviter la guerre avec la Russie?

En vérité non, si la Russie s'est décidée de porter les coups si longtemps médités contre la Turquie, elle les portera si même on délivre nos misérables personnes; un prétexte est bien facilement trouvé pour qui en veut avoir un.

Mais si elle n'est pas résolu de faire la guerre à la Turquie, en vérité elle ne la commencera pas, si l'on nous protège et si l'on ne nous délivre point.

D'autres motifs et d'autres considérations décident sur des questions si importantes, si étroitement liées à la politique générale Européenne.

Ou peut-être la Turquie croit-elle de gagner la sympathie de la Hongrie pour le cas possible d'un choc avec la Russie, par une telle démarche?

Mais il est bien évident que si la Turquie aura chassé le Gouverneur de la Hongrie à l'échafaud, par une alternative pour lui déshonorant, et si elle aura forcé d'autres de ses enfans d'abjurer leur foi pour sauver leur vie, chaque cœur Hongrois se devra tourner en violence contre elle, qui avait agi d'une manière si révoltante contre nous.

Ou enfin la Turquie croit-elle de gagner de cette manière les sympathies de l'Europe et le secours de l'Angleterre et de la France?

Vous connaissez, Monsieur, votre noble nation, et quant aux sentimens de cette nation vous en avez le gage dans votre propre cœur; j'appelle donc à votre propre jugement, et prononce seulement la conviction que la Turquie voudra par l'exécution de ce dessein avouer une faiblesse sans borne, attester son incapacité de vie, saper toute confiance envers sa parole en Europe, et signer sa chûte inévitable.

Après ces remarques il ne me reste que de vous faire connaître avec respect mes sentimens personnelles et la réponse que j'ai donnée au porteur de ce message malheureux.

Quant à moi, la réponse me serait très facile; placé entre la mort et l'infâmie, le choix ne peut être ni douteux, ni difficile. Mis à la tête de ma nation par la confiance unanime de quinze millions d'hommes, je suis ce que je dois à l'honneur de cette nation même dans l'exil et même comme individu; j'ai fini ma carrière politique, mais pas celle de l'honneur.

Gouverneur président d'une noble nation, je ne laisse à mes enfans aucun héritage; il faut que je leur laisse au moins un nom sans tâche.

Mais comme cependant ma position parmi mes compagnons d'infortune est tout-à-fait exceptionnelle, et comme plusieurs de mes compagnons, se soumettant à la crainte, se pourraient déclarer prêts à accepter la condition prescrite à sauver leur vie, je croyais que c'était mon devoir de ne pas donner une réponse définitive, mais seulement une telle qui pouvait assurer à mes compagnons qu'ils ne soient pas dupés par l'acceptation de la condition.

Je demandais à l'officier Turc quelle lettre de croyance qu'il pourrait montrer? Il n'en avait pas.

Je lui disais: on nous assura de la protection au nom du Sultan, et je trouve que la parole donnée n'est pas une garantie de la protection promise; je le demandais donc quelle garantie qu'il pourrait donner que ceux qui seraient prêts à changer leur religion en acceptant la condition prescrite, ne seront pas néanmoins délivrés si la Russie puissante les demanderait?

Quelle garantie donne-t-il que la Turquie, même dans le cas d'un changement du Ministère, aura le vouloir et le pouvoir de s'opposer aux demandes de la Russie? Et comment la subsistance des convertis serait-elle garantie?

Il me répondait: le gage est leur religion, qui leur défend de délivrer un Musulman, et les traités existans entre la Russie et la Turquie.

J'opposais: le Coran ne fait pas de différence dans le devoir de protection envers les malheureux, et même la tête d'un ennemi mortel est saint à l'Arabe, s'il a une fois traversé son seuil; et tout de même on veut accorder notre extradition.

Quant aux traités ils ne sont puissans que tant qu'ils sont supportés par la force ou respectés par la crainte. Il n'y a pas de traité plus saint que le droit éternel de l'humanité et de l'honneur, et tout de même on veut nous envoyer à l'échafaud, tout contraire de la réponse négative donnée déjà une fois par Sa Majesté le Sultan aux Ambassadeurs de la Russie et de l'Autriche.

Je ne puis donc accepter pour garantie la simple parole du messager, et avant que je me décide je m'en dois orienter quel avantage la Turquie pouvait avoir pour sa propre cause par l'acceptation de la condition posée, parcequ'il me parait que cet offre et son acceptation devaient être très nuisible, précisément à la Turquie.

En général je ne puis prendre une décision et encore moins me déclarer définitivement ici, où personne n'a de pouvoir suffisant même pour discuter la cause, et où je manque de toutes les dates pour m'orienter sur les circonstances.

Je demande donc qu'on escorte moi et les trois Messieurs susnommés, et encore le Général Guyon, qui est Anglais de naissance, à Constantinople, pour que nous nous y puissions orienter, c'est seulement là que nous pourrons prendre une résolution; nous y sommes aussi bien au pouvoir du Sultan. Si notre résolution ne le contentera pas, il nous pourra livrer à l'échafaud aussi bien de Stamboul comme de Viddin.

Dans ce sens j'écrivai à son Altesse le Grand Vizir et au Comte Andrasy, Ambassadeur Hongrois; le Colonel Turc s'offrait à remettre ces lettres, trouvant notre demande équitable.

J'appelle donc à la protection et à l'humanité Chrétienne du Gouvernement et de la nation glorieuse de votre Excellence.

Je prie votre Excellence de mettre le poids de votre voix sur la balance, pour que la condition épouvantable ne nous soit pas posée.

La Turquie manquant à sa parole donnée nous refuse sa protection.

Je soumets donc, moi et ceux de mes compagnons qui n'acceptent pas la condition posée, sous la protection de l'Angleterre et de la France.

L'Angleterre et la France pourront-elles souffrir que nous soyons livrés à l'échafaud, ou que 4 à 5 mille Chrétiens soient forcés à abjurer leur foi Chrétienne?

Je prie votre Excellence de réclamer nos personnes pour que nous

puissions nous aller librement pour l'Angleterre et de là nous embarquer pour l'Amérique.

Si cependant notre malheur manquait même de votre protection et de celle de votre noble nation, je prie votre Excellence de vouloir bien supporter ma demande faite au Grand Vizir, c'est d'être escorté à Constantinople, pour décider avec réfléchissement dans une cause si grave, et alors on y pourra décider de notre sort.

Dans le cas le plus mauvais je prie au moins de retarder l'affaire jusqu'à votre Excellence aura rapporté sur ce fait triste à votre Gouvernement.

Notre vie est dans vos mains. Agréez, &c.
(Signé) LOUIS KOSSUTH.

Inclosure 2 in No. 41.

M. Kossuth to the Grand Vizier.

Widdin, le 20 Septembre, 1849.

Altesse,

UN officier Turc qui m'apportait des lettres de Constantinople de la part des Ambassadeurs de l'Angleterre et de la France, dans lesquelles ils ont eu la bonté d'assurer, selon les droits de l'humanité, moi et mes compagnons d'infortune, de leur entière sympathie et compassion, m'apportait en même tems la menace verbale que nous serions livrés à la Russie et respectivement à l'Autriche, si nous n'abjurions pas notre religion de naissance et ne passions pas à la foi Musulmane.

Altesse, j'ai le plus grand respect pour votre religion. J'admire en l'honorant sa sainte morale, dont les saintes règles accordent sans condition la protection aux malheureux qui traversent comme hôtes le seuil d'un Musulman.

Mais votre Altesse trouvera sans doute très naturel que si la prise de cette sainte foi est offerte en alternative de l'extradition à l'échafaud, cela doit être regardé au moins comme contrainte.

Que votre Altesse me permette à remarquer avec respect, que moi et mes compagnons d'infortune nous ne nous avons pas soumis à la protection de Sa Majesté le Padichah aveuglement et sans garanties préalables. Avant mon entrée sur le territoire Turc j'avais envoyé un agent pour m'assurer si le Gouvernement Turc nous prendrait sous sa protection ou non? Si l'on nous avait répondu négativement ou seulement d'une manière douteuse, nous aurions eu le choix ou de tâcher nous sauver incognito et personnellement sur un autre chemin, ou de nous joindre à Georgey, ou de traiter avec les Généraux Autrichiens, ou tomber glorieusement dans une lutte désespérée.

Mais les officiers et les employés Turcs avec lesquels nous avions à faire, le Commandant du Camp de Orsova, si bien comme Mehemet Pacha, et plus tard Zia Pacha, déclaraient à nous, de même que Omer Pacha aux deux bataillons Szekler, qui étaient sortis par le passage du Rothenthurm, et avait assuré à différentes reprises, surtout à moi, que Sa Majesté le Padichah nous accorde sa protection comme à des hôtes bien aimés, et suivant ses nobles sentimens et sa religion, il préférait de sacrifier 50,000 hommes plutôt que de nous laisser heurter un poil sur nos têtes. Seulement sur cette assuration nous sommes entrés sur le territoire Turc, et nous nous avons placés sous la protection de Grand Seigneur, et pendant quatre semaines on nous a traités comme des hôtes.

Confiant sur la sainteté de la parole et de l'action du Sultan, nous n'avons profité depuis ce temps d'aucune occasion de nous sauver. Seulement huit individus ce sont éloignés. Moi-même, muni d'un passeport du Consul Anglais de Belgrade, aurais pu tâcher le même chemin; mais comme on m'avait assuré de la protection au nom du Sultan, je l'aurais trouvé déshonorant pour moi, incompatible avec mon caractère, et offensant pour le Sultan, de montrer de la défiance envers sa parole, et de préférer la fuite à sa protection. Nous restions donc, moi et mes compagnons, et supportions avec patience pendant quatre semaines la situation la plus fâcheuse. Aussi je suis informé que Sa Majesté le Padichah

suivant les nobles sentimens si naturels à son cœur magnanime, et dans le véritable intérêt de l'honneur, de la puissance, et de la sécurité de son empire, a déjà une fois bien voulu donner une réponse négative à la demande inhumaine de la Russie et de l'Autriche.

Enfin, au lieu de la permission attendue de pouvoir faire le voyage pour l'Angleterre, vient la menace de notre extradition avec la suggestion du seul moyen capable à sauver notre vie, c'est en abjurant notre foi de naissance.

Je me permets de prier votre Altesse de vouloir bien se faire rapporter par M. le Comte Jules Andrasy les remarques du point de vue politique qui se donnent d'elles-mêmes contre la tournure inattendue de notre affaire, qui est devenue tout-à-fait une affaire d'humanité, et de ne décider point sur notre sort sans nous avoir entendus.

Je suis parfaitement convaincu qu'aussitôt que cette suggestion deviendra publique (et cela ne sera presque pas à empêcher), une grande sensation se fera dans toute l'Europe, de même que si on insiste à cette démarche, cela ferait le plus grand dommage à l'Empire Turc. Et je suis un ami trop sincère de la Turquie, j'en ai trop travaillé à faire ces sentimens partout répandus dans ma nation, pour, en me vouant tacitement à une mort pas méritée, ne pas sentir les désavantages immenses d'une telle alternative forcée.

Aussi pensé-je, que comme Sa Majesté le Padichah nous a pris sous sa gracieuse protection, et comme nous ne restons sur le territoire Turc qu'en conséquence de cette protection nous promise par les employés, et en effet nous donnée pendant quatre semaines, cette affaire doit être regardée comme une question de la gloire personnelle de Sa Majesté le Padichah, plutôt que de la politique.

Quant à moi la réponse sur la demande posée ne me serait difficile. Gouverneur d'un noble pays, et appelé à la tête de cette nation par la confiance unanime de quinze millions d'hommes, je sais très bien ce que je dois même en exil à cette nation qui m'avait élevé si haut.

Mais il s'agit de ne pas faire un pas qui troublerait pour toujours l'entente future de la Turquie et de la Hongrie contre un ennemi commun, et qui ferait naître la haine où j'ai semé l'amitié et l'amour.

Il s'agit de cela, que les compagnons de mon infortune qui voulaient se soumettre à l'inévitable sort pour sauver leur vie, auraient la parfaite conviction: 1°. Qu'en effet il ne leur reste aucun autre choix; 2°. Qu'ils arrivent au but pour lequel ils se décident à faire le sacrifice, c'est-à-dire, un avantage sur de véritables intérêts de la Turquie et de la Hongrie, et outre cela la garantie que leur vie et leur existence soient assurées d'une manière honorable pour tous les cas possibles.

Et ici, où je manque de toutes les dates pour m'orienter sur les circonstances, je ne peux pas acquérir la conviction qu'il ne reste pas d'autre choix, parce que l'alternative posée est trop en contradiction avec la protection promise, avec l'hospitalité reçue, et avec les véritables intérêts de la Turquie.

Quant aux garanties nécessaires je demandais le messager mentionné plus haut, quelle lettre de croyance qu'il pourrait montrer? Il n'en avait pas.

Je lui disais: on nous assurait de la protection au nom du Sultan, et je trouve que la parole donnée n'est pas une garantie de la protection promise. Je le demandais donc, quelle garantie qu'il pourrait donner que ceux qui seraient prêts à changer leur religion en acceptant la condition prescrite, ne seront pas néanmoins délivrés si la Russie puissante le demanderait? Quelle garantie donne-t-il que la Turquie même, dans le cas d'un changement du Ministère, aura le vouloir et le pouvoir de s'opposer aux demandes de la Russie? Et comment la subsistance des convertis serait-elle garantie? Il me répondait: le gage est leur religion, qui leur défend de délivrer un Musulman, et les traités existans entre la Russie et la Turquie.

J'opposais: le Coran ne fait pas de différence dans le devoir de protection envers des malheureux, et même la tête d'un ennemi mortel est, sainte à l'Arabe, s'il a une fois traversé son seuil; et tout de même on veut accorder notre extradition. Quant aux traités, ils ne sont puissans que

tant qu'ils sont supportés par la force ou respectés par la crainte. Il n'y a pas de traité plus saint que le droit éternel de l'humanité et de l'honneur; et tout de même on veut nous envoyer à l'échafaud, tout en contraire de la promesse de protection; et de la réponse négative donnée déjà une fois par Sa Majesté le Sultan aux Ambassadeurs de la Russie et de l'Autriche. Je ne peux donc accepter pour garantie la simple parole du messager, et avant que je me décide, je m'en dois orienter, quel avantage la Turquie pouvait avoir pour sa propre cause par l'acceptation de la condition posée, parcequ'il me paraît que cet offre et son acceptation devaient être très nuisibles précisément à la Turquie.

En général, je ne peux prendre une décision, et encore moins me déclarer définitivement ici, où personne n'a de pouvoirs suffisans même pour discuter la cause, et où je manque de toutes les dates pour m'orienter sur les circonstances.

Je prends donc la liberté de prier votre Altesse instamment d'accorder à nous, qui sommes munis de passeports réguliers Anglais, un libre passage pour l'Angleterre, ou au moins de faire escorter moi et le Ministre Comte Batthyany, les Généraux Messaros, Perczel, et le Général Comte Guyon (qui est sujet Anglais), à Constantinople, ne pouvant donner notre décision définitive sur les conditions posées de nous sauver qu'en connaissance de toutes les circonstances.

Je crois pouvoir espérer que votre Altesse accordera cette demande; comme à Stamboul aussi nous serons au pouvoir de Sa Majesté le Padichah, et si notre déclaration ne le satisfera pas, il nous pourra livrer à l'échafaud de Constantinople aussi bien que de Viddin.

Je prends donc la liberté de regarder cette cause comme pas achevée, jusqu'à l'arrivée de la décision; et pour le tems intermédiaire je proteste devant Dieu le tout puissant, et devant le monde, contre tout acte de violence, et j'appelle au jugement inévrompable de l'opinion publique de l'Europe et de l'Histoire, en dévouement dévote dans la volonté de Dieu qui récompense la générosité et tient compte à la suppression.

Que votre Altesse daigne accepter l'assurance de ma plus parfaite considération.

(Signé) LOUIS KOSSUTH.

No. 43.

Mr. Longworth to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received October* 10.)

Widdin, September 20, 1849.

My Lord,

MY name, which is undersigned, is probably unknown to your Lordship, but I have been for some years known to Sir S. Canning, &c., and have in some measure been honoured with his confidence. Should you think it worth while to inquire, he can inform you what weight should in his opinion attach to the statements contained in this letter, of which I shall forward a copy to him by the earliest opportunity. It is now more than three months ago that I passed from European Turkey into Hungary. Since that time I have been in frequent communication with M. Kossuth, and subsequently an eye-witness of the military operations from the commencement of the retreat from Szegedin to the final dissolution of the Army, which had been commanded by General Dembinski, at Patchet. I then crossed the mountains from Transylvania into Wallachia with Generals Bem and Guyon, and I am now detained (illegally I presume, since I am provided with an English passport) with the Hungarian and Polish refugees by the Turkish authorities at Widdin. Under these circumstances I consider it my duty to address a few remarks to your Lordship on the subject of the extraordinary negotiations now pending at this place, all of which, together with the letter of M. Kossuth to Sir S. Canning, have been unreservedly communicated to me.

The fortitude displayed by M. Kossuth in this trying situation is highly praiseworthy; his views are as just as his sentiments are honour-

able. He distinctly perceives that the consequences of the shameful step recommended to him would be ruinous to the cause he has most at heart; but it demands a longer experience of the corruption and fanaticism, or, what amounts to the same thing, the hypocrisy, which characterize so large a portion of the governing class in Turkey, to appreciate the motives by which this offer has been dictated. The whole affair may I believe be explained as follows:

The Grand Vizier finding he could obtain no positive pledge from the French and English Ambassadors, that in the event of war resulting from a resistance to the demands of the Emperor of Russia, the Porte might depend on the active support of their respective Governments, had then recourse to the Great Council of State. Here, however, he experienced a similiar disappointment; the dishonour involved in the extradition of Hungarian and Polish exiles was by a large majority declared to be preferable to the alternative held out by the Emperor. Such a measure being apparently most repugnant to the feelings not only of the Ministers but of the Sultan himself, Reshid Pasha next adopted an expedient which he conceived must, as far as the Turks were concerned, overcome all opposition. He privately despatched a steamer with agents to Widdin, strongly urging the refugees to declare themselves Mussulmans, he felt confident in this case, that no Turk would dare to propose their extradition to the Russians. Now whether right or wrong in this conclusion, it is certain that with reference to Hungary and the rest of Europe, he overlooked two important considerations. Such an act of compulsory apostacy must excite universal disgust, and should hostilities ensue, Turkey instead of meeting support and sympathy, would be left to her own resources, without a friend or ally in all Christendom. And in the next place the influence of the men on whom he depends for enlisting on his side the people of Poland and Hungary, would be utterly annihilated.

It happens most fortunately, therefore, and I rejoice that I can announce to your Lordship that the experiment has on the whole proved a decided failure. Out of more than 150 individuals belonging to the civil or military service of the late Hungarian Government, Ministers, Employés, Generals, and Officers, not more than fourteen have, to save their lives, consented to abjure their religion. Amongst these are Generals Bem, Stein, and Keinetthi. With respect to the first of these no one can for a moment suspect him of cowardice in becoming a Turk; he only seeks another chance of making war on Russia. Stein is a German, an able engineer officer, but a mere mercenary and soldier of fortune, who never had the confidence of the Hungarians. Keinetthi is a brave but uneducated man, who has risen from the ranks of the Austrian army. It would be unnecessary to mention the names of the remainder of this small band of proselytes: they have up to this time not been joined by a single private soldier. It remains now to be seen whether the Porte will accept of this limited number of conversions, and whether in case it should do so, the Emperor of Russia will on these grounds be content to take a less number of victims.

As in his autograph letter to the Sultan he is said to have written that the escape of a single individual from Widdin would constitute a *casus belli*, it is more than probable that he will not abate an iota of his pretensions. General Bem must of all others be chiefly obnoxious to his displeasure, when it is hardly to be supposed that he will not insist upon his being given up with the rest. Should the Turks therefore refuse to comply with these demands, war would appear to be the inevitable consequence, and with this certainty before them, it would be folly on their part to surrender those of the refugees who had adhered to their Christian faith, and who would be precisely the agents who might be depended upon for exciting to arms and securing the co-operation of the inhabitants of Poland and Hungary. But the chances of the Porte, entering upon a war, if unsupported by the Western Powers, against Austria and Russia, are too precarious to dissipate the terrors which cast every day a deeper gloom over the devoted exiles of Widdin. Their only reasonable hope of deliverance is founded on the prompt and energetic interference of Her Majesty's Government, alone or in concert with that of the French Re-

public. They scarcely believe it possible that they and the Sultan, who would wish to protect them, can be thus deliberately abandoned to their fate. It must be evident to all, that if, together with international law and the rights of humanity, the independence of the Ottoman Empire be thus trampled upon with impunity, Russia, with the footing she has newly acquired in the Danube, will henceforward obtain an undisputed sovereignty at Constantinople, for there would seem to be no imaginable case in which the Western Powers would venture on a war to protect that independence.

There is every probability on the other hand, that the mere threat of hostilities would at once induce the Emperor to listen to reason in this affair; unless in consequence of the recent triumph of his arms, he is labouring under a delusion as to the military resources of his empire, and inflated with the arrogance which has been usually observed to precede a fall, and which the Turks, whom he treats so contemptuously, may be the destined instruments in the hands of Providence to chastise. The military resources of Russia have never been so much overrated as at this moment. She has gained a great prestige from the successful termination h ıatjeac empaign, but if the truth were known, she would have lost rather than have gained ground in public estimation. She was indebted for her successes neither to the valour of her troops nor the skill of her generals. Notwithstanding the efficiency of the Russian artillery and superior discipline of the cavalry, the army as a whole was an unmanageable mass, the officers were notoriously disaffected, the soldiers spiritless and half-famished, and on all occasions ready to desert to the enemy. But the Hungarians were unfortunately on their side still more disheartened and demoralized; they never for an instant believed that they could make a successful stand against the combined forces of Austria and Russia; with greater confidence in themselves, though their armies were composed chiefly of raw levies, and these very badly armed and officered, I do not doubt that the result would have been widely different. At Temeswar I saw the allied army chased from position to position for the space of four hours, and it is certain that a decisive victory would have been gained by Generals Bem and Guyon if, by some fatal inadvertence, the whole of the ammunition had not been sent forward on the road to Arad. Could the Turks have been induced to send a small subsidiary force into Hungary a few months ago, or even to furnish the Hungarians with a few thousand muskets, the scale might have been easily turned in favour of the latter. But they would now find the task more difficult, not on account of any physical inferiority, for though the Russians may have a better appointed artillery, the Turks, physically and morally too, are in better fighting order, they are much better fed, and animated with a better spirit. Still in any war which the Turks might wage alone against one or more Christian Powers, it is not to be expected they would command the sincere sympathies of any Christian people, even of such as acknowledge the sovereignty of the Sultan; for they naturally fear that the recovery of their former power might lead to the revival of their former oppression. But the alliance of England and France would be taken as a pledge that their rights and privileges would continue to be respected, and it is astonishing how far such a security would go to rally the Christian populations round the throne of the Sultan.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. A. LONGWORTH.

No. 43.

The Marquis of Normanby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received October 12.)

(Secret.)
My Lord, *Paris, October 11, 1849.*

I RECEIVED on Monday morning the 8th instant, your Lordship's despatches to Vienna, St. Petersburgh, and Constantinople, on the subject of the recent differences of the Porte with Russia and Austria; also one directing me to communicate them confidentially to the French Government. This instruction I proceeded immediately to execute. Since the first diplomatic rupture between those Powers was known here by the telegraph, I have felt it my duty to keep your Lordship informed almost daily of the views and sentiments of both the Ministers and leading men in France upon this complicated question.

I therefore now consider myself dispensed from entering into many details which had the result been different I should have considered it necessary to put upon record; but as the effect of my representations has been to induce, on the part of the French Government, the adoption of a line of conduct precisely in accordance with the views of Her Majesty's Government, it will now suffice to state shortly some of the grounds on which in particular points there was hesitation on the part of some of the members of the French Government, the only effect of which, as the matter now stands, has been to delay a couple of days the further transmission of some of the despatches.

Upon the main point of the importance to this country of maintaining the independence of Turkey, no one has openly expressed difference of opinion, though no doubt the feeling as to the extent to which other dangers are to be risked for that object, is in many minds much influenced by the sense of their present internal difficulties. The interest which at any other moment the leading men in France would have felt in the Hungarian struggle, was much checked by the conviction of that close partnership between all the revolutionists in Europe, of which they had proof in the case of Rome, and which they believed to be equally the mainspring of the insurrection, in a country of whose real state they know so little. Considering the dangers from which they hardly feel themselves to have yet escaped, to be aggravated by the spread of this spirit, they certainly felt relieved by the termination of the war in Hungary.

A quarrel which ostensibly had its origin in the safety of the chiefs in the late contest, therefore at first sight was viewed in connexion with a very different state of previous public feeling than that which had prevailed in England. However, upon second thoughts, the unheard-of nature of the demand made by Russia and Austria, and the political danger of submitting to it, had their due weight, and there seems to have been unanimity amongst those who have the conduct of affairs, that the line taken by the French Representative at Constantinople must be firmly supported. There then remained the practical question as to how this was to be done with the least chance of war, which in the present state of the country they think would now be an unexampled evil. There were some who felt in addition, that should the contest become general, the existence of France might be compromised, whilst England must remain in all essentials invulnerable. These considerations were all brought to bear upon the one practical and immediate point—the action of the fleet. The arguments were few, but the voices were many by which it was maintained that it was desirable in the first instance to try the effect of the verbal representations made at the two Imperial Courts; that should these be unsuccessful, it would then be time enough to take a step, which, if in the quarter to which it was directed was not actual menace, indicated, as they thought prematurely, an intention to go beyond purely diplomatic limits.

I should here add that some even of those who now thought, as the case was brought before them, they could not do otherwise than adopt the

course we had already done, still regretted that before that step had been taken and orders sent, there had not been a regular official communication made to Paris. I reminded these in the first instance that from the very moment the question was discussed between us, I had always given as my personal opinion that any diplomatic representation must in this case be accompanied by such a naval demonstration, and I had never heard from any of the French Government with whom I conversed any objection to such a course; but I said that it was more important for them to recollect that this was not a step originating in London. It was understood that Sir Stratford Canning who on the spot must be supposed to be the best judge of the pressing exigency of the case and of the importance of the effect which would thus be produced, either in avoiding danger or giving moral support to the just resistance of the Porte, had himself written to Sir William Parker, on his own responsibility, to come up to the Dardanelles, and the Admiral was only waiting for the confirmation from London of that requisition. Under these circumstances the British Government would not after consultation have changed their resolve, and even the delay which would have been caused by communications between Paris and London might have compromised the vital interests of the question.

But whilst the step had already been taken, the intention had been so well concealed, that these despatches, which it was hoped would produce the desired effect upon the Russian and Austrian Governments, would arrive at their destination and might receive their answer before the approach of the fleets could be known. I therefore urged most strongly that our joint action should not be in the eyes of Europe a bye-word, which would be the case if, whilst the English fleet moved up towards the Dardanelles, the French fleet remained at Toulon. I said the real danger of war would be produced by such hesitation, which would of course be immediately reported to Vienna and St. Petersburgh; whilst in the cordial and ostensible union of these two great Powers of the West, I saw the only assurance for the peace of Europe. It is unnecessary that I should dwell any longer upon the representations I made, or enter into any details of the quarter where these were most needed, as the Council yesterday decided (as I communicated at once in a few hasty lines) that the French fleet should be telegraphed to put to sea immediately, and the instructions were to be prepared and forwarded at once by a special steamer, with the hope that she might reach the squadron before it arrived off Naples. I understand those instructions are to be to the effect that the French Admiral is to bear up towards Smyrna, and put himself in communication with Sir William Parker.

I have marked this "Secret," as the French Government consider it of great importance, on account of their Parliamentary difficulties, that this decision should not be known for some days.

I have, &c.
(Signed) NORMANBY.

No. 44.

M. de Tocqueville to General Lamoricière.—(Communicated to Viscount Palmerston by M. Drouyn de Lhuys, October 14.)

Paris, 1 Octobre, 1849.

Monsieur,

LE dernier courier d'Orient a apporté de Constantinople de graves et fâcheuses nouvelles. Comme vous le verrez par la dépêche ci-jointe en copie de M. le Général Aupick, la Porte s'étant refusée à livrer les réfugiés Polonais et Hongrois, tout en s'efforcant à prendre les mesures nécessaires pour empêcher que leur présence sur son territoire ne pût devenir un danger pour la tranquillité des Etats voisins, les Envoyés de Russie et d'Autriche ont suspendu leurs relations avec le Gouvernement du Sultan. Veuillez, je vous prie, exprimer à M. le Comte de Nesselrode l'impression

douloureuse que nous avons éprouvée en apprenant cette démarche et les communications qui l'avaient précédée. Sans examiner en ce moment si les dispositions des traités, si les précédens sont ou non de nature à légitimer l'exigence des deux Cours Impériales, il nous est impossible de ne pas reconnaître que la Porte, en y accédant, subirait une humiliation qui achèverait d'anéantir sa force morale; que l'opinion publique serait profondément blessée d'un bout de l'Europe à l'autre; et qu'on perdrait en un moment le fruit des efforts faits depuis l'année dernière par les amis de l'ordre pour amener les esprits à cet apaisement, qui, isolant les perturbateurs systématiques, contribue plus que toute autre chose au maintien ou au rétablissement de la tranquillité générale.

Il nous est impossible de comprendre ou même de soupçonner les considérations pour lesquelles on risquerait de compromettre un si grand intérêt. Nous espérons donc encore que les deux Cours s'arrêteront dans une voie où peut-être on les a engagées plus que ce n'était d'abord leur pensée, et que lorsqu'elles connaîtront les propositions faites avec tant de loyauté et de franchise par le Gouvernement Ottoman, elles les accepteront.

Suivant toute apparence, des rapports inexacts sur les intentions de la Porte avaient déterminé de leur part ces manifestations menaçantes, auxquelles nous aimons à penser qu'elles n'auront pas donné suite après qu'elles auront été instruites du véritable état des choses.

Je vous prie de m'informer sans retard de ce que vous aura répondu M. de Nesselrode.

Bien que je n'aie encore que des informations fort incomplètes sur l'effet produit à Londres par les nouvelles de Constantinople, je sais que Lord Palmerston en a été fort affecté.

Recevez, &c.
(Signé) A. DE TOCQUEVILLE.

No. 45.

M. de Tocqueville to M. de Beaumont.—(Communicated to Viscount Palmerston by M. Drouyn de Lhuys, October 14.)

Paris, 27 Septembre, 1849.

UNE dépêche télégraphique de M. le Général Aupick m'annonce que la Porte ayant refusé de livrer les réfugiés réclamés par la Russie et l'Autriche, les Légations de ces deux Puissances ont suspendu leurs rapports avec le Gouvernement du Sultan. Des informations plus circonstanciées pourront seules nous mettre en mesure d'apprécier toute la portée de ce grave incident. Un entretien que M. Lacour avait eu dernièrement avec M. le Prince de Schwarzenberg et dont il m'a rendu compte dans sa dépêche du 11 de ce mois, me donnait lieu d'espérer que le Cabinet de Vienne n'insisterait pas sur une exigence aussi peu en accord avec l'état actuel de l'opinion publique. Je veux croire encore que les intentions ont pu être dépassées. S'il en était autrement, il faudrait voir dans ce qui vient de survenir à Constantinople, un nouvel et déplorable aliment jeté bien malencontreusement à l'irritation des esprits, dans un moment où il serait si important de ne fournir aucun motif, aucun prétexte à de dangereuses divisions.

Recevez, &c
(Signé) A. DE TOCQUEVILLE.

No. 46.

M. de Torqueville to M. de Beaumont.—(Communicated to Viscount Palmerston by Drouyn de Lhuys, October 14.)

Paris, 5 Octobre, 1849.

Monsieur,

LORSQUE j'ai eu l'honneur de vous annoncer le 27 du mois dernier, le grave incident qui venait de suspendre les relations de la Porte avec les Légations d'Autriche et de Russie, je ne connaissais encore les faits que par le télégraphe. Je vous envoie copie de deux dépêches de M. le Général Aupick qui en donnent tous les détails, aussi bien que d'une dépêche antérieure dans laquelle vous trouverez les préliminaires de cette déplorable querelle. Je vous envoie aussi la copie d'un document important qui m'a été communiqué confidentiellement. C'est la lettre écrite par M. de Nesselrode à M. de Titow pour le charger de réclamer les réfugiés. Enfin je joins à cette expédition deux dépêches et une lettre particulière de M. Drouyn de Lhuys relatives à la sensation que cette affaire a faite à Londres et aux déterminations qu'elle a inspirées au Cabinet Britannique, une lettre particulière que j'ai écrite moi-même à notre Ambassadeur à Londres, et la dépêche que j'ai adressée à M. de Lamoricière pour le mettre en mesure de faire entendre au Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg de sérieuses représentations contre les exigences qui ont fait peser sur la Porte.

Je dois ajouter qu'aussitôt après avoir reçu la dépêche télégraphique de M. le Général Aupick, je me suis empressé de l'autoriser éventuellement à donner des passeports pour la France aux réfugiés Hongrois et Polonais, et à les faire embarquer.

Je n'ai pas besoin de vous recommander de ne faire usage qu'avec une grande discrétion des documens et des informations que je vous transmets.

La question, comme vous le voyez, est vivement engagée; le Gouvernement Britannique paraît résolu à soutenir la Porte par tous les moyens. Malgré l'étrange lettre de M. de Nesselrode, malgré le langage très résolu de M. de Hübner, qui affirme ici que les deux Cours Impériales se sont trop avancées pour reculer, nous voulons encore espérer que les Agens de ces deux Cours ont dépassé leurs instructions, ainsi que semblent le supposer MM. de Colloredo et de Brunnow. Comme je vous l'écrivais il y a quelques jours, il me paraît difficile que M. le Prince Schwarzenberg après l'entretien qu'il avait eu avec M. de la Cour, ait pu se proposer autre chose en demandant l'extradition des réfugiés, que d'obtenir ces mêmes mesures de sûreté offertes par la Porte et si péremptoirement refusées par M. de Stürmer. Il est évident d'ailleurs, qu'en s'appuyant sur les traités bien interprétés, et plus encore sur les précédens, la Porte est en droit de se refuser à une mesure qui lui enlèverait toute considération, qui soulèverait en Europe le sentiment public qui, dans un temps où tous les Gouvernemens, toutes les opinions honnêtes et raisonnables tendaient à se rapprocher pour assurer le rétablissement ou le maintien de l'ordre et la paix, élèverait entre eux un nouveau principe de séparation bien difficile à surmonter; telles ne peuvent être les intentions de l'Autriche, telle ne saurait être sa politique. Je vous prie, Monsieur, de parler fortement dans ce sens à M. le Prince de Schwarzenberg, de faire tout ce qui dépendra de vous pour pénétrer sa pensée et de m'en informer sans retard.

Nous attendons des communications formelles sur les résolutions du Cabinet de Londres. Dès qu'elles nous seront parvenues, et que le Conseil en aura délibéré, je vous enverrai, suivant toute apparence, un courier extraordinaire.

Recevez, &c.
(Signé) A. DE TOCQUEVILLE.

No. 47.

M. de Tocqueville to General Aupick.—(Communicated to Viscount Palmerston by M. Drouyn de Lhuys, October 14.)

Monsieur,

Paris, le 11 Octobre, 1849.

J'AI reçu avant-hier la dépêche que vous m'avez fait l'honneur de m'écrire sous le numéro 80.

Vous trouverez ci-jointe la traduction des instructions envoyées par le Gouvernement de Londres à ses Représentans auprès de la Porte et des Cours de St. Pétersbourg et de Vienne, et d'une dépêche écrite par Lord Palmerston aux Lords de l'Amirauté pour leur faire connaître les déterminations prises par le Conseil au sujet de la grande question qui se débat à Constantinople. Comme vous le verrez, l'escadre Anglaise de la Méditerranée recevra l'ordre de s'approcher des Dardanelles et elle pourra même, dans des cas extrêmes, entrer dans la Mer Noire.

Le Gouvernement de la République a pensé de son côté, que dans l'état des choses, il ne lui était pas permis de s'effacer, et que son pavillon devait se montrer aussi sur le théâtre où s'agite une question dans laquelle peuvent se trouver engagés de si grands intérêts. Notre escadre, qui est en ce moment aux Iles d'Hyères, va se rendre à Naples, d'où elle sera dirigée vers les parages du Levant.

Lorsqu'elle y sera arrivée et qu'elle aura établi sa station, soit à Ourlac, soit à Ténédos, soit sur tout autre point, l'Amiral qui la commande se mettra en communication avec vous, et dès-lors ses mouvemens étant de nature à exercer une action politique, n'auront plus lieu que d'après vos indications.

Je dois donc vous faire connaître avec autant de précision que le comporte une telle matière, les vues et les intentions du Gouvernement de la République.

L'action de nos forces navales comme celle des forces Britanniques se bornera à des mesures de protection et de défense; elles s'abstiendront de tout acte agressif.

Une considération que vous devrez avoir sans cesse présente à l'esprit, c'est que le Gouvernement de la République ne veut pas la guerre; c'est qu'il la considérerait comme un très grand malheur; c'est que la détermination que j'ai l'honneur de vous annoncer lui est précisément inspirée par le désir de la prévenir, s'il est possible, au moyen d'une intervention opportune, dont on pourrait craindre de le voir sortir tôt ou tard, si, pour éviter une difficulté ou une compromission du moment, la France se résignait à rester simple spectatrice des événemens.

C'est assez vous dire avec quelle réserve, avec quelle circonspection vous devez faire usage des pouvoirs qui vous sont confiés. Il ne nous est pas permis d'ailleurs, d'oublier qu'aux termes de la constitution, l'Assemblée Nationale ayant seule le droit de déclarer la guerre, ce serait de notre part encourir une grave responsabilité que de la provoquer.

Telles sont, Monsieur, les seules directions que je puisse vous donner aujourd'hui. Vous voudrez bien expliquer dans ce sens aux Ministres du Sultan la résolution que nous venons de prendre.

Nous persistons à désirer, que tout en maintenant le généreux refus de livrer les réfugiés, ils usent, comme ils l'ont fait jusqu'à présent, des plus grands ménagemens envers les deux Cours Impériales, dont il importe de dégager l'amour-propre et les susceptibilités. Nous croyons encore, que même après tout le temps perdu, le meilleur moyen qu'ait le Gouvernement Ottoman de sortir de la position difficile où il est placé, c'est de renvoyer ces réfugiés de son territoire, et de présenter leur expulsion comme l'exécution des traités. Quelque humeur que puissent d'abord en témoigner les Cabinets de Vienne et de St. Pétersbourg, nous ne pouvons supposer que leur mécontentement se manifestât par des violences qui n'auraient plus d'objet, et qui soulèveraient en faveur de la Porte l'opinion du monde civilisé.

Recevez, &c.
(Signé) A. DE TOCQUEVILLE.

No. 48.

Sir Stratford Canning to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received October 15.)

(No. 294.)

Therapia, September 28, 1849.

My Lord,

I HAVE obtained and dispatched to Widdin a Vizirial letter for the immediate liberation of those Englishmen whom I mentioned in a former part of my correspondence as being detained there.

For your Lordship's more complete information, I transmit herewith a copy of my note to Aali Pasha, applying for their release, and a translation of the Grand Vizier's letter to the Pasha of Widdin.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

Inclosure 1 in No. 48.

Sir Stratford Canning to Aali Pasha.

Therapia, September 19, 1849.

THE Undersigned has received information from Her Majesty's Acting Consul at Bucharest, that three Englishmen being detained at Widdin by the authorities of that place, he had applied to Fuad Effendi for their immediate liberation, and that his Excellency had replied that, having no instructions upon the subject, he would lose no time in referring the case to his Government.

The Undersigned, considering the peculiar circumstances in which the Ottoman Commissioner was placed, abstains from making any comment on the very irregular prolongation thus given to the detention of those British subjects, who in that character ought not to have been detained at all by the Turkish authorities. He confines himself to a simple request that the Porte will issue orders, without a moment's loss of time, for the liberation of the three individuals in question, whose names are Richard Guyon, J. A. Longworth, and John Macdonald. He further requests that the letter containing the Porte's commands may be consigned to him for transmission to Widdin, and he avails, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

Inclosure 2 in No. 48.

The Grand Vizir to the Pasha of Widdin.

(Traduction.) (11 *Zilcadé*, 1265.) 27 *Septembre*, 1849.

SON Excellence Fuad Effendi a écrit à la Sublime Porte que parmi les réfugiés qui se trouvent à Widdin il y a trois véritables Anglais, savoir: Mr. Richard Guyon, Mr. J. Longworth, et Mr. John Macdonald, et que le Consul d'Angleterre à Bucharest a demandé leur mise en liberté.

Plus tard, l'Ambassadeur de Sa Majesté Britannique a aussi présenté à ce sujet une note officielle à la Sublime Porte.

D'après les renseignemens qui ont été fourni par le Consul susmentionné et par l'Ambassade, ces individus ne sont point du nombre de ces Polonais et de ces Hongrois qui ont ensuite pris une autre protection, mais de véritables Anglais, et nous en avons la certitude.

Il faut donc les mettre en liberté, et tels sont les ordres du Sultan. Votre Excellence les laissera aller où ils voudront, mais elle aura soin qu'il n'y ait pas à cette occasion quelque erreur, c'est-à-dire, qu'il faut

que votre Excellence prenne bien garde de ne pas laisser partir d'autres, croyant que ce sont les Anglais dont il s'agit.

Vous donnerez à ces trois Anglais des teskérés de route.

C'est à ces fins que je vous écris la présente.

(L.S.) MUSTAPHA RESHID.

No. 49.

Sir Stratford Canning to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received October 15.)

(No. 295.)

Therapia, September 28, 1849.

My Lord,

WE are not yet in possession of any intelligence calculated to throw light on the manner in which the Emperors of Russia and Austria may be expected to receive the Porte's explanation of its motives for not complying with their peremptory demand for the extradition of the refugees from Hungary. It appears that Fuad Effendi set out from Bucharest with the Sultan's letter on the 21st instant. But it is not clear whether he had obtained passports for entering within the Russian frontier, and it is rumoured that he has taken a circuitous route towards Warsaw, where he will probably not find the Emperor.

The prevailing impression here is, that M. de Titoff, influenced by Count Stürmer, has exceeded the strict limits of his instructions in suspending his diplomatic relations with the Porte; but such a proceeding is by no means consistent either with the position of a Russian Minister or with the personal character of M. de Titoff.

I am assured that the Prussian Representative, though I have not seen him myself since the departure of Prince Radzivil, has expressed to Aali Pasha opinions decidedly favourable to the Porte's view of the pending question. Nothing has occurred to indicate any relaxation of firmness on the part of the Turkish Ministers. The only member of the Council who persisted in showing any marked opposition to the line of conduct proposed by Reshid Pasha has been dismissed from office.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

No. 50.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received October 15.)

(No. 245.)

Vienna, October 9, 1849.

My Lord,

I HAVE not heard that there has arrived here any communication from St. Petersburgh respecting the late proceedings of the Russian Minister at Constantinople, and I continue to view that affair in the same light as I did when I had the honour to address to you my despatch No. 238; since then I have had a conversation with M. de Beaumont, and reported to him what Prince Schwarzenberg said to me, and heard from M. de Beaumont that the Prince had held to him the same language.

On the first arrival of intelligence here that the Hungarians had sought refuge in the Ottoman dominions, I took occasion to say to Prince Schwarzenberg that I thought the Sublime Porte would act in that matter in conformity with the counsel of Her Majesty's Government, and that I was certain the counsel would be that the Porte should not consent to deliver up the refugees; and I proceeded to state, with all due caution as to the expressions I used, that if the Porte should be pushed too far upon the point, the Porte would be supported by England and by France. Prince Schwarzenberg said he was well aware that a war with the Porte,

or any other war, would most probably lead to a general European war,—a most serious evil.

I have several times laid before your Lordship my strong opinion that at present the Emperor of Russia has no other views with relation to his foreign policy than those which he has himself avowed. I am convinced that such is his interest, and I shall be surprised if he shall allow himself to be moved by passion to deviate from that line. It is possible that it may be so.

It appears to me that the Russian Minister, M. Titoff, acted hastily, and exceeded the intentions of his Government.

At the outset of the affair, when the flight of the Hungarians was known, I gave my opinion to the Ottoman Minister here.

I have, &c.
(Signed) PONSONBY.

No. 51.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received October 16.)

(No. 247.)
My Lord, *Vienna, October 11, 1849.*

NOTHING has been said here yet respecting the view taken at St. Petersburgh of the events at Constantinople, but I have still the belief that the affair will be terminated without any serious results.

I have, &c.
(Signed) PONSONBY.

No. 52.

The Marquis of Normanby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received October 16.)

(No. 502. Confidential.)
My Lord, *Paris, October 15, 1849.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith to your Lordship the copies of a correspondence which has taken place between Prince Callimaki and M. de Tocqueville respecting a demand for assistance made by the Porte to the French Government.

I also inclose the copy of a speech delivered to the Sultan by the Russian Envoy at Constantinople upon the occasion of an audience which His Majesty granted to Prince Radzivil.

These papers have been communicated to me confidentially.

I have, &c.
(Signed) NORMANBY.

Inclosure 1 in No. 52.

Prince Callimaki to M. de Tocqueville.

M. le Ministre, *Paris, le 5 Octobre, 1849.*

LES informations directes que votre Excellence a dû recevoir sur le regrettable incident qui a amené la rupture des relations diplomatiques entre la Sublime Porte et les Représentans d'Autriche et de Russie à Constantinople, me dispensent d'entrer à ce sujet dans de plus longs détails que ceux qui me paraissent rigoureusement nécessaires pour l'appréciation des faits.

Par suite des derniers événemens accomplis en Hongrie, plusieurs réfugiés vinrent chercher asile et protection sur le sol hospitalier de la Turquie, après y avoir déposé les armes. Obéissant à la voix sacrée de l'humanité, mais désireux en même temps d'observer religieusement et

loyalement les procédés de bon voisinage et, si je puis m'exprimer ainsi, de police internationale que se doivent réciproquement des Etats amis, le Gouvernement du Sultan, en même temps qu'il accueillait ces transfuges du malheur qui venaient s'asseoir au foyer de la Turquie, déclarait hautement, franchement, qu'il entendait les mettre hors d'état de nuire ou même d'inquiéter en aucune sorte les Puissances voisines.

A cet effet des dispositions étaient déjà arrêtés et allaient être mises à exécution pour interner les réfugiés dans une partie reculée de l'Empire Ottoman, ou bien les éloigner du territoire Turque, lorsque, à la douloureuse surprise de la Sublime Porte, un ultimatum collectif des Représentans de la Russie et de l'Autriche à Constantinople vint poser au Gouvernement Ottoman le cas d'extradition immédiate des réfugiés, avec menace de rompre les relations avec la Sublime Porte en cas de refus. Votre Excellence ne peut ignorer que cette menace a déjà reçu son exécution en présence d'une sommation qu'aucun traité ne justifie, que les usages diplomatiques repoussent comme attentatoire à l'indépendance des nations, et qui n'est pas plus fondée en droit et en justice qu'elle ne l'est dans les formes consacrées. La réponse du Gouvernement Ottoman ne pouvait être douteuse: il a refusé de livrer les réfugiés, tout en maintenant sa déclaration préalable.

Cette résolution, dictée par les principes éternels de l'humanité et de l'honneur, le Gouvernement du Sultan l'a prise, M. le Ministre, avec la conscience de sa gravité. Placé entre une faiblesse qui entraînait la déconsidération, et une résistance honorable basée sur son droit, le Sultan et son Gouvernement ont reculé devant un acte de déloyauté. Mais en reculant ils se portaient par la pensée et par l'espérance vers cette noble France, la puissante et généreuse alliée de la Turquie.

Je viens donc, M. le Ministre, au nom du Gouvernement du Sultan, demander au Gouvernement de la République l'assistance morale et matérielle de la France. En faisant cet appel à la généreuse sympathie d'un grand peuple qui n'a jamais connu d'autre guide ni obéi à d'autre mobile qu'aux lois de l'honneur et de l'humanité, j'ose espérer que je n'ai pas trop présumé de sa bienveillance traditionnelle envers la Turquie, et je m'en rapporte à lui avec pleine confiance.

Veuillez, &c.
(Signé) CALLIMAKI.

Inclosure 2 in No. 52.

M. de Tocqueville to Prince Callimaki.

Monsieur, *Paris, ce 10 Octobre, 1849.*

J'AI reçu la lettre que vous m'avez fait l'honneur de m'écrire pour demander au nom de votre Gouvernement, que la France lui accorde son appui dans la situation grave et délicate où il se trouve placé par suite de son refus de livrer les réfugiés réclamés par les Cabinets de Vienne et de St. Pétersbourg. Le Gouvernement de la République, rendant justice à la générosité de la conduite de la Porte Ottomane dans les circonstances actuelles, n'a pas attendu son appel pour se préoccuper sérieusement des difficultés dans lesquelles elle se trouve engagée. A peine informé par le télégraphe, et d'une manière encore incomplète, du différend qui venait d'éclater à Constantinople, il s'est empressé, à l'effet de ménager éventuellement aux voies de transaction, d'envoyer à M. le Général Aupick l'autorisation de délivrer des passeports aux réfugiés que la Porte voudrait faire sortir de son territoire, et de les diriger sur la France, par dérogation aux mesures générales de police adoptées en dernier lieu. Depuis, j'ai chargé les Ministres de la République à Vienne et à St. Pétersbourg de faire entendre aux deux Cours Impériales de sérieuses représentations contre des exigences qui, lors-même qu'elles seraient justifiées par les traités et par les précédens, seraient encore souverainement impolitiques. La Porte qui, dans les négociations suivies avec les Envoyés de ces deux Cours, a montré jusqu'à présent autant de modération et de prudence que de fermeté, comprendra que pour conserver à notre intervention en sa

faveur plus de chances d'efficacité, nous ayons cru devoir éviter de premier abord, tout ce qui eût pu donner à ces représentations l'apparence d'une menace, tout ce qui, en blessant les susceptibilités de l'Autriche et de la Russie, eût engagé leur amour-propre et augmenté ainsi les difficultés d'un accommodement à l'amiable. Dans l'intérêt même du Gouvernement du Sultan, il nous a paru à propos de ne pas compromettre par des manifestations prématurées les relations bienveillantes qui existent aujourd'hui entre ces deux Puissances et le Gouvernement de la République, et qui nous mettront peut-être en mesure de concourir à un arrangement raisonnable. Nous continuerons à agir dans ce sens autant que les circonstances le comporteront, sans négliger cependant de prendre dès à présent les dispositions nouvelles pour être en état de pourvoir à toutes les éventualités.

Veuillez, Monsieur, porter à la connaissance de votre Gouvernement cette franche et loyale déclaration du Gouvernement de la République. Le Sultan y trouvera, sans aucun doute, un nouveau témoignage des sentimens d'amitié qui ont uni de tout temps la France et la Porte Ottomane.

Recevez, &c.
(Signé) A. DE TOCQUEVILLE.

Inclosure 3 in No. 52.

Prince Callimaki to M. de Tocqueville.

M. le Ministre, *Paris, le* 13 *Octobre*, 1849.

J'AI reçu la lettre que votre Excellence m'a fait l'honneur de m'écrire en date du 10 Octobre, et je me ferai un devoir de la transmettre sans délai au Gouvernement Impérial.

Comme vous le dites très bien, M. le Ministre, Sa Majesté le Sultan y trouvera un nouveau et précieux témoignage des sentimens d'amitié qui ont de tout temps uni les deux pays, et qui, je l'espère, demeureront inaltérables.

Quant à moi, M. le Ministre, je suis heureux d'avoir à vous exprimer, au nom de mon Gouvernement, la vive gratitude dont je me suis pénétré de l'accueil bienveillant que le Gouvernement de la République a bien voulu faire à mon appel; et en vous priant d'être auprès de lui l'interprète de ce sentiment,

J'ai l'honneur, &c.
(Signé) ALLIMAKI.

Inclosure 4 in No. 52.

Speech of M. de Titoff to the Sultan.

Sire,

LE message dont le Prince Radzivil est porteur prouve à votre Majesté Impériale combien l'Empereur mon Auguste Maître compte sur l'intérêt amical de votre Majesté en faveur du triomphe de l'autorité légitime en Hongrie.

Ce triomphe est consolant pour les amis de l'ordre et du vrai bonheur de l'humanité dans l'Europe entière.

Il assurera spécialement, s'il plaît à Dieu, le repos et la sécurité intérieure de l'Autriche et de la Russie, deux empires voisins et amis éprouvés de la Turquie.

Ni l'Empereur, ni votre Majesté ne pouviez rester indifférens aux troubles de Hongrie: votre Majesté, à cause des Principautés du Danube; l'Empereur, à cause de la Pologne.

Les factieux y comptaient sur le succès de la révolution en Hongrie pour réaliser leur plans subversifs dans tous les domaines Européens de votre Majesté.

Les partisans de la révolte reçus dans les Etats de votre Majesté plaideront, nous le savons, le droit du malheur pour réclamer un généreuse hospitalité.

L'Empereur exhorte votre Majesté à ne pas croire à ces langages insidieux. Les révolutionnaires l'ont tenu dans la plupart des pays de l'Europe qui, enseignés par de funestes expériences, ont fini par devoir mettre les raisons d'Etat au-dessus des sentimens d'une fausse philanthropie.

La raison d'Etat, Sire, autant que l'équité la plus rigoureuse et l'amitié franche qui unit votre Gouvernement à celui des deux empires voisins, autorise à espérer voir la demande de mon Auguste Maître accordée par le Gouvernement de votre Majesté.

Partout le séjour des réfugiés politiques a valu des dangers et des calamités certaines aux nations qui les ont accueillis.

La Turquie, vû sa position spéciale, est encore plus exposée à ces dangers, encore moins à même d'y opposer des précautions sérieuses.

En dépit de leurs protestations, en dépit de toutes les mesures de surveillance, les réfugiés ne cesseraient de conspirer dans l'ombre; et le jour où l'on s'y attendra le moins, ils feraient, avec audace, éclater leurs sinistres complots.

Le premier résultat en serait de bouleverser l'Orient.

La Russie ne saurait, Sire, se résigner à cette inquiétude perpétuelle, préjudiciable à son repos, et sans cesse menaçant pour la solidité de bons rapports avec le Gouvernement de votre Majesté.

Le sang Russe a coulé dans la guerre de Hongrie. Au sein de mon pays des familles distinguées et respectées pleurent la mort des officiers et autres braves tombés victimes de la lutte.

Votre Majesté exigera-t-elle qu'après ces sacrifices l'Empereur soit indifférent à laisser les chefs de l'insurrection libres de poursuivre leurs trames incendiaires, pour nous arracher un nouveau tribut de victimes dès que cela conviendrait aux ennemis de la paix?

Votre Majesté a trop de prévoyance, de grandeur et de justice pour vouloir offrir une telle perspective à votre sincère et fidèle allié.

Puisse la Divine Providence inspirer les résolutions de votre Majesté.

Daignez, Sire, autoriser les Ministres de votre Majesté à me donner une prompte réponse. Elle servira, j'ose en nourrir la rassurante certitude, à cimenter l'union si heureuse des deux Gouvernemens, des deux Augustes Souverains.

No. 53.

The Marquis of Normanby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received October 19.)

(No. 505.)

My Lord, *Paris, October* 18, 1849.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship the copy of a letter which I have received from Her Majesty's Consul at Marseilles, stating that orders had been received the day before for the French fleet of evolution to sail for the Dardanelles.

I have, &c.
(Signed) NORMANBY.

Inclosure in No. 53.

Consul Turnbull to the Marquis of Normanby.

(Private.)

My Lord, *Marseilles, October* 15, 1849.

ACCOUNTS from Toulon received this morning mention that orders were transmitted yesterday (from Paris) to the fleet of evolution lying in the roadstead of Hyères to sail immediately from thence for the Dardanelles.

The "Descartes" steamer of 540 horse-power had previously joined it. It will therefore be composed of six sail of the line, one small frigate, and two steamers. The "Tenare" steamer sailed the day before direct for Constantinople with despatches.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ALEXANDER TURNBULL.

No. 54.

Viscount Palmerston to Sir Stratford Canning.

(No. 254.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, October* 19, 1849.

I HAVE to acquaint your Excellency, in reply to your despatch No. 294, of the 28th of September, that Her Majesty's Government approve of the steps which you have taken for procuring the release of the three British subjects detained at Widdin.

I am, &c.

(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 55.

Mr. Buchanan to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received October 19.)

(No. 338.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, October* 9, 1849.

FUAD EFFENDI arrived here on the evening of the 5th instant, and his Excellency sent me on the following day a letter of which he was the bearer from Colonel Du Plat, inclosing one which Sir Stratford Canning had addressed to Her Majesty's Consul at Warsaw, under the impression that Fuad Effendi would find the Emperor at that capital. The copy of your Lordship's despatch to Sir Stratford Canning No. 230, of the 13th ultimo, transmitted to me in your Lordship's despatch No. 243, of the 28th ultimo, had fortunately just reached me, making me acquainted with the opinion of Her Majesty's Government respecting the demand which has been made by Austria at Constantinople, for the extradition of the persons who have lately escaped from Hungary into the Turkish territory; and I therefore determined to call upon Fuad Effendi, and offer him every support in the prosecution of the object of his mission, which I could properly afford him without instructions from your Lordship, by availing myself of the knowledge which I possessed of the views of Her Majesty's Government on the merits of the question at issue between the Austrian and the Turkish Governments.

I consequently wrote a few lines to his Excellency, of which I annex a copy, proposing to wait upon him on the following day; and I received the reply of which a copy is also annexed.

When I called at his Excellency's hotel on Sunday the 7th instant, he expressed his great gratification at my kindness in coming to him before he had paid his visits to the Diplomatic Body, which he said he understood it was contrary to etiquette that he should do until he had been received by the Emperor. After some other preliminary remarks, we entered upon the subject of his mission; and he evinced some anxiety to learn from me the feelings produced here by the refusal of the Porte to deliver up the political refugees, stating that as far as civility on the part of the Imperial authorities could be taken as evidence of their dispositions towards Turkey, his reception promised to be more satisfactory than he had at one time ventured to expect. He then said that he was to see Count Nesselrode the next day, the 8th, and that he hoped his audience of the Emperor would also shortly take place.

In replying to his Excellency I said to him that I could not pretend to offer him any decided opinion upon the persistence which might be shown in prosecuting the demands of Russia; but that, as far as I had yet been able to form my judgment, I was inclined to hope that the Porte's refusal to give up the refugees would not be made a serious grievance against Turkey. I acquainted his Excellency with your Lordship's view of the case with respect to the pretensions of Austria; and I said that I was ready, if he thought it would advance his interests, to have some confidential conversation on the subject with Count Nesselrode, in anticipation

of any instructions which I might eventually receive from your Lordship. To this he replied that until he had himself seen Count Nesselrode and perhaps even the Emperor, he thought it would be premature for me to take any step in support of the object of his mission; that the Sultan did not wish, if possible, to discuss the question of right, and had addressed himself rather to the generosity of the Emperor, pointing out to him the impossibility of a Mussulman Sovereign violating the rights of hospitality, on which the refugees had reckoned, without degrading himself for ever in the eyes of his own subjects; and his Excellency said that such a communication from one Sovereign to another had better be made without any appearance of his Envoy's acting in concert with others. His Excellency said, however, that if I would in the meantime ascertain General de Lamoricière's ideas on the subject, he would be obliged to me, and that he would eventually avail himself with gratitude of any support which the French Minister and Her Majesty's Legation might be able to afford him, should his hope of receiving a satisfactory answer to the letter which the Sultan had addressed to the Emperor prove unfounded. He evidently trusted that this would not be the case; and he evinced an opinion that the Austrian Government was likely to prove more unwilling to accept the explanations of the Porte, than His Imperial Majesty.

Such being his Excellency's views, I left him with the expression of a hope that he would be able to acquaint me with his prospects of success before the departure of my messenger who leaves St. Petersburgh to-morrow.

I then called on General de Lamoricière, and after informing him of Fuad Effendi's arrival, I made him acquainted with all that I knew myself upon the subject of his mission and of the recent events at Constantinople—Fuad Effendi having mentioned to me the cessation of diplomatic relations between the Austrian Mission and the Porte.

General de Lamoricière replied that he had not received a line from Paris on the subject of the refugees, since he had announced the departure of Prince Radzivil from Warsaw; but he expressed a conviction that the opinions of his Government would coincide with those which I believed to be entertained by that of Her Majesty; and that therefore, as far as unofficial support could be of use to Fuad Effendi, he was willing to afford it to his Excellency.

As Count Buol, the Austrian Minister, had arrived on the previous evening from Vienna, and as it was probable that his arrival was not unconnected with the late events at Constantinople, General de Lamoricière, after I had left him, proceeded to the Austrian Legation, where he had a long conversation with the Count, during which, availing himself of the information which I had given him, he pressed M. de Buol very hard upon the unjustifiable pretension of Austria to force upon the Porte an interpretation of the XVIIIth Article of the Treaty of Belgrade, which it was impossible for any Mussulman Sovereign to admit, saying that the French in their dealings with the Arab tribes of Africa were obliged to respect the sacredness of the asylum granted to refugees. He insinuated also that Austria evidently intended to avail herself in her interpretation of treaties, of the right of the strongest; and at last succeeded in inducing the Count, when defending the conduct of his Government, to say that no more serious results were likely to arise from the question than those which had already occurred. I dined with General de Lamoricière the same day; when he reported to me what I have now stated to your Lordship, and I agreed with him as to the expediency of Fuad Effendi's being informed, before his interview with the Chancellor, of Count Buol's arrival, and of General de Lamoricière's impression that Austria is not disposed to support her pretensions respecting the refugees by other than diplomatic means. I did not however think it advisable, as the General suggested, that I should call upon Fuad Effendi again myself in the evening, or that the General, who had already left a card upon him in the course of the day should do so, as it might not be agreeable to his Excellency, and it was perhaps even inexpedient that he should receive second visits from either of us until he had seen the Chancellor. I therefore proposed that the General should send one of his aides-de-camp to the Ottoman Envoy,

with the letter of which I have the honour to inclose herewith a copy to your Lordship, containing the information which we thought it desirable to convey to him.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

Inclosure 1 in No. 55.

Mr. Buchanan to Fuad Effendi.

6 *Octobre*, 1849.

MR. BUCHANAN s'empresse d'accuser à son Excellence Fuad Effendi la réception de la lettre que son Excellence a bien voulu lui faire remettre aujourd'hui de la part de M. le Colonel Du Plat; et en prévenant son Excellence qu'il se propose d'avoir l'honneur de se rendre chez elledemain pour lui exprimer ses remercimens en personne, il profite, &c.

Inclosure 2 in No. 55.

Fuad Effendi to Mr. Buchanan.

Hotel de Russie, le 6 Octobre, 1849.

FUAD EFFENDI a eu l'honneur de recevoir la lettre que Mr. Buchanan a eu la bonté de lui envoyer, et en attendant l'honneur qu'il lui promet de venir le voir, il profite, &c.

Inclosure 3 in No. 55.

Mr. Buchanan to Fuad Effendi.

Dimanche, $\frac{13 \text{ Septembre}}{1 \text{ Octobre}}$, 1849.

MR. BUCHANAN s'empresse de prévenir son Excellence Fuad Effendi que le Comte Buol, Ministre d'Autriche à cette Cour, vient d'arriver de Vienne; et qu'il est à supposer que son arrivée aît quelque rapport au sujet du refus de la Sublime Porte de livrer au Gouvernement Autrichien les réfugiés Hongrois.

M. le Général de Lamoricière a eu une conversation assez longue avec M. de Buol aujourd'hui au sujet des prétentions de l'Autriche, et Mr. Buchanan croit qu'il sera agréable à son Excellence Fuad Effendi d'apprendre que l'impression que cette conversation a laissé sur l'esprit de M. de Lamoricière a été, que la question dont il s'agit n'amènera pas une querelle sérieuse entre l'Autriche et la Turquie. M. de Lamoricière a bien voulu se charger de faire parvenir cette lettre à son Excellence Fuad Effendi; et Mr. Buchanan en exprimant son espoir qu'elle aura quelques bonnes nouvelles à lui donner avant Mardi soir, profite, &c.

No. 56.

Mr. Buchanan to Viscount Palmerston.— (Received October 19.)

(No. 339. Confidential.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, October 9*, 1849.

WHEN I informed General de Lamoricière on Sunday the 7th instant, of the arrival of Fuad Effendi, he said that as Count Nesselrode had fortunately named an hour to see him on the following day, he would take advantage of the opportunity to have some conversation with his Excellency on the subject of the demand of Russia to have the Polish refugees delivered up to her by the Turkish Government; and that he would not fail to make me acquainted with what might pass between them.

General de Lamoricière has since told me that he held during this interview nearly the same language to his Excellency, which he had already done to the Austrian Minister, as reported in my preceding despatch; and on his Excellency saying that the IInd Article of the Treaty of Kainardji was clearly in favour of the pretensions of Russia, he replied, having previously made himself acquainted with the French translation of the Treaty, that it seemed to him incredible that a Mussulman Government should have ratified a convention acknowledging the principle of extradition. Upon this Count Nesselrode produced the Treaty, and read the Article, of which a copy is annexed; passing lightly over its first clauses, he apparently rested his case entirely upon the last one, beginning at "Pareillement." The General therefore observed, that his Excellency by so doing confirmed him in his original opinions, as if the first and most important clause in the Article did not render obligatory the extradition of refugees, it was natural to suppose that any phrase of a contrary signification in the last clause was incorrectly translated from the Turkish.

His Excellency does not appear to have made any answer to this reasoning, but shifting his ground, he endeavoured to maintain that the first clause left Russia at all events at liberty to choose between refugees being expelled or delivered up; and he said that she considered the case sufficiently serious to insist upon the latter alternative.

It is needless however for me to trouble your Lordship with a detail of the arguments used on both sides as to the interpretations of which the Article would admit, as all its bearings have doubtless been naturally considered by Her Majesty's Government; but I may mention, that Count Nesselrode pretended to attach some importance to a portion of the Council; or as he said, the Ulemas, or interpreters of the law, having voted in favour of the pretensions of Russia.

The conversation afterwards turned upon the political view of the question. The General said that he spoke without any instructions from his Government; but that he knew enough of his country to feel assured that no French Ministry could last for a day, which would permit the Porte to be forced into delivering up to punishment the persons who had lately sought refuge in their territories; that he could not say that if Russia pushed the question to extremities, the present French Government would support Turkey to the last; but that he could assure his Excellency that Russia's using in this case the right of the strongest would inevitably force them into measures which they wished to avoid, or bring persons into power who would throw the country again into a course of which the results could not be foreseen ("dans l'inconnu"); and that the Russian Government would do well to reflect deeply, for the sake of Europe, before they submitted Turkey to a humiliation which might lead to the most deplorable calamities.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

Inclosure in No. 56.

Article II of the Treaty of Koutchouc-Kainardji, July 10, 1776.

SI après la conclusion du Traité et l'échange des ratifications, quelques sujets des deux empires, ayant commis quelque crime capital, ou s'étant rendus coupables de désobéissance ou de trahison, voulaient se cacher ou chercher asile chez l'une des deux Puissances, ils n'y devront être reçus ni gardés sous aucun prétexte, mais immédiatement livrés ou du moins chassés des Etats de la Puissance chez laquelle ils se seraient retirés; afin que pour de tels malfaiteurs il ne s'élève aucun refroidissement ou contestation inutile entre les deux empires, à l'exception cependant de ceux qui dans l'Empire de Russie auront embrassé la religion Chrétienne, et dans l'Empire Ottoman la religion Mahométane. Pareillement, au cas que quelques sujets des deux empires, soit Chrétiens ou Mahométans, ayant commis quelque forfait ou délit, ou pour quelque cause que ce soit, passent d'un empire dans l'autre, ils seront immédiatement livrés dès que la réquisition en sera faite.

No. 57.

Mr. Buchanan to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received October 19.)

(No. 343.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, October* 9, 1849.

I HAVE the honour to acquaint your Lordship that Prince Radzivil arrived at St. Petersburgh from Constantinople the night before last.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

No. 58.

Mr. Buchanan to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received October 19.)

(No. 346.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, October* 10, 1849.

I CALLED on Fuad Effendi yesterday evening, but his Excellency had unfortunately retired to rest at an early hour, and I have therefore only a few moments before the departure of the steam-packet to acquaint your Lordship with the account which his Excellency has given me this morning of his interview with Count Nesselrode on the 8th instant, and of the prospect which he trusts exists of a satisfactory arrangement of the difference which has arisen between his Government and that of the Emperor, respecting the Polish refugees who have passed from Hungary into the Turkish territory.

He said that during a long conversation with the Chancellor, his Excellency had shown a disposition to discuss the question in a conciliatory spirit, but that nothing decisive took place at the interview, which was ended by Count Nesselrode saying that he would submit to-day to the Emperor the copy of the Sultan's letter, and take His Imperial Majesty's orders upon the subject of its contents.

The impression left however on Fuad Effendi's mind was, that the Chancellor meant him to understand that the question was susceptible of arrangement.

The next day M. Séniavine having called upon his Excellency to return a visit which he had paid to him, a discussion took place between them upon the merits of the question at issue, during which M. Séniavine held much firmer language than Count Nesselrode as to the right of

Russia to insist upon the execution of a demand which could not be refused without a violation of her treaties with the Porte. He said that he could only express his personal opinions until the decision of the Emperor was known, but that he was sure His Imperial Majesty would not submit to any infringement of his Treaties with the Porte; and that if Foreign Powers pretended to interfere in the question at issue, His Imperial Majesty would not listen to any terms of accommodation whatever.

Fuad Effendi replied that his presence at St. Petersburgh as the bearer of a letter from the Sultan in which His Highness evinced his desire to treat the question directly with His Imperial Majesty, as between Sovereign and Sovereign, and as one which affected His Highness' honour, his personal sentiments, and his consideration as a Sovereign in the eyes of his own subjects, was a sufficient proof of the conciliatory dispositions of the Turkish Government, and of their anxiety not to seek for the interference of other Powers, or to take any steps which could offend the susceptibilities or dignity of His Imperial Majesty; and he added that he trusted the Emperor would duly appreciate and respond to the sentiments which animated the Sultan his master. It appears that M. Séniavine became rather less decided in his language towards the close of their conversation, and insinuated that the Russian Government had reason to believe that some of the leading refugees had embraced the Mahometan religion, and that if this were the case, Russia would naturally cease to have any further claim upon them.

To this Fuad Effendi appears to have answered that the persons in question would not ameliorate their position in Turkey by taking such a step, and that whatever measures had been already decided upon respecting them would be equally carried out, whether they remained Christians or became Mussulmans.

During our interview I informed his Excellency that the Austrian Minister had affected to treat the question lightly in conversation with me yesterday, and that he deprecated the idea of Austria ever making it a cause for a serious rupture with the Porte; and I also informed his Excellency of what had passed between General de Lamoricière and Count Nesselrode at the interview referred to in my despatch No. 339 of yesterday's date; and I pointed out to him some other reasons which I had for believing that there was a disposition on the part of the Russian Government to accept the explanations of the Sultan in an amicable spirit.

His Excellency then begged me to inform your Lordship that he did not despair that the matter would be arranged without diplomatic discussions; but that if he should be unfortunately disappointed in this expectation, he would then take his stand upon the rights of the Porte, and that in such a case he trusted he should not be left without the support of Her Majesty's Government.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

No. 59.

Mr. Buchanan to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received October 19.)

(Private.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, October* 10, 1849.

M. SENIAVINE having I understand been at the Foreign Department both yesterday and on Monday, and Count Nesselrode having endeavoured to avoid keeping his appointment with General de Lamoricière on Monday, I cannot help feeling that the Chancellor has been anxious to avoid any communication with the French Minister or myself until after he shall have ascertained the Emperor's decision with respect to the explanations which Fuad Effendi has to offer as to the refusal of the Porte to give up the refugees. As far as I could form my own opinion last

Monday from that of others, as to the probable nature of the Emperor's decision, I was inclined to hope that the question would not lead to a serious rupture of the amicable relations of Russia with the Porte. General de Lamoricière, however, seemed to feel strongly that the reasoning on which persons here were inclined to take this favourable view of the case, was of too diplomatic a character, and did not give sufficient weight to the personal feelings which might influence the Emperor, who has gone too far, in the General's opinion, to retrace his steps without reluctance, as he may possibly conceive that the acceptance of a refusal from the Porte would be quite as derogatory to his dignity as a compliance with his demands would manifestly have been to that of the Sultan. I was therefore anxious to communicate to the Russian Government, in some confidential form, the view which I conceived Her Majesty's Government would take of the rights of Turkey; my opinion of that view being founded on the contents of your Lordship's despatch to Sir Stratford Canning with respect to the XVIIIth Article of the Treaty of Belgrade, taken together with an opinion expressed by that Ambassador in a confidential letter to Colonel Du Plat, that no further rights can be deduced in favour of Russia, from her treaties with Turkey, than to demand the expulsion of political refugees. I therefore took occasion to write a few private lines to M. Seniavine, of which I have the honour to inclose a copy, thanking his Excellency for the arrangement of some current affairs which he had announced to me in a private letter declining to receive me on Monday; and I referred to the subject by expressing my regret that, from intelligence which I had received from Constantinople, it appeared that the interpretation of the Treaties of Russia with the Porte was again about to cause a difference of opinion between our Governments, adding that circumstances had happily permitted us last year to remain good friends, while maintaining our respective opinions; and that I felt too much confidence in the sentiments of the Emperor to fear that the present discussion of Russia with the Porte would lead to a less satisfactory result. I trust that your Lordship will not disapprove of my having ventured to touch upon this delicate subject, even in a private communication, without instructions from your Lordship; but considering that Count Nesselrode maintained to General de Lamoricière that the right of Russia to demand the refugees was clearly supported by her treaties with the Porte, I thought that it was essential without loss of time to prepare his Excellency for the possible expression of an entirely different opinion on the part of Her Majesty's Government. I trust at all events that if your Lordship thinks that I said too much, you will excuse me on the ground that my manner of doing so cannot possibly lead to any inconvenience. I mentioned to Fuad Effendi to-day that I had ventured to say something of this kind to M. Seniavine, and his Excellency expressed himself very grateful for my having done so.

I have to apologise to your Lordship for the hurried manner in which this letter is written; but I have unfortunately been unwell during the last four or five days, and am still suffering from indisposition.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

No. 60.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received October* 20.)

No. 251.)
My Lord, *Vienna, October* 15, 1849.

NO intelligence has arrived from Petersburgh, and therefore I will not say more on the subject of the affairs with the Sublime Porte, than to repeat my belief that they will be settled somehow or other without serious mischief.

I write late in the day, but in time for the post, in order to keep your Lordship informed, so far as I am able, of the actual state of things.

The messenger will I presume come to-day (Monday), and I hope to be able to send fuller intelligence by him to-morrow.

I have, &c.
(Signed) PONSONBY.

No. 61.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received October* 21.)

(No. 253.)
My Lord, *Vienna, October* 16, 1849.

THE messenger Colonel Townley arrived here this day about 11 o'clock, having been delayed on the road. I have received your Lordship's instructions.

I am happy to say that I feel the strongest confidence in the truth of what I now write, namely, that the affairs of Turkey will be amicably settled, and in a way that will satisfy the friends of peace.

I will delay a further report till to-morrow, and I beg your Lordship to excuse my brevity.

I have, &c.
(Signed) PONSONBY.

No. 62.

Baron Brunnow to Count Nesselrode.—(*Communicated to Viscount Palmerston by Baron Brunnow.*)

Londres, le $\frac{7}{19}$ *Octobre*, 1849.

MON entrevue avec Lord Palmerston a eu lieu au Foreign Office le $\frac{7}{19}$ Octobre.

J'ai commencé par résumer la substance de notre entretien précédent, $\frac{27 \text{ Septembre}}{9 \text{ Octobre}}$.

"Nous avons constaté à cette occasion," lui ai-je dit, "que jusqu'ici l'état de paix entre la Russie et la Porte n'a pas été interrompu. Il y a discussion entre les deux Gouvernemens, il y a grief, il y a différend, mais il n'y a pas de conflit. La suspension des relations diplomatiques à Constantinople n'établit pas encore un état de guerre. Même le rappel de la Légation de Russie, s'il avait lieu, ne le constituerait pas non plus. Pour qu'il y ait guerre, il faut une déclaration d'abord, un commencement d'hostilité ensuite; jusque là il n'y a ni lésion, ni attaque. Contre un danger qui n'existe point en réalité, la Turquie n'a pas besoin d'assistance. Nous avons constaté ces vérités, et nous en avons conclu, que tant que la Porte Ottomane reste en paix, le principe de la fermeture des Détroits des Dardanelles et du Bosphore, consacré par notre Traité de 1841, demeure intact dans toute sa force et valeur.

"Nous en sommes convenus entre nous. Vous me l'avez déclaré. J'en ai informé ma Cour.

"Depuis, il est survenu un fait nouveau. J'ai appris qu'à Paris Lord Normanby s'est concerté avec le Gouvernement Français sur un mouvement simultané de vos escadres dans les mers du Levant. La réalité de ce fait m'a été confirmée par le témoignage de l'Ambassadeur de France.

"Cet incident m'a paru avoir besoin d'explication. Je viens à vous pour vous la demander franchement, sérieusement. Les Cabinets qui désirent vivre entre eux en bonne intelligence, pour ne pas se méprendre sur leurs intentions, doivent mutuellement se rendre compte de leurs actes, lorsque ces actes peuvent donner lieu à malentendu.

"Afin d'aller au-devant de cette chance, je viens vous demander aujourd'hui à vous expliquer envers moi sur deux choses: d'abord, sur

l'intention qui a présidé au mouvement actuel de votre escadre; en second lieu, sur les limites dans lesquelles ce mouvement sera circonscrit."

Lord Palmerston m'a répondu:—"Je trouve fort juste le motif de l'explication que vous me demandez, et je n'éprouve aucune difficulté à vous la donner.

"Je commencerai par vous indiquer les bornes de l'expédition de notre escadre. Elle a la Méditerranée pour limite. Elle n'a point pour objet de franchir l'entrée du Détroit des Dardanelles. Aussi longtemps que la Porte reste en paix, le principe de la fermeture des détroits subsiste tel que notre Convention de 1841 l'a établi. Il n'y a d'exception qu'en faveur des bâtimens légers qui servent de communication aux Ambassadeurs de Constantinople.

"L'Amiral Parker, qui se trouve actuellement sur les côtes de la Grèce se rendra de là dans l'Archipel. L'escadre Française se concentrera dans le Golfe de Smyrne. La nôtre se dirigera vers les parages voisins dont l'Amiral Parker fera choix, pour y établir sa station pendant la durée de la croisière de son escadre.

"Quant à l'intention dans laquelle se fait ce mouvement, il n'y a rien de ce qui puisse donner ombrage à la Russie. Un déploiement de forces navales dans les parages de votre empire deviendrait à vos yeux une démonstration que vous auriez lieu de regarder comme dirigé contre vous. Tel aurait été le cas de l'apparition d'une escadre Anglaise dans la Baltique. Je l'admets. Il n'en est pas question. La Méditerranée est séparée de vous par de longues distances. L'entrée des Dardanelles reste fermée en vertu des engagemens réciproques qui nous lient les uns envers les autres, par une transaction dont nous avons tous reconnu la sagesse; et dont nous sommes intéressés à respecter le maintien aussi longtemps que la Turquie demeure en paix.

"Nul doute qu'elle n'ait été vivement préoccupée du différend récemment survenu entre vous. Elle en a été d'autant plus alarmée qu'elle a cru entrevoir dans la suspension des rapports diplomatiques des Légations de Russie et d'Autriche à Constantinople, le symptôme d'une rupture prochaine. Cet état de choses a inspiré au Gouvernement Ottoman des appréhensions que pour ma part je considère jusqu'ici comme mal fondées.

"Mais une politique de simple prévoyance ne permet à aucun Gouvernement d'être pris à l'improviste par les événemens qui peuvent survenir. Cette considération nous a fait reconnaître le besoin d'adopter une attitude d'observation et d'attente. La présence de notre escadre dans les mers du Levant est la conséquence de cette prévision, en face d'une éventualité qui, je l'espère, ne se réalisera point."

J'ai annoncé au Principal Secrétaire d'Etat que je porterais ces explications à la connaissance du Cabinet Impérial, en lui réservant d'en apprécier le mérite; mais en m'acquittant de ce devoir j'ai jugé nécessaire de ne point passer sous silence les réflexions que me suggéraient les éclaircissemens que Lord Palmerston venait de me communiquer quant au mouvement actuel des deux escadres.

Je vais retracer ces réflexions dans leur ensemble.

Avant tout, j'ai demandé si ce mouvement n'a pas quelque chose de prématuré et d'intempestif? En effet entre la Porte et le Cabinet Impérial il s'est élevé une discussion qui jusqu'ici se poursuit dans les voies diplomatiques. Le Sultan a fait partir pour St. Pétersbourg un Envoyé Spécial chargé d'exposer en son nom, et les embarras et les motifs d'excuse de la Porte. Cet Envoyé est à peine arrivé à sa destination. L'accueil qu'il a rencontré chez nous n'est pas encore connu. Si sa mission obtient un résultat favorable, la discussion entre les Cours directement intéressées vient à cesser d'elle-même. N'aurait-il pas fallu attendre l'issue de cette mission sans en prévenir d'avance le non-succès?

"De plus," ai-je ajouté, "le déploiement de forces navales dans les mers du Levant, au lieu de devenir pour la Porte un motif de sécurité, ne servira-t-il pas plutôt à compliquer la situation, en jetant les Turcs dans la voie d'une fausse politique? Des vaisseaux de guerre, comme j'ai eu occasion de le dire à Lord John Russell, sont d'étranges messagers de paix. Le Gouvernement Ottoman, nous le savons d'ailleurs par expérience,

est facilement enclin à s'aveugler sur les vrais intérêts d'un empire qui, pour se maintenir en équilibre, a un besoin absolu de repos. Au lieu de prêter à la Porte un point d'appui, vous courrez le risque de la précipiter, en lui faisant perdre balance. Vous voulez l'étayer. Prenez garde de ne pas la faire crouler.

"Cette catastrophe serait un événement si compromettant pour la paix générale, qu'il est du devoir de tout homme public appelé à traiter une question d'une telle importance, de mettre à couvert sa responsabilité devant son propre Gouvernement aussi bien que devant le jugement de l'Europe entière.

"Je crois satisfaire à ce devoir en signalant à votre attention ce que la situation présente de grave à mes yeux.

"Assurément vous avez éloigné de moi toute responsabilité morale, en adoptant les déterminations que vous venez de prendre sans m'en avoir donné avis. J'ai lieu de m'en féliciter plutôt que de m'en plaindre. S'il en arrive malheur, je vous prends à témoin que l'événement, quel qu'il soit, ne retombera pas à ma charge. J'en appelle aussi à vous pour constater dès à présent que c'est entre les mains de votre Ambassadeur à Constantinople que reposent aujourd'hui les plus graves intérêts de la paix Européenne, selon qu'il conduira les Turcs vers le bien ou vers le mal.

"Autant que je puis en juger, vous avez laissé à cet égard à Sir S. Canning une grande latitude de pouvoir. Je désire qu'il en use sagement. Lorsqu'il s'agit d'une affaire où des questions de guerre et de paix se trouvent mises en jeu, ma confiance, je dois vous l'avouer, serait plus grande, aussi longtemps que je verrais les décisions à prendre rester entre les mains du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique. Trop souvent un agent diplomatique, quelque élevé qu'il soit par son mérite, se laisse influencer par les préoccupations locales qui l'environnent. Il n'y a que les Cabinets seuls qui par leur position soient placés au-dessus de ces influences. Voilà pourquoi je me permets de vous dire sans réserve, que la paix me semblera mieux assurée, tant que le Cabinet de Sa Majesté Britannique sera le juge, que lorsque je prévois que l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre à Constantinople en est rendu le gardien. Cette responsabilité est immense. Elle pésera sur Sir S. Canning de tout son poids."

Lord Palmerston a accueilli ces observations avec un sérieux intérêt. Voici les réflexions qu'il m'a communiquées en retour des miennes.

D'abord en ce qui est de la remarque que j'ai faite sur le caractère, selon moi prématuré, des déterminations qui viennent d'être arrêtées ici, le Principal Secrétaire d'Etat m'a fait observer que lorsqu'il s'agit d'adopter des mesures de précaution à de longues distances, il n'est guères prudent de le différer jusqu'au dernier moment, afin de ne pas se trouver pris au dépourvu par la rapidité de la marche des événemens.

Quant à l'influence que la présence des escadres pourrait produire sur l'esprit du Gouvernement Ottoman en l'égarant, Lord Palmerston pense que "le Divan, selon son habitude, lorsqu'il voit des forces étrangères se concentrer autour de lui, se montre plus pacifique que belliqueux. En général les Turcs se sentent peu à l'aise sous une assistance étrangère. Ils aiment mieux y compter de loin que de près."

Cette considération porte le Principal Secrétaire d'Etat à croire que l'appui moral prêté aux Ministres Ottomans par le voisinage des escadres ne contribuera pas non plus cette fois-ci à leur faire perdre de vue le besoin de la paix dont ils reconnaissent l'indispensable nécessité.

D'une autre part aussi Lord Palmerston ne méconnait pas la vérité de mes réflexions sur le danger qu'il y aurait à précipiter la Porte, en lui donnant mal-à-propos une impulsion qui fût de nature à l'entraîner vers sa chûte. A son avis il convient de l'appuyer d'une main et de la retenir de l'autre. C'est dans ce sens qu'il comprend la tâche que Sir S. Canning aura à remplir. Il compte sur la fidélité avec laquelle cet Ambassadeur s'acquittera de cette mission. Assurément le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté a jugé nécessaire de laisser à son Représentant à Constantinople une certaine latitude de pouvoir selon les circonstances au milieu desquelles il se trouve placé à de si grandes distances. Mais ce pouvoir discrétionnaire à son avis est suffisamment réglé par les instructions dont il est muni. Elles lui recommandent le grand intérêt de la paix qui se

trouve si intimement lié à la conservation de l'Empire Ottoman. Cette considération, selon Lord Palmerston, servira de guide et de contrôle à la conduite politique de Sir S. Canning.

Enfin, quant à l'importance qui j'ai attaché en cette occasion à mettre à couvert ma propre responsabilité par les explications dans lesquelles je viens d'entrer envers lui, le Principal Secrétaire d'Etat a reconnu que j'ai fait en cela strictement ce qui m'était commandé et par la conscience de mon devoir envers le service de l'Empereur, et par la gravité des conjonctures au milieu desquelles je me suis trouvé appelé à porter la parole dans l'intérêt du repos général, commun à toutes les Puissances amies de la paix.

Après avoir ainsi pris soin de me prémunir contre la responsabilité des événemens qui peuvent survenir et qui sont entièrement hors de mon contrôle, il me restait encore une obligation à remplir envers le Ministre de l'Empereur à Constantinople : je me suis acquitté de ce devoir dans un esprit de conciliation et de justice auquel le Cabinet Impérial, j'ose le croire, ne refusera point son suffrage.

Plus d'une fois j'ai entendu affirmer durant cette crise, que les inquiétudes de la Porte avaient été excitées par les menaces dirigées contre elle de la part des Représentans de Russie et d'Autriche. J'ai saisi l'occasion que m'offrait ma présente entrevue avec Lord Palmerston pour éclaircir ce fait en ce qui concerne M. de Titoff personnellement. J'ai invité le Principal Secrétaire d'Etat à me dire s'il tenait entre ses mains la preuve d'une communication comminatoire faite à Constantinople par le Ministre de Russie. Il a formé une demande d'extradition. La lettre de nos Traités autorisait cette demande. A-t-il accompagné cette démarche d'une note conçue dans des termes de menace ? S'il l'a fait, où est-elle, cette note ? La Porte devrait la posséder. Elle n'aurait assurément pas manqué de la produire.

Lord Palmerston m'a répliqué qu'il n'a reçu de Constantinople aucun document de ce genre venant du Ministre de Russie. La plainte du Gouvernement Ottoman paraît se fonder sur le ton de menace dont M. l'Internonce d'Autriche aurait fait usage. Les appréhensions de la Porte ne me sembleraient donc avoir principalement pour motif que la détermination des deux Ministres à suspendre leurs rapports diplomatiques: détermination prise en commun par les Représentans de Russie et d'Autriche.

Ici j'ai jugé nécessaire de rappeler au souvenir du Principal Secrétaire d'Etat un antécédent qui m'a paru offrir une grande similitude avec ce qui vient de se passer aujourd'hui.

Au mois de Mai 1836, à l'occasion d'une contestation survenue entre Lord Ponsonby et le Ministère Ottoman à propos d'une querelle dans laquelle s'est trouvé impliqué Mr. Churchill, sujet Anglais, l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre à l'appui de sa demande de réparation a rompu ses relations avec le Reis Effendi. La Porte nous a communiqué dans le temps les pièces officielles échangées entre elle et Lord Ponsonby. Je les ai retirées de mes archives pour les placer sous les yeux de Lord Palmerston. J'ai appelé son attention et sur la note de Lord Ponsonby du 10 Mai, et sur l'instruction que cet Ambassadeur a adressé au 1er drogman Pisani sous date du 22 Mai.

S'il est une pièce diplomatique qui ait jamais renfermé une menace, c'est assurément cette dernière instruction. Votre Excellence en jugera elle-même si elle veut bien en prendre lecture.

Le Cabinet Impérial ne s'en est point préoccupé. D'un côté il a rassuré la Porte ; de l'autre il a eu recours à la bienveillance et à l'équité du Gouvernement Britannique en transmettant au Comte Pozzo di Borgo des instructions dictées par un sincère désir de conciliation. De la part de la Russie il n'y a eu alors ni inquiétudes, ni agitation, ni mouvement d'escadre. Il y a eu simplement un désir amical d'aplanir un différend qui, en s'aggravant, aurait pu troubler les relations de paix entre la Turquie et l'Angleterre.

Lord Palmerston s'est parfaitement souvenu de cet incident ; mais il m'a fait observer qu'à cette époque Lord Ponsonby, en suspendant ses rapports officiels avec le Reis Effendi, en a appelé de ce Ministre à la

décision souveraine du Sultan ; tandis que dans la situation actuelle, les Représentans de Russie et d'Autriche ont interrompu leurs relations avec la Porte elle-même.

Sans que je conteste la réalité de cette distinction, je me borne à constater le fait tel qu'il a été dans ses résultats.

L'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre ne s'est contenté de rien moins que de la destitution du Reis Effendi. La Porte s'est prêtée à donner cette satisfaction à Lord Ponsonby. Il m'a suffi de rappeler cette circonstance pour démontrer qu'à cette époque le langage de cet Ambassadeur n'avait certainement pas en vue de ménager l'indépendance ni la susceptibilité de la Porte Ottomane. Je ne pense pas qu'un semblable reproche puisse retomber aujourd'hui à la charge du Ministre de Russie.

L'esprit de cordialité mutuelle dans lequel nous avons examiné toutes les questions que nous avons abordées successivement dans le cours de notre entretien, m'a autorisé à revenir encore une fois auprès de Lord Palmerston sur une réflexion que je lui avais déjà signalée dans notre entrevue précédente ; je veux dire sur la nécessité de ne pas compliquer la situation de la Porte au risque de mettre en danger la sécurité de cet empire qui renferme en lui tant d'élémens de dissolution et de désordre.

Nul doute, selon mon intime conviction, que l'amitié et l'appui de l'Empereur n'aient été depuis ces derniers vingt années le soutien le plus solide de l'Empire Ottoman. Tant que la sollicitude de notre Auguste Maître veille à la conservation du repos de cet empire, il est certain que les populations Chrétiennes en Turquie se sentent involontairement retenues dans les bornes de la soumission envers la Porte Ottomane. Dès l'instant où elles croient entrevoir qu'entre les deux Gouvernemens il y a probabilité de rupture, elles sentent se réveiller en elles le désir inné de l'affranchissement. Pour que ce sentiment éclate, il n'est pas besoin qu'il y ait guerre entre la Russie et la Turquie. Il suffit que l'Empereur retire la main qu'il tend encore aujourd'hui au Sultan son allié. Une bonne politique pourrait-elle conseiller à la Porte de renoncer à l'appui qu'elle trouve dans l'amitié de l'Empereur de Russie ? La sagesse des Cabinets de l'Europe ne devrait-elle pas consister au contraire à prémunir la Turquie contre les conséquences qu'entraînerait après elle la perte d'une amitié qui sert de garantie à son repos.

A ces considérations je me suis permis d'ajouter une remarque dont je suis singulièrement frappé. Quel étrange contraste présenterait un jour la Turquie, si les populations Chrétiennes, impatientes de s'affranchir, attiraient encore sur elles les actes de vengeance de la Porte. La Russie pourrait-elle rester indifférente à ce spectacle ? Ne verrions-nous pas alors les sentimens d'humanité, d'affranchissement, de croyance religieuse se réfugier sous la protection de la Russie ? et l'Angleterre se résignerait-elle, le cas échéant, à soutenir la cause de l'Islamisme en conflit avec les idées de civilisation Chrétienne en Orient ?

Pour empêcher que la paix de l'Europe ne soit exposée à une si grande épreuve il importe d'éloigner de la Turquie les causes qui tendent à compromettre ses relations amicales avec la Russie. C'est là une vérité que je me suis fait un sérieux devoir de recommander encore une fois à la sollicitude de Lord Palmerston. Je me permets de croire qu'il a apprécié la franchise de mon langage. Je la devais aux rapports d'amitié et de confiance que l'Empereur m'a chargé d'entretenir avec le Cabinet de Sa Majesté Britannique, et que je me suis estimé heureux de cultiver par le soin avec lequel j'ai fidèlement servi depuis dix ans les intentions pacifiques de notre Auguste Maître.

En terminant notre entrevue, nous sommes convenus avec Lord Palmerston que je lui communiquerais le résumé de notre entretien, afin de le mettre à même de vérifier l'exactitude des explications dont le présent rapport renferme le récit.

J'ai l'honneur, &c.
(Signé) BRUNNOW.

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No. 63.

Viscount Palmerston to Sir Stratford Canning.

(No. 259. Confidential.)

Foreign Office, October 22, 1849.

Sir,

I INCLOSE for your Excellency's information a copy of a despatch from Colonel Du Plat, pointing out that General Bem is not a Russian subject, and that the claim of Austria to his allegiance may be considered doubtful.

I am, &c.
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

Inclosure in No. 63.

Colonel Du Plat to Viscount Palmerston.

Warsaw, October 15, 1849.

My Lord,

ALTHOUGH it be but natural to suppose that a question of such importance as that which has arisen between the Porte and the Imperial Governments of Austria and Russia, in regard to the extradition of the Polish and Hungarian refugees, is not likely to be settled by mere legal technicalities or by the weighing of the words of antiquated treaties, it may not be without some interest to state on undoubted authority, that the fugitive Bem, who appears to have excited the Emperor of Russia's anger, perhaps more than any other individual at present so nobly protected by the Turkish Government,—that this bold partisan and determined enemy of Russia is not at all a natural-born subject of the King of Poland and Emperor of Russia.

Bem was born in that poon of Poland which until of late years formed the territory of the free State of Cracow. In 1812 when that district formed a part of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, Bem entered the military service of that Grand Duchy, and with many of his comrades was afterwards incorporated in the army which was organized in 1815 for the present Kingdom of Poland.

Some years afterwards he was obliged to leave the service of this State; and of course with the cessation of his official relations with the Crown of the Emperor and King, every tie of allegiance was likewise severed. Bem lived in other parts of Poland (Galicia, I believe) until the outbreak of the insurrection of 1830 and 1831, when he again appeared here to play the well-known part which he bore in some of the most remarkable events of that struggle; and although he may have been always considered since then as a rebel by the Russian Government, that Government most certainly has no right to claim him as a subject according to the letter or the spirit of the existing treaties with Turkey.

It seems doubtful even whether Austria has a well-defined legal right to claim Bem as a subject, because he was a proscribed man and a forced exile, not only from the territories of the Emperor of Russia, but likewise from the soil of the free State of which he is a natural-born subject, for years before that little territory was incorporated with the Austrian dominions, and has therefore never owned any allegiance to the Austrian Crown, any more than he has received any protection from it.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GUST. DU PLAT.

No. 64.

Viscount Palmerston to Lord Bloomfield.

(No. 18.)

My Lord,

Foreign Office, October 22, 1849.

I HAVE to acquaint your Lordship that Her Majesty's Government entirely approve the course pursued by Mr. Buchanan in his communications with Fuad Effendi, reported in his despatch No. 338 of the 9th instant.

I am, &c.
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 65.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received October 23.)

(No. 253.)

My Lord,

Vienna, October 17, 1849.

I HAVE the honour to inclose copy of a despatch I sent yesterday to Sir Stratford Canning. I hope your Lordship will not disapprove of it. Therein I have taken the liberty to recommend the adoption of a measure which I think will put an end to the power of the ill-disposed to say that menace is employed against Austria and Russia, and, by raising a cry, endeavour to obstruct the work of peace, which otherwise will be completed as soon as possible.

Up to this hour nothing has arrived from St. Petersburgh; but that does not appear to me of any importance. I am sure that Russia would not act alone; I do not believe that the Emperor Nicholas has much desire to push this matter; and I am certain that Austria will put an end to difficulties as quickly as possible. I will not take upon myself to say in what way that purpose will be effected.

I have, &c.
(Signed) PONSONBY.

Inclosure in No. 65.

Viscount Ponsonby to Sir Stratford Canning.

Sir,

Vienna, October 16, 1849.

I AM happy to tell your Excellency that I feel no doubt of the peaceable and satisfactory settlement of the affair between the Sublime Porte and the Austrian Government relating to the refugees, provided that nothing be done to create excitement; and (if it meets with your approbation) I think it would be well to induce the Admiral Sir W. Parker to make the advance of the fleet have as much as possible the air of an excursion for the purpose of exercising the crews and so forth, and to take any other measure he may please to avoid the appearance of the fleet having been sent as a menace. I presume it may be easy for the Admiral to remain within call if any necessity should arise for his active interference.

There are foolish stories in Vienna, sent no doubt by enemies to peace, which state that the Turkish Government is about to give General Bem the command of a corps of troops, and that the Turkish authorities place difficulties in the way of the return of the Hungarian soldiers (now

at Widdin) who wish to accept the permission given by the Emperor of Austria for their return to their own country, under conditions most easy to themselves, and communicated to them by a general officer dispatched to Widdin by His Imperial Majesty for this express purpose.

I have denied the truth of these stories, being certain that they are false, but I should be glad if your Excellency would empower me to say that they are untrue.

I have, &c.
(Signed) PONSONBY.

No. 66.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received October 26.)

(No. 256.) *Vienna, October 21, 1849.*

My Lord,

PRINCE SCHWARZENBERG is at Schönbrunn with the Emperor, and it is possible that I may not see him in time for the post, and therefore I write to inform you that the messenger from Petersburgh has brought intelligence, which confirms what I had the honour to write in my last despatch and communications to your Lordship, as to the pacific arrangement of the affair with the Sublime Porte, and as to the only thing which could prevent that arrangement. The proposition I submitted to Sir Stratford Canning in my despatch to his Excellency dated October 16, 1849, will also clearly exhibit what I now mean to convey to your Lordship.

The messenger from Berlin is to arrive here to-morrow, and I will write by him on Tuesday, but should anything important occur I will dispatch him to-morrow. I repeat in the meantime that the Emperor of Russia has accepted with good will the application made to him by Fuad Effendi on the part of the Ottoman Government.

I have, &c.
(Signed) PONSONBY.

No. 67.

Sir Stratford Canning to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received October 27.)

(No. 297. Confidential.) *Therapia, October 4, 1849.*

My Lord,

HER Majesty's steam-frigate "Odin" arrived here yesterday morning with letters from the Commander-in-chief of Her Majesty's squadron in the Mediterranean.

Your Lordship is already acquainted with the tenor of my communications to Sir William Parker, in consequence of the suspension of diplomatic relations between the Porte on one side, and the Austrian and Russian Legations on the other. I have the honour to transmit herewith for your Lordship's further information, a copy of the Admiral's reply.

Whatever may be the issue of so serious a difference as that to which our correspondence relates, I cannot feel otherwise than deeply indebted by Sir William's prompt compliance with my views. He appears to comprehend the situation thoroughly; and I have no doubt that, in the expectation of instructions from home, he will continue to afford me every degree of support required by the circumstances, without overstepping the limits of prudence and discretion.

The sudden arrival of the "Odin" has naturally excited curiosity in the present critical state of affairs, and I have been careful to account for it in a manner calculated to allay that feeling among the public. There is less difficulty in so doing from the circumstance that Captain Pelham, after coming from the Adriatic, had touched at Corfu and Athens on his way hither.

The "Tartarus" had returned to this station several days before the arrival of the "Odin," and I have requested Captain Pelham to place the former vessel at my disposal for two or three matters of public service which will not require its absence from Constantinople beyond a week, by which time, or very soon after, a definitive resolution may be expected to arrive from Petersburgh. It is calculated that Fuad Effendi reached that city yesterday, supposing, as may be reasonably presumed, that he has not been stopped on the Russian frontier.

I saw the Grand Vizier privately this morning and told him for his own personal information and that of the Sultan, that the "Odin" had come up to Constantinople in consequence of my application to the Admiral; that it would probably stay here long enough to learn the issue of the pending dispute; and that the squadron now at Corfu would shortly make its appearance in the Archipelago, and keep for a time in communication with me, yet so as to avoid attracting any particular attention with respect to the affairs of this country. I told his Highness that he was not to consider this approach to a demonstration as immediately indicating any opinion of Her Majesty's Government, but as proceeding merely from that general knowledge of their solicitude for the welfare of the Porte which was necessarily possessed by Her Majesty's servants on the spot. I again repeated what I had so often urged before as to the expediency of the Porte's avoiding the hazard of hostile collision with its neighbours, and particularly with Russia, so long as it could do so without a sacrifice of its honour and independence, which are so deeply involved in the question now at issue. The stand to be made by the Porte under present circumstances must be one of necessity, created by the paramount duty of resisting an unjust and dictatorial requisition.

The Grand Vizier appeared to enter cordially into this view of the subject. He could not conceal his emotion at even so limited an evidence of our continued sympathy with the interests of the Ottoman Empire, and he expressed his acknowledgments in the warmest terms; but he also showed me a due sense of the prudence and caution required in presence of a danger, which, however it might be exaggerated for purposes of intimidation, was not to be treated with carelessness or to be braved without necessity. He told me that unless counselled otherwise by friendly Powers, the Porte would stand firm to the last; and that even if the certainty of war as an immediate consequence of further resistance were to shake the Sultan's resolution, he was determined to retire from office.

It is my firm conviction, notwithstanding some inconsistencies of conduct inseparable from the habits of Turkish statesmanship, that Reshid Pasha is sincere in this declaration; and I venture to add, that however the crisis may terminate, an impression most favourable to our future relations with this country has been already made in the minds of all those who are attentive to the character and tendency of passing events.

In the course of our conversation the Grand Vizier inquired whether any officers eventually available for the Turkish service had come up in the "Odin," and I replied in the sense of Sir William Parker's letter to me. It appeared to me that his Highness, though he made no remark, would have been better pleased with the prospect of a larger supply.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

Inclosure in No. 67.

Vice-Admiral Sir W. Parker to Sir Stratford Canning.

(Confidential.)

Sir, *"Queen," at Corfu, September 27, 1849.*

I HAD the honour to receive on the 25th instant, at this anchorage, your Excellency's confidential letter of the 17th, communicating the suspension of diplomatic relations between the Porte and the Austrian and

Russian Legations, and the critical position in which the former is consequently placed.

I had not a steamer available until yesterday, when I was rejoined by the "Odin," which has only waited long enough to complete with water and coals, and is now dispatched to communicate with your Excellency.

I therefore hasten to apprize you that unless prevented by urgent reasons, it is my intention to continue with the squadron under my orders between the Ionian waters and the vicinity of Athens, until I receive further instructions from the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, to whom I had an opportunity of imparting your Excellency's sentiments and the arrangements that I have in contemplation, by an Austrian steam-packet which proceeded to Trieste on the afternoon of the 25th.

I flatter myself that this course will meet for the present your Excellency's views, and I shall send orders to Salonica to direct Lieutenant Sir Godfrey Webster to repair without delay to the Bosphorus, there to remain in communication with your Excellency for the conveyance of a despatch or any other service for which the "Tartarus" is calculated.

Captain Pelham of the "Odin" is directed to put himself also in communication with your Excellency, and I think he will be able to provide two intelligent officers for the purpose to which you advert, should it become necessary; but it is right I should apprize you that it is not at present in my power, consistently with the orders I have received, to assign the "Odin" for duty at Constantinople beyond a few weeks, unless the exigencies of the service require it.

The force of the squadron now in company with my flag consists of the ships named in the margin*. It is desirable, if possible, that each line-of-battle ship should be attended by a powerful steamer; but when the "Odin" departs, I have only to calculate on the "Rosamond," now at Cephalonia, and probably the "Dragon" shortly, as I understand she is on her route from England to the Mediterranean.

The "Terrible" and "Spitfire" have lately been withdrawn. The "Ardent" is ordered to England immediately, and the "Thetis" frigate to Lisbon.

The ships of the line are all assembled here, except the "Bellerophon," which is at Leghorn; and as the Tuscan Government are enforcing a loan there which was enacted in March 1848, extending to foreigners, and some of the British merchants have protested against this as an unjust imposition, it is not advisable to withdraw her protection at this juncture from British interests on the coast of Tuscany and Piedmont. The "Porcupine," a steamer similar to the "Tartarus," is with her.

The "Bulldog" is the only ship now available for the duties on the coasts of Naples and Sicily.

A sixteen gun brig and a small steamer are the only vessels that can be spared for the special protection of the Ionian Islands, and Cephalonia is still in an unsettled state.

Five steamers reserved for the packet service make up the sum of our force.

I have troubled your Excellency with these details that you may understand how limited my means are, but I beg to assure you that every exertion in my power will be made to meet the exigencies of the service within the range of my station, and to promote your suggestions as far as I am able.

I have, &c.

(Signed) W. PARKER.

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* Queen, 116 guns, flag-ship; Howe, 120; Caledonia, 120; Prince Regent, 90; Powerful, 84; Vengeance, 84; Fiorla, 36. Steam-vessels: Odin, 12; Rosamond, 6.

No. 68.

Sir Stratford Canning to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received October 27.)

(No. 298.)

My Lord, *Therapia, October 5, 1849.*

LATE in the evening of the 1st instant a Polish officer named Czayka, who has long resided here under French protection, though in fact an agent of Prince Adam Czartoryski, called on me to deliver a letter from M. Kossuth, and to offer some explanation of the incident to which that letter referred. The incident in question is the profession of Islamism by General Bem and two other Generals, with a number, varying from ten to thirty, of less distinguished Polish and Hungarian refugees detained at Widdin. It appears to have originated in a message conveyed to them from some of the leading Turkish Ministers, by means of an officer sent to Widdin with some commission of a military character. It has produced much excitement and dissatisfaction in the minds of M. Kossuth and those who are particularly connected with him, and it has also had the effect of betraying M. Kossuth into a very improper and indeed unwarrantable use of the answers which General Aupick and myself had severally addressed to him in our private capacity from motives of humanity and compassion.

Your Lordship will be able to derive a clearer idea of what has occurred from the several papers which I have now the honour to forward.

They are, a letter from M. Kossuth to me; a statement which I have received confidentially from General Aupick, and which is evidently derived from Czayka; a message from Aali Pasha as reported to me by M. Pisani; and extracts of a letter from one of those Englishmen at Widdin for whose deliverance I have obtained an order from the Porte.

Whatever discrepancies are apparent in these accounts, compared with each other, it is evident that a message was sent to the Polish refugees at least, and that it has been generally understood as an intimation presenting the eventual alternative of death by the hand of the executioner, or escape by means of conversion to Islamism.

Such an expedient would never under any circumstances have obtained my approval; and when the Grand Vizier some weeks ago threw out a hint of it in private conversation with me, I did not conceal my opinion of its untoward character and tendency. Its least objectionable shape would have been that of a suggestion reserved for the last moment of resistance about to disappear before the certainty of war announced by two powerful empires. In the present stage of the affair it is not only discreditable to all the parties concerned, but well calculated to produce fresh embarrassments and greater irritation against the Porte. Both to Aali Pasha and to the Grand Vizier I have declared this conviction in pointed terms, and animadverted without reserve on their presumed share in the manœuvre. I have further advised the latter to adopt without delay such remedial measures as the extreme injudiciousness of the proceeding has left within reach, namely, to abstain from giving rank or employment at present to the renegades, to send a proper explanation of the whole transaction to those immediately concerned, and to carry forthwith into effect my previous recommendation as to conveying the principal refugees into the interior, under proper security against their escape, leaving the private soldiers under the care of their less noted officers as objects of eventual voluntary restitution to their respective countries, under an act of amnesty to be obtained by the Porte's intercession.

I cannot undertake to say what portion of this advice, if any, will be practically adopted. The Grand Vizier has however declared his readiness to follow my counsels generally; and judging from his language yesterday, I think it probable that the more obnoxious refugees will be withdrawn from Widdin to Schumla, and that a more elaborate attempt will be made in some shape or other to explain away the reprehensible character of the message conveyed, as it is asserted by mistake, to the unfortunate refugees.

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I am informed that the letter presented to Aali Pasha by General Aupick on behalf of Count Zamoyski and General Dembinski, as mentioned in one of my preceding despatches to your Lordship, was not a demand for their deliverance, as entitled to French protection, but a request that the Porte would reserve its final decision respecting them until he could receive instructions from Paris.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

Inclosure 1 in No. 68.

M. Kossuth to Sir Stratford Canning.

[See Inclosure 1 in No. 41.]

Inclosure 2 in No. 68.

Statement received from General Aupick.

LE Colonel d'Artillerie Ekhem Effendi a été envoyé à Widdin le surlendemain du jour où le Grand Conseil s'est montré partagé et indécis sur la réponse à donner à la lettre autographe du Czar. Le Prince Radzivil se trouvait à Stamboul; les Ministres de Russie et d'Autriche pressaient la Porte. Cependant le Grand Vizir connaissait déjà la résolution ferme de son Souverain de refuser l'extradition.

Le Colonel après être arrivé à Widdin s'est présenté chez M. Kossuth et chez les Généraux Dembinski et Bem; après les avoir rassurés sur le bon vouloir des Ministres Ottomans de défendre les réfugiés contre les exigences de la Russie et de l'Autriche, il a ajouté qu'il existe des traités entre la Porte et la Russie et l'Autriche, qui stipulent que tout homme qui embrasserait l'Islamisme n'est plus extraditionable. Le même Envoyé a rendu à M. Kossuth les lettres des Ambassadeurs de France et d'Angleterre, et aux Généraux Polonais une lettre qui leur annonçait la résolution ferme du Sultan à refuser l'extradition. Il est clair que par cette démarche les Ministres Ottomans voulaient prévenir les réfugiés contre l'inquiétude et la crainte qui leur pouvaient venir des nouvelles particulières de Stamboul, qui dans le moment ne pouvaient être que alarmantes. Le Général Bem qui connaissait l'intention du Sultan de refuser l'extradition, a déclaré qu'il veut embrasser l'Islamisme; qu'il veut servir le Souverain généreux qui ose s'opposer à la Russie; qu'il l'embrasse sans condition, et que c'était son intention du moment où il a quitté la Hongrie, et que s'il ne l'a pas fait plus tôt c'est qu'il ne voulait pas qu'on dit qu'il l'a fait par peur. Il a déclaré qu'il n'engage personne de suivre son exemple. Mais les Généraux Kmetty, Stein, et une trentaine des officiers les plus ardens, n'ont pas voulu se séparer de lui, et ont fait la même déclaration d'embrasser l'Islamisme.

M. Kossuth, irrité contre le Général Bem, monté dans ses idées qu'on portait atteinte au Gouverneur de la Hongrie Chrétienne, s'est rendu au camp des Hongrois; a fait lire à haute voix aux soldats la lettre des Ambassadeurs de France et d'Angleterre, qui selon lui était un engagement formel des deux Puissances à défendre les réfugiés; il a parlé de l'acte du Général Bem, en le blâmant, et engageant les soldats de s'opposer aux Turcs. D'autres personnes ont suivi l'exemple de M. Kossuth. Le Colonel Ekhem Effendi a déclaré le plus solennellement, que l'intention des Ministres Ottomans n'a pas été de forcer à embrasser l'Islamisme ni d'amener une pareille intention. Il a prié même le Général Bem de ne pas faire la déclaration officielle qu'après son départ, afin de ne pas donner d'apparence qu'il est venu pour arracher aux réfugiés l'adhésion à l'Islamisme.

La déclaration du Général Bem n'a été faite qu'après le départ du Colonel.

Le Général Dembinski a pris la chose différemment que M. Kossuth: il ne s'est pas fait Musulman, il n'a pas vu dans la mission du Colonel Ekhem Effendi l'intention de la Porte de faire une propagande forcée de Musulmanisme; il a écrit des lettres au Grand Vizir et au Séraskier, qui montrent et sa manière de voir et sa reconnaissance au Sultan.

La conduite ultérieure des Turcs prouve le mieux qu'ils n'avaient pas l'intention de forcer à l'Islamisme. Le même Ekhem Effendi, après l'échauffourée de M. Kossuth, a obtenu de Zia Pacha, sur sa responsabilité, la distribution des chaussures à tous les réfugiés; et on est très disposé de faire rentrer dans l'intérieur du pays, non seulement les soldats et les officiers subalternes, mais les chefs aussi. Ce n'est pas ainsi qu'on force à embrasser une religion, qu'on se venge de ceux qui ont refusé de le faire.

Inclosure 3 in No. 68.

M. Pisani to Sir Stratford Canning.

Péra, 1 Octobre, 1849.

AALI PACHA m'a chargé de vous informer de ce qui suit.

Bem et son aide-de-camp sont devenus Turcs dans toutes les formes à Widdin, en présence du Pacha, du Mufti, et d'autres autorités. Bem a pris le nom de Mourad, et son aide-de-camp celui d'Osman. Dans une lettre que Bem a écrite à Zia Pacha de Widdin, il dit qu'il veut défendre l'Empire Ottoman contre les envahissemens de la Russie et de l'Autriche. Dans la lettre de Zia Pacha au Grand Vizir il est dit que dix généraux* officiers et soldats se sont présentés pour se faire Musulmans, et qu'ils ont été admis comme tels dans les formes; et que d'autres se présenteraient aussi. Mais Zia Pacha a confondu les Polonais avec les Hongrois, car il appelle même Bem Hongrois. Voilà, dit Aali Pacha, ce qui a donné lieu à cet événement. 'Un officier du Séraskierat a été dernièrement envoyé à Widdin pour y porter des objets d'habillement aux troupes de la garnison. On a à cette occasion chargé cet officier de dire aux réfugiés Polonais que la Porte fera tout son possible de ne pas les remettre aux Russes si ceux-ci les demandaient; mais qu'un des moyens de se soustraire à la nécessité d'être consignés aux Russes, c'est de se faire Musulman, attendu que d'après le IInd Article du Traité de Kaïnardji, ni la Porte peut réclamer les Musulmans qui se sont faits Chrétiens en Russie, ni la Russie peut réclamer les Russes qui se sont faits Musulmans en Turquie. L'officier Turc ne devait tenir ce langage qu'aux seuls Polonais, mais il a dit la même chose aux Hongrois aussi, et de là vient qu'il a fait la même proposition à Kossuth lui-même.' Aali Pacha pense qu'il faut pour à présent laisser à Widdin ceux qui se sont faits Musulmans, et ne pas les faire venir ici, et encore moins les prendre en service. C'est au Séraskier Pacha que Bem a écrit pour demander à venir à Constantinople et à être employé dans l'armée. Aali Pacha vous prie de donner votre avis dans cette circonstance à la Porte, et de lui faire savoir ce que vous pensez de tout cela.

Aali Pacha m'ayant conseillé de voir le Grand Vizir sur cette affaire, son Altesse m'a dit les même choses en ajoutant qui si les fanatiques pensaient que, d'après la loi, les réfugiés devenus Musulmans doivent jouir d'une entière liberté, on peut leur observer que de graves raisons d'Etat obligent le Gouvernement de les garder comme les autres réfugiés. Le Grand Vizir veut connaître votre manière de penser sur cette nouvelle phase de la question.

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* Il veut dire sans doute 10 individus.

Inclosure 4 in No. 68.

Mr. Longworth to Sir Stratford Canning.

Widdin, September 23, 1849.

(Extract.)

I AM sorry to say that a great number of Hungarian officers, at least half of those who have taken refuge here, formally abjured their faith, and declared themselves Mussulmans before the Pasha. They say, however, that though they have made their profession of Islamiasm, they will have a sort of noviciate of three months' duration, at the end of which they may, if they please, recant and return to their old faith. It is much to be feared this bad example, together with the desperate circumstances in which they are placed, will influence the rest; and few will be found to prefer death to dishonour. Amongst these few, however, my friend, General Guyon, if not protected by your Excellency, will embrace any alternative rather than be bearded with the name of a renegade. This gentleman, who is by birth an Englishman, wrote to your Excellency, applying for an English passport three weeks ago. He stated that he was a native of Bath in Somersetshire; that his father held a commission as post-captain in Her Majesty's navy; that he has a brother in the East India Company's service, and another in the British army; and that Lord Palmerston, on the production of his credentials, furnished him with a passport under his own hand in the year 1840.

. . . . . I am a prisoner here with the Poles and Hungarians, and as I have not the slightest intention of turning Turk, I suppose I shall be handed over with my gallant countryman Guyon, and the noble-hearted Kossuth, to the Austrian executioner. Now, though it would be an honour to die for so good a cause and in such good company, I confess I do not exactly see the necessity for so doing. With reference to myself, as well as General Guyon, however doubtful our claim to British protection may have been in Hungary, I do not understand how it can be refused to us in Turkey, where we have been guilty of no political offence whatever. Your Excellency must be aware that, in declining to avail ourselves of the means of safety offered by the Turks, we are influenced chiefly by a feeling of national pride as Englishmen. We will never voluntarily forego our birthright, and we hope it will never be disallowed by our Government. I sincerely trust that you will take immediate measures for our liberation. Time passes, and I am afraid that this application may come too late. In applying to the Pasha for permission to leave Widdin, I had no thought about my personal safety, but I believed I could be more useful to my companions in misfortune at Constantinople. Above all, I was desirous of conferring with your Excellency with regard to the position of M. Kossuth, and to ascertain if you had no means of persuading the Turkish Government to connive at his escape. This appears to be the only way of getting out of their difficulties. If the Pasha receive instructions on the subject, his escape may be very easily contrived here so as to evade all responsibility on the part of the Government; and, should they object to his coming to Constantinople, he can proceed to Scutari in Albania, and there embark for Corfu. The Count and Countess Batthyany might perhaps be allowed to avail themselves of the same opportunity. They, like the ex-Governor, may possibly be claimed as Austrian, but not as Russian, subjects; nor would the connivance at their escape, even if susceptible of proof, which it would not be, be likely to involve the Porte in hostilities with Austria.

No. 69.

Mr. Buchanan to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received October 27.)

(No. 348.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, October* 10, 1849.

I CALLED upon M. Sèniavine this morning, after the departure of the messenger Wright, and during our interview I took occasion to refer to the arrival of Fuad Effendi at St. Petersburgh, and the object of his mission. His Excellency said that the question would, he had no doubt, be amicably arranged, intimating, however, that any interference on the part of other Powers in the negotiations between Fuad Effendi and the Russian Government would only retard so desirable a result. I told him that, as yet, I had received no instructions from your Lordship respecting the refusal of the Porte to deliver up the refugees in Turkey; but that from the information which your Lordship had communicated to me on the subject, I could have no doubt as to the nature of the opinions of Her Majesty's Government on the question at issue; and that as far as I could anticipate what my instructions might eventually be, I could only say, if the Russian Government were anxious not to be interfered with in their arrangements with the Porte, they should lose no time in bringing these arrangements to a satisfactory conclusion.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

No. 70.

Mr. Buchanan to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received October 27.)

(No. 349. Confidential.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, October* 12, 1849.

HAVING learnt that the Emperor had been at St. Petersburgh yesterday, without receiving Fuad Effendi, although His Imperial Majesty had granted an audience to Count Moltke, who had arrived on the 8th instant, charged with a confidential mission from the King of Denmark, I called on General de Lamoricière, and communicated to him a copy of the "Times" newspaper of the 2nd instant, which had just reached me; and I suggested the expediency of his sending it to the Ottoman Envoy by one of the aides-de-camp, as a means of doing away with the effect which it might be intended to produce on his Excellency's firmness, by the Emperor delaying to receive the letter which he was charged to deliver to His Imperial Majesty by the Sultan.

I addressed myself to General de Lamoricière for this purpose, as I was engaged for the evening; and also because Fuad Effendi is anxious to avoid offending the susceptibilities of the Russian authorities, by receiving frequent visits from General de Lamoricière or myself,—a desire on his Excellency's part to which I considered it incumbent on me to pay every possible deference, until I should be made fully acquainted with the extent of the support which Her Majesty's Mission may be eventually authorized to afford him. When M. de Senneville, who was sent to him by General de Lamoricière, called at his hotel, his Excellency at first declined receiving him; but on M. de Senneville then asking to see his Excellency's secretary, with whom he had been acquainted in France, he was finally admitted. From the report which I subsequently received from General de Lamoricière, Fuad Effendi appears to have been much pleased with the article in the "Times." As to his reception by the Emperor, he said that no arrangement had yet been made; and that he had reason to believe it would not take place until after an answer had been received from Vienna to a communication which had been lately addressed by this Government to the Austrian Cabinet on the subject of the refugees.

These details, my Lord, were communicated to me the same evening by the French Minister, upon whom I called, at his own request, at a late hour, in consequence of his having received a courier from Paris. General de Lamoricière read to me a series of voluminous despatches, which had been received by the French Government from General Aupick, acquainting them with the events which had preceded and attended, up to the 17th ultimo, the refusal of the Porte to deliver up the refugees. When he had finished them, he said that M. de Tocqueville, in forwarding these documents to him, had stated, that until the Government of the Republic should have ascertained how far that of Her Majesty may be inclined to support the Sultan in resisting the pretensions of Russia, he could not send him any positive instructions to remonstrate against the pretensions of the Imperial Cabinet; but that he had directed him in the meantime, in pointing out to Count Nesselrode the serious consequences which would inevitably result to the peace of Europe, from a determination of the Russian Government to push those pretensions to extremities, to hold language which the General described as being entirely identic with that which he had already used in the interview with his Excellency, reported in my despatch No. 339 of the 9th instant. General de Lamoricière therefore was at first somewhat doubtful as to whether it would not be expedient to postpone any further communication with the Chancellor until after the arrival of the Queen's messenger to-morrow, who would probably bring communications from your Lordship to Her Majesty's Mission, stating more clearly the views of our respective Governments as to the attitude which they may be disposed to assume in the question. On my calling however on him again this morning, I found that he had decided upon asking at once for an interview with Count Nesselrode, as he feared that his not doing so might lead his Excellency to suppose that the opinions of his Government had not coincided with those which he had expressed before the arrival of his messenger. As General de Lamoricière invited the expression of my opinion upon the subject, I entirely agreed with him as to the expediency of his losing no time in communicating with the Chancellor; and I also suggested that he should express his request for an interview so, as to render it difficult for his Excellency to avoid receiving him in the course of the day or of the evening, as I considered that it would make any representations which might possibly be addressed to the Russian Government by Her Majesty's Government and that of the French Republic less difficult to answer, if the Chancellor could be induced before receiving them, to express an intention on the part of the Emperor to withdraw his demand for the extradition of the refugees, in consideration of the feelings and wishes of the Sultan.

The first answer which General de Lamoricière received to his letter to the Chancellor was a verbal message that his Excellency could not see him at all to-day, but that he would write to him to-morrow. His Excellency however soon after sent him a few lines, expressing his readiness to receive him in the evening.

On his return, General de Lamoricière, who has just left me, gave me a full detail of what passed between them. He described the Chancellor as being "très monté," and as holding very decided language at the beginning of their interview as to the rights of Russia and the dispositions of the Emperor; and maintaining that even if it were admitted that the last clause of the IInd Article of the Treaty of Kainardji was badly expressed, the history of the past sufficiently explained the intentions of the Contracting Parties; and his Excellency quoted an instance of a troop of rebellious cavalry having been disarmed on Russian territory and delivered up to the Turkish authorities at their request.

General de Lamoricière replied that such an example was entirely inapplicable, for if the expression "at least expelled," had been introduced into the Treaty to satisfy the scruples of the Turkish Government, it was plain that an act of the Russian Government could not do away with its validity.

Count Nesselrode however deprecated all discussion with other Governments on the interpretation of the treaties which regulated the relations of Russia with the Porte, saying that the Emperor had given

sufficient proofs of his determination not to aggrandize the Russian Empire at the expense of Turkey, to satisfy his allies of his disinterestedness and of his friendly feelings towards the Sultan: and his Excellency concluded by observing that two of the leading refugees had already settled the question of their extradition by embracing the Mahometan faith; and that if Russia were left alone she would find means of coming to an arrangement with the Porte with respect to those who remained, and that no serious consequences need be apprehended as to the means which she would employ for this purpose.

General de Lamoricière replied that his Excellency's assurance was satisfactory in as far as it evinced a disposition to prevent the question assuming a worse aspect than it already bore, but that he should like to learn what his Excellency meant by arranging the question with the Turkish Government, if that Government were left without support to discuss it with Russia; as the value of his Excellency's assurance would naturally depend upon whether he intended to say that the Russian Government had decided to accept the explanations of the Sultan and to withdraw their demand for the extradition of the refugees.

General de Lamoricière found it impossible however to obtain a more explicit answer from his Excellency, who merely repeated what he had already said; but it is to be presumed, my Lord, that the courage shown by the Ottoman Ministers has already decided the question in favour of the Turkish Empire, and that the efforts of this Government will now be merely directed, in withdrawing their demands, to save as much as possible the Emperor's dignity and the prestige of their name at Constantinople, which many persons here consider to be seriously compromised.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

No. 71.

Lord Bloomfield to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received October 27.)

(No. 6.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, October 16, 1849.*

I HAD an interview this morning with Count Nesselrode, and after some general conversation, and some allusions to matters of minor interest, I introduced the subject of the demand of Russia for the extradition of the Polish refugees who had been lately concerned in the Hungarian war. I stated that I had not received instructions to enter into any discussions of the merits of the question with the Imperial Government, or the bearings of the Treaty upon which the demand of extradition had been based; but that I was desirous to obtain some knowledge of the view which was taken of the question by the Imperial Cabinet.

The Chancellor was extremely laconic, and he studiously avoided saying anything which should leave an opening for a remark; his reply was, that he hoped the affair would be arranged without much trouble, but that he could not yet inform me how the difficulties would be smoothed, but that he wished this to be effected by negotiations with the Porte. I endeavoured to obtain some explanation as to the manner in which he proposed to get over the articles of the Treaty which bore on the demand of extradition, and I regret to say that I was unable to obtain any satisfactory answer from his Excellency beyond the assurance that the matter would probably be arranged by an exchange of notes or declarations, without reference to the terms of the Treaty.

At the same time that I have the satisfaction to inform your Lordship of the turn which this affair appears likely to take, I am sorry not to be able to give any details as to the manner in which the Russian Governments propose to remove the irritation which their late demands have created at Constantinople, but I hope in a few days that I may be able to obtain more exact information.

I have, &c.

(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 72.

Lord Bloomfield to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received October 27.)

(No. 7. Confidential.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, October* 16, 1849.

HAVING heard that Fuad Effendi had had an audience of the Emperor this morning, for the purpose of delivering the letter with which he had been charged by the Sultan, I thought it advisable to pay his Excellency a visit with a view to learn what had passed at the interview. As he had, however, expressed some doubts at the expediency of my calling upon him, on my offering to do so the day after my arrival, I requested Mr. Buchanan to see him, and to state that I supposed there could now be no objection to my visiting him, but that I would be guided by his Excellency's wishes, and postpone doing so if he preferred it. Fuad Effendi seemed however to have lost all his former apprehensions of the Russian Government taking umbrage at the friendly visits of Her Majesty's Legation, and expressed a wish to see me.

I therefore went to his hotel and was received in the most cordial manner. He told me that the Emperor had at first addressed him in a somewhat rough and haughty tone, very different he said from the manner in which his own Sovereign the Sultan is in the habit of speaking to people; but that after a little time His Imperial Majesty became more affable, and conversed freely on the subject of his mission. He told me that the Emperor had made use of strong and harsh expressions in alluding to the refusal of the Porte to give up the refugees, according to the terms of the Treaty, but he said that His Imperial Majesty had given him the assurance of his desire to have the matter settled amicably, though he declared that he could not consent to its being done between the Sovereigns, but that it must be left to be adjusted by the two Governments, and that for this purpose he wished Fuad Effendi to remain at St. Petersburgh during the negotiations. The Turkish Envoy told me that these were the principal points of the conversation, and that he was glad when the audience was over, though the Emperor was very kind and condescending during the latter part of it, for it lasted upwards of an hour. I inquired of Fuad Effendi if he was invested with any powers to negotiate with the Russian Government. He replied that he was not, and that consequently he should decline putting his name to any papers whatever, without having previously obtained the full authority and sanction of his Government. I then endeavoured to impress upon the Turkish Envoy the heavy responsibility which was about to rest upon him, stating that he would be made answerable for the due maintenance of the dignity of the Sultan's Crown and of the independence of his empire.

I felt it my duty to use this strong language, because I apprehended that the Russian Government might have some sinister object in detaining Fuad Effendi at St. Petersburgh, and perhaps expect to make him a more supple negotiator on the banks of the Neva than on the shores of the Bosphorus. His detention here is remarkable, from the fact of Count Nesselrode always professing to dislike the presence of Turkish diplomatists at St. Petersburgh; but in justice to Fuad Effendi I must not omit stating to your Lordship, that he appears at present to be animated with the best intentions, and as far as I am able to judge, to be an honest and devoted subject of the Sultan.

Before taking leave of Fuad Effendi, I mentioned to him that although Count Nesselrode had given me the assurance, that the Russian Government hoped soon to bring the matter to an amicable conclusion, he had not mentioned the mode in which he proposed to effect this object, and I therefore inquired of him if he could give me any information on this point. He replied that he could not, but that he had received an impression from his last conversation with Count Nesselrode, that the Russian Government would now content themselves with the removal of the refugees from Turkey, provided the Porte would consent at the same

time to send away certain other Poles, who had been established for some time on the banks of the Danube, and whose numbers I understand is considerable.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 73.

Lord Bloomfield to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received October 27.)

(No. 8.)

My Lord, *St Petersburgh, October* 19, 1849.

I HAVE the honour to inclose an article extracted from the St. Petersburgh Journal of this morning, announcing that Fuad Effendi had been received by the Emperor at a private audience, with all the ceremonial usually observed at the Russian Court on the occasion of the reception of Ambassadors.

The object of this article is to remove the impression which has gone abroad that the Porte had rejected the demands of Russia for the extradition of certain Poles who had been implicated in the Hungarian insurrection; and it goes so far as to assert that the mission of Fuad Effendi was dictated solely by the desire of the Sultan to come to an understanding with the Emperor on the bearings of the Treaty of Kainardji without the interference of third parties; nevertheless it is satisfactory to find that although the Russian Government attempt to place the question in a new form, they evidently give up the main point—their demand of extradition, and express the hope that this affair will be promptly arranged to the satisfaction of both Courts.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

Inclosure in No. 73.

Extract from the St. Petersburgh Journal of $\frac{7}{19}$ Octobre, 1849.

MARDI passé, 4 Octobre, son Excellence Fuad Effendi, envoyé par le Sultan à l'Empereur, en qualité d'Ambassadeur Extraordinaire, a été reçu par Sa Majesté en audience privée. Les équipages de la Cour ont conduit son Excellence au Palais, où elle a été accueillie avec les honneurs dûs à son rang comme aux rapports intimes qui existent entre les deux Souverains.

Les circonstances qui ont accompagné la mission de Fuad Effendi à St. Pétersbourg ont donné lieu dans les journaux aux rumeurs les plus extravagantes. Loin qu'elle implique, comme on l'a prétendu, le rejet des demandes articulées par le Cabinet Impérial, en vertu du Traité de Koutchouk-Kaïnardji, relativement aux rebelles Polonais, qui, ayant pris part à l'insurrection Hongroise, ont récemment cherché refuge en Turquie, cette mission n'a été motivée que par le désir du Sultan de s'entendre amicalement avec l'Empereur, sans intermédiaire étranger, sur l'interprétation à donner à l'Article du dit Traité applicable à ces individus. Cet appel direct d'un intime allié aux sentimens d'amitié de l'Empereur ne pouvait manquer d'être entendu, et l'accueil distingué dont Sa Majesté a honoré le Représentant Ottoman, en faisant tomber tous les faux bruits, autorise l'espoir que cette affaire va être promptement arrangée à la satisfaction mutuelle des deux Cours.

No. 74.

Lord Bloomfield to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received October 27.)

(No. 9.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, October* 19, 1849.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's despatches to the 6th instant, which were delivered to me yesterday by the messenger Haviland.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 75.

Lord Bloomfield to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received October 27.)

(No. 11.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, October* 19, 1849.

FUAD EFFENDI having mentioned to me that he intended dispatching a messenger to Constantinople with the proposals which have been made by the Russian Government for the settlement of their differences with the Porte, I have availed myself of the opportunity to write to Sir Stratford Canning, and beg leave to transmit for your Lordship's information a copy of my letter to his Excellency. Fuad Effendi's messenger proceeds by Odessa, and expects to reach that place in time for the packet which sails for Constantinople on the 1st of November, and to reach his destination about the 3rd or 4th.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

Inclosure in No. 75.

Lord Bloomfield to Sir Stratford Canning.

Sir, *St. Petersburgh, October* 19, 1849.

I AVAIL myself of the departure of a messenger who is about to be dispatched to Constantinople by Fuad Effendi, to inform your Excellency of the first effects of his mission.

He was received by the Emperor on the 16th instant, having previously had two interviews with Count Nesselrode, and frequent visits from some of the subaltern employés in the Foreign Department.

Fuad Effendi, with whom I have endeavoured to place myself on the most friendly and confidential footing, has informed me that on his arrival here he found every Russian with whom he was placed in communication, disposed to hold the most overbearing and harsh language to him, amounting almost to intimidation, so much so indeed that he despaired at one time of ever obtaining an audience of the Emperor for the purpose of delivering to His Imperial Majesty the letter of his Sovereign. About the end of last week, however, an improvement in their manner and language towards him took place, and he obtained his interview. The Emperor at first spoke to him in an arrogant tone, but afterwards changed his manner and became more affable.

The day after the audience Fuad Effendi saw Count Nesselrode, who delivered to him a note or memorandum containing the proposals which are now made, in lieu of the demand of the extradition of the Poles who had been concerned in the Hungarian insurrection.

He has communicated to me in the strictest confidence the paper No. 1 * which I have the honour to inclose, and which he says contains the

* See Inclosure in No. 77.

conditions upon the acceptance of which by the Ottoman Government Russia will consent to re-open her diplomatic relations with the Porte.

His Excellency has only accepted them for transmission to Constantinople for the consideration of his Government.

He evidently feels that he has gained an important point in inducing the Imperial Cabinet to make the question a subject of negotiation; and although I am inclined to think he perhaps did not feel at first, in their full force, the objections to which the Russian proposal is open, he seems to hope that the question has at all events now become susceptible of arrangement.

I have not been able to obtain from Count Nesselrode anything beyond the assurance that he considers the affair to be settled; but the Ottoman Government will doubtless lay the whole case before your Excellency for your opinion, well knowing the deep interest you take in the welfare and independence of Turkey, and the desire you have to see the causes of the late misunderstanding removed in a manner which shall be honourable to both parties.

I transmit herewith to your Excellency the copy of an article which appeared in the St. Petersburgh Journal of this morning, announcing the audience granted to Fuad Effendi, and the object of his mission.

You will at once see how anxious the Imperial Government are to retract the false step which they originally took in the question.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 76.

Lord Bloomfield to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received October 27.)

(No. 12.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, October* 19, 1849.

I HAD an interview this afternoon with Count Nesselrode, and in conformity with your Lordship's instructions I read to his Excellency your despatch marked No. 1 of the 6th instant, upon the subject of the late demand which was addressed by the Russian Government to the Porte for the extradition of certain Polish refugees, and I left a copy of the despatch with him.

When I mentioned to the Chancellor the nature of the communication I had to make, he said that he wished me to consider whether the reception of Fuad Effendi by the Emperor, and the article which had been published in the St. Petersburgh Journal (a copy of which is forwarded in my despatch No. 8) were not a sufficient explanation of the matter, adding that he trusted the affair was in a fair way of settlement. I replied that I was rejoiced to hear such good news, and that if his Excellency would give me a copy of the communication he had been making to Fuad Effendi and M. de Titoff, I would consider how far it would be possible for me to depart from my instructions.

Count Nesselrode said that he could not assent to my proposal, because he could never admit the principle of foreign interference in the relations of Russia with Turkey.

After the despatch had been read, the Chancellor hesitated some time before making any observation, and then inquired of me whether the Porte really had requested our assistance and support, for Fuad Effendi had assured him of the contrary.

I replied that there must be some mistake on this point, for when the Porte became seriously alarmed at the peremptory demand for the extradition of the Polish refugees, which had been addressed to them by M. Titoff, they naturally sought the assistance of a friendly Power, and applied to us in their difficulty, and that we felt bound to support them, because we thought that Russia had put a forced construction upon the Treaty of Kainardji.

Count Nesselrode then alluded to the violent attacks on Russia in the English newspapers, and to the supposition that Russia wanted a pretext to make war on Turkey, observing that this was a great mistake; that she was very glad to have got out of one war, and had no wish or inclination to enter into another with the Turkish Empire, the existence and stability of which she was most anxious to support. He continued that Russia wished above all things to live on good terms with her neighbours, but that she could not submit to have her frontier kept in a continual state of agitation by the numerous adventurers, subjects to the Emperor, who had established themselves in the Ottoman dominions.

His Excellency finished the conversation by saying that he should take the despatch into his consideration and would prepare an answer to it; but he persisted to the last in expressing an opinion that as the Emperor had received the Turkish Ambassador, and the Government had forwarded some new proposals to the Porte, which did not insist upon more than the expulsion of the refugees, the communication of the despatch which I had read to him was only likely to throw difficulties in the way of an early and amicable adjustment of the question which had arisen at Constantinople.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 77.

Lord Bloomfield to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received October 27.)

(No. 13. Most Confidential.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, October* 19, 1849.

FUAD EFFENDI called on me yesterday and informed me that since we last met he had had an interview with Count Nesselrode, and had received from him a communication of the proposals of the Russian Government for the settlement of their differences with the Porte, and that he thought these proposals were of a nature to be accepted by his Government. He told me that he was about to forward them to Constantinople; that he saw in them nothing derogatory to the dignity of his Sovereign; and that if they were accepted by his Government, the diplomatic relations of the two countries would be immediately re-established. He hesitated for some time before telling me the exact nature of these propositions, and seemed unwilling to say more than that Russia would withdraw her claim for the extradition of the Poles, and would be contented with their expulsion. But on my referring to what had fallen from him on a previous occasion (as reported in my despatch No. 7 of the 16th instant, marked "confidential") as to the probability of a demand being made for the expulsion at the same of certain other Poles residing in Turkey, he said that such a proposal had indeed been made, and had been accompanied by another to the effect that the Porte should endeavour to make arrangements with other Powers to prevent the subjects of the Emperor from establishing themselves in her territory under the protection of foreign passports.

I at once pointed out to Fuad Effendi the objections to which this proposal was open and the inconveniences to which it might lead; but though his Excellency was not entirely indifferent to them, he seemed to think that the proposal of Russia was at all events important, as affording a means of arranging the question without lowering the dignity of his Sovereign; and he said that even if it were deemed inadmissible by his Government, it would necessitate some negotitnions, and thus have the effect of renewing diplomatic communications between the two Governments, which he trusted would eventually lead to an amicable settlement of the question.

I therefore observed that unless his Excellency would communicate to me a copy of the note which he had received from Count Nesselrode, I could not form any judgment upon the propositions which it contained,

and I intimated to him my opinion of the expediency of his enabling me to give your Lordship the most accurate information upon this important subject.

He was at first much embarrassed at this proposition, but finally consented to give me an abstract of the Russian proposals, under an injunction of secrecy; and I have the honour to transmit herewith the copy of a memorandum containing them, which I received from him this morning. I believe this document is an abstract of an inclosure in a note which was presented to Fuad Effendi by Count Nesselrode two days ago.

Fuad Effendi will not I think be now much surprised if, in consequence of the opinions which have been expressed to him not only by myself but by General de Lamoricière, the French Minister at this Court, these proposals are not accepted in their present shape at Constantinople; but it appears to me, or I may almost indeed say that Fuad Effendi has admitted, that he was not only prepared for them before his interview with the Emperor, but that in order to prevent any further delay in his being received by His Imperial Majesty, he had even agreed to transmit them to Constantinople, and it is not impossible that his agreeing to do so was made a condition of his being received at all.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

Inclosure in No. 77.

Extract of a Note delivered by Count Nesselrode to Fuad Effendi, on the $\frac{5}{17}$ *October*, 1849.

1. L'EXPULSION de tous les sujets de l'Empereur, quels que soient les passeports dont ils sont munis. Cette expulsion sera exécutée d'après l'indication fournie par la Mission de Russie.

2. La Porte doit s'entendre avec les autres Puissances que cela regarde, pour que les sujets de l'Empereur ayant des passeports soient expulsés s'ils paraissent en Turquie et s'ils se livrent à des menées révolutionnaires contre la Russie.

3. L'éloignement dans une ville intérieure de l'Asie Mineure des réfugiés dont il a demandé l'extradition et qui auraient embrassé l'Islamisme.

No. 78.

Sir Stratford Canning to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received October 29.)

(No. 304.)

My Lord, *Therapia, October* 15, 1849.

THE communication of your Lordship's opinion relative to Prince Schwarzenberg's demand, founded on Article XVIII of the Treaty of Belgrade, has afforded the liveliest satisfaction to the Ottoman Secretary o State for Foreign Affairs, upon whom I waited this morning; and I have no doubt that it will be equally acceptable to the Grand Vizier, and also to His Majesty the Sultan.

General Aupick informed me on the arrival of the last French steam-packet, that M. de Tocqueville had written to him in a similar sense, on receiving the telegraphic report of Prince Radzivil's departure from Constantinople and the accompanying circumstances.

It may be expected that we shall both receive our respective instructions concerning the point at issue between the Porte and the two Imperial Cabinets by the French steam-packet of the 22nd.

In the meantime we shall most probably learn the determination of the Russian Government. The steam-packet from Odessa, which has

been due since yesterday morning, passed down the Bosphorus a few minutes ago.

In so far as Austria is concerned, the appearances are rather more favourable than they were.

The attitude assumed by Russia as to the recruitment, the provisioning and the position of its armies, may justly throw a suspicion on the ulterior intentions of that Power; but I have endeavoured in my confidential communications with the Grand Vizier to counteract any exaggerated impressions suggested by those who would be glad to plunge the Porte into hostilities with Russia at any price.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

No. 79.

Sir Stratford Canning to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received October 29.)

(No. 306.)

My Lord, *Therapia, October 15, 1849.*

THE three Englishmen whose liberation I demanded from the Porte are now on their way hither from Widdin.

Orders are sent to remove the principal remaining *détenus*, and all those of Polish origin, from that fortress to Schumla. No distinction is made between those who have professed the Mahometan faith and those who adhere to the Christian religion. Supplies of clothing, which were greatly needed, have been sent.

The Italians are ordered to Gallipoli, where they will be embarked for their respective countries.

Such of the Hungarians as choose to return to their native country, will be dismissed by agreement with the Austrian authorities, if the latter will grant them an amnesty. It is understood that an officer of superior rank is on his way from Vienna to ascertain the disposition of the individuals concerned.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

No. 80.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received October 29.)

(No. 257.)

My Lord, *Vienna, October 21, 1849.*

IN my despatch No. 256, sent this day by post, I alluded (I hope intelligibly) to the substance of the reply of the Emperor of Russia to the Ottoman Minister Fuad Effendi. I will now state its substance more clearly. His Imperial Majesty said that he could, without loss to his dignity, receive with satisfaction the appeal made to his friendship and generosity by the Sultan, but he should not be able to retire before any menace made by England or by France.

The same feeling respecting menace animates the Austrian Ministers. Your Lordship, however, may be sure that they will not look curiously for evidence of the existence of menace, or make unnecessary inquiries into the cause of the cruize of the British fleet in the Mediterranean.

I presume that the Sublime Porte will be called upon to take measures to put it out of the power of the refugees to act offensively against the Austrians.

I have, &c.
(Signed) PONSONBY.

No. 81.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received October 29.)

(No. 259.)

My Lord, *Vienna, October 23, 1849.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship copy of a note from M. Musurus, the Ottoman Minister at this Court, to his Highness Prince Schwarzenberg, on the subject of the difference between Austria and Turkey, together with his Highness' reply.

I have, &c.
(Signed) PONSONBY.

Inclosure 1 in No. 81.

M. Musurus to Prince Schwarzenberg.

Vienne, le 22 Octobre, 1849.

SI, pour des motifs aussi impérieux que légitimes, la Sublime Porte a eu le regret de ne pouvoir consentir à la demande d'extradition des chefs de l'insurrection Hongroise réfugiés sur son territoire, elle n'a pas hésité a prendre spontanément une résolution qui satisfait parfaitement la raison d'Etat qui a motivé cette demande, en même temps qu'elle est conforme à l'esprit des traités existans.

En effet, le Soussigné, &c., est autorisé à assurer, au nom de la Sublime Porte et de la manière la plus positive, le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal, que, pour donner une preuve éclatante des sentimens d'amitié dont elle a été de tout temps animée envers la Cour d'Autriche, et dans la conviction que ce témoignage de bon voisinage sera apprécié, elle s'est décidée à faire interner et surveiller dans des lieux convenables de l'empire, les chefs de l'insurrection Hongroise réfugiés chez elle, de manière qu'ils fussent dans l'impossibilité de rien entreprendre contre l'ordre légitime dans les Etats Autrichiens.

Heureux d'être chargé par son Gouvernement d'offrir les garanties les plus explicites sur l'exécution de cette mesure, qui, vû les rapports d'amitié heureusement existans entre les deux empires, ne cesserait qu'après une entente préalable avec le Cabinet de Vienne, le Soussigné le serait doublement si son Altesse le Prince de Schwarzenberg, &c., voulait bien le mettre à même d'annoncer à la Sublime Porte que des offres aussi amicales ont été appréciées et accueillies avec pleine satisfaction par Sa Majesté l'Empereur d'Autriche.

Le Soussigné, &c. (Signé) C. MUSURUS.

Inclosure 2 in No. 81.

Prince Schwarzenberg to M. Musurus.

Vienne, le 22 Octobre, 1849.

PAR sa note en date d'aujourd'hui, M. Musurus, Envoyé Extraordinaire de la Sublime Porte Ottomane, a bien voulu, au nom de son Gouvernement, faire part au Soussigné, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, que la Sublime Porte, conformément à l'esprit des traités en vigueur, s'est décidée à faire interner et surveiller dans des lieux convenables, les chefs de l'insurrection Hongroise réfugiés sur son territoire, de manière à les mettre dans l'impossibilité de ne rien entreprendre dorénavant contre l'ordre légal dans les Etats Autrichiens.

Conjointement à cette communication, M. Musurus, &c., a bien voulu offrir au Gouvernement Impérial les garanties les plus explicites pour

l'exécution exacte des mesures en question, qui ne pourront cesser qu'à la suite d'un commun accord entre les deux Cours.

Le Gouvernement Impérial se plaît à considérer ces propositions comme une preuve du haut prix que la Sublime Porte attache au maintien inaltérable des rapports d'amitié et de bon voisinage qui unissent depuis si longues années les deux empires limitrophes.

Apprenant ces sentimens et animé à son tour du désir sincère de les payer d'une entière réciprocité, le Gouvernement Impérial se déclare prêt à accéder à l'arrangement proposé.

Le Soussigné a l'honneur d'ajouter que M. l'Internonce recevra incessamment communication de la note de M. Musuros, ainsi que de la présente pièce, et qu'il sera muni des instructions nécessaires afin de communiquer à la Sublime Porte la liste nominative des individus considérés comme chefs de l'insurrection Hongroise.

Dans l'espoir que cette affaire peut dès-lors être regardée comme arrivée à son terme, le Soussigné saisit, &c.

(Signé) FELIX SCHWARZENBERG.

No. 82.

Viscount Palmerston to Sir Stratford Canning.

(No. 266.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, October* 30, 1849.

I HAVE to acquaint your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government approve of the language which you held and of the advice which you gave to the Porte, as stated in your despatch No. 298, of the 5th instant, respecting the refugees at Widdin and the attempt to induce them to embrace Islamism.

I am, &c.

(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 83.

Viscount Palmerston to Sir Stratford Canning.

(No. 267.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, October* 30, 1849.

I HAVE to acquaint your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government approve of the firm but prudent language held by you to the Porte respecting the demands of Austria and Russia, as reported in your despatch No. 297 of the 4th instant.

I am, &c.

(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 84.

Viscount Palmerston to Viscount Ponsonby.

(No. 162.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, November* 2, 1849.

WITH reference to your Excellency's despatch No. 257 of the 21st ultimo, reporting the feeling entertained by the Austrian Ministers with respect to what they term the menace made by England and France, I have to point out to your Excellency that a movement of Her Majesty's squadron to the upper end of the Mediterranean cannot be considered as a threat against Austria. If the squadron had moved up the Adriatic and had taken post opposite to Venice or Trieste, the case might have been different.

I am, &c.

(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 85.

Lord Bloomfield to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received November 2.)

(No. 15. Confidential.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, October* 22, 1849.

THE French Minister has just called on me, and communicated to me a despatch of the 12th instant, which he received last night from his Government, instructing him to inform Count Nesselrode, that in consequence of the state of affairs at Constantinople, a French squadron had been ordered to Tenedos. General de Lamoricière is directed at the same time to make known to the Russian Government, that the Government of the Republic entertains the most anxious hope that the differences which have arisen between the Russian and the Turkish Governments will be satisfactorily settled; and he is particularly enjoined so to make this communication, that the announcement of the movement of the squadron shall not have the appearance of a menace. He asked me how I advised him to proceed in making this communication; and I told him that I thought that if it had been known at Paris when the despatch was written, that the Russian Government no longer desired to press on the Porte their demand for the extradition of the Poles, but would be contented with their expulsion, that they would not have ordered him to say anything about the fleet; and I added that I had carefully refrained from mentioning the orders sent to Sir W. Parker, when I communicated three days ago to the Chancellor your Lordship's despatch No. 1 of the 6th instant; and I said further, that after all, he would be only telling the Chancellor what he must have already learnt from other sources; and that it appeared to me that the direct mention of the departure of the fleet would only produce the undesirable effect of increasing the existing irritation; and therefore, if Count Nesselrode did not ask any questions on the subject, my opinion was, that the less he said on the subject the better, because the information thus given might be interpreted into a threat, which he wished to avoid; and that after all, there was no reason why our squadrons should not meet in the neighbourhood of the Dardanelles; it was not necessary that their rendezvous should be considered as an act of hostility to Russia; for if Russia did not contemplate any injury to the Porte, the position of the two squadrons was perfectly harmless; and certainly the Porte would not ask any questions on the subject, and she alone had a right to demand an explanation.

For these reasons I advised General de Lamoricière to say nothing, unless asked, respecting the fleet; because I thought that at the present moment we should abstain from doing anything of an irritating nature; that we had sufficient proof that Russia was disposed to settle her difference with the Porte by negotiation; and that our best course was now to leave the matter in the hands of our Governments, and those of our Representatives at Constantinople, and trust to them to bring it to a satisfactory issue.

Since writing the foregoing I have again seen the French Minister, and he has given me the following account of his interview with Count Nesselrode.

He represented himself as having commenced by stating to the Chancellor that the public feeling in France was in a very excited state, in consequence of the late peremptory demands addressed to the Porte by the Russian and Austrian Ministers for the extradition of the political refugees, and their assertion that the escape of one of these individuals would be considered a declaration of war; and that the intelligence also which had reached Paris, of executions of fourteen superior officers having lately taken place in Hungary by order of the Austrian Government, had greatly added to the excitement; and that consequently, he had been directed to speak to his Excellency on these subjects, and to endeavour to discover what steps the Russian Government were taking to put an end to their differences with Turkey. Count Nesselrode replied that the Empe-

rial Government had made a communication to Constantinople, which he trusted would be favourably received by the Ottoman Government. That he had written to M. Kisséleff, the Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Paris, to the effect that the Emperor, out of consideration for the direct appeal which had been made to him by the Sultan through Fuad Effendi, would no longer insist upon the extradition of the Polish refugees, and that the question might be considered in a fair way of settlement.

In reply to the report of M. Titoff's having threatened the Porte with war if the refugee Poles were allowed to leave Turkey, Count Nesselrode asserted that it was unfounded, and declared that he had never said anything of the sort; and in answer to the allusions which had been made by the French Minister to the executions which had taken place in Hungary, the Chancellor said that he could inform him, in the strictest confidence however, that the Russian Government, far from approving of these wholesale butcheries, regretted them deeply; and his Excellency added, that this regret was not only felt by the Government, but that the Russian public were indignant on the subject.

General de Lamoricière told me that Count Nesselrode held the most conciliatory language to him throughout his interview, and that he therefore decided on following my advice, and omitted all mention of the orders which had been sent to the French fleet.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 86.

Lord Bloomfield to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received November 2.)

(No. 16.)
My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, October* 23, 1849.

A VAGUE rumour having reached me a few days ago that orders had been sent to equip the Russian fleet in the Black Sea, I have caused inquiries to be made on the subject, and have obtained the assurance, from I believe a good source, that no such orders have been issued.

I am told on the contrary that there is no appearance of activity in the Naval department at the present moment, and that there is not a ship of war being prepared for service in the Black Sea or the Baltic beyond the number which is usually in commission during the winter months.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 87.

Lord Bloomfield to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received November 3.)

(No. 20.)
My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, October* 24, 1849.

COUNT NESSELRODE has communicated to me a despatch which he has this day forwarded to Baron Brunnow as an answer to the one which your Lordship addressed to me on the 6th instant, a copy of which I delivered to his Excellency, upon the subject of the differences which have arisen between Russia and Turkey in consequence of the late demand for the extradition of certain refugee Poles. I have the honour to forward herewith a copy of this despatch, in case it should not have reached your Lordship's hands before the arrival of the present messenger.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

P.S.—I have forwarded to Her Majesty's Ambassadors at Paris and Constantinople copies of Count Nesselrode's despatch to Baron Brunnow of this date.

B.

Inclosure in No. 87.

Count Nesselrode to Baron Brunnow.

St. Pétersbourg, le $\frac{5}{17}$ *Octobre*, 1849.

J'AI déjà eu l'honneur d'informer votre Excellence qu'à la suite de l'appel direct que le Sultan vient de faire auprès de l'Empereur, par l'envoi à St. Pétersbourg de Fuad Effendi, Sa Majesté prenant en considération les embarras que pourrait causer au Gouvernement Ottoman l'exécution trop stricte de l'Article du Traité de Kaïnardji concernant les réfugiés politiques, c'est-à-dire, leur extradition, avait consenti à se contenter de l'interprétation la moins rigoureuse de cette clause, et se bornait en conséquence à demander à la Porte l'expulsion des Polonais, sujets de l'Empereur, qui par leurs machinations ne cessent d'abuser de l'asile dont ils jouissent sur le territoire Ottoman pour y compromettre le repos et les bonnes relations des deux empires.

Cette proposition venait à peine d'être communiquée à Fuad Effendi, qui ne doute pas qu'elle ne soit acceptée à Constantinople, que Lord Bloomfield est venu me donner lecture d'une dépêche de son Cabinet que votre Excellence trouvera ci-jointe en copie.

D'après sa teneur, M. le Baron, vous verrez que l'Empereur vient de résoudre la question de manière à dissiper les alarmes gratuites du Gouvernement Anglais.

Je crois dès-lors pouvoir me dispenser de m'étendre plus en détail sur les argumens développés dans cette pièce, d'autant plus que sur quelques-uns nous pourrions ne pas nous trouver entièrement d'accord avec le Cabinet Anglais.

C'est ainsi que Lord Palmerston, en invoquant les usages du monde civilisé en matière de droit d'asile, nous semble avoir donné beaucoup d'extension à ce qu'il appelle la cause de l'humanité, à propos d'individus qui en ont violé toutes les lois dans les pays qu'ils ont couvert de confusion, de sang et de ruines.

Également, Lord Palmerston, en ne faisant mention que de l'Autriche, quand il maintient que l'éloignement des réfugiés doit suffire à sa sécurité, nous paraît perdre de vue que la Russie est non moins intéressée que l'Autriche à écarter de son voisinage ces conspirateurs dangereux.

Mais, ainsi que je viens de le dire, l'affaire se trouvant déjà réglée de fait, il deviendrait fort inutile de s'engager sur ce sujet dans une discussion de principes.

Les difficultés que le Gouvernement Anglais s'était proposé d'aplanir par ses bons offices, l'Empereur les a résolues d'avance de son propre mouvement. Du moment que le Sultan, sans articuler un refus, a préféré s'en remettre directement et sans autre intermédiaire aux sentimens généreux de Sa Majesté, notre auguste maître n'a eu besoin de consulter que ses impulsions spontanées et que ses dispositions amicales envers la Porte Ottomane.

La question étant ainsi posée, et à la veille d'être résolue entre les deux parties intéressées, toute démarche de la part d'une autre Puissance, devient désormais sans objet, et il ne nous reste aujourd'hui qu'à rappeler au Gouvernement Anglais que ce n'est pas la Russie qui au milieu de tant de graves circonstances a fourni les moindres preuves de son respect pour l'indépendance et l'intégrité de l'Empire Ottoman.

C'est ce que vous voudrez bien, M. le Baron, déclarer à Lord Palmerston, en lui donnant lecture et copie de la présente.

Recevez, &c.
(Signé) NESSELRODE.

No. 88.

Lord Bloomfield to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received November 3.)

(No. 21. Confidential.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, October 24, 1849.*

WITH reference to my preceding number, I have the honour to inform your Lordship, that after Count Nesselrode had communicated to me his despatch to Baron Brunnow, of this date, we had a conversation of some importance, which I hasten to report to your Lordship.

His Excellency began by saying that he hoped nothing would happen to prevent the affair under discussion at Constantinople from being satisfactorily arranged.

He then observed that a rumour had reached him of orders having been sent to our squadron in the Mediterranean to proceed towards the Dardanelles; and he said that he trusted this rumour would prove to be untrue, because such a step would infallibly embroil the whole affair, which was now in a fair way of settlement. The Chancellor next alluded to a report which he understood had reached Her Majesty's Government, of M. Titoff having declared, previously to the interruption of his diplomatic intercourse with the Porte, that the escape of one of the Poles, the surrender of whom had been demanded by the Russian Government, would be considered a declaration of war; and said to me (as he had already done on a former occasion to the French Minister, as reported in my despatch No. 15) that this statement was unfounded.

I replied to Count Nesselrode that this report had certainly reached Her Majesty's Government; that it had been learnt with deep regret; and that possibly it may have had some influence in inducing Her Majesty's Government to take the affair of the demand for the extradition of the Poles into more serious consideration than they would otherwise have done. That as to the destination of the British squadron I had no communication to make to his Excellency; I thought it, however, not impossible that Sir William Parker might move the force under his command eastwards; but were this to take place Russia need have no alarm for the consequences, for we had no aggressive intentions against Turkey, and the Mediterranean was a long distance from any portion of the Russian Empire.

Count Nesselrode then said that he very much feared some such movement as he had mentioned had been contemplated by Her Majesty's Government, for he had learnt from M. Kisséleff, the Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Paris, that Her Majesty's Ambassador had been actively engaged in urging (avait beaucoup travaillé) the French Government to fit out a squadron for the waters of the Levant; and he could assure me, if this were true, that the apparition of our fleet would be the signal for greater complications than had yet taken place.

Count Nesselrode seemed to attach so much importance to this point, that I have considered it my duty to dispatch the messenger Wright without a moment's delay, in order to submit to the consideration of Her Majesty's Government the expediency of sending such fresh instructions to Sir William Parker as they may deem advisable under present circumstances.

I have, &c.

(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 89.

Lord Eddisbury to Mr. Buchanan.

Sir, *Foreign Office, November 5, 1849.*

I AM directed by Viscount Palmerston to acquaint you that his Lordship approves the private communication which, as stated in your letter of the 10th ultimo, you thought it expedient to make to M. Seniavine with a view of preparing him to expect that Her Majesty's Government might place a different interpretation upon the Article of the Treaty of Kainardji respecting refugees, from that which was given to that Article by the Russian Government.

I am, &c.

(Signed) EDDISBURY.

No. 90.

The Marquis of Normanby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received November 6.)

(No. 524.)

My Lord, *Paris, November 5, 1849.*

GENERAL HAUTPOUL, charged *ad interim* with the Foreign Department, called on me this morning, and amongst other subjects mentioned that M. Kisséleff, the Russian Chargé d'Affaires, had seen him yesterday, and the purport of his communication had been that the difficulties at Constantinople were now over, as the Emperor had confined his demands as to the refugees to that which the Sultan had from the first offered. The General said, under these circumstances, he thought we should probably consider that the possible eventualities to guard against which our combined fleets had been sent into that neighbourhood, no longer existed. He wished me to consult your Lordship on the subject, as he felt it was of the utmost importance that no separate orders should be sent on this subject. It was extremely desirable, in his view, that the perfect accord which happily existed on this question between France and England should be made apparent to all the world. The General then reciprocated most cordially with me the expression of his conviction that upon that alliance depended the best interests of the two countries, and probably the peace of the world.

I have, &c.

(Signed) NORMANBY.

No. 91.

The Secretary to the Admiralty to Mr. Addington.

Sir, *Admiralty, November 6, 1849.*

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to send you herewith, for the information of Viscount Palmerston, a copy of a letter dated the 19th October, No. 299, from Vice-Admiral Sir William Parker, reporting that in obedience to his instructions he was about to proceed off the Dardanelles with the squadron under his orders.

I am, &c.

(Signed) J. PARKER.

Inclosure in No. 91.

Vice-Admiral Sir W. Parker to the Secretary to the Admiralty.

"*Queen*," *off the Island of Belo Poulo*,
October 19, 1849.

Sir,

I REQUEST you will inform the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty that Captain Slade yesterday joined Her Majesty's ship "Queen," off Cerigo, by the "Rosamond," which had been left at Zante to bring whatever letters might be conveyed for me by the packet from Malta.

I have received their Lordships' secret instructions of the 8th instant, and am now proceeding with the squadron for the Dardanelles, on the return of the "Dragon," after communicating with Her Majesty's Minister at Athens, to obtain his latest intelligence of the state of affairs at Constantinople.

The "Rosamond" proceeds immediately to Malta with some necessary orders for further supplies of provisions, and to detain the "Ardent," if she has not already departed for England; in which case both vessels will join me as expeditiously as possible with as much provisions as they can respectively carry.

I shall not fail to communicate with his Excellency Sir S. Canning on my arrival off the Dardanelles; and their Lordships may be assured of my best exertions to execute the instructions which I have received in conformity with the wishes of Her Majesty's Government.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. PARKER.

No. 92.

Viscount Palmerston to the Marquis of Normanby.

(No. 515.)

Foreign Office, *November* 9, 1849.

My Lord,

I HAVE received and laid before the Queen your Excellency's despatch No. 524, of the 5th instant, giving an account of a conversation which your Excellency had held with General Hautpoul respecting the presence of the combined English and French squadrons in the eastern end of the Mediterranean; and I have to state to your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government quite agree with General Hautpoul that the possible contingency, with a view to which the squadrons were ordered up the Mediterranean, being no longer to be expected, and the questions at issue at Constantinople in regard to the surrender of the refugees having been put in a train for amicable adjustment by the course which it is understood the Emperor of Russia has taken, there is no longer any reason for keeping the two squadrons in the Levant; but it may be as well to wait till accounts, which may be soon expected, are received from Constantinople as to the actual nature of the Emperor's answer, before orders are sent for the return of the squadrons.

I am, &c.
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 93.

Sir Stratford Canning to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received November* 10.)

(No. 308.)

Therapia, *October* 20, 1849.

My Lord,

I HAVE communicated privately this morning, by means of Mr. Alison, with Aali Pasha and the Grand Vizier. It appears from the language held by those Ministers, that no ostensible change has taken place in the state of the pending question since I had last the honour of addressing your Lordship. Appearances are generally much more favourable to a pacific solution of the difference in so far as Austria is concerned; but with respect to Russia, nothing further is known except the passage of Fuad Effendi through Warsaw on the 30th ultimo, and the expectation of his reaching St. Petersburgh in less than a week from that time.

I am also distinctly assured that the Porte is carrying out the measures previously adopted with respect to the refugees at Widdin and the Turkish troops in Wallachia.

The former, with the exception of the three English gentlemen who have been given up to me, of the Italians who are going to embark at Gallipoli, and of the Hungarian privates and non-commissioned officers, who remain at Widdin, are by this time on their way to Schumla, if not actually arrived there.

The Hungarians remaining at Widdin will be allowed to go home under an amnesty to be settled, if possible, with an Austrian officer already sent thither from Vienna. Omer Pasha and the Pasha of Widdin are instructed to see that none of the Hungarians return under Austrian authority without their own free consent.

The Sultan has sent a present of 150,000 piastres to the leading refugees, and orders are sent to supply the others with military clothing.

The troops withdrawn from Wallachia, to the number of 10,000, are to be stationed at Schumla and other points in Bulgaria. The Turkish Ministers persist in rating the military force in this neighbourhood at 60,000 men, and three-fourths of them being militia, whose terms of service would naturally expire in a few days, their dismissal to the provinces will be suspended for a month. Throughout Roumelia, as Reshid Pasha affirms, there are not less than 110,000 or 120,000 men in actual military service.

In Bosnia a contest is still going on between the Pasha of that province and a body, more or less numerous, of insurgents; but the Porte seems to have no apprehension of the result, and nothing has occurred in Servia, as far as I am informed, to compromise the public tranquillity.

It may be added that the position of the Russian armies, and the measures adopted for recruiting and provisioning them on a large scale, are far from tranquillizing, and among those who regret the termination of the Hungarian war, there are some who would willingly increase the causes of suspicion and alarm. Against this dangerous excitement, and the designs of those who promote it, I have exerted myself strenuously to warn the Turkish Ministers, and I have now reason to believe that their present state of mind is one which promises a steady adherence to the line prescribed by honour and humanity, without any tendency to rush unreasonably or unnecessarily into the hazards of war.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

No. 94.

Sir Stratford Canning to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received November 10.)

(Private and Confidential.)

Therapia, October 20, 1849.

My Lord,

FOR your more complete information I have the honour to inclose herewith in copy, a private letter which I have received from Her Majesty's Consul-General at Warsaw, in reply to mine by Fuad Effendi, of which a copy has been already transmitted to your Lordship.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

Inclosure in No. 94.

Colonel Du Plat to Sir Stratford Canning.

(Private.)

Warsaw, October 1, 1849.

Sir,

LONG before this letter can reach Constantinople your Excellency will have heard that the Emperor of Russia left Warsaw a few hours after the death of his brother the Grand Duke Michael, which occurred here in the evening of the 9th ultimo. Fuad Effendi, upon reaching this place yesterday, therefore determined to follow His Majesty as quickly as possible to St. Petersburgh; and as the Emperor's Namiestnick even was not here, every motive for delaying the execution of that resolution was wanting, and the Sultan's Commissioner in fact did not remain here more than two or three hours.

I was however fortunate enough to obtain a pretty long interview with Fuad Effendi before his departure, and was thus enabled to discuss with him the contents of your Excellency's letter relative to the object of his mission, and in some degree I hope to second your views for the satisfactory solution of that mission, by putting Fuad Effendi in possession of every information within my own power as to the chance of such a solution, the difficulties of the undertaking, and the military means that Russia at this moment possesses of enforcing her demands, so far as those means can be estimated by the mere numerical force and the actual distribution of her different armies, and by the real means of maintaining them beyond the frontiers of their own country.

As I deemed that your letter was addressed to me principally under the impression of the Emperor of Russia's being still at Warsaw, and as I thought that its confidential communication would be equally applicable to any one of Her Majesty's Political Agents in a position to give the Sultan's Commissioner that information and that moral support in his trials which I feel proud to think you relied on his receiving from my sympathy and at my hands, I thought I could not better respond to your generous intentions, or more forcibly advocate the cause with which I am happy to identify myself, than by sending your own letter to Mr. Buchanan, Her Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at St. Petersburgh, well convinced that whatever co-operation your Excellency may have expected from me will be given with equal zeal, and probably greater efficacy, by my more favourably situated colleague, if so I may be permitted to designate Mr. Buchanan.

I also wrote to that gentleman in great haste, as Fuad Effendi only waited for the termination of my letter to begin his journey from hence, such information bearing on the pending question as I thought I might be better acquainted with than he could be, in consequence of our respective positions during the last three or four months; and I strongly urged Fuad Effendi to seek and to cultivate the personal acquaintance of Mr. Buchanan, and to consider your Excellency's powerful and generous appeal to me as having been originally addressed to Her Majesty's more

regularly recognised Chargé d'Affaires in these parts, instead of to me, who only casually and unavoidably filled that office for a short time.

Acting upon your Excellency's suggestion, I have likewise written to Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, to acquaint him of what I have stated in the foregone part of this letter; and I fear with this announcement to yourself of my very scant services must cease my part in a negotiation to which I would so gladly have devoted greater energies than mine, and better opportunities of applying them. Let me hope, however, that in all I have done I may not have done aught that your Excellency would wish undone; and allow me to assure you that few things in life, none of those connected with my often unpleasant official position in this country, would give me greater pleasure than to receive such an assurance from the same hand that penned the noble letter to which I am responding.

If I might be allowed to risk surmises by way of giving the information which you are so anxious to receive as to the result of Fuad Effendi's mission to the Emperor, I should say that he will succeed, in despite of all Prince Radzivil's bluster, in averting every consequence which your Excellency so properly deprecates, of the Porte's refusal to surrender the Polish refugees. Indeed, Russians high-placed here assert that the demand was made in deference to the feelings and policy of Austria, rather than from any strong desire on the part of the Emperor Nicholas to see that demand complied with; and I cannot help looking even upon this mere assertion at the present moment as a favourable omen of the Sultan's explanations being well received. There is undoubtedly much that is chivalrous in the character of the Emperor, and he has of late shown great moderation and even generosity in political matters. At least he has done so in the case of Georgey, and of the Hungarians generally, so far as the sterner, though perhaps not wiser, policy of the Austrian Cabinet would permit. He likewise only a very short time ago set at liberty and completely pardoned a certain Count Zaluski, one of the most compromised Polish refugees of 1830 and 1831, who had been seized, illegally it is true, by the Russian troops on entering Gallicia in June last. And it is generally said he is much softened by the repeated family losses which have befallen him; more especially the recent sudden death of his favourite and only remaining brother.

At the same time I am sorry to be obliged to add that it is personally known to me that the Emperor entertains the greatest possible animosity towards Bem, whom he apostrophized as a "gredin," regretting that he had escaped to recommence new troubles elsewhere. This conversation was addressed to myself at the door of the late Grand Duke Michael's apartments, not five minutes after the Emperor had left what he believed must be, and what has turned out to be, the death-bed of that Prince. Strange incongruity of human nature!

But despite of this feeling of exasperation against one or, be it, against more than one of the Polish emigrants, I think it would ill square with the moderation which the Emperor has been preaching to Austria, if he were to adopt, as your Excellency says, any measure involving an act of hostility or even an interruption of the usual diplomatic relations; unless indeed the refusal of the Porte to give up the unfortunate in question is to be merely the pretext for an aggressive policy towards her. Russia is keeping up her armies on the war establishment. New levies of recruits have been ordered here and in the eastern provinces of Russia Proper. Three corps d'armée are to remain in the Kingdom of Poland, instead of the usual contingent of one; the corps of grenadiers is not to go further northwards than the neighbourhood of Wilna and Grodno. The corps of dragoons (15,000 men), instead of returning to its usual cantonments at Kharkoff, or even to Kieff, where it was stationed last year, is to halt at Zytomiers; and the fourth corps of the active army is to remain round Dubno, close upon the south-eastern frontier of Poland.

This certainly looks as if the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh thought the further services of the army might be required ere long in the field. But the distribution of the corps also indicates, I think, that it is not in the

direction of Turkey that Russia looks for the occurrence of such an eventuality; and I therefore ventured to suggest to Fuad Effendi that the apprehension of actual violence might be entirely put out of the question in weighing the considerations to be observed in his mission. Nay, I believe Russia would be greatly thwarted in the real objects of her present ambition if any serious diversion of her forces, or even of her attention, were necessary towards the East. The Emperor, whilst at Warsaw this summer, has too often expressed in unguarded moments the belief of its being the holy vocation of Russia to restore tranquillity, that is, to restore the former state of things in Germany, to allow me to think that he has quite given up that idea; and I have also reason to believe that His Majesty coquetted with General de Lamoricière as to the necessity of timely checking Prussia, should she attempt to go too far. Yet notwithstanding my belief in these strong itchings on the part of His Majesty for further intervention, I am inclined to rely on the moderation of the Russian Cabinet, because I do not believe in the hoards of Russian gold; but, on the contrary, have reason to think that the Imperial Government is in considerable financial difficulties.

The consideration of these topics, however, is foreign to the real object of this letter, and instead of apologising to your Excellency for abruptly breaking them off, I think it will be more becoming in me to offer my excuses for having so unconscionably trespassed on your patience and time. I rely on your indulgence for my pardon.

(Signed) G. DU PLAT.

No. 95.

Sir Stratford Canning to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received November 10.)

(No. 314.) *Therapia, October 25, 1849.*

My Lord,

THE messenger Waring arrived here yesterday in the French war-steamer "Tartare," with your Lordship's despatches of the 6th instant.

I lost no time in announcing the intentions of Her Majesty's Government to the Grand Vizier. By my direction M. Pisani informed his Highness that the confidential communications which I had made to him after the arrival of the messenger Robbins, were entirely confirmed by the instructions now received from your Lordship respecting the Polish and Hungarian refugees whose extradition had been peremptorily demanded from the Porte by Their Majesties the Emperors of Russia and of Austria. The Pasha was further informed that representations supporting the views of the Sultan's Government on that question, and couched in friendly terms, had been addressed by your Lordship to Her Majesty's Representatives at Vienna and St. Petersburgh for communication respectively to the Austrian and Russian Cabinets; that orders had been sent to Her Majesty's squadron in the Mediterranean directing it to proceed at once to the Dardanelles; and that there was every reason to expect the co-operation of the French Government with that of Great Britain for the same purposes and by a similar course of proceeding.

I had proposed to wait upon the Minister for Foreign Affairs as well as on the Grand Vizier next day, in order to communicate personally to them such parts of your Lordship's correspondence as might give them a more complete idea of the spirit in which the resolutions of Her Majesty's Government had been adopted. But on learning from Reshid Pasha that he had already appointed 9 o'clock in the morning to receive the French Minister, and that his unavoidable attendance at the Sultan's palace immediately after that interview, on the occasion of a public ceremony, would leave no hour at his disposal but the still earlier one of 8, I determined to postpone my visit till the following day, and to entrust meanwhile to Mr. Alison the duty of making a fuller communication of my instructions.

Mr. Alison was in consequence with the Grand Vizier so as to see him the moment he came out of his private apartment this morning, and though the time was short, he succeeded in putting his Highness in possession of every part of your Lordship's instructions which it was important for him to know at once, and to understand thoroughly; those passages in particular which show how desirable and even how necessary it is for the Porte, while adhering firmly to the course prescribed by honour and humanity, to continue to act in the same conciliatory and prudent manner which she has hitherto so wisely observed, and to be careful throughout these affairs to be invariably in the right.

Reschid Pasha manifested in return a deep feeling of gratitude for the support thus given by Her Majesty's Government to the independence and vital interests of the Ottoman Empire, and a conviction equally deep of the sound policy which was apparent in every part of your Lordship's advice on this occasion. His Highness repeated the Sultan's thanks, as well as his own, with reference to the confidential intimation which had preceded the present official announcement of the course adopted by Her Majesty's Government, and no doubt to be pursued by the French Government also. He expressed emphatically his satisfaction at the approaching arrival of a British squadron in the neighbourhood of the Dardanelles.

To your Lordship and to Her Majesty's Government it will be highly gratifying to know that the Porte has been apprized of the intentions so well calculated to encourage and support her in the unflinching maintenance of her honour and independence; while the decision which has probably been taken by this time at St. Petersburgh is still unknown at Constantinople. Appearances favourable to a peaceful solution of the pending difference continue on the whole to prevail, but nothing in that respect is known with certainty, except that Fuad Effendi had reached the Russian capital; that he had been received officially by Count Nesselrode, who had stated the Emperor's dissatisfaction with the attitude assumed by the Porte: that he was to have an audience of His Imperial Majesty in three or four days, and that he intended to dispatch a special messenger to his Government immediately afterwards.

Whatever may be the line definitively adopted by the Russian Cabinet, even if it were to be a generous relinquishment of the Emperor's present demand, without the substitution of any other more or less embarrassing to the Porte, your Lordship may rest assured that an impression not easy to be effaced has been made on the Sultan and on his Ministers by the generous alacrity with which the Governments of England and of France have come forward in their support; and that whether we look to the character of the Sovereign himself, having from his youth a long reign in prospect, to the relations of this country with those European Powers which have its future interests most at heart, or to those more enlarged considerations which affect the balance of power throughout Europe, a degree of lasting advantage, which no one can better appreciate than your Lordship, is already secured.

I see no reason at present to apprehend any deviation from a prudent and conciliatory line of conduct on the part of the Turkish Government. A few enthusiastic partisans and dangerous advisers, who betrayed at one time an inclination to persuade the Porte that the present question is one which offers a good opportunity for war, have been placed by me in their true colours before the leading Turkish Ministers. Reshid Pasha professes the utmost anxiety to avoid unnecessary complications, and in this respect he only represents the character and policy of the Sultan. The French Minister, though not less alive than myself to the claims of the Porte in its present strait on our sympathy and assistance, is apprehensive almost to excess of overstepping the line of strict prudence; and whatever influence I may still be called upon to exercise over the decisions of the Porte, it would necessarily be regulated by the letter and spirit of your Lordship's instructions, even if those instructions were not in perfect accordance with my own impressions of what is right and prudent under the circumstances. In affairs of so much importance it is no doubt an obvious duty to avoid exaggeration, and to promote by all proper means the adoption of a conciliatory adjustment. If it be also a duty, as assu-

redly it is, to take care that the main question at issue be carried through to that kind of solution which can alone secure a solid result, and satisfy every reasonable expectation, the means to be employed for these purposes, and the manner of employing them, are equally subject to the guidance of a watchful discretion.

I will not conclude this despatch without stating that General Aupick, pursuing the same line of mutual confidence which has continually prevailed between us in the course of the pending question, called after the receipt of his instructions to inform me of their tenor, and I was happy to learn from his account of those received by the messenger who brought mine, that your Lordship's proposals constitute the principal guide for his proceedings with reference to that question.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

No. 96.

Sir Stratford Canning to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received November* 10.)

(No. 316. Confidential.)
Therapia, October 26, 1849.

My Lord,

I AM just returned from a visit to the Grand Vizier, with whom I have had a long and confidential conversation. It is not necessary, nor have I time indeed at present, to trouble your Lordship with the details of what passed. The points of any immediate interest may be stated in few words.

The Pasha seemed thoroughly to understand and to enter into the spirit of the instructions which I have received from your Lordship respecting the question of the refugees. The Sultan as well as his Minister is full of gratitude to Her Majesty's Government, and a formal message of thanks will be shortly sent to me from His Majesty. The Grand Vizier inquired whether a similar message ought in my opinion to be sent to General Aupick, and I replied most decidedly in the affirmative. I had previously learnt from his Highness that the General had announced to him the arrival of instructions from Paris similar to those of which I had communicated the tenor, in so far as the representations to be made at Vienna and St. Petersburgh and the sending up of the French Mediterranean squadron towards the Dardanelles are concerned. In other respects the Vizier seemed doubtful of there being as much determination on the side of France as on our's, and this impression was founded on the hesitation observed in the French Cabinet after your Lordship's proposals had been known at Paris, and on the emphatic manner in which General Aupick, while professing to have the means of peace and of war at his disposal, had deprecated any proceeding which might provoke hostilities.

On the whole, I am convinced that the Porte, though gratified by the conduct of both Powers, knows well on which it has most reason to rely; and that the Grand Vizier, while sensible of the great advantage which he derives from their support, will be careful not to forfeit their confidence and continued sympathy by the indulgence of exaggerated views. I have not been backward either on this or on former occasions, in urging on the Turkish Government the importance of acting with prudence and conciliation as well as with becoming firmness towards the two Imperial Cabinets; and I am still inclined to think that even with the advantages of her present position, the Porte is more likely to require encouragement in the latter than exhortation in the former respect.

The Grand Vizier is well aware of your Lordship's opinion with regard to the expediency of allowing the principal refugees to leave the Sultan's dominions at once. Unfortunately, the Sultan's letter to the Emperor of Russia contains expressions which would justly expose His Majesty to a charge of unfairness, if the refugees were to be sent out of Turkey before an answer or Fuad Effendi's report of his audience can be received. I cannot therefore do more at present than repeat with your

Lordship's sanction the advice which I gave at first on my own responsibility, and prepare the Ottoman Minister, as I have done, for turning to account any fair opening which may present itself for escaping from the embarrassment occasioned by previous concessions.

I shall be greatly disappointed if means are not found in some way or other to maintain the position now gained for this empire, advantageous as it is in so many respects, not only of local but of the highest European importance.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

No. 97.

Sir Stratford Canning to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received November* 10.)

(No. 317.)
Therapia, October 26, 1849.

My Lord,

I WAS informed by the Grand Vizier this morning, that when Omer Pasha apprized General Duhamel of his having received instructions, and given orders for the reduction of the Turkish army of occupation, and his hope that the Russian Government would recognize the propriety of acting in the same manner, the Russian General appeared to acquiesce in the correctness of the proceeding; and there is some reason to hope, although the case is by no means certain, that Russia may be induced to follow the example now given by the Porte.

Such is the impression derived from despatches which have been recently received at the Porte from Prince Stirbey.

Her Majesty's Vice-Consul at Galatz writes under date of the 19th instant, that the Turkish troops at that place and at Ibraïla, were about to recross the Danube on the following day.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

No. 98.

Sir Stratford Canning to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received November* 10.)

(No. 318.)
Therapia, October 26, 1849.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship a copy of a letter which I have this day addressed to Vice-Admiral Sir William Parker.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

Inclosure in No. 98.

Sir Stratford Canning to Vice-Admiral Sir W. Parker.

Therapia, October 26, 1849.

Sir,

HEARING that the squadron under your command is in the Archipelago, and not knowing whether you have yet received instructions relating to the affairs of this country, I have requested Captain Pelham to order the "Tartarus" to join you; and I take the opportunity to forward for your information, in the event of the instructions from England not having reached you, a copy as inclosed herewith of the despatch addressed by Viscount Palmerston to the Lords of the Admiralty on the 6th instant.

Her Majesty's pleasure that you should be directed to proceed at once with the squadron under your command to the neighbourhood of the

Dardanelles is therein signified; and as we are in daily expectation of important if not decisive intelligence from Petersburgh, I think it desirable, though present appearances are favourable on the whole to a peaceable solution of the pending differences, that your squadron should reach its destination with the least possible delay, and that your Excellency should be forthwith placed in immediate communication with me.

At this advanced period of the season, you may think it advisable to anchor the squadron in a less exposed situation than at Besika Bey or off Cape Janissary; and such a station I presume you would find, on the supposition of its being expedient, within the outward castles of the Dardanelles.

Sir Godfrey Webster takes charge of despatches for Her Majesty's Government, and I am desirous that they should be forwarded to Athens, in order to be carried on by the French steam-packet which left Constantinople yesterday evening with the Queen's messenger Waring on board.

I beg to recommend this object to your Excellency's immediate attention, and to add, in conclusion, that I detain the "Odin" here for the same reasons which induced you to place her at my disposal.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

No. 99.

Lord Bloomfield to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received November* 10.)

(No. 27.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, October* 30, 1849.

SEVERAL persons having lately mentioned to me that stories were industriously circulated at St. Petersburgh, to the effect that Her Majesty's Government had made threatening representations to this Court on the subject of the differences which had arisen between Turkey and Russia; and it having been asserted that the honour of Russia would consequently require her to depart from her last determination on the subject of these differences, in order not to appear to yield to a menace from England; I alluded to these reports in the course of my last conversation with Count Nesselrode. His Excellency replied that he at all events was able to declare that I had never used an expression in my conversations with him which could bear a meaning of the kind, and that further, there was nothing in your Lordship's despatch of the 9th instant which looked like a menace. I then said to the Chancellor that I fully expected to hear from him a refutation of these malevolent rumours; but I added, that if ever there were a question of menacing, the accusation would more fairly be brought against the Imperial Government, for the language and conduct of their Minister at Constantinople had certainly been of a most threatening character.

The Chancellor then remarked that he wished he could say the same of the French Government as of the English, but that it was not so; and he regretted also to add that, according to the reports which had reached him from Paris, he had good reason to believe that the French Government would never have taken up the line they had done in this question, but for the influence which had been exercised in the councils of the Government of the Republic by that of Her Majesty, for at the outset of this affair M. Kisselef's reports were by no means so unfavourable to Russia as they had afterwards become; but his Excellency said, in spite of all these difficulties, he trusted everything would yet be settled without serious complications.

I inquired of his Excellency if he had received any intelligence from Vienna on the subject of the misunderstanding with the Porte? He replied that he had not; that he had communicated to the Austrian Government the decisions which had been taken here, and that he had little doubt of their approval of them.

I have, &c.

(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 100.

Lord Bloomfield to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received November* 10.)

(No. 28.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, October* 30, 1849.

FUAD EFFENDI has been confined to his bed for some days past by a severe attack of rheumatic gout, but is now better, and I saw him this afternoon.

He said that he had nothing new to communicate to me on the subject of the differences between his Court and that of Russia; but that Count Nesselrode had been to see him, and had left with him a translation of your Lordship's despatch of the 6th instant, and a copy of his answer to Baron Brunnow.

He told me that the Chancellor taxed him with not having mentioned the fact of the Porte having applied to England for advice and assistance, but that he did not dwell much on the subject; and Fuad Effendi described himself as having evaded a direct answer to this accusation, by saying that the alarm had been caused to the Porte by Austria, whose representation had been most violent and menacing.

The Turkish Ambassador told me further, that since we had last met he had been considering with great care the proposals which he had sent to Constantinople, and that he felt every day more satisfied that they would be favourably received by his Government; that the difficulty of removing Russian subjects residing in Turkey, who were placed under the protection of foreign passports, would not, he thought, be an insuperable objection to the acceptance of these proposals, because he said the Porte could certainly enter upon negotiations with foreign Powers, without binding herself to succeed in them, and after all, if she failed, the question might be undertaken in some other form and perhaps become a subject of negotiation between the Powers themselves, which would exonerate the Porte from her responsibility to Russia.

Fuad Effendi mentioned that he had seen the Grand Duke Constantine, who told him that the Emperor had learnt with much dissatisfaction the movement of an allied English and French squadron towards the Dardanelles, and His Imperial Highness appears to have spoken in a manner which caused the Turkish Ambassador to apprehend that unlooked for obstacles would probably be raised by the Russian Plenipotentiary at Constantinople if the squadrons were to remain so near the scene of the negotiations.

On the whole, however, I may say that the Turkish Ambassador seems full of hope; and he said as I was leaving him, that happen what might, he trusted he should be able to show that Turkey had at all events done everything in her power to conciliate matters and to prevent the calamity of an European war.

I have, &c.

(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 101.

Lord Bloomfield to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received November* 10.)

(No. 29. Confidential.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, October* 30, 1849.

GENERAL DE LAMORICIERE informed me a few days ago that he had received from M. de Tocqueville a confidential letter respecting the numerous foreigners who are now residing in Turkey under French protection, and he mentioned to me, without however going into the details of the communication, that the Government of the Republic had not altogether approved of the late proceedings of General Aupick with respect to some of those persons and that he had no doubt that his Government

were better disposed than they ever had been to get rid of the responsibility which rested on them, and would be found desirous even to facilitate rather than to oppose the arrangements which the Porte had been called on to make by Russia.

In fact General de Lamoricière gave me to understand that the French Government were tired of giving passports to foreign refugees, and would no longer, he thought, object to the removal from Turkey of many of these individuals, the greater part of whom he said were quite unworthy of their protection.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 102.

The Secretary to the Admiralty to Mr. Addington.

Admiralty, November 13, 1849.

Sir,

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to send you herewith, for the information of Viscount Palmerston, a copy of a letter from Vice-Admiral Sir William Parker, dated the 21st ultimo, No. 300, reporting that he was proceeding with the squadron under his command to the Dardanelles.

I am, &c.
(Signed) J. H. HAY,
Pro Secretary.

Inclosure in No. 102.

Vice-Admiral Sir W. Parker to the Secretary to the Admiralty.

"Queen," off the Island of St. George,
October 21, 1849.

Sir,

I REQUEST you will inform the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty that I have been this morning joined by the "Dragon," which I had sent to communicate with Her Majesty's Minister at Athens, from whom I learn that the latest accounts received from his Excellency Sir Stratford Canning are dated the 15th instant, when no political changes had taken place at Constantinople.

I am consequently now proceeding as expeditiously as possible with the squadron to the Dardanelles.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. PARKER.

No. 103.

The Marquis of Normanby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received November 14.)

(No. 535.)

My Lord,

Paris, November 3, 1849.

AFTER I had dispatched the courier yesterday, I had another conversation with the President as to the best manner of regulating the period of the return of the combined fleets from the neighbourhood of the Dardanelles; and as Prince Louis Napoleon upon this occasion made a fresh proposition which appears to me to be worthy of your Lordship's consideration, I do not delay to communicate it, as if you feel inclined to act upon it the French Government would desire that steps should be immediately taken in concert to carry it out. The President remarked that it had occurred to him the next intelligence from Constantinople might be of

that doubtful character which would render it difficult for either Government to decide at this distance precisely what course to adopt.

The fleets had gone there in consequence of representations from the Ambassadors at Constantinople to afford moral and if necessary material support to the Sultan against any possible attack which the then state of affairs seemed to threaten; it might therefore be best to leave the time of the removal of the fleets to be judged by those on the spot who had thought their presence necessary. He therefore proposed that despatches should be addressed from London and Paris to Sir Stratford Canning and General Aupick, leaving it to them to say whether they could now give orders for the return of the fleets, or whether they thought their further continuance in those waters desirable.

If your Lordship should agree in this view of the case, which appears to have the advantage of making the perfect concert between the Allied Powers obvious on the spot where it is most important that it should have its effect upon all parties there, it might be desirable that your Lordship should send me a draft of your instructions on this head to Sir Stratford Canning by the next courier, in the hope that the French Government may form theirs to General Aupick substantially to the same effect.

I have, &c.
(Signed) NORMANBY.

No. 104.

The Marquis of Normanby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received November 14.)

(No. 537. Confidential.)

My Lord,

Paris, November 13, 1849.

SINCE I wrote my despatch No. 535 of this day's date, General d'Hautpoul has been with me and has expressed his great anxiety that he should as soon as possible be able to announce to the Assembly that the affair between Russia and Turkey being in a fair way of settlement, orders had been sent to the Ambassador at Constantinople for the return of the fleet, provided it appeared to him that no new circumstance had arisen which rendered its longer stay in those parts necessary.

I told him that as I had announced to your Lordship, in consequence of what I had heard from the President, that the French Government were satisfied to await the next intelligence from Constantinople, and as it was only last night after post-time when this new proposition was made to me, I could not acquiesce in any announcement until I had heard from your Lordship a reply. General d'Hautpoul then explained confidentially how very important it was, with a view to financial arrangements which were at present in progress, that the Government should be able, as soon as possible, to tranquillize the public mind upon events which must have so much effect upon those operations. He therefore earnestly requested me, as his proposition was not one to which I saw any objection in principle, to endeavour to procure an answer from your Lordship by Friday instead of Saturday, by which means they might be able to make some impression in the Assembly before the end of the week.

I have, &c.
(Signed) NORMANBY.

No. 105.

Viscount Palmerston to Lord Bloomfield.

(No. 26.)

My Lord,

Foreign Office, November 15, 1849.

WITH reference to that part of your Lordship's despatch No. 28, of the 30th ultimo, in which you allude to the language stated to have been held by the Grand Duke Constantine as to the feelings with which the

Emperor had learnt the movement of the British and French squadron towards the Dardanelles, I have to instruct you, if you should again hear the presence of the British squadron at the upper end of the Mediterranean adverted to as a thing at which Russia is entitled to take umbrage, to say that such a movement could be objected to by Russia only upon one of three grounds—first, as an indication of an intention to attack Russia; secondly, as an indication of an intention to attack Constantinople, or to do some violence to the independence of the Sultan; thirdly, as an indication to defend Constantinople against some expected attack of the Russian fleet in the Black Sea. Now with regard to the first, it is plainly and manifestly out of the question that any such intention could have led to the present disposition of the British squadron now cruizing or anchoring in the Archipelago. With regard to the second intention, it is also certain and well known to all, that no such motive has influenced the orders given to Sir William Parker. And with regard to the third, although such an intention would not, if it were applicable to the state of things, be a valid ground on which Russia could object to the movement which has been made, yet the possibility of any such contingency seems to have been put out of the question by the friendly reply which the Emperor has sent to the letter brought by Fuad Effendi from the Sultan.

Your Lordship may however say that the stay of Her Majesty's squadron at the upper end of the Mediterranean will be but short, as Her Majesty's Government are desirous that it should return to its more usual station.

I am, &c.
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 106.

Viscount Palmerston to Lord Bloomfield.

(No. 29.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, November* 15, 1849.

WITH reference to your conversation with General Lamoricière, reported in your despatch No. 29, of the 30th of October, I have to state to your Lordship that there are very few persons indeed in Turkey in the enjoyment of British protection, who are not actually British subjects by birth or naturalization, or else citizens of the Ionian Islands who are placed by treaty under British protection. The instructions given to Her Majesty's servants in the Levant on this head are very precise, and in the few instances in which British protection is allowed to be given to parties who are not strictly entitled to it, the individuals so favoured are either subjects of the Porte who are in some way or other connected with British subjects, or who have claims on the British authorities for past services, or else subjects of some European Power which has no national Representatives on the spot. To these classes, however, have latterly been added some Russian Jews in Palestine, who by an arrangement between the British and Russian Governments have been placed under British protection.

It is possible that there may be some few persons under British protection in Turkey who would not be included in the above enumeration, but their number must be very small.

I am, &c.
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 107.

Viscount Palmerston to Sir Stratford Canning.

(No. 281.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, November* 16, 1849.

I RECEIVED on the 10th instant by the messenger Waring, and I have laid before the Queen, your Excellency's despatches from No. 307 to No. 318, both inclusive, the last of the 26th of October.

With reference to your despatches Nos. 314 and 316, of the 25th and 26th of October, I have to acquaint your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government entirely approve your Excellency's conduct as reported in those despatches, in the execution of the instructions which you had received from me touching the questions pending between the Governments of Austria and Russia on the one hand, and that of the Sultan on the other hand.

I am, &c.
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 108.

Viscount Palmerston to Sir Stratford Canning.

(No. 282.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, November* 16, 1849.

I HAVE received your Excellency's despatch No. 308, of the 20th ultimo, respecting the refugees at Widdin, the amount of Turkish military force at present collected in Roumelia, and the position and other arrangements of the Russian armies.

I have to state to your Excellency in reply, that the arrangements making by the Russian Government to recruit the Russian army and to station a large portion of it during the present winter upon the western frontier of the empire, seem to have reference to an expectation that events in Germany may lead to some military action on the part of Russia, rather than to any hostile designs against Turkey. At the same time it would not be prudent in the Turkish Government to forget that the Emperor, having received a check in his policy towards Turkey, may be disposed to avail himself of any favourable opportunity which might present itself, to obtain some counterbalancing advantage; and therefore the Turkish Government ought to lose no time in taking all proper measures for removing from all classes of the subjects of the Porte every just cause of discontent, and also for gradually placing the defences of the country in serviceable order without any ostentatious display of preparation.

I am, &c.
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 109.

The Marquis of Normanby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received November 16.)

(No. 543.)

My Lord, *Paris, November* 15, 1849.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship the copy of a telegraphic despatch dated Marseilles, November 14th, respecting the demands made by Austria and Russia on the Porte, which has just been communicated to me by General Hautpoul.

I have, &c.
(Signed) NORMANBY.

Inclosure in No. 109.

Telegraphic Despatch.

Dépêche Télégraphique de Marseilles le 14 Novembre, 1849, à 11 heures de matin.

Constantinople, le 5.

Le Ministre de France à M. le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères.

LA Russie et l'Autriche abandonnent la demande d'extradition.

L'Autriche insiste* sur l'internat, la Russie demande l'expulsion de tous les réfugiés Polonais, anciens et nouveaux, et la réclusion à Diarbekir des réfugiés dont elle réclamait l'extradition, qui ont déjà embrassé l'Islamisme.

L'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre vous prie de transmettre cette dépêche à Londres.

No. 110.

The Secretary to the Admiralty to Mr. Addington.

Admiralty, November 18, 1849.

Sir,

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to send you herewith, for the information of Viscount Palmerston, copies of a letter dated the 30th October, No. 305, from Vice-Admiral Sir William Parker, and of its inclosures, reporting the arrival of the squadron under his orders in Besika Bay, and the communications he had received relative to proceeding within the Dardanelles.

I am, &c.

(Signed) J. PARKER.

Inclosure 1 in No. 110.

Vice-Admiral Sir W. Parker to the Secretary to the Admiralty.

"Queen," in Besika Bay, October 30, 1849.

Sir,

I REQUEST you will inform the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty that by carrying a press of sail, Her Majesty's squadron, consisting of the ships named in the margin,† succeeded in reaching this anchorage on the afternoon of the 28th instant.

The wind was adverse from the time we rounded Cape St. Angelo, but the weather being moderate, the "Dragon" towed the "Howe" and "Caledonia" together through the Doro passage, effecting a speed of five knots an hour with the two three-deckers, while the wind was light. I was very glad to obtain this result of her power.

Between the Islands of Mytelene and Agrostreti we encountered a heavy gale of wind from the north-east, which continued without intermission for three days; our progress therefore has been more favourable than we had reason to anticipate.

In passing the Island of Tenedos, I received intimation, herewith inclosed, from Mr. Consul Calvert, of the arrangements made for the squadron passing within the Dardanelles, and on anchoring here a despatch was delivered to me from his Excellency Sir Stratford Canning, of which I inclose a duplicate‡ for their Lordships' information.

The "Dragon" proceeded to Constantinople the same evening to apprize his Excellency of our arrival and of my intention to pass within the Dardanelles, to the anchorage recommended by Her Majesty's Consul, should the appearance of the weather make it desirable; but that I should

* Le mot "Insiste" est douteux.

† Queen, Howe, Caledonia, Prince Regent, Powerful, Vengeance, Dragon.

‡ See Inclosure in No. 98.

not on any consideration pass the Inner Castles without previous communication with his Excellency.

It has however blown hard from the north-east ever since we anchored, and there is little probability of our breaking ground from hence before the "Dragon" or "Odin" returns from the Bosphorus.

I have directed both of these vessels to rejoin the squadron to assist in towing the ships up the Dardanelles, should it be requisite, unless the presence of a large steam-vessel is considered by the Ambassador indispensably necessary at Constantinople, having reason to believe that the "Tartarus" will very shortly resume her station in the Bosphorus from Athens.

The "Rosamond" rejoined me yesterday from Malta, and the "Thetis" and "Ardent" are also on their way, all of them filled with provisions, which I trust will complete the squadron with every species to three months, with an extra quantity of rum, tea, sugar, and chocolate, the articles most required, should our continuance in the Dardanelles be prolonged.

I have also intimation that the "Bellerophon" was to leave Leghorn on the 18th instant, and that the "Bulldog" would probably depart from Naples on the 22nd to join me here.

Their Lordships may depend that I shall not detain the "Ardent" longer than I think necessary for the service on which we are engaged, but she will be so useful both as a dispatch vessel in any direction, and, until we are reinforced by larger steamers, to assist in towing the ships up the Dardanelles in our passage to the Bosphorus, should it become necessary, that her services cannot well be dispensed with at present.

I am led to believe that the French squadron are now on their passage to the Levant, and that they will probably take up their anchorage at Vourla.

I have, &c.

(Signed) W. PARKER.

31 October, 9 A.M.—The "Bulldog" has just arrived; she communicated with the "Thetis" and "Ardent" off Cape Matapan on the 29th instant, when the "Bellerophon" was forty miles to the westward.

Inclosure 2 in No. 110.

Consul Calvert to Vice-Admiral Sir W. Parker.

(Private.)

Sir,

Dardanelles, October 26, 1849.

HER Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople having requested me to communicate to your Excellency without loss of time the existing regulations regarding the entrance of the Straits of the Dardanelles by ships of war, I have the honour to inform you that "vessels of war of all nations arriving in these straits without the necessary permission for their passage onwards having been received from Constantinople, are allowed to make choice of any anchorage between the outer castles and Point Nagara, which their respective commanders may consider the most convenient or safe, and where they will be required to remain until the arrival of the firman for them to pass on to Constantinople."

Should therefore your Excellency consider it desirable for the squadron under your command to take up an anchorage within these straits, which will be in all respects more protected than Besika Bay, I take leave to inform you that I am perfectly understood on this subject with the Pasha commanding these forts, who has sent the requisite orders for the commanders of the outer castles to allow the squadron under your command to enter these straits without let or hindrance, by day or by night, and to proceed to any anchorage between the said castles and Point Nagara. I venture to suggest the anchorage situated between Barber's Point and the Inner Asiatic Castle of Sultanieh Kalessi, as being the most conve-

nient in all respects, for it is safe in all weathers; and there is an excellent watering-place with an abundant supply of good fresh water on the European shore about a mile below the battery of Namasia.

The anchorage of Nagara Bay would in many respects have been preferable, had not the supply of water, which once supplied the so-called Captain Pasha's fountain in great abundance, now totally failed.

The present communication is made in duplicate and given in charge of two persons in whom all confidence may be placed, and who will deliver it to you either at Besika Bay or off Tenedos.

As soon as I hear of the arrival of the squadron anywhere on the coast, I shall have the honour of waiting upon your Excellency, when I shall take an opportunity to communicate the substance of a private and confidential letter received to-day from Her Majesty's Ambassador, who has authorized me to show it to your Excellency.

I have, &c.
(Signed) F. W. CALVERT.

No. 111.

The Secretary to the Admiralty to Mr. Addington.

Sir, *Admiralty, November* 18, 1849.

I am commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to send you herewith for the information of Viscount Palmerston, copies of a letter dated the 2nd November, No. 308, from Vice-Admiral Sir William Parker, and of its inclosures, reporting his proceedings, and that the squadron under his orders had anchored within the Dardanelles.

I am, &c.
(Signed) J. PARKER.

Inclosure in No. 111.

Vice-Admiral Sir W. Parker to the Secretary to the Admiralty.

"Queen," at anchor between the inner Castles of the Dardanelles and Barber's Point, November 2, 1849.

Sir,

I REQUEST you will inform the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty that the wind having yesterday set in strong from the southward, with a probability of its flying to the westward, I deemed it expedient to take advantage of the permission I had received to pass within the Dardanelles; and Her Majesty's squadron in the course of the afternoon anchored between the Inner Castles and Point Barber, which appears a very secure position.

I inclose for their information the copies of letters which I received from Her Majesty's Consul on the subject of the anchorage, but the squadron were in the act of weighing before his letters reached me.

I reported in my last despatch the arrival of the "Bulldog," and I have since been joined by the "Ardent" and "Thetis," with the expected provisions.

The exertions of Captain Codrington, Commander Foote of the "Rosamond," and Lieutenant Nowell, in conveying these supplies, do them great credit.

The quantity brought by the "Thetis" is so large that I went on board to examine her before any part was removed. Her lower deck was appropriated entirely for the stowage of bread and dry provisions, the crew having been transferred to the main deck to mess and sleep, and every crevice throughout the ship was filled, without any serious prejudice to her fighting order.

It has been an admirable manifestation of zeal for the service, which I am sure their Lordships will appreciate as much as I do.

I have directed Admiral Harvey to send extra provisions by every

ship leaving Malta for the squadron, and I trust there will be no occasion for the "Hercules" to come on here.

The "Odin" joined me yesterday from Constantinople, where she left the "Dragon" and "Tartarus," and the "Bellerophon" is now in sight at the entrance of the Dardanelles, which complete the concentration of the ships ordered in this direction.

I have a letter from Sir Stratford Canning, dated 31st of October, wherein he informed me that no answer had then been received from St. Petersburgh, but he inclined to anticipate that the difference pending between the Porte and the two Imperial Courts of Russia and Austria would be finally settled by a peaceable accommodation; their diplomatic relations however continue suspended.

The French squadron, consisting of six sail of the line, the "Pomone" screw-frigate, and four large steamers, were off Malta on the 26th ultimo, and may be shortly expected here or at Vourla.

We have a few defects to make good in the "Vengeance," "Prince Regent," and "Dragon," from accidental disasters, but nothing that will prevent their immediate participation in any service that may be required.

Orders have been sent to the Pasha commanding the Inner Castles for permitting the passage through the Straits of any single vessel charged with despatches for the Embassy, which affords every facility for our communication.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. PARKER.

Inclosure 2 in No. 111.

Consul Calvert to Vice-Admiral Sir W. Parker.

(Private.) *Dardanelles, October* 31, 1849, 2 P.M.

BY the Turkish steamer "Esseri Hadid," just arrived from Constantinople, the Pasha commanding these castles has received despatches from the Sublime Porte approving fully of the measures he has taken at my request to admit the squadron under your command within these straits, and recommending by all means that the ships should anchor between Barber's Point and the Inner Castles.

I have not received any despatches from Her Majesty's Embassy at Constantinople by this opportunity.

I have, &c.
(Signed) F. W. CALVERT.

Inclosure 3 in No. 111.

Consul Calvert to Vice-Admiral Sir W. Parker.

(Private and Confidential.)

Sir, *Dardanelles, October* 31, 1849, 2 P.M.

AFTER writing my private and confidential despatch of this date at 2 P.M., the Pasha commanding the forts called to inform me that the French Consul had just had an interview with him for the purpose, and, as he said, by order of the French Minister at Constantinople, of ascertaining what anchorage within these straits would be assigned to the French squadron, in case they arrived here, as he shortly expected. He further wished the Pasha to promise that the anchorage between Barber's Point and these castles would be reserved for the French squadron; but the Pasha declined making any promise whatever until the French squadron should arrive in this neighbourhood; and he lost not a moment after the French Consul had taken his leave to come and tell me what had occurred, and to beg me to use my influence with you to bring the

squadron under your command without further loss of time to the anchorage between Barber's Point and these castles.

This once effected, the Pasha would not hesitate to assign the anchorage of the White Cliffs to the French squadron, should it come up to this neighbourhood.

I have, &c.
(Signed) F. W. CALVERT.

No. 112.

Sir Stratford Canning to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received November 18.)

(No. 319.)

My Lord, *Therapia, October 27, 1849.*

THE observations ascribed to M. Blondel, His Belgian Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at this Court, in a despatch addressed to your Lordship by Mr. Waller, and communicated to me in copy with your Lordship's instruction No. 246 of this year, refer to points of argument which did not escape notice when the discussions that immediately preceded and accompanied Prince Radzivil's mission to Constantinople were going on. Aali Pasha made special and emphatic use of the examples afforded by Austria and Russia, when the Porte at former periods demanded of those Powers the extradition of fugitive malcontents owing allegiance to the Sultan; and the position of Russia in the present instance as entitled to demand the extradition of her refugee subjects in the sole character of an auxiliary to Austria, far from being lost sight of, was only not put forward prominently in the discussion, because the Treaty Article appealed to by Russia admitted of an easy refutation, when cited in support of the Russian requisition, and offered by itself a solid argument for refusal.

Your Lordship may be assured that every proper exertion was made at the time to place the question at issue on just and strong grounds; in testimony of which I venture even at this late hour to submit to your Lordship a paper comprising the principal considerations in favour of the Porte's view, and prepared by me for eventual communication to the Sultan's Ministers. Their firmness, however, supported by similar arguments, repeatedly pressed on them in detail, did not call for any more elaborate reasoning to keep them steady. The memorandum I refer to is inclosed herewith. Had I thought proper to give it in, I should have endeavoured to make it more cogent and complete.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

Inclosure in No. 112.

Memorandum.

LA résolution prise à l'unanimité par le Conseil relativement aux réfugiés Hongrois et Polonais est basée sur l'humanité, l'honneur, et une juste appréciation des grands intérêts politiques de la Porte. Elle a été adoptée avec pleine connaissance de cause. Des notes officielles présentées par les Envoyés de Russie et d'Autriche étaient déjà sous les yeux du Gouvernement Ottoman. Ces notes demandaient l'extradition des réfugiés, et développaient les motifs de la demande. Une réponse à celle de la Russie fut dressée conformément à la résolution du Conseil, et fut approuvée par Sa Majesté le Sultan.

Telle était la situation, lorsqu'un aide-de-camp expédié de Varsovie, et portant une lettre de la part de l'Empereur de Russie, est arrivé à Constantinople. La présentation de cette missive fut accompagnée d'une

invitation verbale adressée de vive voix, soit au Sultan, soit aux Ministres Ottomans, par l'Envoyé de Russie. L'ensemble de ces communications somme la Porte à livrer les réfugiés Polonais aux autorités Russes. Point d'hésitation, point de réserve, point de discussion: une réponse catégorique, oui ou non, doit être donnée à l'instant. Les instructions du Ministère Russe, communiquées verbalement, menacent un changement dans les relations des deux empires si la réponse n'est pas affirmative, et l'Internonce d'Autriche s'aggrège à son collègue de Russie pour ajouter que l'évasion d'un seul des réfugiés Hongrois sera regardée comme un cas de guerre.

En face de ces démarches péremptoires, qui, loin de toute prétention à la bienveillance, ne respectent ni la dignité de la Porte, ni les convenances prescrites par le Droit des Gens, quel parti doit prendre le Gouvernement de Sa Hautesse? Doit-il abandonner une position occupée de propos délibéré et appuyée sur les considérations les plus graves et les plus nobles, pour livrer d'illustres malheureux à ceux qui les regardent comme criminels déjà condamnés au supplice? Ou trouve-t-il dans son bon droit, dans les obligations de son honneur, dans les intérêts permanens de son empire, et dans l'opinion éclairée de l'Europe, des motifs assez puissans pour tenir ferme contre la dictation de l'étranger et les menaces employées sans façon pour l'intimider?

La Porte s'est déjà rendu justice sous le rapport des traités. Elle s'est montrée prête à remplir toutes les obligations imposées d'une manière expresse par les engagemens existans, quoiqu'ils eussent été contractés dans des temps moins favorables à l'humanité que ceux-ci. Elle a dû en appeler aux précédens fournis par l'Autriche et par la Russie même. Elle a refusé l'extradition qui n'a jamais été accordée d'obligation, soit d'un côté soit de l'autre. Elle n'a pas refusé d'éloigner les réfugiés des frontières, et de les empêcher de jeter de nouveaux brandons dans les États voisins, nonobstant la cessation de tout danger, à la suite des succès accablans remportés par les armées alliées, et l'exemple éclatant qui en résulte en faveur de l'ordre public et du pouvoir établi.

Il est donc évident à ne pas en douter que la Porte en maintenant son refus de l'extradition, ne donnera aucune prise légitime aux deux Gouvernemens voisins. La Porte est à même de satisfaire aux besoins de l'humanité et de l'honneur sans manquer aux devoirs de bon voisinage. Le sacrifice qu'elle est sommée à faire de tout ce qu'il y a de plus sacré parmi les hommes n'est justifié par aucune nécessité, à moins que la force arbitraire n'en soit une. Elle ne saurait le faire sans proclamer à toute l'Europe qu'elle désespère de sa propre indépendance, et qu'elle se laisse entraîner sans effort par une volonté qui est l'expression d'une manière de voir opposée à la sienne. Il serait de sa sagesse de bien peser l'importance de ménager les sympathies éventuellement nécessaires à son salut, et d'éviter autant que possible une humiliation gratuite. Mieux vaudrait-il s'exposer à des ressentimens non fondés, à un hazard qu'il serait à la longue plus dangereux d'exagérer que de confronter avec calme.

Le sentiment de la force, l'énivrement de la victoire, et la mortification d'éprouver un refus peuvent à la vérité en tout temps et lieu réveiller les passions et pousser les hommes à des actes contraires à la raison et à l'amitié. Cependant il est difficile de croire que le Souverain d'un grand empire ami pourrait se laisser aller par un mouvement de dépit, jusqu'au point d'oublier toute considération de justice et tout calcul de prudence. L'opinion publique de l'Europe, quoiqu'elle ait éprouvé quelques rudes atteintes, n'a pas perdu la valeur qui lui appartient dans l'estimation de tout Gouvernement éclairé. Les Puissances Occidentales, préoccupées qu'elles puissent être de leurs propres soins, ne sont ni mortes ni endormies. L'intérêt qu'elles attachent comme de raison à la conservation de la paix générale n'est aucunement incompatible avec une vive sollicitude pour le bien-être et l'indépendance de l'Orient, et surtout de la Turquie. Les supposer indifférentes à tout acte de prépotence attentatoire aux droits, à l'honneur et à l'intégrité de cet empire, serait méconnaître les principes qui les guident, et perdre de vue les preuves multipliées de bienveillance qu'elles ont déjà données.

L'affaire en question peut être considérée sous trois points de vue:

1.° Par rapport aux obligations et aux intérêts de la Porte; 2. Par rapport aux droits et aux vues de la Russie et de l'Autriche; 3. Par rapport aux principes et aux dispositions de quelques autres Grandes Puissances de l'Europe.

Quant au premier chef, il est constaté que la Porte n'est tenue par aucun engagement à livrer les réfugiés. Le Second Article du Traité de Kaïnardji sur lequel la Russie s'appuie, laisse à la Porte dans cette occasion l'alternative de les faire sortir de ses Etats. Le XVIIIme Article du Traité de Belgrade, auquel l'Autriche se réfère, n'impose en dernier résultat sur la Porte que l'obligation d'éloigner les réfugiés des frontières, ou de les punir elle-même. Le droit d'insister sur l'extradition des réfugiés politiques n'existe pas pour l'Autriche, non plus que pour la Russie. Les intérêts et les sentimens de la Porte s'accordent avec cet état de ses obligations: les intérêts, puisqu'il y va de son honneur, de son humanité, et des sympathies Européennes; les sentimens, parceque le cœur généreux du Sultan et son système d'administration en sont les garans.

Pour ce qui regarde le second chef, il répugnerait de supposer que les assurances d'amitié données à la Porte par les deux Cours Impériales sont autres que sincères. La bonne foi de leurs professions s'oppose à l'idée de quelques actes de violence qui ne seraient pas justifiés soit par le Droit des Gens basé sur les traités, ou sur l'usage établi, soit par la nécessité des circonstances, dont la seule excuse serait la raison d'état, peu applicable aujourd'hui à l'Empire Ottoman. Si par malheur il en était autrement, et que les succès en Hongrie tendaient à faire éclore quelque projet sinistre aux dépens de la Porte, ce n'est pas le sacrifice de quelques réfugiés qui pourrait arrêter la marche de l'ambition. Leur extradition ne serait que le premier anneau d'une chaîne préparée d'avance pour lier la victime destinée à expier les torts d'autrui. Il ne s'agirait pas de bon droit et de la mesure qui doit en régler l'application, mais bien de la volonté, de la force, et de l'exécution d'un plan arrêté.

Les engagemens contractés par la Porte envers la Russie limitent dans cette occasion les droits de celle-ci, et tout ce que le Traité de Kaïnardji prescrit à l'égard des réfugiés politiques est déjà connu. Le IInd Article de ce Traité n'a pas confondu les délits politiques, qui sont regardés bien différemment dans les divers pays du monde, avec des forfaits, tels que le meurtre et le brigandage, dont il n'y a qu'une opinion parmi toutes les nations.

Le troisième chef se rapporte moins au fond de la question qu'aux conséquences qui pourraient résulter d'une décision négative. Il est pourtant à remarquer que l'opinion et l'usage de l'Europe Occidentale sont contraires au principe de l'extradition appliqué aux délits politiques, et par conséquent la Porte est dans le cas de pouvoir compter sur les sympathies de plus d'un Gouvernement puissant, pour ne rien dire des populations, favorables à tout mouvement d'humanité et de courage. Mais d'autres considérations encore plus graves ne manquent pas de fixer l'attention de tout Etat qui s'intéresse à l'indépendance de la Turquie. L'esprit de prépotence et de dictation manifesté par les démarches auxquelles la Porte est maintenant en butte, doit y faire naître une inquiétude analogue aux intérêts qui en sont menacés. A mesure que la Porte consulte sa propre dignité et sait agir avec consistence, elle s'attirera de plus en plus la confiance des Gouvernemens amis, et augmentera la disposition de leurs peuples à faire des sacrifices pour elle. Activé par ces sentimens, l'intérêt commun formera une liaison forte et durable entre elle et eux, une liaison sur laquelle on pourra compter en proportion de l'approche du danger. De l'autre côté, si par malheur l'Empire Ottoman prenait la couleur politique que l'on cherche à lui imprimer, et qu'il devenait par conséquent partie intégrale, pour ainsi dire, d'un système dont l'objet serait de réprimer dans l'Orient comme dans le Nord, tout mouvement généreux du cœur humain, tout développement progressif de la société, il va sans dire que toutes les sympathies libérales lui seraient perdues, que les Gouvernemens les mieux disposés deviendraient indifférens à son sort, quand même celui de la Pologne serait prêt à l'engloutir.

No. 113.

Sir Stratford Canning to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received November 18.)

(No. 320.)

My Lord, *Therapia, October 26, 1849.*

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith in copy, for your Lordship's information, a despatch addressed to me by Her Majesty's Ambassador at Vienna and my reply to it. This correspondence relates to the movements of Her Majesty's Mediterranean squadron and to certain rumours connected with the pending question of the refugees from Hungary.

I avail myself of this opportunity to acknowledge the communication of Lord Ponsonby's despatch No. 238 to your Lordship, as inclosed in copy with your Lordship's instruction No. 247 of this year to me.

As rumours had reached me of some disgraceful transactions at Widdin, I took occasion yesterday to turn Reshid Pasha's attention to that subject. On learning Lord Ponsonby's assertion that the Hungarian refugees at Widdin had "expressed the wish to go home and be hanged rather than remain in Turkey," his Highness could not quite repress a natural movement of indignation, and he proposed with earnestness that I should send some one to make inquiry among the refugees on the spot. This I hardly think it worth while to do in the present state of my information, especially as the principal refugees are now transferred from Widdin to Schumla; and as the negotiation for the return home of the Hungarian private soldiers and petty officers left at Widdin has probably been completed by this time under the auspices of General Hauslab, sent thither by the Austrian Government for that purpose. The partiality to being hanged which is said to have been declared by the Hungarians, if meant to be taken seriously, might possibly be explained by a generous wish to share the fate of their officers already consigned to the gibbet in numbers of awful magnitude, and perhaps of evil augury to the future repose of Austria.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

Inclosure 1 in No. 113.

Viscount Ponsonby to Sir Stratford Canning.

[See Inclosure in No. 65.]

Inclosure 2 in No. 113.

Sir Stratford Canning to Viscount Ponsonby.

My Lord, *Therapia, October 25, 1849.*

I AM much gratified by the communication of your persuasion as expressed in a despatch addressed to me by your Lordship on the 16th instant, that the pending difference between Austria and the Porte will be peaceably and satisfactorily settled. Most truly do I hope that such will prove to be the case, and that the Court of St. Petersburgh has been induced to adopt the moderate course which your Lordship leads me to expect from that of Vienna.

With respect to the movements of Her Majesty's Mediterranean squadron, they are at present directed by instructions from the Admiralty, and Sir William Parker is probably by this time off or near the Dardanelles. If this demonstration, which will be accompanied or closely fol-

lowed by a similar proceeding on the part of the French Admiral, should cause any unfavourable excitement, as you appear to apprehend at Vienna, your Lordship I am sure will find no difficulty in placing it in its true point of view, with reference to the very unusual and threatening circumstances which attended the peremptory demand addressed to the Porte by Austria and Russia at the time of Prince Radzivil's mission to Constantinople. The real intention of those two Powers may have been misapprehended; but the fault, so far from lying at our door, is exclusively owing either to the Imperial Cabinets themselves, which appear to have acted in strict concert together, or to the Agents who respectively represented them here.

Though menace and unnecessary excitement are as remote as possible from the views of Her Majesty's Government in this instance, it would be hard to require that in order to avoid the mere appearance of either a British squadron should run about disguising the fair object of its presence in this neighbourhood, and remove, while uncertainty still hangs over the decisions of the two Emperors, to a distance which at this season and in these latitudes, as your Lordship must know, might eventually paralyze its means of interfering with effect.

A resolution of some kind has in all probability been taken by this time at St. Petersburgh; and should it so far realize your Lordship's anticipations as to tranquillize every just apprehension of danger to this empire, the position of the squadron will be naturally subject to reconsideration.

The foolish stories respecting General Bem, which your Lordship wishes me to authorize you to contradict, have I really believe no foundation in fact, and are probably excrescences from the reports, unhappily better founded, of his profession of Islamism. On hearing them some time ago, I expressed my opinion to Reshid Pasha, and received from his Highness an assurance that neither rank nor employment had been given to any of the refugees who had declared their readiness to turn Turks.

As to any obstacles alleged to have been opposed by the Porte's officers to the return home of any Hungarian soldiers now at Widdin, I can state on the same authority that a promise of amnesty from Austria, and the free consent of the individuals are the only conditions required; and these I conceive to be quite indispensable.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

No. 114.

Sir Stratford Canning to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received November 18.)

(No. 321.)

My Lord, *Therapia, October 31, 1849.*

Of the Hungarian and Italian refugees who remained near Widdin after the removal to Schumla of the more distinguished individuals among them, and of the Poles in general, 3,300 have spontaneously accepted the Austrian offer of amnesty, and have in consequence returned to the Austrian territory.

It appears therefore that the Porte, in facilitating this desirable arrangement, has not lost sight of the two essential conditions which I recommended.

Inclosed herewith is a report of M. Pisani's conversation with Aali Pasha on this subject. It states particulars which your Lordship may find by no means destitute of interest.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

Inclosure in No. 114.

M. Pisani to Sir Stratford Canning.

M. l'Ambassadeur, *Péra, ce 29 Octobre, 1849.*

J'AI l'honneur d'informer votre Excellence que dans une conversation qui a eu lieu aujourd'hui entre Aali Pacha et moi au sujet des réfugiés de Widdin, son Excellence m'a dit ce qui suit.

"Le Général Hauslab, qui a été envoyé par le Gouvernement Autrichien à Widdin, a fait savoir aux réfugiés sujets Autrichiens, simples soldats, ou n'ayant pas un rang supérieur à celui de sergent, qu'ils étaient amnistiés, et pouvaient rentrer dans les Etats Autrichiens. En conséquence de cette proclamation, 3000 Hongrois et environ 300 Italiens ont quitté Widdin et passé dans les Etats Autrichiens.

"Le Général Hauslab a aussi fait savoir aux officiers que ceux parmi eux qui consentiraient à passer par un conseil de guerre, étaient libres de retourner dans les Etats Autrichiens. Parmi les officiers Hongrois, il y en a eu qui ont accepté la proposition et ont exprimé le désir de passer à l'autre côté; mais les autorités Ottomanes n'ont pas voulu les laisser partir; or, en cela les autorités Turques de Widdin n'ont pas bien agi; car la Porte n'a jamais entendu empêcher les réfugiés de retourner là d'où ils sont venus, si, de leur plein gré, ils veulent le faire, comme les soldats et les sergents déjà partis l'ont fait, en ne consultant que leur bon plaisir."

J'ai l'honneur, &c.
(Signé) FRED. PISANI.

No. 115.

Sir Stratford Canning to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received November 18.)

(No. 322.)

My Lord, *Therapia, November 2, 1849.*

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith, for your Lordship's information, extracts of the last reports which I have received from Bucharest, Jassy, and Galatz, respecting the movements of the Russian army of occupation in the two Principalities.

I have reason to believe that the Porte has by this time completely executed its intention of withdrawing from those provinces the whole of its army, with the exception of about 8000 men.

It is greatly to be desired, and it may justly be expected, that in the present state of Hungary and Transylvania, the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh will be induced to follow the example thus given by the Porte. The inhabitants of the Principalities, to say nothing of other considerations, are surely entitled to the earliest and fullest relief which the declared objects of the occupation admit.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

Inclosure 1 in No. 115.

Her Majesty's Consul to Sir Stratford Canning.

(Extract.) *Bucharest, October 27, 1849.*

THE only news of any interest is, that since the return of General Lüders from Russia, orders have been given from the Home Department to prepare a considerable number of waggons for the transport, it is said,

of part of General Lüders' chancellerie, and of the baggage of the corps of Russian dragoons, or rather gendarmes, who are to be withdrawn from the Principality; but their number is very insignificant. Nothing is yet said about the departure of the regular forces, exceeding 10 000 men, as stipulated by the Convention of May 1st last; and the only movement in the Russian troops is the cantonment of another regiment along the line of the Danube, where the corps of pontonniers and sappers are already stationed.

Inclosure 2 in No. 115.

Consul Gardner to Sir Stratford Canning.

Jassy, October 25, 1849.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to acquaint your Excellency that the Turkish regiment cantoned in Jassy for the winter has been recalled by orders, and left this capital on the 21st instant for the frontiers of Turkey. Mr. Cunningham has had the honour to communicate to your Excellency the corresponding movement of the Turkish troops of the Imperial Guard at Galatz and Ibraïla.

On speaking with the Hospodar on the motives of the departure of the Turkish troops, his Highness replied that he regarded it as an execution of the Treaty of Balta Liman between Russia and Turkey for the reduction of the auxiliary corps in the two Principalities, and thought it probable that it would be immediately followed by the departure of the Russian troops, leaving only an effective force of 20,000 men of the two armies to occupy both Principalities. That he had not received any positive news of the result of the mission of Fuad Effendi, but did not entertain a doubt that it would be followed by an adjustment of the difference between the respective Governments. Sineya Bey, on the contrary, conceived that the measure was one of precaution, and that the Ottoman troops had been recalled from Jassy, as they were too far removed from any support in the unfortunate event of any rupture.

There has been a considerable outlay and expense for the quarters and subsistence of these troops, who were to form a part of the garrison of the town. Those quarters remain now unoccupied, and there are considerable amounts of commissariat stores and provisions collected in them, applicable to military purposes.

I have, &c.

(Signed) SAMUEL GARDNER.

Inclosure 3 in No. 115.

Her Majesty's Consul to Sir Stratford Canning.

Galatz, October 28, 1849.

(Extract.)

I HAVE just seen M. Cola, the Russian Consul of this place, and he informs me that the Russian troops are retiring from the provinces, and that only 10,000 will remain according to treaty. In confirmation of the fact that the Russian troops are retiring, I inclose translation of a letter of the 25th instant, received from M. Calcagno, British Consular Agent at Foxsany.

Inclosure 4 in No. 115.

Report from Her Majesty's Consular Agent.

Foxsany, October 25, 1849.

(Extract.)

IN conformity to your request to keep you informed of the passage of Russian troops, I have to announce that this morning a battery of eight field-pieces and a battalion of Rifles of Gotomesky of the corps of General Lüders arrived here, and will march to-morrow for Jassy.

It is said that other Russian troops are to arrive, and of which I will inform you in due time.

No. 116.

Sir Stratford Canning to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received November 18.)

(No. 323.)

Therapia, November 2, 1849.

My Lord,

THOUGH we are still without any positive intelligence of the result of Fuad Effendi's communications with the Russian Government; and though it appears that the Russian Envoy at this Court has not yet received the expected instructions from Count Nesselrode, there is strong reason to believe that at St. Petersburgh as well as at Vienna the demand of extradition is to be given up.

The information which I have received on this subject, though bearing a secret character, is from so authentic a source that I entertain no doubt whatever of its correctness. I am not however quite free from the apprehension of some proposal, less objectionable indeed than the required demand, but tending at the same time to embarrass the Porte and to diminish in some degree the advantages obtained by the assertion of its honour and independence.

Sir William Parker having placed the messenger Captain Vyner, at my disposal, I avail myself of his return by Trieste to forward this despatch, with others which are already prepared, to your Lordship's office. He will pass by the squadron and take charge of the Admiral's despatches also. In the course of a day or two I propose to write more fully to your Lordship by messenger Robbins, who will also have to return home by way of Vienna. It is probable that within that space of time I shall be in possession of the communications which the Porte expects to receive almost immediately from the Legations of Austria and Russia.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

No. 117.

Sir Stratford Canning to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received November 18.)

(No. 324.)

Therapia, November 2, 1849.

My Lord,

ON the 30th ultimo Her Majesty's steam-ship "Dragon" arrived here with despatches from Vice-Admiral Sir William Parker. A copy of his Excellency's despatch announcing his arrival with the squadron under his command in the immediate neighbourhood of the Dardanelles, is herewith inclosed, together with a copy of my reply.

The Turkish Ministers and their Sovereign received the communication of this intelligence with lively expressions of satisfaction.

Some doubts have arisen, though not with them, as to the expediency of the squadron's anchoring within the mouth of the Dardanelles. The language of the Treaty is not so explicit on that point as it is with respect

to the passage through the Straits, but the existing regulations admit ships of war under the colours of any friendly Power to anchor within the outer castles, and the general practice has hitherto confirmed the regulations.

The safety of the squadron in bad weather and the means of easy access to Constantinople in case of emergency, appearing to be the paramount considerations at this juncture, provided there be no violation of treaty or reluctance on the part of the Turkish Government, I have not thought it necessary to dissuade Sir William Parker from placing his ships in the situation best adapted to the eventual requirements of the service for which they have been sent into this neighbourhood.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

Inclosure 1 in No. 117.

Vice-Admiral Sir W. Parker to Sir Stratford Canning.

Sir, *"Queen," Besika Bay, October 28, 1849.*

I HAVE just had the honour to receive by Mr. Calvert junior, your Excellency's despatch of the 26th instant.*

I have not seen the "Tartarus," and conclude that Sir Godfrey Webster has proceeded in compliance with your wishes to Athens.

It had not entered into my contemplation to pass the inner castles of the Dardanelles without previous communication with your Excellency, although Mr. Calvert's letter, a duplicate of which I inclose,† inform me that I am perfectly at liberty to do so.

On the question of our having permission to obtain a secure anchorage between the outer and inner castles, there appears to be no doubt; and as I have in my despatch of the 27th instant noticed to your Excellency that this bay cannot be considered secure at the present season of the year, I may probably proceed to the position recommended by Mr. Calvert, should the wind become favourable for such a movement, although it is not unlikely, from the appearance of the weather, that I shall maintain our anchorage here until the return of the "Odin" or "Dragon."

I was not, until the receipt of your Excellency's letter, aware that the "Tartarus" had proceeded to Athens.

If you think a steamer indispensably necessary at this moment at Constantinople, the "Dragon" will be at liberty to remain until the return of the "Tartarus."

I am led to this arrangement in consequence of an unfortunate accident by which Her Majesty's ship "Vengeance" came in contact this afternoon with the "Dragon" and "Caledonia," whereby considerable damage has been caused to the steam-vessel, which may perhaps be adjusted in the Bosphorus.

The presence of both steamers will however be very useful until we reach our proposed anchorage, when one of them can be sent back to Constantinople if the "Tartarus" does not in the meantime make her appearance.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. PARKER.

Inclosure 2 in No. 117.

Sir Stratford Canning to Vice-Admiral Sir W. Parker.

Sir, *Therapia, October 31, 1849.*

FROM the hands of Captain Hall, who arrived here this morning with Her Majesty's ship "Dragon," I have had the honour to receive your Excellency's despatches of the 27th and 28th instant informing me that

* See Inclosure in No. 98. † See Inclosure 2 in No. 110.

you had brought the squadron under your command to anchor in Besika Bay, and that you entertained the intention of taking up a more protected station either at some greater distance from the Dardanelles, Mesconissi being the nearest, or in the mouth of those straits within the outer castles.

Your Excellency's prompt appearance in this neighbourhood is a subject of just congratulation, and the Turkish Government has received the intelligence of it with feelings of cordial satisfaction and gratitude. Appearances continue to warrant a hope that the difference still pending between the Porte and the two Imperial Courts of Russia and Austria, will be finally settled by a peaceable accommodation. But nothing is yet known here of the decision, if any, taken by the Russian Cabinet on learning the Sultan's objection to the required extradition of the refugees from Hungary, and all diplomatic intercourse continues to be suspended between the Ministers of the two Allied Courts and the Turkish Government.

In this state of things, which may at any moment change to better or to worse—the former contingency appearing the more probable of the two—I can only suggest the expediency of your waiting for such further communication as I may have to make you whenever the present uncertainty shall be removed. It is evidently desirable meanwhile not only to provide for the convenience and safety of Her Majesty's squadron at this advanced period of the year, but also to secure those objects without removing the ships to any considerable distance from the scene of their prospective services, should they be eventually required.

You are already informed by Her Majesty's Consul at the Dardanelles, that orders have been given by the Pasha of those straits, in conformity with the existing general regulations, to admit the ships under your command within the outer castles. Although some cavil might probably be raised or jealousy excited by your reception there, I conceive that no such ground of objection can be expected to outweigh the advantages, essential as they are, of a sheltered anchorage, and an easy approach to Constantinople. The Turkish Government itself recommends the anchorage of Havouzlar, situated I understand on the Asiatic coast, somewhere between the outer and the inner castles.

With respect to the "Odin" and "Dragon," there is no longer any immediate call for the presence of the former here; and Captain Pelham, with whom I have had the advantage of holding a confidential and most satisfactory intercourse, has apprized me of his intention to return to your squadron to-morrow.

The "Tartarus" being absent, I avail myself of the latitude you have obligingly left me, to detain the "Dragon" for the present, with a view to communication in case of emergency. As her repairs will be going on for some days without preventing her from going to sea, if wanted, I hope the arrangement will meet with your Excellency's approval.

Captain Slade remains at my request with the "Dragon."

Orders will be forthwith sent down by the Porte to afford every due attention to the wants and comfort of Her Majesty's squadron, together with permission for the immediate passage through the straits of any single vessel charged with communications for the Embassy.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

No. 118.

Sir Stratford Canning to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received November 18.)

(No. 325.)

My Lord, *Therapia, November 2, 1849.*

EDHEM PASHA, one of the Sultan's aide-de-camps, after calling yesterday, when I happened to be absent, called again this morning by the express command of His Imperial Majesty, to express the Sultan's gratitude to Her Majesty the Queen and to Her Majesty's Government

for the prompt assurances of succour, both moral and material, which had been so generously given at the solicitation of the Porte. The message included a reference to the important services rendered by Great Britain to the Turkish Empire on preceding occasions, and expressed the Sultan's unbounded confidence in the continued friendship and support of Her Majesty Government. It expressed confidentially the pleasure which His Majesty's had derived from the generous outburst of sympathy which had proceeded from the whole British nation, and it paid a just tribute of admiration to the noble feelings of honour and humanity in which that display of national magnanimity had originated.

The Sultan's language, as communicated to me by Edhem Pasha, conveyed a strong impression of the sense of dignity and independence which had dictated these expressions of gratitude, and it may be reasonably hoped that His Majesty's firmness of character has derived from the late transactions an addition of strength which may prove of essential advantage to his empire during the long career of sovereignty which apparently lies before him.

I was requested to transmit this message in substance to Her Majesty's Government, and to add the expression of the Sultan's acknowledgments to your Lordship in particular. Some gracious expressions were also addressed to Her Majesty's Representative.

I availed myself of the opportunity to impress upon the Sultan's mind that he was principally indebted for the proofs of sympathy which he had so handsomely acknowledged, to the adoption of those humane and wise principles of government which have so remarkably distinguished his reign, and that he could not gratify Her Majesty's Government and the British nation more highly than by pursuing strenuously, and carrying into full effect, the same liberal, just and benevolent policy.

In making this remark I had more especially in view the execution, but too long delayed, of those important measures of reform which I have so frequently recommended to the Grand Vizier and to the Turkish Ministers in general, even before his Highness' resumption of office, and which on my return from England last year formed part of the instructions addressed to me by your Lordship.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

No. 119.

Sir Stratford Canning to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received November* 18.)

(No. 326.)

My Lord, *Therapia, November* 3, 1849.

I HAVE this moment received from the hands of the Grand Vizier, whom I saw this morning at his country-house, the accompanying copies of a despatch and correspondence received last night by Aali Pasha from the Turkish Envoy at Vienna.

I beg leave to congratulate your Lordship on the important concession which now appears to have been made by the two Imperial Cabinets. The cause of honour and humanity has been vindicated, and I trust that the advantage thereby obtained in favour of the Porte's independence, and the great European interests connected with it, will not easily be lost.

I observe at the same time in M. Musurus's correspondence more than one point which to all appearance will require explanation, and which in the sequel will I trust be found susceptible of amendment and rectification.

I have already directed the Grand Vizier's attention to these matters, and as M. Musurus appears to have acted in some respects on his own responsibility, I do not despair of succeeding with his Highness' concurrence, of which I am assured, in obtaining the correction of anything which may be found on closer investigation to be a real blot on the final settlement of a question which involves so many important considerations, and which has excited so deep an interest in England and France.

I must request your Lordship's indulgence if I confine myself for the moment to this brief statement, the immediate departure of the steam-packet allowing no time for more.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

Inclosure 1 in No. 119.

M. Musurus to Aali Pasha.

Monseigneur, *Vienne*, 29 (*Qy.* 23) *Octobre*, 1849.

JE suis heureux d'être à même d'annoncer à votre Excellence la solution complète et définitive de la question des réfugiés Hongrois et Polonais.

Un courrier arrivé avant-hier de St. Pétersbourg a porté la réponse attendue du Cabinet de Russie, et qui est en tout point conforme à la décision prise dès le commencement par le Ministre d'Autriche d'accepter les garanties offertes par la Sublime Porte pour l'internement et la surveillance de ces réfugiés.

Dès-lors M. le Prince de Schwarzenberg m'a invité à me rendre dans la journée d'hier à la Chancellerie d'Etat pour nous concerter sur la rédaction des notes à échanger entre la Légation Impériale et le Ministère d'Autriche dans le but de mettre fin à ce fâcheux différend.

Entre autres objections, la Russie insistait avec force à ce que je déclarasse dans ma note que les réfugiés seraient relégués dans des places fortes et que les offres de la Sublime Porte n'étaient qu'une obligation imposée par les stipulations des traités en vigueur.

Quant au premier point, je lui ai fait observer que comme une telle expression ne figurait point dans mes instructions, il m'était impossible d'en faire une mention si explicite, et que d'ailleurs c'était à la Sublime Porte de désigner les lieux qui lui paraissaient les plus propres au but de l'internement. Pour ce qui est du second point, j'ai rédigé ma note de manière à représenter les offres de la Sublime Porte plutôt comme une décision s'émanant de sa volonté spontanée et comme un effet de son amitié pour l'Autriche, et à constater en même temps que l'extradition qu'on réclamait n'était pas conforme à l'esprit des traités.

Mais il ne m'a été si facile de lutter contre l'instance du Prince sur un autre point. Il exigeait que je précisasse dans ma note que l'internement et la surveillance dureraient à perpétuité, et que de plus, la Sublime Porte prendrait l'engagement formel de ne faire cesser cette mesure que d'un commun accord et sur la demande de l'Autriche. "Si vous hésitez," m'a-t-il dit, "à nous donner cette assurance, vous croyez devoir demander à votre Gouvernement des instructions précises, vous nous autorisez à supposer que vous doutez de la validité des garanties que vous êtes chargé de nous offrir, et qui seraient en effet illusoires, si dans un ou deux ans la Sublime Porte pouvait laisser les réfugiés libres de tramer contre nous. Cette assurance est pour nous une garantie *sine quâ non*, et si vous persistez à nous la refuser, notre différend restera pendant, et c'est à mon grand regret que je serai forcé de charger M. le Comte de Stürmer d'entamer à Constantinople de nouvelles négociations et de nouvelles discussions sur cette question; ce qui rendrait sans effet la démarche directe de votre Gouvernement auprès de notre Cour."

Bien qu'il m'eût été impossible d'opposer à la demande du Prince un refus absolu et qui pourrait lui inspirer des doutes sur la loyauté des intentions de la Sublime Porte, j'ai réussi cependant, tout en évitant de prendre un engagement aussi exclusif, à me servir dans ma note d'une expression, qui en même temps qu'elle a satisfait le Prince, réserve à la Sublime Porte la faculté de s'entendre au besoin avec le Cabinet de Vienne, sur la cessation des mesures qu'elle offre d'adopter à l'égard des réfugiés.

Si j'ai pris la liberté de soumettre à votre Excellence les détails qui précèdent, c'est pour la mettre à même de mieux apprécier la portée de la note que j'ai remise au Ministère d'Autriche, et que d'ailleurs elle trouvera,

j'en ai la conviction, tout-à-fait conforme à ses instructions et à la décision primitive de notre Gouvernement.

Après ces commentaires je me fais un devoir de soumettre à votre Excellence la copie ci-jointe de ma note. Elle y remarquera en outre, que j'ai restraint l'internement et la surveillance aux seuls chefs de l'insurrection Hongroise; d'où il s'en suit que, quant aux autres, il est loisible à la Sublime Porte de les interner, de les expulser, ou de prendre à leur égard telle autre mesure qu'elle jugerait à propos. Le Prince qui a accepté sans difficulté cette restriction, m'a dit que M. le Comte de Stürmer communiquerait à votre Excellence la liste nominative des chefs de l'insurrection Hongroise qui seront assujettis aux mesures arrêtées par la Sublime Porte.

J'ai l'honneur de joindre également ici la copie de la note responsive de M. le Prince de Schwarzenberg. Quoique je n'ai pas montré pour la rédaction de cette réponse la même insistance dont ma note avait été l'objet de la part du Prince, votre Excellence y verra avec plaisir que le Cabinet de Vienne accepte en termes obligeans les offres de la Sublime Porte, et promet la réciprocité.

Après l'échange des notes, M. le Prince de Schwarzenberg m'a annoncé que demain je serai reçu par l'Empereur pour lui remettre la lettre de Sa Majesté Impériale notre auguste maître. On m'a assuré que son Excellence Fuad Effendi devait avoir son audience le 16 de ce mois; j'ai donc lieu de croire que votre Excellence aura déjà reçu directement cette agréable nouvelle.

Je ne saurais terminer ce rapport sans offrir à votre Excellence l'hommage de mes félicitations respectueuses sur le triomphe complet de la Sublime Porte dans une cause qui, après avoir excité l'admiration universelle pour les sentimens de philanthropie et de générosité de notre auguste et gracieux Souverain, a contribué à rehausser l'état de sa gloire, à manifester encore une fois l'habileté de ses Ministres, et à constater le respect dû à ses droits et à la puissance de son empire.

(Signé) MUSURUS.

Inclosure 2 in No. 119.

M. Musurus to Prince Schwarzenberg.

[See Inclosure 1 in No. 81.]

Inclosure 3 in No. 119.

Prince Schwarzenberg to M. Musurus.

[See Inclosure 2 in No. 81.]

No. 120.

Sir Stratford Canning to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received November 19.)

(No. 327.)

My Lord, *Therapia, November 5, 1849.*

BY the messenger Vyner I forwarded copies of a correspondence showing in what terms the decision of the Austrian Cabinet concerning the question of the refugees from Hungary, had been announced to the Porte from Vienna. Yesterday at a late hour of the evening, no official communication on that subject had been received by Aali Pasha from the Internuncio.

I have now the honour to inclose for your Lordship's information a similar set of papers received from St. Petersburgh, with respect to that part of the question which relates emphatically to Russia. M. de Titoff

called on Aali Pasha this morning, and talked over the terms of the Russian propositions with that Minister. His visit was carefully characterized as private, or rather personal, and I regret to learn that the resumption of diplomatic intercourse between his Legation and the Porte is still made to depend upon the final adjustment of the question.

In the course of yesterday I endeavoured to ascertain the impression made upon the principal Ministers of the Porte by these important communications from the two Imperial Cabinets. It may be described in a single sentence,—They are naturally much gratified by the relinquishment of the principal demand, but are not yet prepared to accept the proposals now addressed to them, without the removal or modification of some objectionable points.

I may be allowed to add that they feel the honour of the Sultan and the independence of his Government to be sufficiently vindicated. The lives of the unfortunate fugitives thrown upon their hospitality by the issue of the Hungarian contest are no longer endangered. The language and attitude of dictation, so justly and wisely resisted by them, are replaced by the more commendable forms of negotiation. It may even be hoped that the reserve of complete diplomatic intercourse is a mere formality, intended rather to guard the dignity of the proposing parties, than indicating the continuance of an imperious or unfriendly spirit on their part.

Something however of no inconsiderable importance, and which may prove more or less difficult in the arrangement, remains to be done. It would be a just ground of regret if the Porte, while relieved from the dangers involved in the late demand, were to be entangled in fresh embarrassments, or obliged to accept unreasonable terms of accommodation. Some apprehension may fairly be entertained on this score when the proposals now made by Austria and Russia are carefully examined.

With respect to Austria, it is evident that if the Porte's engagement be carried to the extent of guarding the refugees in the interior of her dominions during the pleasure of that Power, she will place herself in a very invidious and responsible position during a period of indefinite duration, and entitle the Austrian Agents to claim a most inconvenient and disparaging right of superintendence over such measures of restraint as she may be called upon to adopt. It is greatly to be wished that the Turkish Government may find itself at liberty to substitute the expulsion of the refugees from Turkey for their detention in the interior of the country. But of this latitude the Porte would appear to have deprived herself, if not by the notes which her Representatives at Vienna and Petersburgh presented without any special authority to Prince Schwarzenberg and Count Nesselrode, at least by the terms of the Sultan's letter to each of the two Emperors.

Concerning the Russian proposals, it may be observed that the first transcends the limits of the original demand of extradition; that the second requires of the Porte to contract an engagement of which the execution would not depend upon herself; and that the third may find an obstacle to its acceptance in the religious convictions of the country.

Notwithstanding these palpable objections I am inclined to hope that the desire, known or presumable, of all parties to terminate the present difference, will eventually, perhaps almost immediately, prevail to effect a satisfactory accommodation.

Your Lordship may depend upon my earnest endeavours to contribute towards this desirable result with the least possible delay. I forward this despatch to your Lordship through Her Majesty's Ambassador at Paris. It will be conveyed to Toulon or Marseilles by a French steamer of war, whose intended departure this evening has been obligingly announced to me by General Aupick.

The messenger Robbins is gone to Alexinitza in order to clear his quarantine and to be ready for the despatches which I propose to transmit to him by a confidential tartar in the course of two or three days.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

Inclosure 1 in No. 120.

Speech of Fuad Effendi to the Emperor of Russia, October 4, 1849.

Sire,

MON Auguste Souverain, votre fidèle allié, m'a chargé de remettre à votre Majesté Impériale cette lettre qu'il a écrite par ses propres mains.

Le premier but de ma mission, comme votre Majesté verra dans cette lettre, est de la féliciter sur le succès éclatant que ses armes ont obtenu en Hongrie. Vous avez rendu, Sire, un immense service, non seulement à un empire voisin, mais à l'Europe en général, en venant au secours de l'ordre social et du pouvoir légitime. Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan a vu avec plaisir que votre Majesté Impériale avait apprécié au juste ses sentimens, en lui communiquant particulièrement l'heureux résultat de votre mission réparatrice. Le Sultan vous en remercie, Sire!

L'Empereur, mon maître, m'a chargé aussi, Sire, d'exprimer à votre Majesté Impériale, ses vifs et sincères regrets de ne pouvoir accomplir entièrement le désir de votre Majesté concernant les quelques débris de cette révolution qui sont venus chercher refuge à l'autre rive du Danube. Le Sultan, comme tout le monde, reconnaît leur faute, et son intention n'est pas de rendre son empire le foyer de leur malveillance. Ils sont déjà arrêtés, comme votre Majesté l'a désiré. Mais une fois qu'ils ont demandé refuge à son nom, il ne peut pas, Sire, sans porter atteinte à son honneur de Souverain, violer ce principe d'asyle, qui est si sacré dans tous les pays, surtout en Orient. Il veut réconcilier ces deux choses, et son honneur et votre désir en même tems, en vous promettant formellement de les faire enfermer quelque part dans son empire, si votre Majesté le désire, de les faire garder et surveiller strictement. Pour cela le Sultan a voulu s'adresser à votre Majesté qui a tant fait pour montrer au monde ce sentiment de respect à la dignité des Souverains. L'Empereur, votre fidèle allié, se fiant comme toujours à votre caractère noble et loyal, à cette amitié intime qui unit non-seulement vos deux empires, mais vos deux cœurs Souverains, veut vous rendre juge dans une question qui le touche personnellement. C'est à votre Majesté Impériale, à sa haute sagesse, de la décider; je n'ose rien ajouter.

Il me reste un devoir bien pénible, Sire, c'est de vous parler d'une grande perte que votre Majesté vient de faire. L'Empereur, lorsqu'il m'a chargé de cette mission, ne le savait pas encore; mais soyez sûr, Sire, qu'il partagera votre douleur; il le partagera comme un véritable frère.

Inclosure 2 in No. 120.

Count Nesselrode to Fuad Effendi.

M. l'Ambassadeur, *St. Pétersbourg, le 5 Octobre*, 1849.

J'AI rendu compte à l'Empereur des entretiens que j'ai eus avec votre Excellence. Le contenu des lettres de Sa Majesté le Sultan dont vous étiez porteur, ainsi que des explications que vous m'avez mis à même d'y ajouter sur le but comme sur le caractère tout particulier de votre mission, ont été appréciés par Sa Majesté Impériale avec ces sentimens d'intérêt sincère qui ont toujours présidé aux rapports personnels de nos augustes Souverains.

Les déterminations que l'Empereur a adoptées en conséquence l'attesteront suffisamment à votre Excellence.

Répondant à l'appel fait à sa magnanimité par son auguste ami et allié, l'Empereur lui offre un moyen de résoudre d'une manière aussi honorable que mutuellement satisfaisante, le différend qui a malheureusement surgi à Constantinople, et qui aurait pu si facilement entraîner les conséquences les plus funestes.

Votre Excellence trouvera dans la notice ci-jointe les termes de l'arrangement que Sa Majesté propose à cet effet.

Ainsi que j'ai eu l'honneur de vous le dire, Monsieur l'Ambassadeur, ce que nous avons principalement à cœur c'est qu'à la faveur de l'hospitalité que trouvent indistinctement en Turquie tous les aventuriers étrangers, tous les artisans de troubles, ce pays ne devienne le foyer permanent de conspirations menaçantes pour le repos intérieur de l'Empire Ottoman lui-même et pour la sécurité des Etats limitrophes. Tel est le but des mesures que nous proposons, et dont l'adoption permettrait à l'Empereur de ne pas insister, dans le cas actuel, sur la demande en extradition formulée par M. Titoff, demande qui d'ailleurs, en l'absence même des stipulations d'un traité solennel, nous aurions été suffisamment fondés à faire valoir, rien qu'à titre de réciprocité pour l'empressement que, durant tout le règne de l'Empereur, nous avons constamment mis à livrer à la Porte les transfuges sujets Ottomans.

Dans la vive sollicitude que m'inspire le prompt aplanissement de la complication pendante, je m'estimerai heureux de recevoir de la part de votre Excellence une réponse qui nous permît de compter sur l'adhésion du Cabinet Ottoman à nos ouvertures conciliantes. Je vais en même tems transmettre à M. Titoff l'invitation de communiquer officiellement nos propositions à la Sublime Porte et de lui annoncer que notre Légation s'empressera de rétablir sur l'ancien pied ses relations diplomatiques avec le Gouvernement Ottoman dès qu'il y aura acquiescé.

Recevez, &c.

(Signé) LE COMTE DE NESSELRODE.

Inclosure 3 in No. 120.

Russian Proposals.

1. EXPULSION de tous les Polonais, sujets de l'Empereur, quels que soient les passeports dont ils seraient munis. Cette mesure s'exécuterait avec la participation et d'après les indications fournies par la mission de Russie.

2. De même, la Porte s'engage à s'entendre avec les Puissances étrangères que cela concerne, pour que ceux des sujets Polonais de l'Empereur qui dans d'autres pays auraient obtenu la naturalisation sans le consentement de l'Empereur, puissent être expulsés, s'ils reparaissent en Turquie, et s'ils se livrent à des menées révolutionnaires contre la Russie.

3. Engagement à prendre par la Porte, d'enfermer à Diarbekir, ceux des réfugiés dont nous avons réclamé l'extradition, qui auraient embrassé l'Islamisme.

Inclosure 4 in No. 120.

Fuad Effendi to Count Nesselrode.

M. le Comte, *St. Pétersbourg, le 7 Octobre*, 1849.

J'AI eu l'honneur de recevoir la note que votre Excellence a bien voulu m'écrire en date du 5 courant, ainsi que la notice qui contient les termes de l'arrangement que Sa Majesté l'Empereur propose pour lever les difficultés qui ont surgi dernièrement à Constantinople.

Je m'empresserai de porter à la connaissance de mon Gouvernement cette communication bienveillante de votre Excellence, et j'attendrai ici les ordres de l'Empereur mon maître, pour pouvoir répondre d'une manière positive à cette ouverture du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté l'Empereur.

Cependant, je puis assurer d'avance le Gouvernement Impérial, que Sa Majesté le Sultan recevra avec un vif plaisir cette nouvelle marque d'amitié par laquelle l'Empereur vient de répondre à la confiance que son allié avait mise dans ses sentimens de loyauté et de bienveillance; et que désirant toujours resserrer de plus en plus les liens d'alliance intime qui

unissent les deux empires, le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté le Sultan croira remplir un devoir d'amitié par l'accomplissement des vœux de l'Empereur pour mettre un terme au différend qui existe, et que l'Empereur mon Auguste Souverain a tant à cœur de faire disparaître un moment plus tôt de ses relations avec le Cabinet Impérial de Russie.

Je vous prie, &c.
(Signé) FUAD.

No. 121.

Sir Stratford Canning to Viscount Palmerston.—Received November 19.)

(No. 328.)

My Lord, *Therapia, November 5, 1849.*

I AVAIL myself of the present occasion to inform your Lordship that Sir William Parker has written to acquaint me with the removal of his squadron from the exposed station of Besika Bay to a preferable anchorage within the outer castles of the Dardanelles.

Inclosed herewith are an extract of the Admiral's despatch relating to that movement, and a copy of a despatch which I have addressed and forwarded to Lord Bloomfield to-day.

The want of sufficient time prevents me from writing more fully on this subject by the present opportunity.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

Inclosure 1 in No. 121.

Vice-Admiral Sir W. Parker to Sir Stratford Canning.

(Extract.) *Dardanelles, November 2, 1849.*

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's letter of the 31st of October by the "Odin," and beg to inform you that as the wind set in very strong from the southward yesterday, making Besika Bay a doubtful anchorage in such weather, I availed myself of the permission which had been intimated to me by Her Majesty's Consul, to pass the outer castles of the Dardanelles with Her Majesty's squadron under my command* between the inner castles and Barber's Point.

Since I last addressed your Excellency I have been joined by the "Thetis" frigate, bringing a large supply of provisions, which is now being distributed amongst the ships, and I hope to get them completed with water from our present anchorage.

Inclosure 2 in No. 121.

Sir Stratford Canning to Lord Bloomfield.

My Lord, *Therapia, November 5, 1849.*

I AVAIL myself of an opportunity obligingly offered by M. de Titoff to acknowledge the receipt of your two despatches dated the 19th and 25th ultimo.

It is highly satisfactory to know that the main question at issue has been resolved by His Majesty the Emperor of Russia agreeably to the wishes of the Sultan and the opinion of Her Majesty's Government.

Whatever difficulties may retard that final arrangement, which I observe with regret is to precede the restoration of diplomatic intercourse between the Russian Legation and the Porte, I am unwilling to believe

* So in the original Extract.

that they are of a nature to prevent an early settlement of the whole affair.

My persuasion in this respect is greatly strengthened by a confidential conversation which I have had this morning with M. de Titoff, whom I was happy to receive at his request with that good will and frankness which have always characterized our personal communications.

It may be desirable for you to know that he spoke to me on the subject of Her Majesty's Mediterranean squadron now anchored at the Dardanelles, giving me to understand that he questioned the propriety of its having entered the mouth of the straits, and intimating the embarrassment which it might occasion to his negotiations with the Porte by occupying a position to which the public voice would hardly fail to attach the idea of a menace.

I endeavoured to remove any unfavourable impression from his mind by reading to him Sir William Parker's statement of his motive for shifting the squadron's anchorage from the outside to the inside of the entrance to the straits.

You will see by the extract inclosed herewith, that the Admiral's motive was one of weather alone, and that there is no idea whatever of either violating the Treaty or assuming an attitude of menace. I assured my Russian colleague, moreover, that he might rely upon my spontaneous sentiments for raising no unnecessary obstacle to the conclusion of a satisfactory arrangement between him and the Porte, supposing even that the improved state of the weather had not of itself already induced the Admiral to take up his former or some more distant station beyond the outer castles.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

No. 122.

The Marquis of Normanby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received November 19.)

(No. 547.)

My Lord, *Paris, November 18, 1849.*

I WENT to explain to the President this morning that some unforeseen difficulty must have prevented the arrival of the despatches accepting his proposition of referring to the Ambassadors at Constantinople the question of the recall of the fleets, or their continuance in the neighbourhood of the Dardanelles. I was aware that from embarrassments with members of his Government and others he was very anxious that there should no longer be any delay in sending out instructions to this effect; and I had therefore communicated to him confidentially yesterday, what I had reason to expect from your Lordship's private letter I should receive such despatches this morning.

I then adverted to the intelligence I had just received from Sir Stratford Canning, and stated that I could not conceive this could make any difference as to the mere fact of sending out discretionary orders, as it only proved, from its contradiction with what we had been led to expect, that it was only upon the spot that the question as to the fleets could be satisfactorily decided; but with respect to the effect such intimations would have upon the movements of the fleets, I thought it destroyed the motive for the extraordinary precipitation which had been urged upon him; for when we heard that the renewal of diplomatic relations was made by Russia contingent upon the settlement of the many novel demands she had made, if one placed oneself in the situation of the Ambassadors, one could not suppose they could choose such a moment to send away the fleets.

Our good offices had first been required on account of the threatening attitude assumed in the interruption of diplomatic relations. It seemed to me obvious whilst the menace was still maintained, the support could not with safety or with honour be withdrawn.

But this did not make me alter the opinion in which I concurred with him, that it was right such discretionary orders should be sent to our agents there. This could do no harm, might indeed strengthen their hands, and would show we had no other object than the avowed one which we all hoped would soon be pacifically obtained.

I have, &c.
(Signed) NORMANBY.

No. 123.

Lord Bloomfield to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received November 19.)

(No. 31. Confidential.)
St. Petersburgh, November 6, 1849.

My Lord,

I HAD some conversation two days ago with Count Orloff respecting the extradition of the Poles, and was glad to find that he did not altogether approve of the proceedings of M. Titoff, who he said had gone too far in the matter, adding that the Emperor was dissatisfied with his conduct.

I was somewhat surprised to hear this admission from Count Orloff; because I had been informed by Count Nesselrode that the conduct of the Russian Minister at Constantinople had received the formal approval of his Government; and on my saying so to Count Orloff, he attempted to explain that the system of the Russian Government was never to disavow their Ministers, as such a course would be attended with too many inconveniences, but that I might rest assured that M. Titoff had been severely censured; for that although the Emperor had a full right to demand the exact fulfilment of the Treaty of Kainardji, M. Titoff had been over zealous, and that nothing was further from the Emperor's intentions than to raise such a cry on the subject as had been got up at Constantinople, at London, and at Paris.

Count Orloff made some inquiries of me as to the position of our squadron in the Mediterranean, and said that the movement towards the Dardanelles would be feared complicate matters. I endeavoured to make him feel that the attitude of the Russian Minister at Constantinople was in itself sufficient to warrant this movement; but he said that there were so many precedents for the cessation of diplomatic intercourse between a foreign Minister and the Porte, that he must confess his opinion to me that that there was no sufficient necessity for our having given the affair so serious a turn.

He next made some observations on the conduct of France in the question, and wished me to understand that according to the reports which had reached the Russian Government, they were persuaded that France followed us most unwillingly, and that but for the influence of the President, the French squadron would not even at the present moment have sailed for the Levant.

I replied to Count Orloff that I knew nothing and had nothing to do with the individual opinions of the members of the French Cabinet, or the question which had been lately discussed by them, and that all I had to consider was the decision at which they had arrived, and the zeal and activity with which that decision appeared to have been carried out by the executive power.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 124.

Lord Bloomfield to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received November 19.)

(No. 32.)
St. Petersburgh, November 6, 1849.

My Lord,

COUNT NESSELRODE sent for my perusal a few days ago a despatch from Baron Brunnow dated October $\frac{18}{12}$ (? October $\frac{8}{21}$), in which that Minister gives an account of a conversation which he had had with your Lordship on the subject of the differences which have arisen between the Russian and the Turkish Governments.

The Chancellor, whom I saw yesterday, did not appear quite pleased with this communication, but expressed the hope that it would soon be followed by something of a more satisfactory nature. His Excellency informed me that the despatch had been submitted to your Lordship by Baron Brunnow, and that you had confirmed the accuracy of his report of the conversation.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 125.

The Secretary to the Admiralty to Mr. Addington.

Admiralty, November 20, 1849.

Sir,

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to send you herewith, for the information of Viscount Palmerston, a copy of a letter from Vice-Admiral Sir W. Parker, dated the 29th ultimo, and of its inclosures, on the subject of the approach of the squadron under his command off the Dardanelles.

I am, &c.
(Signed) J. PARKER.

Inclosure 1 in No. 125.

Vice-Admiral Sir W. Parker to the Secretary to the Admiralty.

"Queen," in Besika Bay, October 29, 1849.

Sir,

I TRANSMIT herewith, to be laid before the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, copies of letters which I have received from his Excellency Sir Stratford Canning and Captain the Honourable Frederick Pelham of the "Odin," on the subject of the approach of Her Majesty's ships in company with my flag off the Dardanelles; and as the squadron are very short of steam-vessels and it is probable that frequent communications may be required, I trust their Lordships will approve of my retaining the "Ardent" with my flag for those duties, in consideration of the expense and inconvenience which would be caused by employing the large steam-vessels for such purposes.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. PARKER.

Inclosure 2 in No. 125.

Sir Stratford Canning to Vice-Admiral Sir W. Parker.

Sir, *Therapia, October* 5, 1849.

THE "Odin" arrived here the day before yesterday, to my great satisfaction; and I avail myself of the discretion which you have so considerately given to Captain Pelham to retain her at this station for the present.

In the course of a week or of ten days at latest, we shall probably be made acquainted with the final decision of the two Imperial Courts, and the Porte's determination in consequence.

The presence of your squadron in the Archipelago under these circumstances cannot be otherwise than productive of useful impressions, and it may eventually prove to be of utmost importance. I reckon upon your being at Athens in the course of the ensuing week.

Should it be necessary for me to request a nearer demonstration in support of the Turkish Government, or for the more immediate protection of our interests, I have now the means of communicating with you by express.

To allay the excited anxiety of the public, I propose to request that the "Tartarus" may be detached for a few days on two or three matters of public service which called for attention before the arrival of the "Odin."

I hope you will feel yourself at liberty to detain the squadron in the Archipelago until instructions arrive from England, or affairs in this quarter assume a more decided character.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

Inclosure 3 in No. 125.

The Hon. Captain Pelham to Vice-Admiral Sir W. Parker.

Sir, "*Odin*," *Therapia, October* 15, 1849.

I HAVE the honour to inform you that I anchored in the port of Athens on the 30th September; and as soon as I received answers from the British Minister at that Court I proceeded on to Constantinople, where I arrived on the morning of the 3rd instant.

The British Ambassador being at Therapia I proceeded on there (after having exchanged salutes with the Turkish Government), and communicated with him on the subject of my arrival in the Bosphorus.

His Excellency expressed a strong wish that the "Odin" should remain in the Bosphorus for a short time, or until some answer could arrive from St. Petersburgh, for as yet the Porte has received no answer to their mission to that Court, nor have the Ministers of Austria and Russia received instructions since their last interview with the Porte, and departure (on his return to St. Petersburgh) of the Emperor of Russia's special Envoy to the Porte.

There is every reason to believe that instructions might arrive on the 14th, and almost certainly before the 20th instant; and from the conversations that I have had with his Excellency, and from what I can myself observe, I fully agreed that it would be advisable to remain here until something definitive was known, when I might either join you with information, or dispatch the "Tartarus," according to circumstances.

All diplomatic relations have ceased between the Porte and the Austrian and Russian Ministers, and there appears to be a general feeling through the Turkish dominions to support the views of the Porte.

I found the "Tartarus" at Therapia on my arrival, Sir Godfrey Webster having returned to the Bosphorus the moment that he heard what was going on. I have had occasion to dispatch the "Tartarus" to a port

in the Sea of Marmora. I inclose a copy of Sir Stratford Canning's letter to me on the subject, and of my orders to Sir Godfrey Webster.

The "Tartarus" returned here on the 13th at noon.

The "Odin" and "Tartarus" are both ready for sea.

The Peninsular boat leaves for Malta on the 19th, when I will again write to you.

I have, &c.
(Signed) FRED. PELHAM.

Inclosure 4 in No. 125.

Sir Stratford Canning to the Hon. Captain Pelham.

Sir, *Therapia, October* 10, 1849.

HAVING occasion to send a gentleman of the Embassy to Rodosto on public service, and thinking that his appearance there in one of Her Majesty's vessels will promote the object of his mission, I have to request that you will direct the Commander of the "Tartarus" to receive Mr. Alison on board to-morrow, to convey him to the above-mentioned place, and to return with him to this station as soon as the execution of the service will allow.

The absence of "Tartarus" need not I conceive be extended beyond two or at most three days. Should the duty to be performed by Mr. Alison require a longer time, he will release the "Tartarus" and return by land.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

Inclosure 5 in No. 125.

The Hon. Captain Pelham to Sir Godfrey Webster.

HIS Excellency Sir Stratford Canning having informed me that he was obliged to send one of the gentlemen of the Embassy to Rodosto on public service, and that the presence of a vessel of war off that port during the time would tend to bring the case to a satisfactory result, it is my direction that you proceed in Her Majesty's vessel "Tartarus," under your command, to that port, taking with you Mr. Alison, of the British Embassy; and you will be back at this anchorage by 4 P.M. of the 13th, or earlier, should Sir Stratford Canning's mission be finished.

In execution of this service you will remember that you are not authorized to take part in any transaction at Rodosto, beyond affording the support which the presence of a British vessel of war must always give to a British Agent in a foreign port.

Given under my hand this 10th day of October, 1849.

(Signed) F. T. PELHAM.

No. 126.

Viscount Palmerston to Sir Stratford Canning.

(No. 292.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, November* 20, 1849.

I HAVE to acquaint your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government approve of the memorandum on the subject of the demands of the Courts of Austria and Russia which you had prepared, for communication, if necessary, to the Porte, and of which a copy is inclosed in your despatch No. 319 of the 27th ultimo.

I am, &c.
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 127.

Lord Bloomfield to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received November 22.)

(No. 38.) *St. Petersburgh, November 13, 1849.*

My Lord,

THE Russian Government are in daily expectation of the arrival of the post from Constantinople of the 5th instant, but Count Nesselrode informed me yesterday, that although M. de Titoff may be able to acknowledge by the packet returning to Odessa the receipt of the communications which were sent from hence on the 19th and 24th ultimo, respecting the differences between Russia and Turkey, he does not look for the formal decision of the Porte before next week.

Fuad Effendi continues very unwell, and has scarcely left his bed during the last three weeks, but I have nevertheless seen him frequently, and I find that by the first post he fully expects to hear from Aali Effendi that the Russian proposals have been accepted by his Government. His Excellency has promised to communicate with me as soon as he hears from Constantinople, and I have therefore desired the messenger Moore to hold himself in readiness to proceed to Berlin in the event of my hearing anything which it might be advisable to send to your Lordship without loss of time.

Fuad Effendi appears much pleased with the note which was addressed by Prince Schwarzenberg to M. Musurus on the 22nd of October, and has no doubt but that it will have a good effect at Constantinople, and have prepared the way for the communications from St. Petersburgh. In the meantime this correspondence between the Turkish Envoy and the Austrian Government has not given satisfaction here. From the abandonment of the original demand of extradition being too clearly expressed, Count Buol, the Austrian Minister at this Court, has told me, however, that although the communications from the two Imperial Courts differ materially, there is an equally good disposition at St. Petersburgh to settle the matter in dispute, and that if Fuad Effendi had chosen in the opening of the negotiations to take as much responsibility on himself as M. Musurus had done at Vienna, the difficulties would have been still further diminished.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 128.

The Marquis of Normanby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received November 23.)

(No. 553. Confidential.) *Paris, November 22, 1849.*

My Lord,

GENERAL DE LA HITTE has called upon me this morning, and has read to me a letter from M. Drouyn de Lhuys of yesterday's date, by which it appears that your Lordship had announced to him that provided it was perfectly understood that the orders sent were substantially the same, you did not think it of importance that the instructions should be simultaneous or identic. Under these circumstances, should General de la Hitte be prepared with his new orders before the despatches which your Lordship promised to me last week shall arrive, I shall take upon myself to write a few lines to Sir Stratford Canning by the French conveyance, explanatory of the intention of Her Majesty's Government to send out directions of the same character, as otherwise his Excellency would probably be for some days without the means of acting in concert with his colleague.

I cannot however help remarking to your Lordship, that at the express request of the President, I sent on Tuesday week an extra courier

with a proposal on his part for joint action on the new footing, and stating I had been requested to name Friday as the day on which it was possible to receive an answer. On Saturday morning I received a private communication from your Lordship, which said that the despatches containing your agreement to this proposal would come out by the same conveyance.

From that day to this I have never received those despatches, nor any explanation whatever of the delay; and it is now only through a letter from the French Ambassador in London to his Government, containing his account of a conversation with you, that I learn your decision. Had the same conveyance brought me a similar communication from you, it would not merely have been acceptable, as showing consideration for the difficulties in which I am placed amidst the intrigues actively at work at this moment, but if the permanence of joint action on this question is considered indispensable, it could not but have much facilitated the conduct of the public service.

I have, &c.
(Signed) NORMANBY.

No. 129.

Viscount Palmerston to Sir Stratford Canning.

(No. 297.) *Foreign Office, November 24, 1849.*

Sir,

I HAVE to acquaint your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government have been much gratified by the account contained in your despatch No. 325, of the 2nd instant, of the communication made to you that day by command of the Sultan, and expressing His Highness' gratitude for the prompt assurances of succour and support which the Queen had been pleased to authorize your Excellency to convey to His Highness on the part of the British Government. The Sultan may feel assured that his efforts to maintain the dignity and independence of his empire will always be regarded with sympathy and with favour by the British nation; and it is because the British Government are convinced that one of the most effectual means to that end is the improvement of the social condition of the Turkish people, that they have so earnestly endeavoured to induce the Porte to devote its utmost attention to that object.

Her Majesty's Government are happy to think that the embarrassing discussion in which the Sultan's Government has been involved with the Courts of Austria and Russia, is likely to be soon brought to an end in a manner that is in accordance with the stipulations of treaties and consistent with the honour and dignity of the Sultan; and they trust that no similar questions may hereafter occur to cast even a momentary shade over the friendliness of the relations between the Sultan and any other European Power.

I am, &c.
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 130.

Viscount Palmerston to Sir Stratford Canning.

(No. 298.) *Foreign Office, November 24, 1849.*

Sir,

IT appears from your Excellency's despatch No. 328, of the 5th instant, and also from a despatch addressed by Sir William Parker to the Admiralty on the 2nd instant, of which a copy has been communicated to this office, that the British squadron has anchored between the inner castles of the Dardanelles and Barber's Point. But I have to state to

your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government regret that Sir William Parker should have taken his squadron to anchor within the outer castles of the Dardanelles, instead of seeking shelter elsewhere in the neighbourhood of the straits, because the fact of his having done so affords to persons who may be disposed to cavil a pretence for saying that Her Majesty's squadron has acted in contravention of the Treaty of the 13th of July, 1841, by which the Contracting Parties engaged to respect the established rule of the Porte which prohibits ships of war of foreign Powers from entering the Straits of the Dardanelles and Bosphorus while the Porte is at peace.

It is true that it may be said in reply to such an assertion that by the Treaty the Contracting Parties bound themselves to respect and conform to the regulations of the Porte on this subject; and that it appears by the letter of the Vice-Consul at the Dardanelles to Sir William Parker, that by the port regulations established by the Turkish Government for the Dardanelles, the anchorage to which Sir William Parker has taken his squadron is the place assigned for ships of war of all nations arriving at the Dardanelles, as the point at which they are to stop, and beyond which they are not to go, and where they are to wait till they learn from Constantinople whether a firman can be granted to authorize them to proceed further. But to this it may be replied that such regulation can be considered as applicable only to such light ships of war as, under the stipulations of the Treaty above mentioned, the Porte reserves to itself the right of permitting to pass the two straits for the purpose of communicating with foreign Embassies and Missions at Constantinople, but that it is putting a forced construction on this regulation to apply it to a squadron of line-of-battle ships, which according to the clear stipulations of the Treaty cannot, while the Porte is at peace, be permitted to pass up the straits, and which according to the strict letter of the Treaty ought not to enter the straits.

Your Excellency should explain this matter to Sir William Parker, and you should state to him that if, while he remains in the neighbourhood of the Dardanelles, he should be driven by stress of weather from Besika Bay, it is desirable that he should take shelter in Enos or Saros, or anywhere else, though somewhat further from the Dardanelles, rather than give occasion for verbal controversy by anchoring within the outer castles.

I am, &c.
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 131.

Viscount Palmerston to Sir Stratford Canning.

(No. 299.)

Foreign Office, November 24, 1849.

Sir,

THE accounts which have been received from St. Petersburgh and Vienna lead Her Majesty's Government to entertain a confident hope that by this time the differences which had arisen between the Russian and Austrian Governments on the one hand, and the Porte on the other, as to the demand made upon the Porte for the surrender of the Polish and Hungarian refugees, will have been settled amicably, and in a manner satisfactory both to the Imperial Governments and to the Porte.

Whenever such a settlement of the matters in dispute shall have been effected, there will of course no longer exist any sufficient reason for the continuance of Her Majesty's squadron in the neighbourhood of the Dardanelles; and it would be convenient, with reference to the general arrangements of Her Majesty's Service, that the squadron should return towards its more accustomed stations, whenever its presence at the upper end of the Mediterranean shall be no longer required for the purposes, with a view to which it was ordered to go thither.

I have accordingly to inform your Excellency that with a view to prevent unnecessary delay in carrying such arrangements into effect, I have signified Her Majesty's pleasure to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty that Sir William Parker should be instructed, that whenever and as soon as he shall be informed by your Excellency that the presence of his squadron in the neighbourhood of the Dardanelles is no longer required with a view to the negotiations going on at Constantinople between the Imperial Governments and the Porte, he will be at liberty to quit that station, and his squadron will be disposable to proceed elsewhere in conformity with such other instructions as the Lords of the Admiralty may give him.

Her Majesty's Government understand that similar instructions will be given to the French Admiral, who will be ordered to be guided as to remaining at, or departing from the sea of the Levant, by communications which he will receive from the French Ambassador at Constantinople. Your Excellency will therefore communicate on this matter, as you have done in regard to all the other questions connected with these affairs, with the French Ambassador; and it is desirable that the communication to be made by your Excellencies to the Admirals of your respective Governments should if possible be to the same effect.

I am, &c.
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 132.

Viscount Palmerston to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty.

My Lords, *Foreign Office, November 24, 1849.*

I HAVE the honour to acquaint your Lordships that the accounts which have been received from St. Petersburgh and Vienna lead Her Majesty's Government to entertain a confident hope that by this time the differences which had arisen between the Russian and Austrian Governments on the one hand, and the Porte on the other, as to the demand made upon the Porte for the surrender of the Polish and Hungarian refugees, will have been amicably settled, and in a manner satisfactory both to the Imperial Governments and to the Porte.

With reference to this contingency, I have to signify to your Lordships Her Majesty's pleasure that Sir William Parker should be instructed that whenever and as soon as he shall be informed by Sir Stratford Canning that the presence of his squadron in the neighbourhood of the Dardanelles is no longer required with a view to the negotiations going on at Constantinople between the Imperial Governments and the Porte, he will be at liberty to quit that station, and his squadron will be disposable to proceed elsewhere, in conformity with such other instructions as your Lordships may have given him.

Her Majesty's Government understand that instructions to the same effect will be given to the Admiral of the French squadron, who will be ordered to be guided as to remaining at, or departing from the sea of the Levant, by communications which he will receive from the French Ambassador at Constantinople. But to guard against the possibility of inconvenience arising from any difference in the instructions to the two Admirals on this point, I have to suggest that your Lordship's instructions to Sir William Parker should be sent to this office in the afternoon of this day, in order to be forwarded through Her Majesty's Ambassador at Paris, who will have received directions to communicate with the French Government on the subject.

I am, &c.
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 133.

Viscount Palmerston to the Marquis of Normanby.

(No. 542.)
Foreign Office, November 24, 1849.

My Lord,

I HAVE received and laid before the Queen your Excellency's despatches No. 535 and 537 of the 13th instant, reporting conversations with the President and General Hautpoul, from which it results that the French Government are desirous that the British and French Representatives at Constantinople should be authorized to apprize the Admirals of their respective squadrons that their presence is no longer required in the upper end of the Mediterranean, whenever those Representatives shall be of opinion that the state of the negotiations between the Imperial Governments and the Porte admits of the departure of the squadrons from the neighbourhood of the Dardanelles.

I now inclose to your Excellency for communication to the French Government, a copy of an instruction which I have addressed to Sir Stratford Canning on that matter; and I have to acquaint your Excellency that the messenger Webster is placed at your Excellency's disposal, either to be sent on to Constantinople in the French steamer by which the French Government propose to send their despatches to General Aupick, or if the French steamer has already left Toulon, then to be sent on overland to Constantinople.

I have, &c.
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 134.

Viscount Palmerston to the Marquis of Normanby.

(No. 544.)
Foreign Office, November 24, 1849.

My Lord,

THE inclosed packet for Sir Stratford Canning contains my despatch to his Excellency No. 299, of which a copy is transmitted to your Excellency in my despatch No. 542 of this day.

If nothing should occur at Paris to induce you to delay forwarding this packet, you will give it to the messenger Webster, and direct him to proceed on his journey to Constantinople by French steamer; or, in the contingency specified in my despatch No. 542, overland to Constantinople. Your Excellency will of course apprize Sir S. Canning of what may have passed between you and the French Government on the subject referred to in the accompanying despatch.

I am, &c.
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 135.

Viscount Palmerston to Sir Stratford Canning.

(No. 300.)
Foreign Office, November 25, 1849.

Sir,

I INCLOSE for your Excellency's information a copy of a letter which I have addressed to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, on the subject of the instructions to be given to Sir William Parker, as stated in my preceding despatch to your Excellency.

I am, &c.
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 136.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received November 25.)

(No. 269.)
Vienna, November 20, 1849.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to inclose copy of a despatch I have this day received from his Excellency Sir Stratford Canning, dated the 7th instant, from Constantinople. I do not know what are the particular proposals to the unqualified acceptance of which by the Sublime Porte his Excellency objects, and therefore I am unable to endeavour to be of use here in smoothing difficulties if they exist.

Prince Schwarzenberg has accompanied His Imperial Majesty to Prague. The Emperor is expected to return in about a week. The Prince may come back sooner, but I hope that before his arrival I shall know facts well enough to be enabled to treat of the affair, if necessary.

I have, &c.
(Signed) PONSONBY.

Inclosure in No. 136.

Sir Stratford Canning to Viscount Ponsonby.

Therapia, November 7, 1849.

My Lord,

I AVAIL myself of the messenger Robbins' return by Vienna to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's despatch of the 13th ultimo.

The Porte is engaged in considering the proposals transmitted respectively from Vienna and St. Petersburgh, on the relinquishment by Austria and Russia of their demand for the extradition of the principal refugees from Hungary. With every wish to contribute to a satisfactory accommodation of the difference, I cannot recommend an unqualified acceptance of those proposals. Offered, as I presume they are, in a real spirit of conciliation, it may be hoped that they will receive the necessary amendments, and remove every motive for a longer suspension of diplomatic intercourse between the two Imperial Cabinets and the Porte.

The improved aspect of the affair has enabled me to suggest to Sir William Parker the propriety of his anchoring the squadron outside the Dardanelles, its exposure to violent weather having led him to take up a more sheltered anchorage within.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

No. 137.

Sir Stratford Canning to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received November 25.)

(No. 329.)
Therapia, November 7, 1849.

My Lord,

THE despatch under date of the 4th instant, addressed by me to Sir William Parker and inclosed herewith in copy, will inform your Lordship of my opinion as to the degree in which our last intelligence from Vienna and St. Petersburgh may justly be considered to bear upon the position of Her Majesty's squadron under his command.

A subsequent despatch of this day's date, copy of which is also inclosed herewith, will be found to confirm my previous suggestion to the Admiral: and I avail myself of the same opportunity to forward copies for your Lordship's information, of some further correspondence received from Her Majesty's Consul at the Dardanelles.

It is to be hoped that Sir William Parker will feel himself at liberty under the present circumstances to comply with my recommendation, according, as it evidently does, with the impressions of the Sultan and of his principal Ministers. Considerations of weather at a more exposed anchorage may however induce him to hesitate; and the unsettled state of the pending negotiation forbids the adoption of any definitive course of proceeding at this moment.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

Inclosure 1 in No. 137.

Sir Stratford Canning to Vice-Admiral Sir W. Parker.

Therapia, November 4, 1849.

Sir,

IN the course of to-day and yesterday, authentic intelligence reached me that the Courts of Russia and of Austria had renounced the demand they had previously addressed to the Porte for the extradition of the refugees from Hungary who had sought a temporary asylum within the Sultan's dominions. The conciliatory character of this resolution is confirmed by the assurances transmitted for Lord Palmerston's information from Count Nesselrode, disclaiming every intention calculated to give alarm to this country, and describing the question at issue as having been put into a train of regular adjustment.

Under these circumstances I conceive that the continuance of Her Majesty's squadron at its present anchorage can no longer be a matter of immediate urgency, and I only wait to ascertain the wishes of the Turkish Government in that respect, before I submit the expediency of its removal to your consideration.

The main object of your appearance in the Archipelago may be now regarded as virtually secured, and should any remaining difficulties occasion some further delay and trouble, they are not likely to put the peaceable relations of Turkey with either of the neighbouring empires to fresh hazard.

Considering at the same time that the usual diplomatic intercourse is still suspended between the Porte and the two Imperial Representatives, I am not yet prepared to incur the responsibility of recommending your final retirement from the neighbourhood of the Dardanelles.

With the deference which is due to your superior judgment, I would venture to suggest as the more advisable course, that you should leave your present anchorage, unless requested by the Porte to stay, and transfer the squadron to some neighbouring station, whence it may return, should its valuable services be wanted again, without any inconvenient delay.

The moral effect produced by its prompt appearance at the Dardanelles will not be speedily effaced. The Porte in its hour of need has seen the British flag displayed peaceably within her waters, in earnest of that more active support to which in a just and generous cause her Sovereign and people would never look in vain. The successful service which you have thereby performed deserves my warmest congratulations.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

Inclosure 2 in No. 137.

Sir Stratford Canning to Vice-Admiral Sir W. Parker.

Therapia, November 7, 1849.

Sir,

REFERRING to my despatch of the 4th instant, I have the honour to inform you that having ascertained the present state of the Sultan's impressions with respect to the new proposals from Vienna and St. Petersburgh, I am confirmed in the suggestion which I then proposed to your

consideration. It appears to me that by anchoring the squadron in the immediate neighbourhood of the Dardanelles, you will continue to afford the Porte the full degree of advantage contemplated under circumstances like the present by Her Majesty's Government, without exciting any sentiment unfavourable to the progress of negotiation on friendly principles.

According to present appearances a very few days ought to suffice for bringing the points in discussion to that state in which they may be either definitely settled here, or referred again to the Imperial Courts with more or less uncertainty as to the final result.

In the meantime the same consideration which reasonably induced you to take advantage of existing regulations, may render it extremely imprudent for the squadron to take up a more exposed anchorage so late in the season, and in this respect it is not for me to interfere with your Excellency's professional judgment and experience.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

Inclosure 3 in No. 137.

Consul Calvert to Sir Stratford Canning.

(Extract.) *Dardanelles, October* 30, 1849.

AS to the propriety of the squadron entering the Dardanelles and taking up a more sheltered anchorage than that of Besika Bay, I feel now convinced that doubts can only have arisen in consequence of the true meaning of the word *détroits*, as contained in the original Treaty signed in French on the 10th July, 1841, having evidently been erroneously rendered in the English text by the word *straits*. The Straits of the Dardanelles are always designated in French as *Le Canal des Dardanelles*, and the real sense of the word *détroits*, in the present instance, would evidently have been more appropriately rendered by calling it the *narrowest passages*, thus implying that of the inner castles.

Considering furthermore, that the instructions of the Turkish Government to the various officers in command of the forts of the Dardanelles, since the signature of the Treaty, have invariably admitted the right of all foreign vessels of war to enter within the outer castles of the Dardanelles; and also the fact that Russian, Austrian, and American vessels of war have at all times availed themselves without hesitation of the faculty thus granted indiscriminately to ships of all nations.

No. 138.

Sir Stratford Canning to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received November 25.)

(No. 330. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Therapia, November* 7, 1849.

IN my ostensible despatch of this date, I have stated for your Lordship's information the course which I had thought it my duty to pursue with respect to the position of Her Majesty's Mediterranean squadron in consequence of the relinquishment by Austria and Russia of that demand and dictatorial mode of enforcing it, which had compelled the Turkish Government to solicit Her Majesty's sympathy and active support. It remains for me to acquaint your Lordship in this confidential form with certain circumstances and considerations bearing on the subject of that despatch, and also to avail myself of the opportunity thus afforded for drawing your Lordship's attention to the terms of the Treaty con-

cluded in 1841 between the Porte and the five principal Powers of Europe.

I shall probably be borne out by the reports of our officers, in stating that neither the land defences of the Bosphorus, nor the available Turkish Navy, would be found sufficient to secure Constantinople against a successful attack by sea, were Russia determined to risk the enterprize by means of her squadron at Sebastopol. The same reasons, which had prevailed with Her Majesty's Government to order the ships under Sir William Parker's command to the Dardanelles, continued necessarily to have their effect so long as we remained in ignorance of the decision taken at St. Petersburgh on learning the issue of Prince Radzivil's mission to Constantinople. Appearances had indeed become gradually favourable to a peaceful solution of the pending difference, but a credulous reliance on appearances at such a juncture was fraught with hazard, and might eventually have proved fatal to the object of Her Majesty's intervention.

Such being the case, it was evidently desirable that the British auxiliary squadron should at once approach the possible scene of action so nearly as to insure its arrival there in time, if the danger, which is still problematical, should become on a sudden not only real but urgent. To its passage through the straits in time of peace, the First Article of the Treaty of 1841 presented, as your Lordship knows, a distinct and unquestionable barrier; but the distance from Constantinople might be materially shortened by the advance of the squadron to an anchorage below the inner castles which constitute the effective defences of the straits, and occupy those points where the channel assumes its most decided character. The standing regulations, and consequent local practice, corroborate a distinction which public convenience had already suggested. Even the terms of the Treaty may be so taken as to warrant that exercise of discretion which the Porte has for some time at least practically assumed with regard to the admission of foreign ships of war outside the above-mentioned castles and their adjacent batteries. I am aware that the word *détroit* applies generally to the whole length of a channel, but surely its more emphatic application belongs to that part of the channel where the shores approach most nearly to each other, and where the right of control is officially exercised by the constituted authorities.

Notwithstanding these various considerations in favour of a liberal interpretation of the Treaty, and my conviction, not lightly entertained, that the Porte had no objection whatever to the squadron's reception at the inner anchorage, I was unwilling to add my official sanction without the further inducement of hazard to the ships from remaining longer in an exposed situation. Of this important point the Admiral was necessarily the proper judge; and your Lordship will have learnt from the correspondence between Sir William Parker and myself that the pressure of a strong south wind was the immediate cause of his advance to the second place of anchorage, in the propriety of which movement at the time I still most cordially concur.

An important change has since however occurred in the diplomatic bearings of the question. Not only has the Russian and Austrian demand of extradition been given up, but together with the removal of any immediate cause of apprehension as to the views of those powers with respect to Turkey, a more distinct knowledge has been acquired of the umbrage occasioned at St. Petersburgh by the movements of the British and French squadrons in this direction, and of the unfavourable effect which its increase may have upon the proceedings essential to a complete and satisfactory accommodation. In consequence of the former and in contemplation of the latter circumstance, I did not hesitate to address my letter of the 4th instant to Sir William Parker.

M. de Titoff called upon me the next day, and, after referring to a letter which he had obligingly transmitted to me from Lord Bloomfield, and confirming what I had already learnt from that and other authentic sources of the decision taken at St. Petersburgh, which he handsomely attributed to the expression of public opinion in England as well as to regard for the Sultan's desire expressed through Fuad Effendi, asked my

permission to make some inquiry as to the arrival of Her Majesty's squadron at the Dardanelles. I had scarcely intimated my assent when he went on to say, with excuses founded on the responsibility of his situation, that whatever might be thought of the motives which had brought the squadron to that neighbourhood, it was more particularly its position within the entrance of the Dardanelles that induced him to apply to me. He would not, he said, conceal from me that he deemed the measure to be an infraction of the Treaty of 1841; and he was the more disposed to regret its adoption, because such an appearance of menace towards Russia, when taken up by the public voice, as he thought it had been already, might seriously embarrass him in his exertions to complete the pending accommodation.

I assured M. de Titoff, in reply, that he could not be more anxious than I was to respect the Treaty of 1841. I admitted that the passage of the Dardanelles by a foreign squadron in time of peace, was undoubtedly forbidden by its First Article; but I asserted that the same stipulation did not apply with equal distinctness to the anchorage occupied by Her Majesty's squadron; that, on the contrary, regulations and practice were both favourable to the propriety of our ships having been received there; that the Turkish authorities on the spot had offered no objection; and that the difference between a squadron and single ships of war, many of which, under various flags, had taken advantage from time to time of the permitted latitude, was not one of principle as to the Treaty, but of consideration for the Porte in point of security. I gave him nevertheless to understand that Sir William Parker had shifted his station on the sole ground of weather; that for aught I knew the squadron might have gone outside again by that time; and that, at all events, though I had heard nothing of the "public voice," which he appeared to apprehend, he might reckon without further explanation upon my spontaneous reluctance to put any unnecessary impediment in the way of his negotiations with the Porte. I may add, that in the course of my conversation with him I declined giving any account of the Admiral's reasons for bringing Her Majesty's squadron to the Dardanelles, observing that if his Government wished to be informed on that part of the subject, they would no doubt apply in the usual manner to your Lordship; and that it was only with respect to the supposed infraction of treaty that I thought it my duty to meet his inquiry with a frank explanation.

The day after this interview with M. de Titoff, which took place at his request, I had occasion to see Aali Pasha, from whom, after hearing a full exposition of his views as to the Austrian and Russian proposals, I learnt that the Russian Envoy, during a private and personal conversation with his Excellency before his visit to me, had already questioned him as to the appearance of Her Majesty's squadron at the Dardanelles, and had complained of its admission to the inner place of anchorage. It appears that he received, in answer from Aali Pasha, that succinct and candid recapitulation of antecedent facts justifying the Porte's appeal to the Governments of England and France, and accounting for the subsequent movements of their respective squadrons, which my unwillingness to excite irritation and to deviate from the tone of your Lordship's communications with Russia had induced me to reserve. The statement, as reported to me by Aali Pasha, was made with most impressive truthfulness, and a repetition of it has been sent by his Excellency to Fuad Effendi, for the eventual information of the Russian Government. The Turkish Minister affirmed, moreover, that he had maintained the propriety of the squadron's admission to its last anchorage on the grounds of the treaty, of convenience, of security, of regulation, and of practice. The Porte, he said, entertained no wish to include the whole length of channel in the stipulations of the Treaty, and thought it hard not to be mistress in her own waters, whenever there was no positive necessity for restricting their navigation. We both agreed that the Dardanelles presented a case essentially differing from that of the Bosphorus, inasmuch as the metropolis and the Sultan's palace were alike situated on the banks of the latter.

Nothing could exceed the delicacy with which Aali Pasha treated this

question. It was only in answer to a pointed inquiry from me that he expressed his belief in the removal of any immediate danger; nor could I elicit from him more than a wish that the squadron, if it changed its place of anchorage, should still remain at no considerable distance from the Dardanelles. The Sultan, whose pleasure I requested him to take, has only confirmed our mutual impression that matters are nearly calmed down, and that the danger, whatever it may have been, is no longer imminent.

Throughout these proceedings it has been my anxious endeavour to meet, as far as depended upon me, the several exigencies of the crisis, with a due regard for the convenience and safety of Her Majesty's squadron on the one hand, and for the promotion of a peaceful and satisfactory adjustment of differences on the other. My Russian colleague has probably his motives for making a parade of zeal on this occasion. It appears that he at first threatened the Porte with a formal protest, but subsequently fell back on a note of inquiry, which I have not yet seen. He has also written to his Court, in terms, I presume, of animadversion.

It is observable that the Austrian Minister, as far as I know, has taken no part in M. de Titoff's susceptibility about the Dardanelles; and I am informed by Mr. Calvert that the French had privately communicated with the commanders of the outer castles in contemplation of the approach of their own squadron to the anchorage occupied by Sir William Parker.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

No. 139.

Sir Stratford Canning to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received November 25.)

(No. 331.)

Therapia, November 7, 1849.

My Lord,

HAVING seen Aali Pasha on his invitation yesterday, I was informed by his Excellency that the Russian and Austrian Envoys had separately called on him to communicate the new propositions which they had respectively received from St. Petersburgh and Vienna concerning the question of the refugees. Each of them had been careful to give a personal, or at least unofficial character to his communication, continuing thereby in principle the suspension of diplomatic intercourse.

The terms proposed were exactly the same as those transmitted by Fuad Effendi and M. Musurus, copies of which have been forwarded to your Lordship with my preceding correspondence. The Internuncio had also produced a list of the refugees whose detention in the interior of Turkey he was instructed to require. It comprised between thirty and forty names, among others those of General Dembinski and Count Zamoysky, whose extradition had been originally demanded by Russia. M. de Titoff had a reserved list of his own, comprising eighteen individuals, twelve of whom are among the refugees from Hungary, and six residing previously in this country under French or other protection.

To smoothe the way by explanation and personal civility for a complete acceptance of the new propositions would seem to have been the main object of these visits, which have been since followed up with a more formal communication by notes. Nothing, as I learn from Aali Pasha, occurred to exclude a modification of the terms; and judging from expressions used by M. de Titoff in conversation with me, I am inclined to hope that any reasonable objections maintained firmly by the Porte will not experience a determined or unfriendly resistance.

The Austrian proposal assuming that a compulsory detention of the refugees in Turkey had been rendered unavoidable by the Porte's engagements, retains only one objectionable point of decided magnitude. It is that which would virtually tie down the Porte to the principle of perpetuity relinquished at Vienna, and causing the period of detention to depend ultimately on the indulgence and consent of the Austrian Government. The admission of a claim entailing such consequences would be scarcely

more creditable than the degrading requisition which has been happily rejected. The Porte is by no means insensible to this objection, and will probably struggle hard to escape from it, with the advice and support of her friends; but I question whether her desire to conciliate Austria and to detach that Power from Russia may not in the end prevail over other important considerations.

The Austrian list is vicious enough, both as comprising individuals who were classed as Russian under the general demand, and therefore to be exempted from detention now, and as helping with other securities to place the execution of the Porte's intended measures under foreign superintendence.

With respect to the Russian proposals, there is little apparent difficulty that may not be expected to give way, provided there be fairness on one side and firmness on the other.

The Porte is not inclined to make any stand on behalf of Bem and his fellow-renegades, whose disappointment will probably reconvert them to Christianity.

The expulsion of the Polish refugees who took part in the Hungarian war, will of course be assented to. All that Russia can fairly demand of the Porte in addition, is what the Porte may readily concede without incurring any fresh obligation, namely, an engagement to do what depends upon her to prevent any Russian Poles from carrying on revolutionary intrigues against Russia within her territory, under the shadow of protection or naturalization obtained from some other State. What is now required of the Turkish Government is more than it can answer for performing, and among the Poles who have long resided in this country, and whom no doubt the Emperor of Russia has principally in view, are two agents of Prince Czartorysky under French protection.

These several points I have fully talked over with the Grand Vizier and Aali Pasha,—more particularly with the latter,—and I have reason to believe that those Ministers view them on the whole in the same light that I do. The notes which Aali Pasha is preparing in reply to each of the two Imperial Envoys, will best exhibit the degree of resolution intended to be put forth in the present improved state of the business. I may perhaps obtain a perusal of them to-day. A suitable spirit of accommodation will I trust be displayed in terms more dignified than those which figure in the notes and speeches transmitted from Vienna and St. Petersburgh.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

No. 140.

Sir Stratford Canning to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received November 25.)

(Private and Confidential.)

My dear Lord,

Therapia, November 7, 1849.

WITH reference to my despatches about the entrance of the Dardanelles, I inclose two letters from Mr. Calvert, marked "private and confidential," with the view of completing your information upon the subject. An extract from one of them is inclosed with my ostensible despatch No. 329 of this date.

I wrote privately to let the Admiral know that I think he had better take the squadron outside for the present, unless it were to be really and seriously endangered by anchoring there.

If the present negotiation should end in a fresh reference to Petersburgh, the Russian Government might declare its determination not to resume it while the British squadron remained in the channel of the Dardanelles. The prospect of such an embarrassment must have its weight with us.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

Inclosure 1 in No. 140.

Consul Calvert to Sir Stratford Canning.

(Private and Confidential.)

Dardanelles, October 31, 1849.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to inform your Excellency that the military Pasha in command of these castles has this day received the full approbation of the Sublime Porte for all that he has done at my requst towards facilitating the entrance into these straits of Her Majesty's squadron.

The Pasha has further informed me that the French Consul called upon him privately a few minutes ago, for the purpose, and, as he said, with the authority of the French Minister at Constantinople, of asking that a safe anchorage within these straits should be reserved for the French squadron then hourly expected to arrive. The French Consul further urged the Pasha to assign the anchorage between Barbers' Point and the castles for this purpose, but the Pasha declined making any promise before the French squadron should actually arrive, and came to inform me of what had taken place, all of which I have communicated to Admiral Parker.

I have, &c.

(Signed) F. W. CALVERT.

Inclosure 2 in No. 140.

Consul Calvert to Vice-Admiral Sir W. Parker.

Dardanelles, October 30, 1849.

Sir,

AFTER seriously considering the substance of the private communication made to me yesterday by your Excellency whilst I was on board of the "Queen," and after maturely weighing the nature of the doubts entertained by Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople as to the propriety of the squadron under your command entering the Straits of the Dardanelles, and taking up a more sheltered anchorage than that of Besika Bay, I have the honour to state that I feel now convinced that such doubts can only have arisen in consequence of the true meaning of the word *détroits* as contained in the original Treaty signed in French on the 10th July, 1841, having evidently been erroneously rendered in the English text by the word *straits*. The *Straits of the Dardanelles* are always designated in French as *Le Canal des Dardanelles*, and the real sense of the word *détroit* in the present instance would evidently have been more appropriately rendered by calling it the narrowest passages, thus implying that of the inner castle.

This assertion will be further corroborated by the substance of the inclosed copy of a despatch received at this Consulate from Her Majesty's Embassy at Constantinople on the 27th March, 1845, together with the copy of a memorandum from the Sublime Porte which accompanied it.

Considering furthermore that the instructions of the Turkish Government to the various officers in command of the forts of the Dardanelles since the signature of the Treaty have invariably admitted the right of all foreign vessels of war to enter within the outer castles of the Dardanelles, and also the fact that Russian, Austrian and American vessels of war have at all times availed without hesitation of the facility thus granted indiscriminately to ships of all nations; I am the more confirmed in the opinion expressed by me to your Excellency as to the undoubted propriety that the squadron under your command should anchor for shelter within these straits.

I have, &c.

(Signed) F. W. CALVERT.

Inclosure 3 in No. 140.

Sir Stratford Canning to Consul Lander.

(Extract.)

Constantinople, March 22, 1845.

IN directing your attention to the importance of conforming strictly to the regulations adopted by the Ottoman Government, I have the satisfaction to state that any British vessel, whether it be a merchant-vessel or a vessel of war, is allowed to come within the outer castle of the Dardanelles at once, as far as the anchorage of Kepez Bournou or Point Barbieri, by night as well as by day. I am assured by the Ottoman Minister that a permission to this effect, including the vessels of other friendly Powers, will form a part of the instructions addressed to the commanders of the castles and other Turkish authorities of the Dardanelles.

P.S.—*March* 26, 1845.—I am assured by the chief interpreter of the Embassy, upon the authority of Chekib Effendi, that the above-mentioned instructions have already been dispatched.

No. 141.

Sir Stratford Canning to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received November 25.)

(No. 333. Confidential.)

Therapia, November 8, 1849.

My Lord,

I HAVE succeeded in obtaining copies of the notes presented to Aali Pasha by Count Stürmer and M. de Titoff, with the proposed terms of adjustment transmitted by their respective Governments. They are inclosed herewith for your Lordship's information. The note to be given in answer by Aali Pasha will not be completed before the day after to-morrow.

Your Lordship will not fail to observe the marked difference of tone which distinguishes the Russian from the Austrian note. The latter declares that Russia is to be satisfied as well as Austria before the Internuncio will consent to resume his usual diplomatic intercourse with the Porte. The Russian note on the contrary makes no mention of Austria. The Austrian note requires the confirmation and execution of the measures apparently agreed upon at Vienna. The Russian note may be construed as leaving open a door for modification and the mutual adjustment of terms. I have a strong misgiving that the Sultan and his principal Ministers will make little more than a flourish of opposition to what is most objectionable in the Austrian proposals.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

Inclosure 1 in No. 141.

Count Stürmer to Aali Pasha.

Constantinople, le 5 Novembre, 1849.

M. le Ministre,

C'EST avec une véritable satisfaction que j'ai l'honneur d'informer votre Excellence que d'après une dépêche que je viens de recevoir de Vienne en date du 23 du mois passé, Sa Majesté l'Empereur, mon auguste maître, désireux de fournir une nouvelle preuve du prix qu'il attache au maintien des rapports d'amitié subsistant entre les deux empires, a trouvé bon de se désister de la demande d'extradition formulée précédemment à l'égard

des chefs de l'insurrection Hongroise réfugiés sur le sol Ottoman, et d'accepter les propositions contenues dans la lettre autographe de Sa Majesté le Sultan et reproduites dans une note présentée par M. Musurus. D'après ces propositions, la Sublime Porte s'engagerait à faire interner et surveiller dans des lieux convenables les réfugiés susmentionnés, de manière à les mettre dans l'impossibilité de rien entreprendre dorénavant contre l'ordre légal dans les Etats Autrichiens. Elle fournirait en même tems au Gouvernement Impérial les garanties les plus solennelles pour l'exécution immédiate et exacte des mesures en question, qui ne pourront cesser qu'à la suite d'un commun accord entre les deux Cours.

En m'empressant donc de transmettre à votre Excellence ci-jointe, la liste nominative des individus qu'il s'agit pour le moment d'interner, je dois lui faire observer, par ordre exprès de ma Cour, que cette liste ne saurait être considérée comme complète et définitivement close, et que par conséquent les mesures de réclusion et de surveillance, dont il est parlé ci-dessus, devront être appliquées uniformément à toutes les personnes appartenant à la même catégorie et que nous serons peut-être dans le cas de signaler par la suite à l'attention de la Sublime Porte.

Il est d'ailleurs sousentendu que si quelqu'un des réfugiés compris dans la liste ci-jointe ne se trouvait pas dans la localité indiquée, mais dans quelque autre endroit situé dans l'Empire Ottoman, la Sublime Porte n'en serait pas moins dans l'obligation de le faire arrêter aussitôt et de le traiter d'après le mode convenu.

Persuadé que votre Excellence est animée autant que moi-même du désir d'effacer au plus tôt, toutes les traces du malheureux différend qui a troublé un instant nos rapports naturels avec le Gouvernement du Sultan, je me plais à espérer qu'elle voudra bien m'annoncer le plus tôt possible l'assentiment de la Sublime Porte à tous les points qui précèdent.

Dès que votre Excellence se sera ensuite entendue avec moi sur les garanties à donner à la Cour Impériale, et que la Sublime Porte aura mis la main à l'exécution des mesures arrêtées, je serai heureux de reprendre mes relations diplomatiques avec elle, en supposant toujours que les propositions dont est chargé M. le Ministre de Russie auront aussi trouvé jusque là auprès de la Sublime Porte un accueil qui lui permette de s'associer à ma démarche.

Je saisis, &c.
(Signé) STURMER.

Inclosure 2 in No. 141.

M. de Titoff to Aali Pasha.

Le 31 Octobre / 5 Novembre 1849.

VOTRE Excellence a appris par la correspondance de l'Ambassadeur Extraordinaire de Sa Majesté le Sultan à St. Pétersbourg les résolutions auxquelles s'est arrêté l'Empereur mon auguste maître, fidèle à ses dispositions bienveillantes envers la Turquie, et surtout désireux de répondre à l'appel direct fait par le Sultan à l'amitié sincère et spontanée de son auguste allié.

En conséquence le Ministère Impérial m'a communiqué d'ordre souverain les termes d'un arrangement à l'amiable proposés à son Excellence Fuad Effendi. Ils sont résumés dans la notice ci-jointe que cet Ambassadeur s'est engagé de son côté à mettre sous les yeux de la Sublime Porte, en faisant pressentir que l'adhésion de son Gouvernement à ces mesures ne lui paraissait point douteux.

Les instructions dont je suis muni sur cet objet me prescrivent de soumettre officiellement ces termes d'accommodement au Cabinet Ottoman, et d'annoncer en même tems que je me ferai un devoir empressé de rétablir avec la Sublime Porte mes relations diplomatiques, momentanément interrompues, dès qu'elle aura bien voulu y donner son adhésion.

Heureux d'avoir à m'acquitter de cette communication auprès de votre Excellence, j'attendrai avec un vif intérêt les obligeantes informations sur les résolutions du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté le Sultan à cet égard.

Il m'est doux de penser que ces résolutions seront conformes à l'amicale et légitime attente de ma Cour.

Cet espoir est fondé non seulement sur le langage préalable de l'Ambassadeur de Turquie, mais aussi sur les explications que votre Excellence m'a offert l'occasion de puiser dans mon entrevue privée ce matin avec elle, explications qui, je n'hésite pas de l'avancer, ont fortifié dans mon esprit la consolante certitude que rien d'essentiel ne s'oppose à établir cette entente définitive qu'à St. Pétersbourg on aime à considérer déjà comme une certitude, et dont il me tarde en cette occasion plus qu'à personne de recueillir le fruit immédiat.

Veuillez, &c.
(Signé) TITOFF.

No. 142.

Sir Stratford Canning to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received November 25.)

(No. 334. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Therapia, November 8, 1849.*

NO positive intelligence of the arrival of the French squadron in the Archipelago has yet reached Constantinople.

The French Minister has dispatched one of the gentlemen of his Embassy in a war steamer to find Admiral Parceval. I understand that there is no present intention of inviting the French squadron to the Dardanelles, and that if it has reached Vourla, it will stay there for the present.

I have seen a despatch addressed by General Lamoricière to my French colleague, who put it into my hands to read. Its author takes much credit to himself for having, as he imagines, succeeded in softening Count Nesselrode's feelings towards this country before the Emperor of Russia was prepared to listen to Fuad Effendi, and before Lord Bloomfield's return with your Lordship's instructions of the 6th ultimo in his possession. From the tone and tenour of this despatch it might be supposed that England was playing only a secondary part in the vindication of Turkish independence.

General Lamoricière's despatch has been communicated to Reshid Pasha, who told me that his feelings had been deeply wounded by observing that the Ambassador had listened without remark to Count Nesselrode's assertion that the Turkish Empire had for some time existed only by the sufferance of Russia.

While stating these facts for your Lordship's information, I am willing to believe that, in case of any active operations by sea for the protection of Turkey, the French Admiral would not be slow to act in concert with Her Majesty's squadron.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

No. 143.

Lord Bloomfield to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received November 25.)

(No. 39.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, November 15, 1849.*

I AVAIL myself of the departure of a French messenger to inform your Lordship that the Constantinople mail of the 5th instant arrived here this day, and that I received by this opportunity a despatch from Sir Stratford Canning* of which I herewith inclose a copy, mentioning that the British squadron had been forced by the weather to anchor inside the Dardanelles. I thought it advisable therefore to call upon Count Nessel-

* See Inclosure 2 in No. 121.

rode, and was fortunate in finding his Excellency at the Foreign Department. He told me that M. Titoff had forwarded to the Porte the proposals of the Russian Government for the settlement of the differences which had arisen, but that sufficient time had not elapsed to enable him to report by the return packet the effect which had been produced by this communication on the Turkish Government, and that he would write again in a few days by a special steamer that was awaiting his orders.

The Chancellor spoke only in general terms of the proposals which have been made by M. Titoff, and avoided entering into any discussion of the details, but observed that the whole affair was in the hands of Sir Stratford Canning, and that the result of the negotiations would depend upon him and the advice which he would give to the Porte. His Excellency then adverted to the squadron under Sir William Parker's command having anchored inside the Dardanelles, saying that this was contrary to the Treaty of 1841; and as I expected some such observation from Count Nesselrode, I told him that I was able to give him the most satisfactory explanation on this point, and could assure him that there was no intention on the part of the British Admiral of violating the Treaty. In confirmation of this assertion I read to his Excellency the despatch and inclosure which I had received from Sir Stratford Canning, which proved that the state of the weather was the sole cause of the squadron having anchored inside the straits; and that further I had no doubt whatever but that as soon as the weather moderated the squadron would retire from the outer castles.

His Excellency seemed satisfied with the explanation which I had given him, and as he said he should be glad to communicate it to the Emperor, I left the papers with him, saying however that I begged it to be understood that I did so at his own request, and that if there was any expression in them which was not quite agreeable to His Imperial Majesty, he (the Chancellor) must be responsible for it.

Count Nesselrode then mentioned to me that according to information which he had just received from Paris, orders had been dispatched from Toulon to recall the French squadron, and that he hoped similar instructions would be sent to Sir William Parker. From Count Nesselrode I went to see Fuad Effendi. The Turkish Ambassador told me that the letters which he had received from Aali Pasha were quite satisfactory; that he thought there would be no difficulty in accepting any of the conditions demanded by Russia, except the one regarding the expulsion from the Turkish dominions of those Russians who were under foreign protection; and that the opinion of the Porte upon this point appeared to be that the present moment was not favourable for a negotiation of this nature, and that an answer to this effect would probably be given by his Government. He afterwards said that he thought we should hear in a few days of the diplomatic intercourse between the Russian Legation and the Porte being re-established, for that serious importance could not be attached to the protest which M. Titoff was about to address to the Porte upon the subject of the arrival of the British squadron inside the Dardanelles, as it was probable that the squadron had already left its anchorage when the packet sailed for Odessa.

Fuad Effendi appears to have received from Aali Pasha a long list of complaints against the Russian Legation, which will supply him with ample arguments in support of the just apprehensions entertained by the Porte at the proceedings of M. Titoff, and of the Russian agents in the Principalities, and which when put together will fully justify the Turkish Government in their appeal for the advice and assistance of foreign Powers.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 144.

The Marquis of Normanby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received November 26.)

(No. 556.)

My Lord, *Paris, November 25, 1849.*

AS General de La Hitte announced to me on Thursday evening that after your Lordship's conversation with M. Drouyn de Lhuys he did not think I could any longer ask him to detain the French Government steamer, and that if nothing arrived on Friday morning he proposed to dispatch his new instructions that evening, I felt I could not do otherwise than assent to this plan, requesting him to forward by the same conveyance a despatch which I would write to Sir Stratford Canning, to prevent any possible misconstruction on his Excellency's part as to the absence of all similar instructions addressed to himself.

I have the honour to inclose your Lordship a copy of my despatch to Sir Stratford Canning, which I communicated confidentially to General de la Hitte before sending it.

I have, &c.
(Signed) NORMANBY.

Inclosure in No. 144.

The Marquis of Normanby to Sir Stratford Canning.

Sir, *Paris, November 23, 1849.*

THE French Government are about to send conditional instructions to General Aupick as to the recall of the fleet, leaving it to the discretion of the General, after consulting with your Excellency, to decide when affairs are so surely in a train of satisfactory arrangement at Constantinople as that the two fleets may, without abandoning the objects for which they were both sent to those parts, return to their winter quarters.

I gladly avail myself of the opportunity kindly offered by General de la Hitte to enter thus into communication with your Excellency on this subject, because I am afraid that otherwise you would not be aware, at the time of the arrival of the French Government steamer, that this step has been taken in cordial concert with Her Majesty's Government, and that despatches of a similar character addressed to your Excellency will either follow by the next Marseilles steamer, or be sent within a day or two by an overland messenger. I think it of the more importance that your Excellency should have it in your power to correct any erroneous impressions which might arise at Constantinople from the circumstance of General Aupick alone receiving instructions on this subject, because I am aware that it has been wrongfully asserted, and industriously circulated here, that with respect to the future movements of the fleets there had been established a separation between the policy of the two countries; and I cannot but foresee that should such an idea be current at Constantinople it might exercise an injurious influence on the result of pending negotiations.

The facts of the case are shortly these. Upon the communication of a despatch from St. Petersburgh, stating that the differences with the Porte were upon the point of adjustment, accompanied by an expression of a desire that the French fleets should not therefore longer remain in that quarter, I was requested to consult Her Majesty's Government as to the time of the withdrawal of the two fleets. I received an answer from Lord Palmerston (a copy of which may probably by this time have been forwarded to your Excellency) stating that Her Majesty's Government were equally desirous for the return of the fleet, but suggesting that it would be well to wait at least for the next intelligence from Constanti-

nople. This was in the first instance assented to by the French Government; but two or three days later another proposition was made to me by the President, that instructions should without delay be sent to the two Ambassadors, but only to the effect that they must themselves judge upon the spot according to circumstances, what was the approximate moment for the withdrawal of the fleets. I received an answer from Lord Palmerston assenting to this new mode of action, and promising despatches to pass through Paris to that effect.

A week has since elapsed, during which time I have induced the French Government to keep their vessel waiting at Toulon for these despatches. I am unable to account for the delay, of which I have not yet heard any explanation; but I can easily imagine that it may have been probably caused by the arrival in the meantime of your Excellency's despatches, announcing the important fact that diplomatic relations would not be renewed by Russia until all her demands, many of these novel in their nature, had been arranged. This in my mind would naturally have induced Her Majesty's Government to think there was no extraordinary haste necessary in sending out conditional orders to your Excellency.

As, however, I have heard that M. Drouyn de Lhuys had an interview with Lord Palmerston on Wednesday last, in which his Lordship stated that, provided it was understood by both Governments that the decision upon this point was to be left to the Ambassadors, he did not consider it signified whether the instructions, the same in substance, were identic or simultaneous, I do not think I should be justified in asking the French Government any longer to detain their messenger, and I am satisfied by these means with having done my best to prevent any erroneous impressions either on your Excellency's mind, or in any other quarter at Constantinople; to insure which I trust this simple recital of the facts within my own knowledge will suffice.

I have. &c.
(Signed) NORMANBY.

No. 145.

Viscount Palmerston to the Marquis of Normanby.

(No. 551.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, November 27, 1849.*

I HAVE received your Excellency's despatch No. 553, of the 22nd instant, respecting the delay which has occurred in sending to Sir Stratford Canning instructions to use his discretion in dispensing with the presence of Sir William Parker's squadron near the Dardanelles.

Since the date of your despatch No. 553, your Excellency will have received my private letter of the 19th instant, which was accidentally prevented from being sent to Paris on the 20th, and which will have explained to you the causes of the delay in sending the above-mentioned instructions to Sir Stratford Canning.

I am, &c.
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 146.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received November 27.)

(No. 270.)
My Lord, *Vienna, November 21, 1849.*

SINCE I had the honour yesterday to write to your Lordship, I have made myself acquainted with the demands of the Russian Minister at Constantinople (M. Titoff). I find that the affair is a Russian question, and I see no reason to imagine that the Austrian Government will interfere in it. The Austrian question with the Porte was I presume completely terminated when the official notes were passed between Prince Schwarzenberg and M. Musurus, as reported to your Lordship in my despatch No. 259.

Your Lordship is perfectly aware that the position taken up by Her Majesty's fleet is much lower down than the Dardanelles, properly so called, and is one where all vessels take refuge in bad weather.

I have, &c.
(Signed) PONSONBY.

No. 147.

Baron Brunnow to Viscount Palmerston.

November, 1849.

[Sending despatch to Count Nesselrode, giving an account of a conversation with Lord Palmerston respecting entrance of British squadron within the outer castles of the Dardanelles.]

No. 148.

Viscount Palmerston to Sir Stratford Canning.

(No. 306.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, November 30, 1849.*

I HAVE to observe to your Excellency that no doubt there is much force in the arguments which in your despatch No. 330 of the 7th instant, you state as reasons why the anchorage immediately within the outer castles of the Dardanelles might be considered as not included in the prohibition contained in the First Article of the Treaty of July 1841; but nevertheless the natural and most obvious construction of the Treaty would make the other way. The Straits or the Détroit of the Dardanelles must, geographically considered, be deemed to be the narrow passage between the Mediterranean and the Sea of Marmora; and it is difficult to draw any such substantial distinction between different portions of that passage with reference to their relative breadth, as to be able satisfactorily to affirm that any portion of that passage can justly be excluded from the scope of the expression "the Straits, or the Détroit of the Dardanelles." In any matter which bears on the construction of a treaty it is best to be, if possible, on the safe side, and not to run matters so near as to be obliged to contend for a disputable interpretation. But in the present case there is a strong motive of interest which ought to induce Great Britain to observe very scrupulously the engagements of this Treaty, for the example of Great Britain in disregarding the Treaty would readily be followed by Russia; and from the relative positions of the cruizing grounds of their respective fleets, a Russian squadron would have occasion to enter the Bosphorus far oftener than a British squadron would have to enter the Dardanelles, and while the British squadron entering the Dardanelles would still not be in a position to produce any serious moral effect at Constantinople, the Russian squadron entering the Bosphorus would directly and imminently threaten the Turkish capital.

This last-mentioned consideration seems to answer the reasoning which led your Excellency to think that the presence of the British squadron within the outer castles would render it much more efficacious than if it had remained at Besika Bay. For from that inner anchorage, as well as from Besika Bay, it could probably not have reached Constantinople as soon as a Russian squadron would have run down into the Bosphorus, and have placed itself abreast of Constantinople; but the knowledge that a British squadron was close to the Dardanelles, and could in a short time make its appearance in the Bosphorus, would naturally act as an effectual restraint to prevent the Russian squadron from making any such attack; and this restraining effect would be produced

by the British squadron from Besika Bay, or from any other place in the neighbourhood of the Dardanelles, just as well as from the anchorage within the outer castles.

I am, &c.
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 149.

Viscount Palmerston Sir Stratford Canning.

(No. 307.)

Foreign Office, November 30, 1849.

Sir,

YOUR Excellency's despatches of the 7th and 8th instant, giving an account of the then state of the negotiations between the Porte on the one hand, and the Russian and Austrian Governments on the other, have been received at this office; and although it seems probable that before your Excellency can receive this present despatch, the questions which were then pending between the negotiating parties will have been settled, yet I think it right to let you know the opinion of Her Majesty's Government upon the matters in question, and upon the course which they think it would be advisable for the Porte to take thereupon.

The general principles upon which it appears to Her Majesty's Government that the Porte ought to take its stand in the circumstances in which Turkey is placed, are that it should fulfil faithfully all its treaty obligations, and should do moreover whatever the general duties of good neighbourhood require, even though not prescribed by treaty, provided always that nothing shall be required which is inconsistent with the honour and dignity and independence of the Sultan.

Now applying these general principles to the specific demands which have in the last instance been made by the Imperial Governments, the following seems to be the conclusion to which those principles would lead.

Russia makes three demands: first, that all Poles who are subjects of the Emperor of Russia, whether they have or have not passports from any other Government, shall be expelled from the Turkish territory. Secondly, that the Porte shall come to an understanding with foreign Powers to the effect that any Polish subjects of the Emperor of Russia who have been naturalized in another country without the consent of the Emperor, may be expelled from Turkey if they should reappear there, and should therein engage in revolutionary proceedings against Russia. Thirdly, that the refugees whose surrender had been demanded by Russia, and who have embraced the Mahometan religion, should be confined at Diarbekir.

Now with regard to the first demand, it may be said that the Treaty of Kainardji, in virtue of which the demand for expulsion is made, does not stipulate any limitation of time after the expiration of which the demands which that Treaty authorizes, shall no longer be made; and, consequently, though it may seem hard to require that Poles who have taken no part in recent events, and who have for many years been domiciled in Turkey, should now be expelled, yet if the Russian Government can show that such persons come within the category of the persons described in the Treaty, and especially if it can show that it has good ground for supposing that such persons have been engaged in practices tending to disturb the internal tranquillity of Russia, that demand is one which the Porte could not well refuse to comply with, as far as regards the relations between Turkey and Russia. But as the words of this demand imply that some of the Poles whose expulsion is thus asked for have passports from foreign Governments, some communication on this matter might probably be necessary between the Porte and the Government by which such passports have been given.

With regard to the second demand, it is one the entire compliance with which does not depend upon the Porte alone, and the Turkish

Government might either engage to enter into the communications therein mentioned with foreign Governments, explaining to Russia that it must rest with such foreign Governments to give or to withhold their consent to the specified arrangement, or the Porte might suggest that the Russian Government should itself make application to the foreign Powers concerned.

With regard to the third demand, it is to be observed that it is not founded on the stipulations of the treaties between Russia and the Porte, and that on the contrary it is at variance with those treaties; for the Treaty of Kainardji, which entitles each of the two Governments to demand the expulsion or surrender of such of their rebellious subjects as may take refuge in the territory of the other, distinctly exempts from the scope of such demands Turkish subjects who in Russia may become Christians, and Russian subjects who in Turkey may become Mahometans.

Moreover Christians who in Turkey embrace the Mahometan faith become thereby subjects of the Sultan, and Her Majesty's Government do not know whether the Sultan could deem himself justified in imprisoning any of his subjects at the mere request of a foreign Power, and without those subjects having committed any offence within the Turkish dominions, or against the Turkish laws. The duties of good neighbourhood would indeed require that the Sultan should take care that these newly acquired subjects should not, any more than any of his natural-born subjects, make any attempts to disturb the tranquillity of neighbouring and friendly States; and he would no doubt be able to make such arrangements as to the places of their residence as would prevent there being any just ground for apprehension on this score on the part of the Government of Russia.

There seems therefore in these last made Russian demands little if anything that is not susceptible of easy arrangement by friendly communication between the two Governments.

The last Austrian demand is more simple, but at the same time more difficult of arrangement. The Austrian Government requires that all the refugees of whom it has already given in a list, amounting to about forty, and that all those of whom it may hereafter give other lists, should be sent to some suitable place in the interior of the Turkish dominions to be there placed under "surveillance," so that it should be impossible for them henceforward to undertake anything against legal order in the Austrian States; and that this arrangement should not cease without the joint consent of the two Governments.

Upon this it is to be observed that such a demand is not borne out by the treaties between Austria and the Porte, and that the engagement which it requires the Turkish Government to take would place the Sultan in some respects in a position unbecoming an independent Sovereign.

The Austrian Government relinquishes indeed its demand that the Sultan should by the surrender of the Hungarian refugees become accessory to consigning to the fate that would have awaited them, men who have committed no offence against his authority or against the laws of his country, and who before entering his territory were assured by his officers that they would enjoy therein the protection which the laws of hospitality prescribe. But the Austrian Government now requires that the Sultan should constitute himself the keeper of state offenders against the Austrian Government; that he should make himself responsible to Austria for the exact and vigilant performance of his task in that capacity, and that he should not be at liberty to cease to perform these functions without the consent of the Austrian Government.

It is for the Turkish Government to judge how far it would have any effectual means of carrying into effect such an arrangement, and they best know how far the promises made in their behalf to the Hungarian refugees, before those refugees entered the Turkish territory, would be broken by such an engagement towards the Austrian Government. But it is manifest that such an engagement would impose upon the Sultan unbecoming obligations, which neither the stipulations of treaties nor international amity require him to undertake.

That which the spirit of his treaty engagements and the general principles of international amity bind the Sultan to do, is to prevent any part of his territory from being used by any persons, whether his own

subjects or foreigners, for the purpose of carrying on machinations directed against the internal tranquillity of any friendly State.

But this duty the Sultan would perform more effectually by sending out of his territory foreigners suspected of such practices, than by retaining such persons within his territory, however guarded or watched they might be; and therefore it is obvious that if the Sultan should compel all the Hungarian refugees (excepting of course those who may have become Mahometans) to leave the Turkish dominions, he would be doing the utmost that could justly be asked of him in order to secure the Austrian States from any danger of disturbance originating from his own dominions.

It seems possible, however, according to the accounts which Her Majesty's Government have received, that the Turkish Government may have fettered itself on this score by some insufficiently considered communications. If the faith of the Sultan has been pledged, Her Majesty's Government of course could not counsel a breach of a positive engagement, however objectionable such engagement might be; but if such has unfortunately been the case, the Turkish Government ought to lose no time in entering into friendly communication with the Government of Austria, with a view to persuade that Government to accept, in the stead of so objectionable an arrangement, a measure of the same kind as that with which Russia has been contented, namely, the expulsion of the Hungarian refugees.

In addition to the arguments in favour of such a proposal, which are founded upon considerations more peculiarly relating to Turkey, it might well be urged that the engagement proposed by Austria, requiring as it does the continued execution within the interior of Turkey of measures of vigilant police, of the satisfactory nature of which the Austrian Government is to be entitled to judge, must necessarily be pregnant with causes of bickering and of disagreement between the two Governments. Examples are not wanting to show how impossible it is even in well-organized countries to prevent the escape of single individuals confined within the walls of a prison, and guarded by watchful keepers; but how much more difficult would it be, in a country so imperfectly organized as Turkey, for the Government to make any arrangements by which it should be rendered impossible that out of forty, fifty, or more persons kept as prisoners at large in a town of any kind, some should not from time to time escape. Then would come remonstrance and reproaches on the one hand, and complaints on the other hand of having been saddled with impracticable obligations; and such discussions would tend to render less secure than they ought to be, the friendly relations between Austria and Turkey.

I am, &c.
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 150.

Viscount Palmerston to Viscount Ponsonby.

(No. 182.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, November 30, 1849.*

I HEREWITH transmit to your Excellency for your information, copies of instructions which I have addressed to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople; and I have to instruct your Excellency to support any representations which the Turkish Minister at Vienna may be instructed to make to the Austrian Government in accordance with the opinions of Her Majesty's Government as expressed in my despatch to Sir Stratford Canning, No. 307.

I am, &c.
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 151.

Baron Brunnow to Viscount Palmerston.

November 30, 1849.

[Inquiry whether orders have been sent to Sir William Parker to remove his squadron from within the outer castles of the Dardanelles.]

No. 152.

Lord Bloomfield to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received December 3.)

(No. 41.)
My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, November 21, 1849.*

THE newspapers having lately mentioned that the Turkish troops had left Bucharest, I inquired yesterday of Count Nesselrode if this report was true, and if so, whether we might not expect to hear of a similar movement of the Russian forces from the Danubian Principalities.

The Chancellor replied that the retreat of the Turkish troops had, he believed, taken place as a matter of precaution on the part of Omer Pasha, and was dictated by the apprehension of a possible collision with the Russians in the event of the arrangement of the differences which had arisen respecting the Polish refugees having been seriously retarded; and that it had not been done with any previous concert between the two Powers.

His Excellency added that as I had put this question to him, he would inform me that he nevertheless hoped a reduction in the Russian occupying force would soon take place, for that he had already directed M. Titoff, as soon as his diplomatic intercourse with the Porte was re-established, to discuss the subject with the Ottoman Government, in order to carry out the arrangements which had been stipulated by the Act relative to the Principalities, signed at Balta Liman on the 1st of May last.

I am not able to discover the exact amount of the Russian forces at present in the Danubian Principalities; but my French colleague, with whom I have lately had some conversation on the subject, has informed me that he believes it to amount to 36,000 men, whereas he calculates the force under Omer Pasha to be only 16,000 men.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 153.

Lord Bloomfield to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received December 3.)

(No. 42.)
My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, November 21, 1849.*

GENERAL DE LAMORICIERE has mentioned to me confidentially that in a short conversation which he had a few days ago with the Emperor at a parade, His Imperial Majesty, after alluding to the news which had just arrived from Paris of orders having been sent to recall the French fleet which had sailed for the Dardanelles, used some unmeasured expressions on this subject, saying that he was surprised to find France "à la remorque de l'Angleterre." The Emperor had scarcely uttered these words when he galloped down the line, and the General was unable at the time to make any reply. He had however an opportunity of doing so soon afterwards, when His Imperial Majesty received the French Minister's remonstrances with great good humour, observing at the close of them that England and France had been very unjust towards him in supposing that he entertained hostile designs against Turkey, for he had

had no more intention of going to Constantinople upon the present occasion than he had at the time he ordered troops to the assistance of the Sultan when his capital was menaced by the Pasha of Egypt.

Whilst making this report to your Lordship it may not be out of place for me to allude to the impression which is fixed in the mind of every Russian, that Constantinople must eventually be theirs; that the time however has not yet arrived for a further advance to the south, because too much remains to be done to consolidate the home interests of the empire before this important addition can or ought to be effected, and in fact that it would be madness to attempt it at the present moment.

I am aware that I can state nothing new as to the traditional policy of Russia with respect to Turkey; but I have lately been endeavouring to collect the opinions of persons of all classes on this subject, and the result of my search is a confirmation of the opinion established on this point, and the belief that there will not be any serious attempt at annexation until the period arrives when Russia shall have completely gained over to her interests the whole Christian population of Turkey; and I beg to add that I have no doubt that all her efforts will now be mainly directed to this object. I am the less disposed to believe that Russia is in any hurry to effect her schemes, because she must be desirous to avoid giving unnecessary offence to foreign Powers by exciting their alarms as to the independence of Turkey; and such are the feelings of the Russian public on this point that the Government is generally blamed for the impetuosity of their late acts at Constantinople.

The feelings of the Emperor, the Government, and the educated portion of the nation are doubtless unanimous on this matter. Russian policy however has happily received a serious and important check by the late energetic measures of Her Majesty's Government; but we must be prepared to see the Government redoubling their efforts, and exerting every means in their power to retrieve their lost position at Constantinople; and I apprehend that we shall further find them directing these efforts towards retarding the development of civilization in the Turkish Empire, which is there making such rapid progress, and which they feel is the most serious barrier to the accomplishment of their gigantic projects.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 154.

Baron Koller to Viscount Palmerston.

Chandos House, le 4 Décembre, 1849.

LE Soussigné, Chargé d'Affaires de Sa Majesté Impériale et Royale Apostolique, a reçu de son Gouvernement l'ordre de faire à son Excellence M. le Vicomte Palmerston, Principal Secrétaire d'Etat pour le département des Affaires Etrangères de Sa Majesté la Reine du Royaume Uni de la Grande Bretagne et d'Irlande, la communication suivante.

Le Gouvernement de l'Empereur a été informé par des rapports officiels de Constantinople, qu'une escadre Anglaise, composée de douze bâtimens de guerre, et commandée par l'Amiral Parker, était entrée le 1er du mois passé dans le Détroit des Dardanelles, en dépassant les premiers châteaux situés à l'embouchure du détroit, et avait jeté l'ancre dans la Baie des Barbiers, près des vieux châteaux des Dardanelles.

Avant de se livrer à l'appréciation de ce fait, le Gouvernement Impérial a cru devoir en attendre la confirmation, puisque l'ancrage de la flotte Anglaise dans le Détroit des Dardanelles était trop en opposition, soit avec les assurances données par M. le Vicomte de Palmerston au Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg à l'égard des mouvemens prescrits à l'Amiral Parker, soit avec les traités existans, pour pouvoir légèrement ajouter foi aux premières nouvelles arrivées de Constantinople. Des rapports plus récens n'ont cependant point laissé de doute sur la réalité du fait.

Par l'Article I du Traité conclu à Londres le 13 Juillet, 1841, entre le

Gouvernement Ottoman, d'une part, et l'Autriche, la France, l'Angleterre, la Prusse et la Russie, de l'autre, le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique s'est engagé, conjointement avec les autres Puissances co-signataires, à respecter la détermination du Sultan de n'admettre aucun bâtiment de guerre étranger dans les Détroits des Dardanelles et du Bosphore, tant que la Porte se trouve en paix.

A l'époque où la flotte Anglaise est entrée dans les Dardanelles la Porte était en paix. Le différend survenu entre elle et les deux Cours Impériales était en pleine voie d'arrangement après l'accueil favorable fait aux représentations que Sa Hautesse le Sultan avait adressées immédiatement à Leurs Majestés les Empereurs d'Autriche et de Russie. D'ailleurs aucune menace de guerre n'avait été proférée dans le cours des explications échangées entre les parties contendantes, et pas le moindre mouvement de forces de terre ou de mer, qui eût pu faire supposer des intentions hostiles de la part des Cours Impériales n'avait eu lieu.

Ceci posé, il s'ensuit que l'entrée de l'escadre Anglaise dans les Dardanelles constitue une infraction évidente du Traité du 13 Juillet, 1841, qui a eu principalement pour but de donner à Sa Hautesse le Sultan une preuve manifeste du respect que les Puissances signataires portent à l'inviolabilité de ses droits souverains, ainsi que de leur désir sincère de voir se consolider le repos de son empire.

La gravité de ces intérêts, que l'apparition de l'escadre Anglaise dans le Détroit des Dardanelles est de nature à compromettre, impose au Gouvernement de l'Empereur le devoir de se prémunir, en sa qualité de co-signataire du Traité de Londres du 13 Juillet, 1841, contre le fait ci-dessus mentionné, et de protester solennellement contre les conséquences qui pourraient en être tirées.

En s'acquittant des ordres de son Gouvernement, le Soussigné, &c.
(Signé) A. v. KOLLER.

Inclosure 1 in No. 154.

Prince Schwarzenberg to Baron Koller.

Vienne, le 27 Novembre, 1849.

M. le Baron,

L'ENTREE dans les Dardanelles de l'escadre Anglaise aux ordres de Sir W. Parker, constitue à nos yeux une violation du Traité de Londres du 13 Juillet, 1841. Nous nous croyons en droit comme en devoir de protester contre cette violation. Vous êtes chargé, Monsieur le Baron, de vous acquitter de cette tâche, en remettant à M. le Principal Secrétaire d'Etat de Sa Majesté Britannique, la note ci-annexée en projet.

De quelque côté que nous envisagions l'apparition aux Dardanelles de la flotte Anglaise, elle ne nous offre que des sujets de regret.

Pour ce qui est d'abord de l'opportunité de la mesure, il me suffira, Monsieur le Baron, de vous faire observer, qu'elle a eu pour effet immédiat de retarder la solution définitive de la question pendante entre la Porte et les Cours Impériales, lorsqu'elle était déjà au moment d'être réglée à la satisfaction mutuelle. Rien de plus naturel que les hésitations et les doutes qui se sont emparés de l'esprit des Représentans d'Autriche et de la Russie en face d'un événement que les explications amicales offertes par Lord Palmerston sur le but et la nature des mouvemens de l'escadre Britannique, n'étaient nullement propres à faire prévoir. Cet incident devait les offusquer d'autant plus, qu'il était attentatoire au texte d'un traité solennel dont leurs Gouvernemens sont co-signataires; et qu'enfin il eut pu être interprété comme une menace dirigée contre ces Gouvernemens.

Envisagée aux points de vue du droit international et de la politique générale, la question se présente à nos yeux de la manière suivante.

Interpellé par les Représentans d'Autriche et de Russie, Aali Pacha, a décidément nié que la Porte eût autorisé l'entrée dans les Dardanelles de l'escadre Anglaise. Eût-elle consenti à cette mesure, la Porte, selon nous, aurait à son tour porté atteinte au Traité du 13 Juillet, 1841, puisque par cette transaction elle a formellement renoncé au droit d'admettre dans les

détroits en temps de paix des bâtimens de guerre étrangers, en ne se réservant que la faculté de délivrer des firmans de passage aux bâtimens légers sous pavillon de guerre, qu'il est d'usage d'employer au service des Légations des Puissances amies. Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, il est vrai, a essayé d'excuser l'apparition de l'escadre Anglaise, en prétendant qu'il était permis à tous les bâtimens étrangers de pénétrer jusqu'à l'endroit où elle avait mouillé en-deçà des premiers châteaux des Dardanelles.

Cette assertion se trouve cependant démentie par les principes que la Porte elle-même a mis autrefois en avant dans de nombreuses occasions. Je n'en veux pour preuve que la note ci-jointe en traduction que la Porte adressa à l'Internonciature Impériale à la date du 23 Février, 1845. Il ressort de cette pièce que la Porte a de tout temps considéré les Détroits du Bosphore et des Dardanelles comme devant être fermés dès leur embouchure aux bâtimens de guerre étrangers. Ce n'est pas tout. La Porte est allée jusqu'à insister pour que les bâtimens marchands n'entrassent point de nuit dans les goulets des détroits, parce que dans l'obscurité, il était impossible de distinguer les bâtimens marchands d'avec les bâtimens de guerre. Les Légations étrangères ayant toutefois représenté à la Porte que les bâtimens marchands, s'ils étaient obligés à rester pendant la nuit en pleine mer au-delà des premiers châteaux qui défendent l'entrée de l'un et de l'autre détroit, seraient exposés à des dangers imminens, surtout par la mauvaise saison, le Gouvernement Ottoman, cédant à ces représentations, finit par permettre que les bâtimens marchands pourraient même de nuit pénétrer d'un côté jusque dans le port de Buyukdéré dans le Détroit du Bosphore, et de l'autre côté jusque dans la baie dite des Barbiers, près des vieux châteaux des Dardanelles, où l'escadre de Sir W. Parker a mouillé. En supposant même que la Porte, contrairement aux maximes qu'elle a toujours soutenues, consentît maintenant à accorder à une escadre, forte de douze bâtimens de guerre, des facilités qu'elle n'avait jusqu'ici concédées qu'à la marine marchande, il faudrait encore examiner si le Gouvernement Ottoman par cet acte de condescendance envers une des Puisances co-signataires du Traité du 13 Juillet, 1841, ne contracterait pas l'obligation de faire, le cas échéant, la même concession aux autres Puissances co-signataires. Nul doute que dans cette hypothèse le Traité ne reçut une atteinte des plus graves, puisqu'il n'admet aucune distinction entre les nouveaux et les vieux châteaux des Dardanelles, et établit, au contraire, comme règle immuable, la fermeture du détroit tout entier. Or, il est évident que le Détroit des Dardanelles commence là où se trouvent les premiers châteaux destinés à en défendre l'entrée.

Qu'on réfléchisse d'ailleurs un instant aux conséquences qu'entraînerait l'admission de l'interprétation par laquelle on a essayé d'assimiler les bâtimens de guerre aux bâtimens marchands quant aux priviléges dont jouissent ceux-ci pour le passage des détroits. Si, d'un côté, il était permis aux bâtimens de guerre venant de la Méditerranée de s'avancer dans le Détroit des Dardanelles jusque dans la Baie des Barbiers, où doivent s'arrêter nuitamment les bâtimens marchands, il serait difficile, de l'autre côté, d'empêcher les bâtimens de guerre venant de la Mer Noire, de pénétrer à leur tour dans le Détroit du Bosphore jusqu'au port de Buyukdéré, destiné également à l'ancrage nocturne des bâtimens marchands. N'est-il pas évident que de la sorte le Traité du 13 Juillet, 1841, serait virtuellement annullé, et que les garanties qu'il avait pour objet d'offrir à l'indépendance et à l'intégrité de l'Empire Ottoman et par là à la conservation de la paix générale, deviendraient tout-à-fait illusoires?

Pénétrés de la gravité de ces considérations, auxquelles se rattachent des intérêts qui sont pour l'Empire d'Autriche d'une importance vitale, nous aurions cru manquer à nos devoirs en sanctionnant pour ainsi dire par notre silence, un fait aussi regrettable que l'est l'entrée dans les Dardanelles de l'escadre de Sa Majesté Britannique.

Je vous charge, Monsieur le Baron, de donner lecture et copie de cette dépêche à Monsieur le Principal Secrétaire d'Etat de Sa Majesté Britannique.

Recevez, &c.
(Signé) F. SCHWARZENBERG.

Inclosure 2 in No. 151.

Mémorandum from the Porte to the Internuncio.

(Traduzione.) *Sefer*, 1261. (23 *Febbrajo*, 1845.)

COME è pur noto all' Eccellenza vostra fù proibito, gia lungo tempo fà, ai bastimenti di guerra di qualunque Corte straniera di entrare ne' Dardanelli ossia nel Bosforo, e questo vecchio divieto fù confermato di nuovo nel Trattato conchiuto fra la Sublima Porta e le Cinque Grandi Potenze ai dì 19 Regeb dell' anno 1257. Benchè sia noto dunque a tutto il mondo che se nulladimeno un tal bastimento, grande o piccolo, appartenente a qualsiasi Corte, mostrasse voglia di entrare in uno degli stretti summentovati, verebbe primo avvisato del divieto; se non ascoltasse, verrebbero tirati uno a due colpi di canoni senza palle, e se anche questo non producesse verun effetto, si prenderebbero, avendo il bastimento agito contro il regolamento ed i trattati, le misure necessarie ad impedire l'entrata per mezzo di colpi di canoni carricati a palle; benchè poi sia noto che è proibito anche ai bastimenti mercantili delle amiche Corti ed a quei della Sublima Porta stessa di passar il Bosforo ed i Dardanelli di notte: ci venne pure notificato dagli impiegati di quelle parti: "Cercar di tempo in tempo qualche bastimento mercantile, senza riguardo al suddetto regolamento, di entrar negli stretti, e per quanti colpi di canoni che essi mostrino di valer impedire l'entrata di esso, non riuscirvi punto, poichè si sa che sono colpi poco nonvoli. Questo vecchio divieto contro i bastimenti mercantili non essendo necessario che perchè di notte non si può distinguere se sia un bastimento mercantile oppure uno di guerra, e non essendosi finora trattato di realmente danneggiar i bastimenti mercantili che entrano il tal guisa, la maggiore parti de' bastimenti mercantili attribuendo il non tirar a palla ad una specie di tacito permesso, cercare d'infrangere il regolamento in discorso."

In conseguenza di ciò è stato fermamente deciso di mantener in vigore il divieto assoluto più volte citato, il quale è un' antica massima governiale della Porta confermato ultimamente nel Trattato conchiuso colle Cinque Potenze unite. Tal divieto sarà seriamente eseguito contra qualunque bastimento che intrapredesse di passar il Bosforo oppure il Dardanelli dopo il tramontar del sole, in modo che a commineiar dal mese di Marzo di quest' anno 1261 (1845), sarà ancora fissato un termine di 3 mesi; spirato il quale gli impiegati di quelle parti receveranno l'ordine di avvisare del divieto i bastimenti che persistessero nel volere entrare nei summentovati stretti, se non ascoltassero di tirar uno o due colpi di canoni senza palle, e se anche a questo non badassero, di prendere le misure necessarie perchè venga impedita l'entrata per mezzo di colpi di canoni caricati a palle. Abbiamo quindi diretto questa memoria ufficiale all' Eccellenza vostra per pregarla di compiacersi sin da ora far significare quanto sopra ai capitani de' bastimenti Austriaci, dar loro gli ordini necessari ed informarli parimente che qualora dall' esecuzione della piuddetta misura emergesse qualche danno a qualcuno, egli non potrà lagnarsi ne domandarne giustizia.

No. 155.

Sir Stratford Canning to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received December 6.*)

(No. 336.)

My Lord, *Therapia, November 10, 1845.*

I AVAIL myself of the present opportunity to transmit to your Lordship herewith a copy of Sir William Parker's despatch in reply to mine of the 4th instant.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

Inclosure in No. 155.

Vice-Admiral Sir W. Parker to Sir Stratford Canning.

"Queen," off Barbers' Point, November 7, 1849.

Sir,

I HAVE had the honour to receive this day your Excellency's letter of the 4th instant, and learn with sincere satisfaction that the unreasonable demands of the Imperial Courts, which threatened Turkey with the calamity of a war that would have probably involved the greater part of Europe in its results, has happily been abandoned with every prospect of the difference with the Porte being honourably adjusted.

It is also a source of high gratification to me that the arrival of Her Majesty's squadron in this vicinity has produced any beneficial effect.

The ships are now nearly replenished with water, and a few days would complete the repair of the injuries which one or two sustained from accidental disasters, but the whole shall be ready to quit this anchorage at the shortest notice that may be wished by the Porte, or held desirable by your Excellency.

I had promised myself the honour and pleasure of paying my personal respects to your Excellency by one of the steamers, had the period of our stay permitted it, but this arrangement will be relinquished, if our immediate departure is expedient.

I would not willingly anchor the line-of-battle ships beyond a few days in a position so unsheltered as Besika Bay at this season; but I believe they would be secure at Mosconissi, or certainly at Vourla (if the latter is not occupied by the French squadron), until I am informed by your Excellency that we can finally retire without prejudice to the public interests.

I have, &c.

(Signed) W. PARKER.

No. 156.

Sir Stratford Canning to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received December 6.*)

(No. 338.)

Therapia, November 10, 1849.

My Lord,

I HAVE reason to believe that the Porte is preparing notes in reply to those presented respectively by M. de Titoff and Count Stürmer on the subject of refugees, which, though expressing a general adoption of the terms of adjustment transmitted from St. Petersburgh and Vienna, will contain amendments as to certain objectionable points indicated to your Lordship in my preceding correspondence. Of these amendments the most important is that which would make the detention of the Hungarian refugees in Turkey to depend, not upon the specific consent of Austria to their complete enlargement, but upon a fair judgment of the cessation of all danger likely to accrue to that Power from the revolutionary intrigues of Kossuth and his colleagues, in consequence of a more complete and solid re-establishment of tranquillity in Hungary and Transylvania. According to present appearances no other objection, though others will be made, is likely to occasion any serious difficulty or protracted delay; and I am unwilling to believe that the Cabinet of Vienna would be so unreasonable as to insist upon a security already abandoned by name, no less discreditable and embarrassing to the Porte than unnecessary for the permanent repose of the Austrian Empire.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

No. 157.

Baron Brunnow to Viscount Palmerston.

Londres, le $\frac{25 \text{ Novembre}}{7 \text{ Décembre}}$ 1849.

LE Soussigné, &c., par une note en date du $\frac{18}{30}$ Novembre, a eu l'honneur d'inviter M. le Vicomte Palmerston, &c., à vouloir bien lui faire connaître si l'ordre de retirer l'escadre de l'Amiral Parker du Détroit des Dardanelles, a déjà été expédié, afin que la Cour Impériale de Russie puisse se convaincre que les engagemens mutuels résultant de la Convention du $\frac{1}{13}$ Juillet, 1841, continuent à recevoir leur pleine et entière exécution.

En réitérant aujourd'hui cette demande, le Soussigné se fait un devoir d'y ajouter les considérations suivantes, qu'il se permet de signaler à l'attention séreuse du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique.

Il commencera d'abord par lui rappeler les motifs de haute prévoyance qui ont dicté la Convention du $\frac{1}{13}$ Juillet, 1841. Ils ont eu deux objets en vue. Le premier a été d'offrir à l'Europe une garantie de la conservation de la paix générale, en constatant l'union et l'accord des Cinq Grandes Puissances; le second a été de donner à l'indépendance et au repos de l'Empire Ottoman un gage nouveau, en plaçant sous la sauvegarde d'une transaction Européenne le respect dû à l'ancienne règle de cet empire, en vertu de laquelle les Détroits du Bosphore et des Dardanelles sont fermés aux bâtimens de guerre étrangers, tant que la Porte se trouve en paix.

Sur la base de ces principes l'Article I de la Convention de 1841 a fondé les déclarations solennelles ci-après:

"D'une part, Sa Hautesse le Sultan a déclaré sa ferme résolution de maintenir à l'avenir le principe invariablement établi comme ancienne règle de son empire, en vertu duquel il a été de tous tems défendu aux bâtimens de guerre des Puissances étrangères d'entrer dans les Détroits des Dardanelles et du Bosphore, et que, tant que la Porte se trouve en paix, Sa Hautesse n'admettra aucun bâtiment de guerre étranger dans les dits détroits.

"De l'autre, les Cinq Grandes Puissances se sont engagées à respecter cette détermination du Sultan et à se conformer au principe ci-dessus énoncé."

"Par l'Article II, le Sultan s'est réservé, comme par le passé, de délivrer des firmans de passage aux bâtimens légers sous pavillon de guerre, lesquels seront employés, comme il est d'usage, au service des Légations des Puissances amies."

Il suffit de citer les stipulations ci-dessus pour se persuader que les Hautes Parties Contractantes n'ont certainement pas prévu qu'un jour le commandant d'une escadre, pour se mettre à couvert du mauvais tems, allât chercher un refuge dans le Détroit des Dardanelles, que la Convention de 1841 déclarait fermé.

Un cas de détresse maritime mérite assurément de justes égards. Cependant dans la circonstance actuelle l'Archipel n'avait-il pas d'autres rades pour lieu d'abri? La réputation de l'Amiral Sir W. Parker n'est-elle pas trop bien établie pour qu'on puisse douter de l'habileté avec laquelle il aurait pu choisir un autre ancrage tout aussi sûr que celui qu'il a cherché sous le château des Dardanelles.

Mais, dira-t-on, en choisissant ce mouillage, le commandant de l'escadre Anglaise n'a fait que se prévaloir d'un règlement du Gouvernement Turc, qui autorise les navires marchands à attendre dans la Baie des Barbiers, entre le premier et le second château des Dardanelles, l'expédition des firmans de passage qui leur permettent de traverser le canal.

Ici le Soussigné se félicite de rendre à M. le Vicomte Palmerston la justice de dire que c'est ce Ministre qui a été le premier à réfuter l'argument qui vient d'être allégué. En effet, il n'a point hésité à reconnaître que le règlement Turc, ci-dessus mentionné, ne s'applique qu'aux navires marchands et aux bâtimens légers sous pavillon de guerre, qui peuvent obtenir la permission de traverser le canal, mais qu'il ne saurait s'étendre aux vaisseaux de guerre de haut bord, auxquels le passage du détroit reste expressément interdit.

Cette distinction, que M. le Vicomte Palmerston a établie spontanément dans son entrevue à Broadlands avec le Ministre de Russie, est d'une justesse trop évidente pour qu'elle ait besoin de commentaire.

Il en est de même d'une autre réflexion qu'on pourrait faire valoir en faveur de l'Amiral Parker. Il n'a pas eu l'intention, dira-t-on, d'enfreindre le principe de la fermeture des détroits. Il s'est arrêté à l'entrée du détroit, sans le dépasser.

Cette allégation, il faut le dire, n'aurait d'autre portée que celle d'affirmer que l'Amiral Parker a entrepris de toucher, sans les enfreindre, jusqu'aux dernières limites posées par la sagesse des Cabinets de l'Europe dans l'intérêt commun de la conservation du repos général.

Or, dans le monde politique les questions graves se pésent dans la balance du bon sens, qui, entre Cabinets sincèrement amis de la paix, n'est autre que celle de la bonne foi.

A ce point de vue, il est hors de doute que l'ancrage choisi par l'Amiral Parker n'ait été de sa part la preuve d'un défaut de jugement que le Soussigné a cru qualifier avec autant de ménagement que possible, lorsqu'il lui a donné le nom d'une méprise.

Comme signataire de la Convention du 13 Juillet, 1841, il s'est cru en devoir d'émettre cette opinion. Mais, en l'énonçant, il s'est cru appelé, en même temps à représenter sérieusement au Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique qu'il était temps de mettre fin à la station choisie par le commandant de l'escadre Anglaise dans une baie que M. le Vicomte Palmerston regarde lui-même comme interdite aux vaisseaux de guerre étrangers.

Dans la persuasion que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique ne saurait vouloir que sa flotte restât à l'ancre dans un détroit que la Convention de 1841 a déclaré fermé, le Soussigné a prié M. le Vicomte Palmerston de vouloir bien lui faire connaître, pour l'information de sa Cour, si l'ordre avait été donné de retirer du Détroit des Dardanelles l'escadre de l'Amiral Parker.

En renouvelant aujourd'hui cette demande, il a l'honneur d'y joindre une dernière observation.

Le Cour Impériale de Russie, comme l'une des Hautes Parties Contractantes de la Convention de 1841, a besoin de savoir au juste quelle est l'interprétation que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique donne à cet acte.

Si la dite Convention peut être comprise de manière à ce que des vaisseaux de guerre étrangers soient admis à stationner en-dedans du Détroit des Dardanelles, dans la baie où les navires marchands attendent les firmans de passage, il en résulterait qu'à l'entrée du Bosphore la même faculté resterait assurée aux bâtimens de guerre venant de la Mer Noire. L'un et l'autre des deux détroits, dans les mêmes limites, doivent rester fermés ou ouverts. En conséquence le Soussigné serait en devoir de prendre éventuellement ses réserves, afin de mettre le Gouvernement Impérial en mesure, s'il en reconnaissait le besoin, d'user de la même faculté dont l'Amiral Parker a invoqué le droit et donné l'exemple.

Si, au contraire, le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique adhère invariablement au principe de la fermeture absolue des détroits, ainsi que la Convention du 13 Juillet l'a strictement entendu, en ce cas le Soussigné se croit en devoir d'insister formellement sur l'ordre à donner à l'Amiral Parker de se retirer avec son escadre en-dehors du Détroit des Dardanelles sans le moindre délai.

Le Soussigné a l'honneur d'inviter M. le Vicomte Palmerston a vouloir bien soumettre à l'examen du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique les réflexions contenues dans la présente note, et à lui en faire connaître le résultat, afin qu'il puisse en instruire la Cour Impériale de Russie, pour qu'elle avise de son côté à ses déterminations ultérieures.

Il profite, &c.
(Signé) BRUNNOW.

No. 158.

Viscount Palmerston to the Marquis of Normanby.

(No. 565.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, December 7, 1849.*

WITH reference to your Excellency's despatch No. 556 of the 25th ultimo, I have to acquaint you that Her Majesty's Government have approved the despatch which you addressed to Sir Stratford Canning on the 23rd ultimo, explaining to his Excellency the circumstances under which the French Government determined not to delay the transmission to General Aupick of a discretionary power to dispense with the presence of the French squadron near the Dardanelles.

I am, &c.
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 159.

Sir Stratford Canning to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received December 8.)

(No. 389.)
My Lord, *Therapia, November 12, 1849.*

THE Porte has prepared notes in reply to those presented to Aali Pasha by Count Stürmer and M. de Titoff on the subject of the refugees from Hungary. They were to be laid before the Council this afternoon, and will doubtless be adopted, with a view to their being communicated respectively to those Envoys in the course of to-morrow or the following day.

It is not without difficulty that they have been brought to a state which, under the circumstances, will I trust appear satisfactory to Her Majesty's Government. Better in my opinion would it have been if all the refugees from Hungary without distinction had been sent away; and this opinion, which is entertained by the French Minister also, I have not concealed from the Grand Vizier and his colleagues. The measure is however no longer at the option of the Porte, whose hands are tied by the terms of the Sultan's letter to the Emperor of Austria, as well as by those of Aali Pasha's note of the 16th of September to Count Stürmer, copies of which I transmitted to your Lordship at the time. There seems to have been a real fatality in the Porte's conduct on this part of the subject. Warned at an early hour of the approaching embarrassment, she took no step to avoid it. She declined having recourse to the obvious expedient of allowing the refugees to pass at once through her territory. Even at a later period she might have connived at their escape, had not a declaration made with very doubtful authority by the Internuncio, persuaded her that by so doing she would have incurred an imminent risk of war. Under this impression, and uncertain of support from distant friends, the Sultan was induced to pledge his word to the Emperor of Austria; and His Majesty's Minister at Vienna, though he succeeded in resisting Prince Schwarzenberg's demand that the refugees should be detained in a fortress for life, admitted that their detention in the interior of the country should not cease except with the consent of Austria.

To this condition, which would have conceded virtually what had been refused ostensibly, and which would have constituted the Sultan perpetual gaoler of Kossuth and his unfortunate colleagues, I thought it my duty to make a strenuous, and, I am happy to say, a successful opposition. The Grand Vizier considerately gave way to the representations which I addressed to him on the 9th instant by means of Mr. Alison, and on the same occasion he also determined to decline that part of the Internuncio's note which reserved the power of adding indefinitely to the list of

refugees to be detained under surveillance in the interior of the Sultan's dominions.

Having secured these important points on behalf of the Porte's honour and interest, no less than on that of the refugees themselves, and having subsequently received the drafts of Aali's Pasha's notes with a view to the suggestion of any amendments which might still be found desirable, I sought an interview with General Aupick, and, proposing to him such further alterations as had occurred to me, concerted with him the course of proceeding best adapted to the accomplishment of our common purpose.

In execution of this agreement we sent our respective interpreters to Aali Pasha, who after receiving M. Pisani and settling with him the points recommended for adoption, communicated the result to M. Cor, the French dragoman, who arrived shortly afterwards. The only expressions retained by Aali Pasha, notwithstanding our opinion to the contrary, were few and of minor importance. Your Lordship, if it be worth while, can appreciate the whole of this arrangement by referring to the drafts which are herewith inclosed, with the original version entered on the margin opposite the amended passages.

I learnt from M. Pisani with regret, that the drafts thus amended were to be shown privately to Count Stürmer and M. de Titoff before their final delivery, a step which seems to invite objections, and which is not in keeping with the suspension of diplomatic intercourse so invidiously continued by those Representatives. It appears from Aali Pasha's explanation that a promise to that effect had been given without my knowledge, and consequently that the joint exhortations of General Aupick and myself could only avail to obtain an assurance that no essential change would be admitted.

Another object of our joint remarks, though the Porte agrees with us in opinion, is still left uncertain, and that is the transfer of some Polish names, among others, those of General Dembinski and Count Zamoyski, from the Russian demand of extradition to the Austrian list of refugees to be detained in the interior. The march thus stolen on the Porte is any thing but fair to the individuals concerned, and it raises more than one question which may embarrass this Government in its relations with other Powers. Count Zamoyski was born at Paris, and on former occasions has been protected by the French Embassy here. General Dembinski, besides having a French passport under the name of Dubois, is a native of Cracow, transferred to Austria by an irregular exercise of power repudiated by Her Majesty's Government. These distinguished men were claimed by Russia, when there was a prospect of obtaining their extradition, that is, their consignment to the executioner; and now they are claimed by Austria, that instead of being sent away in liberty, they may be subjected to an irksome detention of indefinite duration, in some remote and barbarous province of Turkey.

In bringing these details to your Lordship's notice, I am influenced not only by sentiments of humanity such as they naturally involve, but also by a sense of the deep interest which attaches to this whole question by reason of its bearings on the character and external relations of the Turkish Government. Every part of it requires to be treated with delicacy and firmness; nor should I feel that the spirit of your Lordship's instructions were properly carried out unless I exerted the influence of this Embassy to dissuade the Porte as well from making any unworthy concession or holding any unworthy language, as from pursuing an intemperate course or maintaining pretensions not founded on her just rights and substantial interests.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

Inclosure 1 in No. 159.

Aali Pasha to Count Stürmer.

(Traduit du Turc.)

IL est dit dans la note que j'ai eu l'honneur de recevoir de votre Excellence en date du 5 Novembre, nouveau style, de l'année courante Chrétienne 1849, qu'attendu que la haute Cour Impériale a accepté la mesure mise en avant par la Sublime Porte, savoir, d'établir dans des endroits convenables ceux des chefs des troubles de la Hongrie qui se sont réfugiés dans les Etats de Sa Hautesse, et de les empêcher de conspirer dorénavant contre l'autorité légitime dans les Etats Autrichiens, votre Excellence me transmet avec sa note une liste renfermant les noms des individus susmentionnés; que cette liste ne doit pas être considérée comme définitive et complète, car il se peut qu'il y ait encore d'autres individus dont les noms n'y ont pas été insérés, et dans ce cas, si on en dénonce d'autres à la Porte, elle aura à garder ceux-ci aussi de la même manière qu'elle gardera ceux dont les noms se trouvent dans la présente liste; que si parmi les individus qui sont sur cette liste, il y en a qui ne se trouvent pas dans les lieux qui ont été désignés, mais dans d'autres endroits des Etats Ottomans, il faut les arrêter aussi sans aucun délai, et les envoyer à l'endroit où le séjour des autres aura été fixé; et que comme il est probable, aussitôt que ces mesures auront commencé à être mises à exécution, après que la Sublime Porte aura annoncé son adhésion aux points sus-énoncés et qu'elle se sera entendue avec votre Excellence sur la garantie à donner sur ces points à la Cour Impériale, que les représentations que la Mission de Russie fera aussi sur cette question auront un bon résultat, votre Excellence renouvellera ses relations diplomatiques avec le Gouvernement de Sa Hautesse.

La Sublime Porte est animée du désir de resserrer sans cesse les liens d'une étroite amitié avec une illustre Cour telle que l'Autriche, son ancienne amie et sa voisine; et c'est uniquement pour prouver ce désir qu'elle a, de son chef, donné des assurances que tant que les réfugiés susmentionnés se trouvent dans ses

Etats, elle les gardera et les empêchera de troubler les Etats du Gouvernement Autrichien. L'appréciation de ces assurances par Sa Majesté l'Empereur et par ses Ministres offre à cette occasion aussi une marque d'amitié et de confiance qui a causé à Sa Majesté le Sultan une vive satisfaction; et nous n'avons pas besoin de dire qu'autant l'interruption inattendue* des relations diplomatiques avec votre Excellence nous a fait de la peine, autant la reprise de ces relations nous sera agréable.

Comme la Sublime Porte désire mettre fin à cette question, en procédant sans délai à l'exécution des mesures qu'elle a annoncées dernièrement, elle a pris la résolution d'interner les chefs à Kutahia, en les cherchant partout où ils sont, et de nommer un Commissaire spécial, homme de confiance, pour qu'il les surveille; et qu'il mette toute son attention à ce qu'ils ne puissent en aucune manière conspirer contre les Etats Autrichiens; et il aura soin de les traiter convenablement. Et c'est avec un vrai plaisir que je m'empresse de faire savoir à votre Excellence que le Gouvernement de Sa Hautesse va faire ces jours-ci ce qui est nécessaire à cet égard.

Les vœux de la Sublime Porte pour que les Etats Autrichiens soient à l'abri de troubles et de toute inquiétude sont commandés et par l'amitié intime qui existe entre les deux Gouvernemens, et par l'intérêt même de la Sublime Porte à cause du voisinage des deux empires.

Il est donc naturel que la Porte, de son côté, fasse pour l'accomplissement de ces vœux les efforts qui dépendent d'elle pour lever les obstacles qui s'y opposent*. Et s'il est certain que jusqu'à ce qu'il devienne constant que les chefs susmentionnés ne pourront pas troubler la tranquillité dans les Etats de l'Empereur d'Autriche, la Sublime Porte les gardera et les surveillera soigneusement, ainsi que la résolution en a été prise, il n'est pas moins sûr que dès que, Dieu aidant, la tranquillité désirée aura été établie, comme ils ne pourront plus, quelque part qu'ils soient, causer des troubles, on ne verra plus la nécessité qu'ils restent dans les Etats de Sa Hautesse.

de conspirer en quelque manière que ce soit contre le Gouvernement Autrichien.

* momentanée.

nous sera agréable et nous causera une véritable joie.

* qui s'y opposent, ce qu'on doit attendre d'elle.

Before Mr. Alison saw Reshid Pasha this passage stood thus:—

The chiefs in question shall not be liberated until full security is obtained that they can no longer disturb the tranquillity of the Austrian dominions. That tranquillity, disturbed by these men, will be (please God) shortly established on a firm and solid basis; and as, wherever they may be in short, it will be out of their power to disturb it, we entertain the firm hope that the two Governments will in that case easily come to an understanding for sending them out of the country (Turkey).

Quant à la question des individus qu'on dénoncerera plus tard, et qui ne sont pas compris dans la liste, on n'a pas besoin de dire que ce point causera pour longtemps des embarras et des difficultés aux deux parties; et que les assurances et les engagemens de la Porte dans la question des réfugiés ne concernent que ceux qui sont actuellement entre nos mains; et c'est avec regret que nous nous en excusons.

Comme il n'y a pas de doute que ces communications amicales sont conformes aux désirs de Sa Majesté l'Empereur, et que votre Excellence voudra bien reprendre les relations diplomatiques sans délai, démarche vraiment à être désirée de part et d'autre, je me félicite sincèrement d'être l'organe d'une communication aussi agréable que celle-ci qui me procure l'occasion de renouveler à votre Excellence, &c.

Before Mr. Alison saw Reshid Pasha this passage stood thus:—

With reference to the question of subsequently giving information with respect to individuals not included in the present list, it not being expedient that this point be left open, a certain time should be specified; and in the case of any of these persons having become subjects of other Powers, the question of nationality should lie between those Powers and the Austrian Government, and thus the Porte shall not be under any obligation in this respect.

Inclosure 2 in No. 159.

Aali Pasha to M. de Titoff.

(Traduit du Turc.)

J'AI eu l'honneur de recevoir la note de votre Excellence en date du 24 Octobre, 1849, dans laquelle elle a inclus l'arrangement qui a été communiqué par la haute Cour Impériale à son Excellence Fuad Effendi, relativement aux réfugiés; et votre Excellence a ajouté que dès que la Sublime Porte aura accepté cet arrangement, vous êtes autorisé à reprendre les relations diplomatiques qui ont été interrompues momentanément.

D'après les sentimens sincères et bienveillans dont la Sublime Porte est animée envers la haute Cour Impériale de Russie, il est superflu de dire qu'autant l'interruption inattendue* des relations avec la Sublime Porte, qui a été causée par la question des réfugiés nous a fait de la peine, autant la reprise de ces relations nous fera du plaisir†. Les objections‡ bien fondées qui ont été exposées par la Sublime Porte ayant été appréciées, ce fait a augmenté et fortifié‡ la confiance de Sa Majesté le Sultan en l'amitié et l'équité de Sa Majesté l'Empereur.

Comme Sa Majesté le Sultan a tout-à-fait à cœur de mettre fin, au plus tôt, à cette question, en portant

et par suite de son désir véritable et sincère de voir les liens d'une étroite et intime amitié augmenter et se resserrer de plus en plus, l'interruption

* momentanée

† causera de la joie

‡ excuses

‡ de plus en plus

promptement à exécution telles conditions conformes aux droits politiques de la Sublime Porte qui sont renfermés dans l'arrangement qui, comme on l'a dit plus haut, a été présenté par le Gouvernement Impérial, il a été tout d'abord résolu d'expulser* des Etats de Sa Hautesse, à condition qu'ils n'y reviendront plus, ceux des Polonais qui par suite des événemens de la Hongrie se sont réfugiés dans les Etats de la Sublime Porte, dont les noms seront indiqués par la Mission Impériale.

Quant à la question de l'engagement à être pris par la Sublime Porte de faire un accord avec les Puissances que cela concerne, pour qu'on puisse expulser ceux des Polonais qui étant des sujets du Gouvernement Russe se seraient naturalisés sujets de Puissances étrangères, sans la permission de l'Empereur, et qui seraient revenus en Turquie et y conspireraient contre le Gouvernement Russe, il est superflu de dire que Sa Majesté le Sultan mon maître est prêt à donner des preuves qui font voir jusqu'à quel point il sait apprécier le bon voisinage et l'amitié du Gouvernement Russe; et dans aucun tems, dans aucune circonstance, Sa Hautesse ne pourra souffrir que des complots se trament dans ses Etats contre la Russie.

Mais comme votre Excellence le sait, quand un étranger, qui n'est pas d'origine Raya, arrive en Turquie avec un passeport d'un Gouvernement, ce n'est pas, après tout, à la Sublime Porte à examiner de quel Gouvernement cet étranger est le sujet naturel, et si le passeport dont il est muni, il l'a bien ou mal acquis. Cette discussion naturellement appartient, d'une part, au Gouvernement dont l'individu en question était le sujet primitivement, et de l'autre au Gouvernement qui l'a pris sous sa protection. *Mais si parmi les individus de cette catégorie, il y en a qui osent tramer des complots contre la Russie, et que cela soit un fait positif, je m'empresse d'annoncer officiellement à votre Excellence que la Porte fera sérieusement à cet égard des démarches auprès de la Mission du Gouvernement dont ils ont la protection†. Enfin je répète ici par ordre de Sa Majesté le Sultan, que la Sublime Porte est prête à remplir à l'avenir aussi les devoirs de bon voisinage et de l'amitié.

* de chasser et d'éloigner

dont la Mission Impériale donnera les noms, sans distinction, sans exception aucune.

* Cependant tout ce qu'il y aurait à faire c'est que si

† et c'est ce que je m'empresse d'assurer à votre Excellence officiellement.

Comme le désir de l'Empereur que ceux des réfugiés qui professent actuellement* l'Islamisme soient envoyés dans quelque province lointaine Turque en Asie, s'accorde avec les intentions du Sultan à leur égard, Sa Hautesse a jugé à propos qu'ils soient envoyés à Konia ou Alep.

Comme il n'y a pas de doute que ces communications et ces explications amicales et sincères seront conformes aux désirs de Sa Majesté l'Empereur, et que votre Excellence voudra bien, conformément aux désirs dont les deux parties sont véritablement animées, reprendre sans délai les relations diplomatiques, je me crois heureux d'être l'organe d'une communication aussi agréable.

Je saisis, &c.

* ont professé

à Diarbekir.

No. 160.

Sir Stratford Canning to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received December 8.)

(No. 341.)

My Lord, *Therapia, November 18, 1849.*

I STATED in a preceding despatch that Aali Pasha, notwithstanding my opinion to the contrary and the continued suspension of diplomatic intercourse between the Porte and the two Imperial Legations, had made a separate unofficial communication to Count Stürmer and M. de Titoff of the notes prepared by him in reply to theirs announcing the proposals of their respective Cabinets on the subject of the refugees. The consequences of this mistaken course of proceeding soon became apparent. The Russian Envoy demanded several amendments which the Porte is not willing to accept, and declared that, whether they were accepted or not, he must equally refer to his Government, and maintain while waiting for its decision, the existing suspension of diplomatic intercourse. The Austrian Representative expressed a similar dissatisfaction as to more than one passage of the note addressed to him; and on learning that the Porte was not disposed to give way, requested that it might be sent to him officially with the intention of replying in form. He also declared that independently of the points in dispute between him and Aali Pasha, he could not, without a fresh reference to Vienna, re-establish his diplomatic relations with the Porte,—a reservation which he justified by the example of his Russian colleague.

The additional embarrassment, not to say humiliation, thus occasioned to the Porte, will I hope be of some use as a lesson to the Turkish Ministers, who have yet to learn that a moderate and conciliatory course of conduct may be pursued without any unbecoming sacrifice of self-respect.

The amendments proposed by M. de Titoff are inclosed herewith. The first and third are hitherto treated as inadmissible by the Porte; nor indeed is it easy to imagine how they can be either required of right by Russia or accepted by Turkey, without a hazardous subserviency to the views of that Power. Objections of a similar kind may be justly affirmed to apply to the second proposal as it now stands.

The Internuncio on his side persists in requiring that the refugees to be detained in the interior of Turkey, shall never be allowed to go away

without the consent of his Government; and that a certain length of time shall be allowed for completing the list of those who, together with the leaders already designated, are to be thus restrained for an indefinite period. For your Lordship's more precise information, I transmit herewith an extract of M. Pisani's report on this part of the question.

It remains for the Porte to send in officially the two notes, such as they have been communicated to your Lordship with a preceding despatch; and meanwhile it appears that the Russian Envoy has forwarded privately to Count Nesselrode an unofficial copy of the one addressed to him with his amendments, Aali Pasha having written by the same occasion to Fuad Effendi, with the view of obtaining through him the Emperor of Russia's assent to the terms of settlement proposed by the Porte.

Another period of two or three weeks must now elapse before we can reach the termination of this important and delicate question. It is not perhaps very surprising that the two Envoys should find themselves unable to accept on their own responsibility, the Porte's modification of those proposals which had been substituted by their respective Courts for the original demand of extradition. But it may fairly be observed that the Imperial Governments would have shown a more conciliatory spirit, and one less open to the suspicion of any reserved intention, if they had left somewhat more to the discretion of their Representatives, and freed the pending negotiations from that mistrust which is implied by the suspension of diplomatic intercourse. Whatever inconvenience may attend the prolongation of a difference which puts to hazard many important interests, I am persuaded that your Lordship would view its conclusion with deeper regret if it were to be purchased by any unjust concessions or any sacrifice whatever of the Porte's independence and honour.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

Inclosure 1 in No. 160.

M. Pisani to Sir Stratford Canning.

Péra, ce 14 Novembre, 1849.

(Extrait.)

LE Comte Stürmer a fait des observations à Aali Pacha, par le canal du Baron Testa, sur les deux points suivans :

1. Pourquoi l'entente mutuelle entre la Porte et l'Autriche, chose convenue à Vienne, n'est pas mentionnée explicitement dans la note de la Porte? Il est tout naturel, dit le Comte, que la Porte ne pourra pas seule juger quand le tems sera venu de mettre les détenus en liberté, et que par conséquent les deux Gouvernemens se consulteront là-dessus, la Porte ne voulant pas agir d'elle-même. Ainsi il faut qu'à cet égard quelque chose soit dite dans la note.

2. Le Comte convient que la liste à être donnée plus tard contenant d'autres noms de Hongrois, donnerait lieu à des difficultés et à des embarras; mais ces difficultés ne sont à craindre que si l'on ne fixe pas un terme pour donner les noms d'autres Hongrois, et que si on laissait cette faculté indéfinitivement; ainsi il faudrait, dit le Comte, fixer un terme convenable; il parle de six mois.

Aali Pacha a dit au Baron Testa que le projet de note ayant été arrêté en plein Conseil, il ne peut y faire absolument le moindre changement; mais qu'il pourra donner la note dans la forme officielle, et que le Comte Stürmer pourrait, s'il le croit nécessaire, faire ses observations par écrit, n'étant que dans ce seul cas que lui (Aali Pacha) pourrait entreprendre de soumettre ces observations au Conseil.

Péra, 15 Novembre.

Le Comte Stürmer a fait dire par le Baron Testa ce matin à Aali Pacha, que la Porte n'a qu'à donner sa note formellement, et qu'après il fera ses observations qu'il communiquera à la Porte par écrit. Aali Pacha m'a dit, à deux reprises différentes, que la Porte ne prendra aucune résolution en conséquence des observations que l'Internonce fera, sans vous consulter.

Inclosure 2 in No. 160.

Amendments proposed by M. de Titoff, November 16, 1849.

BIEN que dans la notice remise à Fuad Effendi l'expulsion soit proposée en termes généraux, la Sublime Porte croit répondre à la pensée du Cabinet Impérial en y adhérant de la manière indiquée dans ce paragraphe; elle promet aussi, conformément aux instructions arrivées à sa Mission, d'attester par une publication officielle, que les réfugiés en question partent non de leur propre gré, comme de simples voyageurs, mais avec la réprobation dont l'idée est impliquée dans le mot "chasser," et avec la défense formelle de rentrer en Turquie.

La Sublime Porte n'entend pourtant pas de refuser à prendre la part active qui lui revient, tant pour tirer au clair les droits réels d'un individu à sa protection étrangère dont il se réclame, que pour approfondir et soutenir de bonne foi les preuves produites à l'appui des menées révolutionnaires dont il est accusé; et dès que les preuves sont reconnues valides, elle promet de faire des démarches officielles et prononcées auprès de l'autorité que cela concerne, pour obtenir le prompt éloignement de l'accusé.

D'après les termes proposés à Fuad Effendi, ces sortes de réfugiés devraient être enfermés à Diarbekir. Au lieu de cette ville, la Sublime Porte, parmi les places intérieures de l'Anatolie, offre le choix entre Alep et Konia, et s'engage à les y tenir sous surveillance, de manière à empêcher tant l'évasion que des communications illicites.

No. 161.

Sir Stratford Canning to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received December* 8.)

(No. 342.)

My Lord, *Therapia, November* 18, 1849.

AT a late hour last night I received information from M. Pisani that Aali Pasha had apprized him of his intention to cancel the notes which he had communicated privately to the Austrian and Russian Envoys preparatory to their official delivery. The sole reason alleged by his Excellency for this unexpected change of proceeding, was the information obtained from those Ministers, that even if Aali Pasha were to admit the Russian amendments, M. de Titoff would not be at liberty to renew his diplomatic intercourse with the Porte until he had obtained the express permission of his Government.

Persuaded that so marked a proof of uncertainty and weakness could only discredit the Turkish Government, and put to hazard the best results of our friendly interference, I lost no time in going down to Constantinople and declaring my sentiments in person to the Ottoman Secretary of State. The performance of this duty was the more incumbent upon me, because there had been previous indications of an unsteady and compromising line of conduct on his Excellency's part, which, from whatever cause it proceeded, could not be left unchecked without placing both the Porte and Her Majesty's Government in a false position towards each other, and endangering the success of their common exertions at the present important juncture.

I am happy to state that my friendly though unreserved expostulations with Aali Pasha produced their desired effect; and before the close of our interview I had the satisfaction of receiving his positive assurance

that the notes prepared for Count Stürmer and M. de Titoff would b officially delivered to them as amended by the joint advice of the British and French Representatives. I had the further satisfaction of finding, in so far as language could express it, a complete agreement of his opinions with mine in all that respects the nature of the present negotiations, its bearing on the prospects of the Turkish Empire, and the disastrous consequences which would result from disappointing the generous and reasonable expectations of England and France.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

No. 162.

Sir Stratford Canning to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received December 8.)

(No. 344.)

My Lord, *Therapia, November 18, 1849.*

SIR WILLIAM PARKER finding himself unable to execute without inconvenience the intention which he had originally entertained of coming up to Constantinople in private, for the purpose of communicating personally with me, I availed myself of an opportunity afforded by Her Majesty's steam-frigate "Dragon," to pay my respects to his Excellency at the Dardanelles. Though I made it a point of duty to limit my absence to little more than eight-and-forty hours, I had time enough to exchange ideas with the Admiral on such topics of immediate interest as our respective situations, with reference to the present state of things between Russia and Turkey, naturally suggested.

I found on reaching the Dardanelles that Her Majesty's squadron had removed two days before from the inner anchorage to that which it had previously occupied between the plain of Troy and the Island of Tenedos. This station is so much exposed that Sir William Parker will probably find it necessary to withdraw to a greater distance from the Dardanelles, should the reasons for its continuance in this neighbourhood, as now appears probable, remain in force for any considerable length of time. I hope to be able in the course of two or three days to furnish him with information calculated to enlighten his judgment in that respect.

I derive satisfaction in the meantime from having communicated more fully with him than I could have done by correspondence, and the knowledge which I have thus obtained may help materially to assist me in those contingent difficulties to which the present state of things, however improved in appearance and I hope in reality, may nevertheless eventually lead.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

No. 163.

Lord Bloomfield to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received December 11.)

(No. 51.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, November 29, 1849.*

LETTERS from Constantinople of the 16th instant have arrived here, and Fuad Effendi has communicated to me copies of some of the papers which have been sent to him by his Government on the subject of the differences which have arisen between Russia and Turkey.

I have taken copies of them and have the honour to transmit them herewith:—

1st. Letter addressed by M. Titoff to Aali Pasha on the 5th of November.*

* See Inclosure 2 in No. 141.

2nd. Draft of a note which the Porte proposes to address to the Russian Mission, and which has been submitted to the consideration of M. Titoff.

3rd. Some additions* which M. Titoff desires to have inserted in the Turkish note.

Fuad Effendi is still confined to his room, and Count Nesselrode having been likewise indisposd for some days past, they have not met since the receipt of the last Turkish mail, and I am therefore unable to inform your Lordship whether the Russian Government will insist on the additions to the note as proposed by M. Titoff, or will consent to a modification of them.

I had an interview with Count Nesselrode this afternoon, and asked his Excellency whether the negotiations at Constantinople upon the subject of the refugees would soon be closed. He replied that some additions to the draft of the Turkish note had been suggested by M. Titoff, but that he had not yet had time to consider their full weight and importance; that as soon as he was well enough to go out, he should call on the Turkish Ambassador for the purpose of concerting with him as to the answers to be sent to Constantinople, and in the meantime he could assure me that he was most desirous to avoid throwing any difficulties in the way of bringing this affair to a speedy termination.

From Count Nesselrode I went to see Fuad Effendi. His Excellency told me that M. Seniavine of the Russian Foreign Office, had paid him a long visit last evening, and that he had evidently been sent to find out whether he thought his Government would be disposed to consent to the additions to the note to be delivered by the Porte, which had been suggested by M. Titoff.

Fuad Effendi said further, that M. Seniavine had made no new suggestions, and that although they discussed the matter for a long time, their conversation ended without arriving at any result.

In a few days I shall probably learn from Fuad Effendi the nature of the instructions which are sent to M. Titoff, and in the meantime I shall endeavour to impress upon the Turkish Ambassador the advantage of taking his stand on the terms proposed in the draft of note submitted by Aali Pasha to the Russian Minister, and conceding as little as possible, because the object of Russia in these additions appears to me to be dictated by a desire to increase the responsibility of the Porte as to the refugees, and to lessen her freedom and independence of action.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

Inclosure 2 in No. 163.

Proposed Note from the Porte to the Russian Legation.

J'AI eu l'honneur de recevoir la note que M. le Ministre de Russie m'a fait remettre sous la date du $\frac{\text{19 Octobre}}{\text{1 Novembre}}$ 1849, avec la pièce contenant le projet d'arrangement communiqué par le Gouvernement Impérial à son Excellence Fuad Effendi, sur la question des réfugiés, et dans laquelle note elle expose qu'il a ordre de reprendre ses relations officielles interrompues depuis quelque tems, aussitôt que ce projet aura été accepté par la Sublime Porte.

Autant Sa Majesté le Sultan a été peiné que cette question ait occasionné l'interruption inattendue des relations diplomatiques entre son Gouvernement et la Mission de Russie, autant, comme il est inutile de l'exprimer, le plaisir qu'elle ressentira de leur rétablissement sera vif et réel.

L'accueil fait aux raisons fondées que la Sublime Porte a exposées dans cette affaire, et qui ont été justement appréciées, a fortifié encore la confiance du Sultan dans les sentimens d'équité et d'amitié de Sa Majesté l'Empereur.

* See Inclosure 2 in No. 160.

En conséquence, comme Sa Majesté le Sultan a extrêmement à cœur de voir mettre fin à cette question, par la prompte exécution de celles des dispositions contenues dans le projet d'arrangement précité qui sont dans la limite des droits de la Sublime Porte, il a tout d'abord été décidé que ceux des Polonais réfugiés en Turquie par suite des événemens de Hongrie, dont la Mission Impériale indiquera les noms, seront immédiatement et sans exception expulsés et éloignés des Etats du Sultan, pour n'y plus revenir.

Quant à l'engagement à prendre par la Sublime Porte, de s'entendre avec les Gouvernemens que cela concerne, pour qu'elle puisse expulser les Polonais qui, sujets du Gouvernement Russe, auraient pris une autre nationalité étrangère sans l'autorisation de l'Empereur, et qui, revenus en Turquie, oseraient se livrer à des menées coupables contre la Russie, on ne saurait douter que le Sultan mon auguste maître ne soit prêt à chercher les moyens de montrer combien il attache de prix à ses relations de bon voisinage et d'amitié avec le Gouvernement Russe, et de prouver qu'il ne souffrira, en aucune circonstance et en aucun tems, que l'on trame dans ses Etats des complots contre ce Gouvernement. Mais comme M. le Ministre le sait, lorsqu'un étranger qui n'était pas primitivement sujet de la Sublime Porte, arrive en Turquie avec un passeport du Gouvernement étranger, ce n'est pas précisément à elle à rechercher de quel Gouvernement il dépendait, et si c'est à bon droit ou non qu'il a eu le passeport dont il est muni. Ce point doit naturellement se discuter entre le Gouvernement dont il relevait dans le principe, et celui sous la protection duquel il s'est placé depuis. Seulement je m'empresse de déclarer officiellement à M. le Ministre, que s'il est avéré que parmi ces étrangers, il y en a qui osent se livrer à des menées contre le Gouvernement Russe, la Sublime Porte en fera parler à la Légation qui les protégerait, et donnera sérieusement et réellement ses soins à ce qu'ils soient renvoyés. En un mot, je renouvelle ici d'ordre et de la part de Sa Majesté le Sultan, l'assurance que son Gouvernement est prêt à faire, à l'avenir aussi, comme il est dit ci-dessus, tous les efforts possibles pour l'accomplissement des devoirs de bon voisinage et d'amitié.

Le désir que l'Empereur a manifesté de voir interner dans une des provinces éloignées de la Turquie d'Asie, les réfugiés aujourd'hui Musulmans, se trouvant d'accord avec l'intention de Sa Majesté le Sultan à leur égard, elle a jugé convenable qu'ils fussent envoyés à

Cet exposé et ces éclaircissemens amicaux et sincères répondent trop au vœu de Sa Majesté l'Empereur, pour qu'on puisse douter que M. le Ministre ne veuille bien hâter de ses soins la reprise de ses relations officielles si conforme au vœu réciproque des deux Gouvernemens. C'est pourquoi je me félicite sincèrement d'être l'organe d'une aussi heureuse communication.

No. 164.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received December 20.)

(No. 274.)

Vienna, December 3, 1849.

My Lord,

IN consequence of the misinformation and misapprehension of this Government respecting the operations of Her Majesty's squadron in the Mediterranean, I thought it desirable to place the matter before Prince Schwarzenberg in a manner to put an end to the existence of doubt as to the fact, and therefore I communicated to him the substance of Sir Stratford Canning's despatch No. 325, to your Lordship, dated Constantinople, November 5th, and the extract from a letter to his Excellency written by Admiral Sir William Parker, wherein the cause of the entrance of the squadron into the bay within the castles at the entrance of the Straits of the Dardanelles, is stated by the Ambassador and by the Admiral. I called the attention of the Prince to the fact that the above-mentioned report is

one made by the Ambassador to your Lordship for the information of Her Majesty's Government, and for no other end; that it came to me in the ordinary course of communications sent from the Foreign Office to this Embassy, for my information, without any direction accompanying it that it should serve any other purpose; that when it was written, and also when it was sent from London it could not be known at Constantinople or in London, that the entrance of the squadron had given umbrage here in Vienna; and therefore that the statement of our Ambassador at Constantinople and of the Admiral could have no other object than to acquaint Her Majesty's Government with the fact itself, and not to disguise its motives. That the fact, namely, the entrance of the fleet within the castles being proved to be completely innocent of design, and an effect of the pressure of bad weather, and the squadron being shown to have so immediately quitted the station when enabled to do so by the return of good weather, nobody could imagine that there was any design to violate the Treaty. I added, that the position occupied by the squadron within the old castles at the mouth of the Strait of the Dardanelles, is a position always occupied by vessels of all sorts and of all nations, when the weather makes the anchorage outside dangerous or inconvenient.

The Prince was informed by the best authority, namely, by Mr. Musurus, the Ottoman Minister, that the position occupied by the British squadron is not within the limits of the Dardanelles, as the denomination, *Dardanelles*, is applied by the Sublime Porte to the spot beyond which no vessels of war shall pass, and which is used for the designation of that spot in the Treaty of 1841; that spot being many miles higher up the Strait, that is, where the two castles denominated the inner castles of the Dardanelles are situated, and where the firmans are given by the authorities of the Sublime Porte to vessels passing up the Straits to proceed to Constantinople.

I think it proper to give this long detail that there may be no doubt respecting the matter.

Having mentioned the Ottoman Minister, I will take the liberty to add that in the whole of the late affairs with Turkey, he has acted with sagacity, with prudence, with moderation, and with firmness, speaking unblemished truth in the most conciliatory language, and maintaining the dignity of his own Government without touching the sensibilities of any other.

I have, &c.

(Signed) PONSONBY.

No. 165.

Viscount Palmerston to Lord Bloomfield.

(No. 48.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, December 11, 1849.*

I HAVE received and laid before the Queen your Lordship's despatches to No. 54, of the 29th ultimo inclusive.

I have to acquaint your Lordship that Her Majesty's Government approve the advice which in your despatch No. 51 you state it to be your intention to give to Fuad Effendi as to the language which he should hold to Count Nesselrode in regard to the propositions for settling the question respecting the refugees which have been transmitted from Constantinople to St. Petersburgh.

I am, &c.

(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 166.

Sir Stratford Canning to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received December* 14.)

(No. 345.) *Therapia, November* 22, 1849.

My Lord,

HAVING received information from Her Majesty's Consul at Varna that General Bem, under the name of Murad Pasha, was employed in exercising the Turkish troops at Schumla; and fearing that the Porte would be thereby exposed gratuitously to fresh embarrassments with Russia, I thought it my duty to call Aali Pasha's attention to the subject. His Excellency affirms that General Bem has not received any authority to assume the title of Pasha; and that if he has taken any part in exercising the Turkish troops he has done so without the sanction of the Porte. The Ottoman Secretary of State moreover assured M. Pisani that he would write to admonish the authorities at Schumla.

I have &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

No. 167.

Sir Stratford Canning to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received December* 14.)

(No. 348.) *Therapia, November* 24, 1849.

My Lord,

THE Porte's official replies to the two notes respectively presented to Aali Pasha by the Austrian and Russian Envoys have been formally delivered to their Excellencies.

Copies of them in translation are herewith inclosed for the more complete information of Her Majesty's Government.

With the exception of a passage added to that which is addressed to the Internuncio, these copies differ in no respect from the drafts already transmitted to your Lordship. The additional passage is placed between inverted commas.

In answer to certain inquiries which I addressed this morning through M. Pisani to Aali Pasha and the Grand Vizier, I learn that Count Stürmer, as well as M. de Titoff, has already referred to his Court: that an answer may be expected to arrive from St. Petersburgh in about three weeks; that the negotiation may be considered as terminated for the present; and that the two Ottoman Ministers entertain a hope—they cannot venture to say more—that their amendments will be finally accepted.

It appears that Count Stürmer sent his interpreter this morning to ask Aali Pasha for some explanation respecting the passage added to his note. He received for answer that the Porte would treat the Hungarians who professed Islamism in the same manner as the Polish renegades were to be treated, and that the chiefs whose national allegiance was doubtful would form a subject of explanation not only between the Porte and the Austrian Legation, but also between the Porte and that of France, which was the Power more immediately concerned in their case.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

Inclosure 1 in No. 167.

Aali Pasha to Count Stürmer.

(Traduit du Turc.) *7 Moucharrem*, 1266. (22 *Novembre*, 1849.)

IL est dit dans la note que j'ai eu l'honneur de recevoir de votre Excellence en date du 5 Novembre, nouveau style, de l'année courante Chrétienne 1849, qu'attendu que la haute Cour Impériale a accepté la

mesure mise en avant par la Sublime Porte, savoir, d'établir dans des endroits convenables ceux des chefs des troubles de la Hongrie qui se sont réfugiés dans les Etats de Sa Hautesse, et de les empêcher de conspirer dorénavant contre l'autorité légitime dans les Etats Autrichiens, votre Excellence me transmet avec sa note une liste renfermant les noms des individus susmentionnés; que cette liste ne doit pas être considérée comme définitive et complète, car il se peut qu'il y ait encore d'autres individus dont les noms n'y ont pas été insérés, et dans ce cas, si on en dénonce d'autres à la Porte, elle aura à garder ceux-ci aussi, de la même manière qu'elle gardera ceux dont les noms se trouvent dans la présente liste; que si parmi les individus qui sont sur cette liste, il y en a qui ne se trouvent pas dans les lieux qui ont été désignés, mais dans d'autres endroits des Etats Ottomans, il faut les arrêter aussi sans aucun délai et les envoyer à l'endroit où le séjour des autres aura été fixé, et que comme il est probable, aussitôt que ces mesures auront commencé à être mises à exécution, après que la Sublime Porte aura annoncé son adhésion aux points sus-énoncés, et qu'elle se sera entendu avec votre Excellence sur la garantie à donner sur ces points à la Cour Impériale, que les représentations que la Mission de Russie fera aussi sur cette question, auront un bon résultat, votre Excellence renouvellera ses relations diplomatiques avec le Gouvernement de Sa Hautesse.

Il est superflu de répéter que la Sublime Porte est animée du désir de resserrer sans cesse les liens d'une étroite amitié avec une illustre Cour telle que l'Autriche, son ancienne amie et sa voisine; et c'est uniquement pour prouver ce désir qu'elle a de son chef, donné des assurances que tant que les réfugiés susmentionnés se trouveront dans ses Etats, elle les surveillera et les empêchera de troubler les Etats du Gouvernement Autrichien. L'appréciation de ces assurances par Sa Majesté l'Empereur et par ses Ministres offre à cette occasion aussi une marque d'amitié et de confiance qui a causé à Sa Majesté le Sultan une vive satisfaction; et nous n'avons pas besoin de dire qu'autant l'interruption inattendue des relations diplomatiques avec votre Excellence nous a fait de la peine, autant la satisfaction que le renouvellement de ces relations causera est véritable et grande.

Comme la Sublime Porte désire mettre fin à cette question, en procédant sans délai à l'exécution des mesures qu'elle a annoncées dernièrement, elle a pris la résolution d'interner les chefs à Kutahia, en les cherchant partout où ils sont, et de nommer un Commissaire spécial, homme de confiance, pour qu'il les surveille et qu'il mette toute son attention à ce qu'ils ne puissent, en aucune manière, conspirer contre les Etats Autrichiens, et qu'il ait soin de les traiter convenablement. Et c'est avec un vrai plaisir que je m'empresse de faire savoir à votre Excellence que le Gouvernement de Sa Hautesse va faire ces jours-ci ce qui est nécessaire à cet égard.

"Mais comme quelques uns des chefs dont les noms sont inscrits sur la dite liste ont changé de religion, et que la nationalité de quelques uns des susdits chefs est douteuse, la Sublime Porte s'empresse de déclarer qu'elle a décidé de s'expliquer à leur égard avec l'Internonciature."

Les vœux de la Sublime Porte pour que les Etats Autrichiens soient à l'abri de troubles et de toute inquiétude sont commandés et par l'amitié intime qui existe entre les deux Gouvernemens, et par l'intérêt même de la Sublime Porte à cause du voisinage des deux empires. Il est donc naturel que la Porte, de son côté, fasse pour l'accomplissement de ces vœux les efforts qui dépendent d'elle pour lever les obstacles qui s'y opposent. Et s'il est certain que jusqu'à ce qu'il devienne constant que les chefs susmentionnés ne pourront pas troubler la tranquillité dans les Etats de l'Empereur d'Autriche, la Sublime Porte les gardera et les surveillera soigneusement, ainsi que la résolution en a été prise, il n'est pas moins sûr dès que, Dieu aidant, la tranquillité désirée aura été établie, comme ils ne peuvent plus, quelque part qu'ils soient, causer des troubles, on ne verra plus dans ce cas la nécessité qu'ils restent dans les Etats de Sa Hautesse.

Quant à la question des individus qu'on dénoncera plus tard, et qui ne sont pas compris dans la liste, on n'a pas besoin de dire que ce point

causera pour longtems des embarras et des difficultés aux deux parties; et que les assurances et les engagemens de la Sublime Porte dans la question des réfugiés ne concernent que ceux qui sont actuellement en son pouvoir, et c'est avec regret qu'elle s'en excuse.

Comme il n'y a pas de doute que ces communications amicals sont conformes aux désirs de Sa Majesté l'Empereur, et que votre Excellence voudra bien reprendre les relations diplomatiques sans délai, démarche vraiment à être désirée de part et d'autre, je me félicite sincèrement d'être l'organe d'une communication aussi agréable que celle-ci, qui me procure l'occasion de renouveler à votre Excellence les assurances de ma considération distinguée.

Inclosure 2 in No. 167.

Aali Pasha to M. de Titoff.

(Translation.) *7 Mouharrem*, 1266. (22 *Novembre*, 1849.)

J'AI eu l'honneur de recevoir la note de votre Excellence en date du 24 Octobre, 1849, dans laquelle se trouvait inclus l'arrangement qui a été communiqué par la haute Cour Impériale à son Excellence Fuad Effendi relativement aux réfugiés, et par laquelle votre Excellence nous fait savoir que dès que la Sublime Porte aura accepté cet arrangement, vous êtes autorisé à renouveler les relations diplomatiques qui ont été interrompues momentanément.

Il est superflu de dire que autant l'interruption inattendue des relations diplomatiques entre la Sublime Porte et la Mission Impériale, qui a été causée par la question des réfugiés, a fait de la peine à la Sublime Porte, autant le renouvellement de ces relations lui fera un véritable plaisir.

Les objections bien fondées qui ont été exposées sur cette affaire par la Sublime Porte ayant été appréciées, ce trait a augmenté et fortifié la confiance de Sa Majesté le Sultan en l'amitié et l'équité de Sa Majesté l'Empereur.

Comme Sa Majesté le Sultan a tout à fait à cœur de mettre fin, au plus tôt, à cette question, en portant promptement à exécution telles conditions conformes aux droits politiques de la Sublime Porte, qui sont renfermées dans l'arrangement, lequel, comme on l'a dit plus haut, a été présenté par le Gouvernement Impérial, il a été tout d'abord résolu d'expulser immédiatement des Etats de Sa Hautesse, à condition qu'ils n'y reviendront plus, ceux des Polonais qui par suite des événemens de la Hongrie se sont réfugiés dans les Etats de la Sublime Porte, dont les noms seront indiqués par la Mission Impériale, sans exception.

Quant à la question de l'engagement à être pris par la Sublime Porte de faire un accord avec les Puissances que cela concerne pour qu'on puisse expulser ceux des Polonais qui étant des sujets du Gouvernement Russe se seraient naturalisés sujets de Puissances étrangères sans la permission de l'Empereur, et qui seraient revenus en Turquie et y conspireraient contre le Gouvernement Russe, il est superflu de dire que Sa Majesté le Sultan mon maître est prêt à donner des preuves qui font voir jusqu'à quel point il sait apprécier le bon voisinage et l'amitié du Gouvernement Russe; et dans aucun temps, dans aucune circonstance, Sa Hautesse ne pourra souffrir que des complots se trament dans ses Etats contre la Russie.

Mais comme votre Excellence le sait, quand un étranger qui n'est pas d'origine Raya, arrive en Turquie avec un passeport d'un Gouvernement étranger, ce n'est pas, après tout, à la Sublime Porte à examiner de quel Gouvernement cet étranger est le sujet naturel, et si le passeport dont il est muni il l'a bien ou mal obtenu. Cette discussion appartient naturellement d'une part au Gouvernement dont l'individu en question était le sujet primitivement, et de l'autre au Gouvernement qui l'a pris ensuite sous sa protection. Mais si parmi les individus de cette catégorie il y en a qui osent tramer des complots contre la Russie, et que le fait soit positif, je m'empresse d'annoncer officiellement à votre Excellence que la

Porte fera sincèrement à cet égard des démarches sérieuses auprès de la Mission des Gouvernemens dont ils ont la protection. Enfin je répète ici par ordre de Sa Majesté le Sultan, que la Sublime Porte est prête à remplir à l'avenir aussi les devoirs de bon voisinage et de l'amitié.

Comme le désir qui a été exprimé par l'Empereur que ceux des réfugiés qui professent actuellement l'Islamisme soient envoyés dans quelque province lointaine Turque en Asie, s'accorde avec les intentions du Sultan à leur égard, Sa Hautesse a jugé à propos qu'ils soient envoyés à *Diarbekir.

Considérant que ces communications et ces explications amicales et sincères sont sans doute conformes aux désirs de Sa Majesté l'Empereur, et que votre Excellence voudra bien conformément au désir dont les deux parties sont véritablement animées, reprendre sans délai les relations diplomatiques, je me crois heureux d'être l'organe d'une communication aussi agréable.

Je saisis, &c.

No. 168.

Sir Stratford Canning to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received December* 14.)

(No. 349.)

My Lord, *Therapia, November* 24, 1849.

IN the present state of the Porte's negotiations with Russia and Austria respecting the refugees from Hungary, I consider that there is no longer any political objection to the removal of Her Majesty's squadron from Besika Bay to some more sheltered though rather more distant anchorage. A copy of the despatch which I have addressed on this subject to Sir William Parker is inclosed herewith. The Grand Vizier is of opinion that the squadron cannot be withdrawn entirely under present circumstances without a risk of thereby adding to the difficulties of a negotiation which is rather suspended than finished. To M. Pisani, who saw him by my direction this morning, his Highness expressed his personal wish that the squadron should remain in the neighbourhood of the Dardanelles until the present question be completely terminated.

I trust that the course which, with these considerations in view, I have suggested to Sir William Parker, will meet with the approbation of Her Majesty's Government.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

Inclosure in No. 168.

Sir Stratford Canning to Vice-Admiral Sir W. Parker.

Sir, *Therapia, November* 24, 1849.

AS the Porte's negotiations with Austria and Russia are suspended for the present by a further reference to the Courts of Vienna and St. Petersburgh, under a continued interruption of diplomatic intercourse, but with the hope of a satisfactory accommodation, I conceive that there is no political urgency for the continued presence of Her Majesty's squadron under your command in the immediate neighbourhood of the Dardanelles, should your Excellency think it desirable on professional grounds to remove it to a more sheltered station at this late season of the year.

The anchorage at Mosconissi, if preferable in point of security, might afford a convenient position as to distance under the present circumstances, with the facility of a prompt return, should it be necessary, to the Dardanelles.

I am of opinion at the same time that if you determine to adopt that course, you will best consult the interests of the public service as con-

* Should be blank. See Sir Stratford Canning's No. 361, p. 221.

nected with the Porte and Her Majesty's Embassy, by stationing one of the steam-vessels under your command at the inner anchorage of the Dardanelles where the squadron itself was lately stationed, with directions to receive and convey to you any despatches which I may have occasion to send down, whether by the steamer placed here, or by any other conveyance.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

No. 169.

Sir Stratford Canning to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received December 14.)

(No. 352.)
Therapia, November 24, 1849.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith copies of two despatches which I have addressed to-day respectively to Her Majesty's Representatives at Vienna and St. Petersburgh concerning the present state of the refugee discussions.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

Inclosure 1 in No. 169.

Sir Stratford Canning to Lord Bloomfield.

Therapia, November 24, 1849.

My Lord,

THE Porte having accepted the proposals transmitted from St. Petersburgh with certain amendments which the Russian Envoy has referred to his Court, maintaining at the same time the suspension of diplomatic intercourse, I have the honour to inclose herewith confidentially for your information a copy of the official note by which Aali Pasha announced to M. de Titoff the deliberate intentions of his Government.

I venture to hope that your Lordship will agree with me in thinking it greatly to be desired that the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh should accede to modifications appearing to exclude nothing which Russia is entitled to claim or the Porte at liberty to grant.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

Inclosure 2 in No. 169.

Sir Stratford Canning to Viscount Ponsonby.

Therapia, November 24, 1849.

My Lord,

THE Porte having accepted the proposals transmitted from Vienna with certain amendments which the Internuncio has referred to his Court, maintaining at the same time the suspension of diplomatic intercourse, I avail myself of the present opportunity to send you herewith confidentially a copy of the official note by which Ali Pasha announced to Count Stürmer the deliberate intentions of his Government.

I venture to hope that your Excellency will agree with me in thinking it greatly to be desired that the Cabinet of Vienna should accede to modifications which appear to rest on reasonable grounds, without excluding such requisite securities as Austria is entitled to expect or the Porte at liberty to grant.

(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

No. 170.

Sir Stratford Canning to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received December 14.)

(No. 353.)
Therapia, November 24, 1849.

My Lord,

INCLOSED herewith is a statement which pretends to great accuracy, of the number of Russian troops constituting the army of occupation in Wallachia.

I have not obtained it from any responsible agent, nor do I possess the means of immediately testing its correctness. It comes from an intelligent though not disinterested source, and appears to be considered worthy of credit by the officers of the French Legation.

Your Lordship will observe that the Russian army is still kept up to nearly the number allowed under the highest supposition by the Porte's agreement with Russia.

The Porte having withdrawn so large a proportion of its own army as to leave in Wallachia a number unequal to that which was fixed on the lower supposition, and there being to all appearance no danger whatever of fresh disturbances on the frontier of Transylvania, it might fairly be expected that the Court of St. Petersburgh would also diminish in a similar proportion the burthen which has so long and painfully weighed on the inhabitants of the two Principalities.

If any representations conveyed under your Lordship's authority to the Russian Government were to have the effect of hastening that measure of justice and mercy, I am convinced that so important an addition to the services rendered by Great Britain to this empire would be gratefully acknowledged by the Sultan and his Ministers.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

P.S.—A letter which I have just now received from a correspondent at Odessa states that "the 14th division of infantry had not been withdrawn from the Principalities as was expected, and that the Russian forces still remaining there in occupation consist of eight regiments of infantry, four of regular cavalry, and three of Cossacks."

The Russian army, as described in the third paragraph of this despatch, is supposed to include the troops from Transylvania, which may only pass through Wallachia, though it is rumoured that they are to remain there for the present.

Inclosure in No. 170.

List of Russian Troops in Wallachia.

Nombre et Cantonnement des Troupes Russes en Valachie.

		Hommes.	
Infanterie.	Le Régiment de Mirosk - -	2,800	
	2 Bataillons du Régiment de Sublin	1,200	
	1 Bataillon de Chasseurs - -	600	
Cavalerie.	Le Régiment de Lanciers de Nassau	1,300	
	Cosaques - - -	200	
Artillerie.	3 Batteries à pied, 24 pièces -	160	
			6,310
A Pitesty:			
Infanterie.	Le Régiment de Modlin - -	3,200	
Artillerie.	Demi-Batterie à pied, 4 pièces -	30	
Cavalerie.	Cosaques - - - -	120	
			3,350

Ce détachement est destiné pour Krajova.

A Jyrgowest;

Infanterie.	Le Régiment de Prague -	-	2,400

Ce régiment est destiné pour Rimnik.

A Berzes:

Cavalerie.	Le Régiment de Hussards	-	1,400

A Slam Rimnik:

Infanterie.	Le Régiment de Zitomir	-	2,700

A Fokschany:

Cavalerie.	Le Régiment Hussard de Varsovie	1,300	
Artillerie.	Une Batterie à cheval, 8 pièces -	60	
	Cosaques - - - -	100	
			1,460

Près d'Ibraïla:		
1 Bataillon de Sapeurs, avec 360 Chars de ponts	-	400
A Obelesky:		
Cavalerie. Le Régiment de Lanciers de Berg	-	1,000
Sur le Danube d'Ibraïla à Orsova:		
Cosaques - - - - - -	-	8,000
Total - - -	-	27,020

Sont attendus incessamment de Transylvanie.

Infanterie.	Le Régiment de Zamosi -	-	2,700
	2 Bataillons du Régiment de Lublin		1,000
Artillerie.	Demi-Batterie à pied, 4 pièces	-	30
	Cosaques - - -	-	300
			4,130

L'armée Russe en Valachie se composera, après l'arrivée du détachement de Transylvanie, de 31,150 hommes, et 48 pièces de canons

Les Russes comptent	26,000 Infanterie
	8,000 Cavalerie
	1,000 Artillerie et train
	10,000 Cosaques
Total - -	45,000 hommes.

No. 171.

Sir Stratford Canning to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received December 14.)

(No. 354.)

Therapia, November 24, 1849.

My Lord,

I AM indebted to the courtesy of my French collegue for the accompanying report drawn up by an agent sent towards the close of October to Widdin by the French Consul at Bucharest, with the view of inquiring into the truth of certain alleged occurrences which had shed considerable discredit on the Turkish authorities. I cannot answer for the impartiality of M. Hory's inquiries or the correctness of his impressions; but his statement is by no means destitute of interest; and those details, which more immediately concern the number and destination of the several classes of refugees, may be considered as varying but little, if at all, from the real state of the case.

It is by no means satisfactory to add that conversions to Islamism continue even here among the Italian, Polish and Hungarian refugees.

This disreputable practice appears to be encouraged by the prospect of obtaining employment in the Turkish service, a prospect which naturally offers strong temptation to exiles shut out from any other resource, and reduced in many cases to extreme indigence.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

Inclosure in No. 171.

Report addressed to the French Consul-General at Bucharest.

M. l'Agent, *Quarantaine de Calafat, 31 Octobre*, 1849.

J'AI déjà eu l'honneur de vous annoncer que j'étais arrivé à Calafat le 24 de ce mois, après trois jours de voyage.

Le lendemain matin, le Directeur de la Quarantaine mit à ma disposition une barque et une garde de santé pour me conduire à Widdin. Arrivé chez Zia Pacha, Gouverneur de la forteresse, j'ai dû renoncer à la faculté de rester en libre pratique, car elle eût non seulement entravé la mission délicate qui faisait l'objet de mon voyage, mais elle était incompatible avec les investigations minutieuses auxquelles je devais me livrer.

Zia Pacha après avoir pris connaissance de la dépêche qui lui annonçait le but de ma mission, eut l'obligeance de mettre à ma disposition tous les moyens pour faciliter les recherches tendant à constater dans tous les détails la véritable situation des réfugiés, qui avaient cherché un asile sur le territoire Ottoman. Le Commandant Militaire, Colonel Ismaïl Bey, ne mit pas moins d'empressement à satisfaire la demande que je lui fis de voir les réfugiés.

La forteresse de Widdin compte environ 12,000 habitans, moitié Turcs et moitié Bulgares de la religion Grecque; sa garnison de 4,500 hommes, dont 1500 artilleurs.

Par les investigations auxquelles je me suis livré pendant six jours, tant auprès des chefs qu'auprès des soldats émigrés, j'acquis les convictions suivantes.

"Bien avant la fin de l'insurrection Hongroise," m'a dit M. Kossuth, "et dans l'appréhension d'une issue défavorable, nous avons acquis la certitude que le Gouvernement Ottoman accorderait le droit d'asile à tous ceux qui se réfugieraient sur son territoire." C'est donc sur la foi de cette promesse sacrée que M. Kossuth et les Généraux Mezzaros, Perczel, et Dembinski se sont rendus à Widdin vers le 18 Août, en passant par la Valachie.

Le 22 Août 2000 hommes sous les ordres du Général Stein y arrivèrent de Torno-Severin, et environ autant de la Tour Rouge, à travers la Valachie.

Le 25 du même mois la Légion Polonaise, forte de 1100 hommes, et la Légion Italienne de 500, entrèrent sur le territoire de Viddin, ayant traversé la Servie; total environ 5,600 hommes.

Tout ce monde, à l'exception de quelques chefs qui logèrent en ville, campa sous des tentes en-dehors de la forteresse, près du camp Turc.

Les premiers jours de leur arrivée les soldats manquèrent en effet des objets de première nécessité, les vivres étaient insuffisans, et les Hongrois surtout manquèrent de vêtemens. Ce manque peut s'expliquer par la confusion qui régnait d'abord parmi les réfugiés, et par la difficulté de pourvoir à la fois à des besoins si divers et si multipliés, peut-être bien aussi à l'absence d'instructions précises à cet égard de Constantinople.

L'insuffisance d'une nourriture saine, l'abus des fruits, les pluies, la fraîcheur des nuits, et le manque de vêtemens, ne tardèrent pas à développer des symptômes de typhus et de dyssenterie dans le camp. Jusqu'à ce jour 380 personnes ont succombé à ces maladies; et tandis que les chefs Polonais et Italiens cherchaient à alléger les maux de leurs soldats, en distribuant des rations supplémentaires, et en achetant de leur propres

deniers des vêtemens plus chauds, la troupe Hongroise, abandonnée de ses chefs, en était à regretter de les avoir suivis sur la terre étrangère. Environ une centaine d'hommes s'évadèrent alors du camp.

C'est aussi à cette époque que se rattache l'affaire de la jeune fille dont parle la lettre anonyme écrite de Widdin le 3 Octobre. Cette jeune personne, native de Waiskirchen, qui avait suivi l'armée Hongroise, ainsi que beaucoup d'autres femmes, a en effet été exposée à la brutalité des soldats. Toutefois les renseignemens que j'ai recueillis à son égard me portent à croire que cette scène révoltante a eu lieu au camp des Hongrois, et que la volonté de cette jeune fille peut bien ne pas y avoir été entièrement étrangère. Transporté chez l'Agent Consulaire d'Autriche, elle a succombé le lendemain, malgré les soins du médecin, sans proférer une seule parole.

Quant au jeune homme qui, après avoir embrassé l'Islamisme, aurait été traité *in mores Turcorum* par des soldats Turcs, il m'a été impossible d'avoir à ce sujet le moindre renseignement précis de qui que ce soit. Je suis donc fondé à regarder cette assertion contenue dans la lettre déjà citée comme au moins très risquée, à laquelle on a cherché à donner une importance qu'elle ne mérite pas.

L'arrivée du Colonel Ismaïl Bey, envoyé par Omer Pacha, fit cesser presqu'entièrement les maux dont souffraient les réfugiés. Ce fonctionnaire arriva à Viddin avec mission de régulariser leur position et d'en surveiller l'administration. Les hôtes de la Sublime Porte partagèrent dès ce moment le traitement de ses propres soldats. Les ordres les plus sévères furent donnés de respecter les étrangers, et dans le cas où l'un d'eux commettrait un acte répréhensible, le coupable devra être amené devant le commandant, seule autorité de laquelle il relève. Un registre exact de tous les réfugiés est tenu ; ils reçoivent journellement, soit en nature, soit en argent, les rations de leurs grades, tout comme s'ils faisaient partie de l'armée Ottomane ; des instructions venues de Constantinople feront accélérer la confection des habillemens. Sans doute il eût été à désirer que les paternelles intentions de la Porte fussent exécutées plus promptement, mais il faut tenir compte aux autorités de Widdin de la difficulté de se procurer les fournitures et les ouvriers nécessaires à la confection de tant de vêtemens à la fois, et aussi de l'indolence inhérent au caractère Turc. Cependant je dois rendre justice en cette occasion à la bonne volonté et au zèle du Gouverneur et du commandant de la forteresse.

Tout promettait d'aller au mieux, lorsque le 18 Septembre arriva e Constantinople un binbachi, ou major d'artillerie, aide-de-camp du Séraskier.

C'est la mission de cet officier qui, mal interprétée par les journaux Européens, a répandu l'alarme en Occident. Je regrette de devoir ajouter ici que M. Kossuth, avec un très petit nombre de ses compagnons d'exil, ont largement contribué à induire l'opinion publique en erreur, en faussant les intentions bienveillantes du Divan à leur égard. J'ai acquis la conviction que c'est par calcul, et uniquement dans le but d'attirer sur eux l'attention et l'intérêt de l'Europe entière, que la pensée du Divan a été mal interprétée. J'ai fait de cette importante question l'objet d'investigations scrupuleuses, et je ne crains pas d'affirmer que j'ai réussi à l'approfondir et à la présenter sous son véritable jour.

L'aide-de-camp du Séraskier arrivé à Widdin se rendit successivement chez les chefs émigrés, et leur fit entendre qu'il était envoyé près d'eux par les Ministres du Grand Seigneur pour leur faire la proposition d'embrasser l'Islamisme, et pour leur exposer que ce subterfuge n'avait été imaginé par le Divan que dans la crainte qu'il n'aurait par la majorité dans le Grand Conseil sur la question d'extradition ; que cette question menaçait de faire tomber le Ministère actuel ; que le nouveau Ministère serait moins favorable à la cause, et que par ce moyen les émigrés tiraient le Divan de l'embarras où cette question l'avait placé vis-à-vis de la Russie et de l'Autriche.

Cette insinuation a été faite aux réfugiés de nuit, à voix basse et sous le sceau du secret, en leur déclarant, en outre, que cela ne les engageait à rien, que ce n'était que pour la forme ; qu'ils seraient toujours libres de

quitter la Turquie quand bon leur semblerait ; que ce n'était qu'un masque qu'ils pourraient jeter à la première occasion.

Il est inutile d'ajouter que cette proposition a été énergiquement repoussée par la plupart des chefs, qui préféraient finir leurs jours en Sibérie plutôt que de renoncer à la foi de leurs pères ; mais elle n'en a pas moins répandu la terreur dans le camp, surtout lorsque M. Kossuth l'a présentée aux soldats comme une condition *sine quâ non* de non-extradition.

L'ex-dictateur de la Hongrie publia une lettre qu'il venait de recevoir de M. Andrassy, son agent à Constantinople, et qui apparemment envisageait la proposition du Divan d'une manière plus pressante et moins favorable, en un mot comme une intimation. C'est sous l'influence de ce sentiment qu'est dictée la protestation de M. Kossuth adressée au Cabinet Anglais ; les journaux Français qui reproduisirent ce document, arrivèrent à Widdin précisément au moment où cette question délicate fixait toute mon attention. J'eus occasion de causer avec M. Kossuth et de lui faire remarquer toute l'importance qu'il y a de ne point confondre le sens du mot "invitation" dont s'est servi, je n'en puis douter, l'envoyé du Divan, avec celui "d'intimation" reproduit dans la protestation Française. M. Kossuth n'hésita pas à me dire que ayant écrit ce document en Anglais, il ne pouvait être responsable de la traduction Française ; cette langue ne lui est d'ailleurs pas très familière ; pouvait, il au surplus ne pas convenir en présence d'une investigation rigoureuse, que jamais le Gouvernement Turc n'a songé à contraindre les réfugiés à chercher dans l'apostasie un asile contre l'extradition ?

Le Général Bem, moins scrupuleux sur ce point, et entrevoyant surtout dans l'apostasie des chefs une idée qui selon lui aurait été suggérée à la Porte par des agens Russes, un cas de guerre, fut le premier à embrasser l'Islamisme. Son exemple et ses exhortations entraînèrent plusieurs soldats et officiers, principalement Hongrois ; mais tout en étant le plus zélé instigateur de la conversion, je dois dire que le Général Bem ne cachait pas à ses néophites qu'elle était toute volontaire, et qu'elle n'est nullement imposée par la Turquie ; ce qui contribua encore à augmenter le nombre des adeptes, malgré le talent d'orateur entraînant de M. Kossuth, qui cherchait à les retenir, c'est que les nouveaux initiés furent aussitôt revêtus d'uniformes, casernés en ville, et reçurent dès ce moment la solde de soldat Turc, à l'exception des officiers supérieurs, qui ont le tiers du traitement d'activité.

Une nouvelle preuve incontestable de la tolérance Turque, c'est que les autorités ne mirent aucun obstacle à la célébration du service Catholique dans le camp et même en ville. Cette pieuse cérémonie réunissait tous les Dimanches, et surtout depuis que la question de l'Islamisme a été agitée, les fidèles autour de la croix du Seigneur.

J'ai donc tout lieu de croire que les autorités de Widdin n'ont exercé aucune influence sur ces conversions.

Ceux qui voulaient changer de religion se rendaient chez le Pacha, ou chez le commandant, qui avant de les admettre les renvoyaient chez eux à plusieurs reprises, en les engageant à bien réfléchir sur l'importance de l'acte qu'ils allaient accomplir. Ce n'est qu'après une persévérance soutenue qu'ils furent admis. Ce fait m'a été formellement confirmé tant pas les rénégats eux-mêmes que par les soldats et chefs émigrés restés fidèles à la foi du Christ. J'ai d'ailleurs été moi-même témoin du renvoi d'un soldat Hongrois agé de 46 ans, qui voulait abjurer sa religion.

Quelques officiers émigrés ayant eu à se plaindre de la conduite des rénégats qui cherchaient à débaucher leurs anciens camarades, aussitôt on empêcha les coupables de reparaître au camp, en les consignant dans les casernes.

Dans les premiers jours la question de l'Islamisme avait non-seulement répandu la terreur dans les rangs des réfugiés ; cette terreur avait gagné aussi la population Bulgare. Les Bulgares s'étaient un moment imaginé que l'ancien fanatisme des Turcs allait se réveiller, et ils craignèrent pour leur propre sécurité. Ils se tinrent sur la réserve même à l'égard des réfugiés qu'ils avaient d'abord accueillis favorablement. Mais quand ils

virent le petit nombre de défections parmi les Polonais, ils les attirèrent chez eux et les engageaient à rester dans le pays, on leur promettant même leurs filles en mariage; nouvelle preuve des sympathies que l'Europe Occidentale trouverait chez ces peuples, mais dont elle n'a su tirer aucun profit jusqu'à présent.

Sur ces entrefaites les réfugiés entrèrent dans la forteresse, où ils furent logés dans des maisons particulières; la libre circulation leur était accordée; toutefois une surveillance plus active était exercée à l'égard des chefs, qui avaient une ordonnance Turque à domicile pour les accompagner partout. Le Général Bem (Mourad Pacha) avait obtenu la permission de chasser aux alentours de la forteresse; cette faculté lui fut retirée avant qu'il ait pu en profiter.

Le 13 Octobre arrive à Widdin le Général Hauslab, avec mission de ramener tous les soldats et sous-lieutenans Autrichiens qui le suivraient volontairement, et à qui l'Empereur accordait une amnistie complète. Des proclamations furent affichées dans ce sens à l'Agence Consulaire d'Autriche. Dès que sa mission fut connue par les réfugiés, ils se rendirent en grand nombre chez lui. L'autorité Turque craignant du désordre, y plaça des sentinelles, mais elles furent congédiées par le Général Hauslab. Les affiches ayant été arrachées le soir même par les réfugiés et un tumulte s'en étant suivi, on envoya chercher la garde Turque pour empêcher que le Général Hauslab lui-même ne fût insulté. Les réfugiés étaient divisés en deux partis: l'un voulait rentrer en Autriche, l'autre cherchait à l'en dissuader; et c'est dans ce but que les affiches furent arrachées ou souillés de boue à plusieurs reprises. Les soldats qui se décidèrent à suivre le Général Hauslab reçurent, avec la promesse de rentrer dans leur régiment, six kreutzer (25 centimes) par jour, et furent immédiatement équipés.

Les autorités Turques n'ont pris aucune part active au retour des réfugiés en Autriche. L'Agent Consulaire les en accuse. J'aurais voulu trouver chez les Turcs aide et assistance pour leur embarquement. D'un autre côté M. Kossuth et le Général Bem regrettent vivement cette défection, et accusent également les Turcs de ne pas avoir cherché à retenir les soldats, en les traitant mieux et en leur faisant entrevoir les avantages qu'ils ne trouveront certainement pas dans leur patrie.

Quoique les officiers Autrichiens ne fussent pas compris dans l'amnistie proclamée au nom de l'Empereur par le Général Autrichien, cependant les Turcs ne se sont point opposés à l'embarquement des officiers, qui, encouragés par les paroles de leur Général, et confiant dans la clémence de l'Empereur, ont voulu courir la chance de se rendre à discrétion.

Le 22 du même mois le Général Hauslab s'embarqua avec 3,360 réfugiés, et remonta le Danube avec des provisions pour deux jours fournis par le Pacha.

Le bruit s'étant répandu dans la ville que la Légion Polonaise allait prochainement partir sans ses chefs, une députation de cette légion vint me trouver pour me demander d'intervenir en leur faveur auprès du Pacha. Je me rendis à ses vœux, et je fus assez heureux de pouvoir lui annoncer le lendemain, que toute la légion sans exception partirait aussitôt l'arrivée des officiers Turcs chargés de leur conduite.

Le 28 au matin le bateau de Constantinople amena en effet le Colonel Suleyman Bey et le Lieutenant-Colonel Faik Bey. Le choix que la Porte vient de faire de ces officiers pour accompagner les réfugiés Polonais et Hongrois à Schoumla est une nouvelle preuve de la sollicitude qu'elle n'a cessé de porter à ses hôtes, depuis le moment où ils se sont confiés à sa sauvegarde.

M. de Sartiges passant à Widdin avec le même bateau à vapeur, et que j'ai mis aussitôt au courant de ma mission, a cru dans l'intérêt des réfugiés, devoir m'engager à prolonger mon séjour auprès d'eux jusqu'au départ de la Légion Polonaise.

Avant-hier toute cette légion, ses officiers en tête, s'est rendue chez le Pacha pour lui exprimer ses remercimens et le prier d'être auprès de Sa Majesté le Sultan l'interprète de sa plus vive reconnaissance et de son dévouement.

Le lendemain matin les Polonais se réunirent hors la forteresse. Le Pacha, le Commandant, et les chefs Hongrois, vinrent prendre congé d'eux. A onze heures ils se mirent en marche accompagnés d'un escadron de cavalerie.

Les chefs Polonais ont fait distribuer avant leur départ une somme de 3000 piastres, environ 750 francs, aux pauvres Turcs et Chrétiens de la ville.

Le même jour j'ai repassé le Danube et je suis entré en quarantaine.

La Légion Italienne a dû partir ce matin pour Gallipoli.

Les Hongrois partiront également à la fin de la semaine.

A l'appui de ce qui précède j'ajouterai encore des chiffres que j'ai tout lieu de croire aussi exacts que possible.

Total des réfugiés arrivés à Widdin vers la fin du mois d'Août, 5,600; savoir:

Hongrois - - - -	4,000
Polonais - - - -	1,100
Italiens - - - -	500
Total - -	5,600

Réfugiés présens à Widdin le 29 Octobre, 1,525:

Hongrois - -	426	dont 170 officiers ou employés et 6 femmes.
Polonais - -	859	
Italiens - -	240	
Total - -	1,525	

MM. François Pierre Poisson, né à St. Méry Eglise, Manche, âgé de 27 ans, et Oswald Sniffel, né à Agneneau, Bas-Rhin, âgé de 23 ans, tous deux faisant partie de la Légion Polonaise, et sur le compte desquels leurs chefs m'ont donné les meilleurs témoignages, se sont adressés à moi dans le but de leur faciliter les moyens de rentrer en France. J'ai promis de faire part de leur demande à l'autorité supérieure.

Réfugiés qui ont embrassé l'Islamisme jusqu'au 29 Octobre, 238:

Hongrois - - - -	216	dont 8 femmes.
Polonais - - - -	7	
Italiens - - - -	15	
Total - - -	238	

Sur lesquels on compte—

Généraux - - - -	3
Colonel - - - -	1
Lieutenant-Colonels - - -	2
Majors - - - -	8
Capitaines - - - -	27
Officiers - - - -	25
Sergents - - - -	16
Caporaux - - - -	23
Soldats - - - -	133
Total - - -	238

Réfugiés partis le 22 Octobre avec le Général Hauslab, 3,360; savoir:

Hongrois -	3,059	dont 57 officiers et 90 femmes.
Polonais -	111	presque tous au service de l'Autriche,
Italiens - -	190	faits prisonniers pendant la guerre de Hongrie.
Total -	3,360	

Réfugiés morts en fuite jusqu'au 28 Octobre; savoir:

Hongrois	-	-	198	
Polonais	-	-	127	
Italiens	-	-	55	
En fuite	-	-	100	presque tous Hongrois.
Total		-	480	

Ainsi qu'il arrive ordinairement dans des circonstances analogues à celles où se trouvent aujourd'hui les exilés, la diversité des sentimens et des intérêts personnels a causé parmi les chefs une dissention regrettable à tous égards.

L'arrivée d'un agent Français à Widdin, le seul qui y soit allé, désireux de connaitre leur véritable situation, et surtout d'examiner jusqu'à quel point les accusations portées contre les autorités Musulmanes, au sujet de la part qu'elles ont pu prendre à la conversion des réfugiés, sont fondées à produire sur les émigrés l'effet auquel on devait s'attendre. Tous ont vu dans cette démarche une nouvelle preuve des sentimens d'humanité dont la France a toujours été animée.

Avant de terminer ce rapport j'en résumerai ainsi les faits qu'il contient, savoir:—

Que les réfugiés s'étaient assurés bien avant la fin de la guerre, de l'hospitalité inviolable qu'ils trouveraient en Turquie.

Que les privations et les souffrances auxquelles ils ont été momentanément en proie, étaient indépendantes de la volonté des autorités Turques, et surtout entièrement étrangères à la question de l'Islamisme, qui n'a surgi qu'environ un mois après l'arrivée des réfugiés à Widdin.

Que les autorités Musulmanes ont tout fait pour alléger ces souffrances le plus tôt possible.

Que ces maux ont été exagérés par des personnes mal-intentionnées ou au moins mal-informées, et qui n'ont pas tenu compte des difficultés qu'une hospitalité aussi étendue, surtout dans les premiers momens, et dans une ville qui offre aussi peu de ressource que Widdin.

Que l'intérêt, le calcul seul, ont donné aux ouvertures faites aux chefs des émigrés par l'aide-de-camp du Séraskier, une interprétation qui pendant quelques jours a jeté la consternation parmi eux. Cette proposition était sans doute une faute, mais non pas un crime.

Que non-seulement on a exagéré le nombre des conversions, mais qu'on les a présentées comme ayant été amenées par l'emploi des moyens les plus barbares.

Et que, en un mot, tout le contenu de la lettre du 3 Octobre, dont l'auteur, selon moi, n'est autre que l'Agent Consulaire d'Autriche lui-même, porte le cachet de l'exagération et souvent de la partialité.

Tel est, M. l'Agent, le résultat de l'enquête consciencieuse que j'ai faite conformément à vos ordres sur la situation des réfugiés depuis leur séjour à Widdin.

Je suis, &c.
(Signé) HORY.

No. 172.

Sir Stratford Canning to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received December 14.)

(No. 356.)
My Lord, *Therapia, November 25, 1849.*

INCLOSED herewith for your Lordship's information, are two despatches which I have received this morning from Vice-Admiral Sir William Parker, under the respective dates of the 13th and 21st instant.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

Inclosure 1 in No. 172.

Vice-Admiral Sir W. Parker to Sir Stratford Canning.

Sir, *"Queen," Besika Bay, November 13, 1849.*

I DO myself the honour of informing your Excellency with reference to my letter of the 9th instant, that the strong gales which had prevailed for many days at the anchorage we occupied within the outer castles of the Dardanelles became sufficiently moderate for the departure of the squadron from thence this morning, when Her Majesty's ships resumed their position in Besika Bay, where I propose to continue, weather permitting, until I am apprized by your Excellency that our presence in this vicinity is no longer desirable.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. PARKER.

Inclosure 2 in No. 172.

Vice-Admiral Sir W. Parker to Sir Stratford Canning.

Sir, *"Queen," Besika Bay, November 21, 1849.*

I BEG to offer my thanks for your Excellency's communication of the 19th instant by the "Dragon," and to inform you that it is my intention to remain at this anchorage with the squadron, weather permitting, until I receive decisive information from your Excellency of the progress of the negotiations between the Porte and the Imperial Envoys, on which the movements of Her Majesty's squadron from the Levant or to a more secure anchorage, pending a fresh reference to the Courts of Vienna and St. Petersburgh, may be determined. It is very desirable if possible to select a position where fresh water can be obtained.

On the arrival of the "Dragon," the "Ardent" was immediately detached with your Excellency's despatches to Smyrna, where I have every reason to believe she will find the "Euxine" Oriental packet for their conveyance to Malta.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. PARKER.

No. 173.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received December 20.)

(No. 276.)
My Lord, *Vienna, December 4, 1849.*

YOUR Lordship no doubt will have received full information from Constantinople of what has taken place there, but perhaps I may not do amiss to mention that I have heard from the Ottoman Minister here that M. Titow and Ali Pasha have concurred in an arrangement for the treatment of the refugees.

I presume therefore that the question has been settled at Constantinople.

I have, &c.
(Signed) PONSONBY.

No. 174.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received December 14.)

(No. 278.)

Vienna, December 9, 1849.

My Lord,

I VERY fully stated to Prince Schwarzenberg your Lordship's views and opinions, as they are stated and enforced in your instructions No. 307 to Sir Stratford Canning, and in other communications with which you have honoured me, respecting the question of the treatment of the Hungarian refugees in Turkey.

Prince Schwarzenberg refused most peremptorily to consent to the removal of those persons from Turkey at present, alleging that the interest of Austria required their detention.

He said that the Imperial Government would hold the Ministers of the Sublime Porte to the terms they had themselves made: to wit, that the cessation of the confinement and surveillance of the refugees should not be terminated, except with the consent of Austria.

That he had proposed to limit to two months the term within which the Austrians should be at liberty to give the names of the additional persons, to be subjected to restraint in Turkey.

He said that the relations between the Austrian Legation, and the Ministers of the Sublime Porte, should not be renewed until the Ottoman Ministers had performed their engagement. In reply to some observation of mine, he said "that state of things will be detrimental to Austria, but it will be much more so to Turkey."

I think it useless to trouble your Lordship with details of what was said in the conversation between his Highness and myself; the subject in all its bearings is familiar to your Lordship. The result of our conversation is a refusal to admit the force of your Lordship's arguments, or to act in conformity with your recommendation.

I have, &c.

(Signed) PONSONBY.

No. 175.

Lord Bloomfield to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received December 17.)

(No. 58.)

St. Petersburgh, December 5, 1849.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith the copy of a despatch and its inclosure, which General de Lamoricière has communicated to Count Nesselrode by direction of his Government, containing intelligence that the orders which were to have been sent to Constantinople respecting the return of the French squadron from the neighbourhood of the Dardanelles have been delayed, in consequence of the demands which have been addressed by Russia to the Porte being found different from what the French Government had been led to expect.

Upon comparing the Second Article in the inclosure with the one in the paper which was communicated to me by Fuad Effendi (a copy of which was transmitted in my despatch No. 13 of the 19th October), I find that there has been an omission, probably intentional, on the part of Fuad Effendi, of some importance, respecting the question of naturalization, but that with this exception, the sense and import of the papers are identical.

The French Minister informs me that Count Nesselrode appeared greatly annoyed at the despatch of General Lahitte, but that the Chancellor had nevertheless been prepared to receive similar intelligence by his correspondence from Paris.

I have, &c.

(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

Inclosure 1 in No. 175.

Général Lahitte to General Lamoricière.

Monsieur,

Paris, le 23 Novembre, 1849.

DANS la dépêche que M. le Général d'Hautpoul vous avait écrite le 14 de ce mois, il vous faisait connaître l'ordre donné à M. le Général Aupick de renvoyer l'escadre dirigée vers les parages du Levant. Cette mesure était la conséquence naturelle de l'aspect qu'avait pris la question du différend engagé entre la Porte et les deux Cours Impériales, qui semblait alors terminé de fait. Les nouvelles postérieures ont modifié cette situation. Les conditions substituées par le Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg à des premières exigences, si elles sont telles qu'on nous l'affirme et que vous les trouverez dans le résumé ci-joint, sont de nature à soulever quelques difficultés. Sans doute, nous continuons à penser que l'Autriche et la Russie, ayant renoncé à exiger l'extradition des réfugiés, la question est résolue au fond, et qu'aucun danger ne menace plus la tranquillité de l'Orient: nous avons la confiance que l'Empereur Nicolas, fidèle au sentiment de noble modération dont il vient de donner une preuve éclatante par l'accueil fait aux réclamations de Fuad Effendi, et préoccupé surtout de la grande cause de l'ordre et de la paix Européenne, qui est plus ou moins compromise dès qu'il existe un malentendu prolongé entre les Gouvernemens, restreindra ou expliquera dans un sens satisfaisant ses demandes actuelles. Néanmoins, tout en persistant à croire que la présence de nos forces navales dans les mers de l'Orient a cessé d'être nécessaire, nous avons cru devoir modifier les instructions données à M. le Général Aupick, en ce sens seulement, qu'il devra apprécier par lui-même le moment précis où l'escadre aura à effectuer son retour. Il est bien entendu, d'ailleurs, que des circonstances complètement imprévues et heureusement en-dehors de toute vraisemblance, pourraient seules retarder ce moment, et je ne laisse pas ignorer à M. le Général Aupick que notre plus vif désir est de donner promptement ce gage non-équivoque de nos dispositions conciliantes.

Vous voudrez bien donner lecture de la présente dépêche à M. le Comte de Nesselrode. Elle rectifiera les versions exagérées qui auraient pu lui parvenir sur la portée des instructions nouvelles envoyées à notre Ministre à Constantinople.

Recevez, &c.

(Signé) GENERAL LAHITTE.

Inclosure 2 in No. 175.

Russian Proposals.

ARTICLE 1. Expulsion de tous les Polonais, sujets de l'Empereur, quels que soient les passeports dont ils seraient munis. Cette mesure s'exécuterait avec la participation et d'après les indications de la mission de Russie.

2. De même la Porte s'engage à s'entendre avec les Puissances étrangères que cela concerne, pour que ceux des sujets Polonais de l'Empereur qui, dans d'autres pays, auraient obtenu la naturalisation sans le consentement de l'Empereur, puissent être expulsés s'ils reparaissent en Turquie, et s'ils se livrent à des menées révolutionnaires contre la Russie.

3. Engagement à prendre par la Porte d'enfermer à Diarbekir ceux des réfugiés dont nous avons réclamé l'extradition, qui auraient embrassé l'Islamisme.

No. 176.

Lord Bloomfield to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received December 17.)

(No. 59.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, December 5, 1849.*

I HAVE just seen Fuad Effendi, who informs me that Count Nesselrode called on him yesterday afternoon for the purpose of communicating with him respecting the instructions which he was about to address to M. Titow, and which he assured me were sent last night to Constantinople.

Fuad Effendi told me that the Count began by finding great fault with the manner in which the Turkish Government had communicated all the documents sent from St. Petersburgh to Sir Stratford Canning and to General Aupick, stating that this was a breach of confidence on their part.

To this Fuad Effendi appears to have replied that England and France had a right to be made fully acquainted with everything connected with this question in consequence of the generous manner in which they had come forward to the assistance of Turkey at a moment of such serious difficulty. After these words Count Nesselrode read to the Turkish Ambassador a few notes containing what he described to be the substance of the instructions to be forwarded to M. Titoff, but would not leave any copy with his Excellency; but from the assurances which have been given to me by Fuad Effendi, and which have been fully confirmed by General de Lamoricière, who has just called upon me after an interview with Count Nesselrode, I have the satisfaction to inform your Lordship that the Russian Government have consented to separate the question of the expulsion of the refugees from that concerning the negotiation with foreign Powers as to the protection to be given to those subjects of the Emperor of Russia who have been naturalised in other countries.

Fuad Effendi told me further, that the Porte had in fact carried her point, and that the draft of the official note to the Russian Mission at Constantinople which had been submitted to M. Titoff, and a copy of which was sent in my despatch No. 51, was accepted with some very slight alterations; and that he had no doubt whatever but that the differences would be arranged after M. Titoff received the communication which was sent to him last night.

I beg your Lordship's indulgence for the manner in which I have written this despatch, but I have been obliged to do so in great haste in order not to lose the safe opportunity offered to-day by the departure of Sir Edward Baynes.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 177.

Viscount Palmerston to Sir Stratford Canning.

(No. 321.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, December 17, 1849.*

I HAVE to acquaint your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government approve of your having proceeded to the Dardanelles in order to have personal communication with Vice-Admiral Sir William Parker, as reported in your despatch No. 344 of the 18th of November.

I am, &c.
(Signed). PALMERSTON.

No. 178.

The Marquis of Normanby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received December 18.)

(No. 590.)

My Lord, *Paris, December 17, 1849.*

GENERAL DE LAHITTE has just read to me a despatch from General de Lamoricière of the date of the 5th instant, stating that Count Nesselrode had communicated to him that the Russian Government accepted the last proposition of the Porte, and did not insist upon any of the additions required by M. de Titoff. The question as to the foreigners residing in Turkey under the protection of the passports of France or of England, was to be kept quite separate from that lately raised as to the refugees from Hungary. Lord Bloomfield has been, as General de Lamoricière stated, to Fuad Effendi, and they had compared the report of the arrangement given by both parties in order to avoid mistakes, and had found the result perfectly satisfactory.

The courier conveying the instructions necessary for the final settlement of the question had started for Odessa on the 4th instant.

I have, &c.
(Signed) NORMANBY.

No. 179.

Viscount Palmerston to Sir Stratford Canning.

(No. 323.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, December 19, 1849.*

I HAVE received your despatch No. 339 of the 12th of November, inclosing drafts of the notes which the Porte proposed to address to the Austrian and Russian Ministers at Constantinople, in reply to the communications made to it by those Ministers on the 5th of November on the subject of the Hungarian and Polish refugees.

I have to acquaint your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government entirely approve the principles laid down by you, as those by which you ought to be guided in the advice to be given to the Porte with regard to the manner of dealing with the demands of the two Imperial Governments.

With respect to the lists to be given in by the Ministers of those Governments, it seems to be clear that neither Government can with justice or propriety insert in its list the name of any person who is not one of its own subjects, because the demands of each Government are founded upon treaty stipulations: and the treaties of neither Government give them any right to make demands as to persons who are not their subjects.

Her Majesty's Government also approve the course which, as reported in your subsequent despatch, No. 342 of the 18th of November, your Excellency pursued, on learning that Aali Pasha intended to cancel the notes of which drafts were inclosed in your despatch No. 339.

I am, &c.
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 180.

Sir Stratford Canning to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received December 20.)

(No. 359.)

My Lord, *Therapia, November 27, 1849.*

NOTWITHSTANDING the professed suspension of diplomatic intercourse, a communication was made to Aali Pasha yesterday by the Russian interpreter, of two despatches addressed by Count Nesselrode respectively to M. de Titoff and to the Russian Consul in Servia.

The former relates to the military occupation of the Danubian Prin-

cipalities; and the substance of it, as reported to me by M. Pisani, is inclosed herewith.

The latter directs the Consul, to whom it is addressed, to contradict any prevailing rumours of an approaching rupture between the Porte and Russia, in order "to tranquillize the public, and to deprive ill-intentioned persons of a pretext for indulging idle expectations."

Referring to the former note, your Lordship will have observed that M. Pisani's report of it closes with a declaration that M. de Titoff was authorized to inform the Porte unofficially, that the agreement which regards the occupying forces would be executed by Russia.

Aali Pasha's reply to the whole communication is also transmitted in substance herewith to your Lordship, who will not fail to remark the unusual firmness of tone by which it is characterized.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

Inclosure 1 in No. 180.

M. Pisani to Sir Stratford Canning.

(Extract.) 26 *Novembre*, 1849.

LA dépêche à M. Titoff dit en substance:—

"L'Empereur regrette que la Porte ait déjà réduit à 10,000 hommes les troupes Turques dans les Principautés, sans une entente préalable entre les deux Cours. L'Empereur exécutera la Convention qui a été faite relativement aux armées d'occupation; mais croit que le tems n'est pas encore venu, car l'existence dans le voisinage des Principautés, de tant de milliers de perturbateurs de la tranquillité publique, peut influer sur l'état des esprits des habitans des provinces, et conséquemment la présence de nombreuses troupes parait nécessaire. Si M. Titoff a rétabli ses relations officielles avec la Porte, il doit s'entendre avec elle sur la retraite des troupes; mais si à l'arrivée de la dépêche, il n'a pas repris ses relations officielles, il ne pourra s'entendre sur ce point avec la Porte qu'après qu'il aura recommencé ses relations officielles. M. Titoff est autorisé à informer officieusement la Porte que la convention qui regarde les troupes d'occupation sera exécutée par la Russie."

Inclosure 2 in No. 180.

M. Pisani to Sir Stratford Canning.

(Extract.) 26 *Novembre*, 1849.

AALI PACHA a fait à M. Chirico la réponse qui suit: "Le corps d'occupation devait être réduit à 10,000 hommes de chaque côté, dès le moment que la tranquillité dans le voisinage des Principautés serait rétablie. Or, le cas désiré est venu, la tranquillité la plus parfaite règne partout. La Porte n'a pas vu la nécessité d'une nouvelle entente avec la Russie pour réduire l'armée d'occupation au nombre stipulé par la convention; elle ne voit pas non plus la nécessité d'une nouvelle entente pour la retraite des troupes Impériales Russes, moins le nombre convenu. Quant aux dangers qu'on croit voir pour les esprits des Moldo-Valaques dans le voisinage des perturbateurs de la tranquillité et de la paix, plus de 3000 hommes ont déjà passé à l'autre côté avec permission; que plusieurs ont été déjà assez éloignés des frontières, et que le reste le sera sans délai, de manière qu'il n'y a rien à craindre d'eux.

No. 181.

Sir Stratford Canning to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received December 20.)

(No. 361.)
My Lord, *Therapia, November 28, 1849.*

I AM informed by Aali Pasha that in his official note of the 22nd instant to M. de Titoff, the name of Diarbekir was inserted by mistake, and that it ought to have been left in blank. As the note in question is a document of some importance, I think it right to trouble your Lordship with this particular.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

No. 182.

Sir Stratford Canning to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received December 20.)

(No. 362.)
My Lord, *Therapia, November 28, 1849.*

ON the 26th instant I received the following information from Aali Pasha through M. Pisani.

The Ottoman Secretary of State having declined the exchange of a signed list of the detained Hungarian refugees, as proposed by the Internuncio, the latter requested that at least the Porte's official note should be made to contain the list. This proposal was also declined, on the ground of its being necessary for the Porte to rectify the list in concert with the Internuncio, some persons comprised in it being claimed by France as protected subjects of that Power, and others of them being liable to be claimed by some other Power. With the consent of the French Minister, Aali Pasha communicated subsequently to Count Stürmer an official note presented to him by General Aupick, and claiming General Dembinski and Count Zamoyski as persons entitled to French protection.

Count Stürmer called on Aali Pasha this morning and assured him in friendly terms that he was satisfied with the above-mentioned explanations, and had written in consequence to his Court.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

No. 183.

Sir Stratford Canning to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received December 20.)

(No. 365.)
My Lord, *Therapia, November 30, 1849.*

THE Sultan has been graciously pleased to send down an officer high in rank and respectability to express his acknowledgments to Vice-Admiral Sir William Parker, for the zeal and promptitude with which he brought up Her Majesty's squadron under his command to the mouth of the Dardanelles. Raghib Pasha, President of the Court of Admiralty, and a Lieutenant-General in the Ottoman army, is the officer charged with this commission. After calling to inform me of the Sultan's commands, he embarked this evening in a Government steamer for the Dardanelles. A copy of the letter by which I have introduced him to the Admiral, is inclosed herewith for your Lordship's further information. Captain Slade has accompanied him at my request, having thereby an opportunity of witnessing the Turkish management of a large war-steamer at sea, and completing his information to the Admiral.

Your Lordship will observe an expression of the Sultan's desire that

Her Majesty's squadron, while waiting at some more sheltered anchorage for the conclusion of the pending question, should not remove further than is necessary for that purpose from its present station between Tenedos and the plain of Troy.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

Inclosure in No. 183.

Sir Stratford Canning to Vice-Admiral Sir W. Parker.

Sir, *Therapia, November* 29, 1849.

THE Sultan having been apprized of your intention to remove the squadron to some further distance from the Dardanelles, is graciously pleased to charge Raghib Pasha, President of the Board of Admiralty, and a Lieutenant-General in His Majesty's service, to wait upon you with the expression of his thanks for the promptitude with which under recent circumstances you came into the entrance of the straits; and his high satisfaction at the zeal displayed under the friendly orders of Her Majesty's Government, not only by yourself but, as he is well assured, by the whole squadron under your command.

I have reason to believe that in seeking another anchorage for the moment, you will act in the manner most agreeable to His Majesty's wishes by selecting the nearest to your present station capable of supplying the wants of the squadron, and affording it the necessary degree of shelter at this advanced period of the year.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

No. 184.

Sir Stratford Canning to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received December 20.)

(No. 367.)

My Lord, *Therapia, December* 5, 1849.

RAGHIB PASHA, whose mission to the Commander-in-chief of Her Majesty's squadron at the Dardanelles I have mentioned in a preceding despatch, returned last night; and Captain Slade, who accompanied him, brought me a letter from Sir William Parker, of which I have the honour to inclose a copy herewith for your Lordship's information.

The gales of wind have been so frequent and so violent during the last ten days, with every prospect of their continuance, that I shall be glad to hear of the Admiral's arrival at some more sheltered anchorage than that of Besika Bay.

The Turkish squadron, which remained in the Bosphorus to a later period than usual this year, has been taken into harbour during the absence of Raghib Pasha from Constantinople; but I have reason to believe that it is not yet dismantled for the winter.

The French squadron is understood to be still at Vourla.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

Inclosure in No. 184.

Vice-Admiral Sir W. Parker to Sir Stratford Canning.

Sir, *"Queen," Besika Bay, December* 2, 1849.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's letter of the 29th ultimo, by Captain Slade, and beg to assure you that I fully appreciate the compliment paid by the Sultan in transmitting by

Raghib Pasha his acknowledgments for the exertions manifested by Her Majesty's squadron under my command in repairing to this vicinity.

I request your Excellency to convey to His Majesty the sincere wishes of the British squadron for the security and prosperity of this empire.

Complimentary salutes and an interchange of friendly visits have passed this day between his Excellency the Pasha and myself, although the weather was somewhat unfavourable for our communications.

I flatter myself his Excellency will return favourably impressed with the good feeling of the squadron.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. PARKER.

No. 185.

Sir Stratford Canning to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received December 20.)

(No. 370.)

My Lord, *Therapia, December* 4, 1849.

THE accompanying copy of a despatch addressed to me by Her Majesty's Consul at Varna will serve to put your Lordship in possession of my latest intelligence respecting the refugees transferred from Widdin to Schumla.

In answer to my inquiries respecting the Austrian and Russian agents stated to have arrived at the latter place, the Grand Vizier has sent me word that he knows nothing of any Russian agent there, and that the Austrian Consul from Rustchuk, who was lately at Widdin, had gone on to Schumla for the purpose of persuading others of the Hungarian refugees to return into the Austrian dominions. It appears that the Porte is not disposed to prevent the return of those who are willing of their own accord and at their own risk to accept the Consul's proposal.

In the meantime it appears that others of the refugees, besides Colonel Neale's informant, have contrived to get away from Schumla; and of those who have reached Constantinople, several, in addition to some of the Italians previously there, have embraced Islamism, and made themselves candidates, not always without success, for employment in the Turkish service.

The case which has excited most attention is that of a Count Rivadrowsky, an officer in the Austrian service, who arrived with a regular passport and was received with courtesy by the Internuncio. This gentleman subsequently declared his intention of turning Turk; and notwithstanding Count Stürmer's dissuasions to the contrary, obtained the assistance of an Austrian interpreter, and carried his intention with due regularity into effect. His wife, a Venetian, I am told, by birth, and a lady of good connections, has since followed his example.

I am informed that the number of Hungarian and Polish officers who have here professed their faith in Mahomet amounts to about twenty; that they are all below the rank of colonel, and have obtained corresponding positions in the Turkish army. I learn from Mr. Wood's correspondence, that a Colonel Kollman, who escaped with an English passport given to him at Belgrade, has obtained military service in the Turkish army at Damascus under the name of Mehemet Faiz Bey.

Of the converted Italians two have been sent to the Dardanelles, one to the castles of the Black Sea, and two are retained at Tophana.

It is not a little remarkable that the Sultan, having received a petition from Count Rivadrowsky, directed Aali Pasha to see him and to use his best endeavours to dissuade him from abandoning the creed in which he had been born. The convert's new lights and edifying perseverance have however procured him an appointment in the Ordnance.

The scandal of these religious prostitutions can hardly be viewed in two ways by any one—be he Christian or Mahometan—of tolerable education and common habits of reflection. To me I confess they are completely disgusting; and I must be allowed to doubt whether any degree of

advantage in point of military knowledge, equal to the discredit and other eventual drawbacks, can be reasonably expected to result therefrom to the Sultan's service.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

Inclosure in No. 185.

Lieutenant-Colonel Neale to Sir Stratford Canning.

Sir, *Varna, November 27, 1849.*

I HAVE the honour to inform your Excellency that M. Gorové, an ex-Hungarian Deputy, arrived yesterday in Varna from Widdin by way of Schumla; and this gentleman having called upon me, I have been enabled through him to obtain positive information respecting the refugees in Schumla, and which I hasten to communicate to your Excellency, as correcting the imperfect intelligence I had previously received. The refugees now in Schumla are Generals Bem, Perczel, Dembinski, and Messaros. Kossuth and Count Casimir Batthyany were also arrived there.

About 1000 Poles, under General Vishotzki and Colonel Zamoyski, were also in Schumla, with 300 Hungarians, civil and military; the latter chiefly officers of the subordinate ranks.

The Poles, as M. Gorové informs me, arrived in Schumla about the 16th instant, and Kossuth with the Hungarians on the 22nd.

General Bem and Perczel were living in the barracks; the other refugee chiefs were residing in the houses of the inhabitants; but they were all guarded by Turkish soldiers. M. Gorové states that General Messaros had received a passport from the French Ambassador at Constantinople, of which he had endeavoured to avail himself, but the Governor of Schumla had refused to acknowledge its validity. A very strict surveillance it would appear was exercised by the Turkish authorities in Schumla with respect to the refugees generally; and the departure from Schumla, for Constantinople or elsewhere, of even individuals amongst them, was rendered extremely difficult.

Two Polish officers with French passports had left Schumla for Varna, but as I am informed to-day, they were arrested six hours' distance from hence; and the acting French Vice-Consul of Varna, who is also the Austrian Vice-Consul, having claimed the release of these officers, they were permitted to come on to Varna, though not without much opposition on the part of the Pasha.

The Austrian Vice-Consul of Rustchuk I understand has arrived in Schumla, as also a Russian agent.

M. Gorové states that a great gloom and feeling of disappointment prevails in the minds of the refugee chiefs and others, at a rumour which had been conveyed to them at Schumla, to the effect that they would be removed to the interior of Asia Minor, and there be placed under restraint; and in the opinion of M. Gorové they would not leave Schumla for that destination voluntarily, and had remonstrated against the adoption of that measure.

Fearful lest his departure for Constantinople might be prevented by the Turkish authorities of Varna, should his arrival here be known to them, or lest he might be arrested and detained at Constantinople, M. Gorové earnestly requested that I would provide him with a passport; but I have not felt myself warranted in complying with his request in the absence of instructions from your Excellency. In the relative situations of Varna and Schumla, the former being the nearest port of embarkation for Constantinople, it is not improbable that such applications to me may be renewed, and I have the honour to solicit your Excellency's instructions for my guidance in such an emergency.

I have, &c.
(Signed) E. ST. JOHN NEALE.

No. 186.

Viscount Palmerston to Sir Stratford Canning.

(No. 327.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, December 20, 1849.*

I HAVE to acquaint your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government approve the communication which you made to Vice-Admiral Sir William Parker on the 24th of November, as reported in your despatch No. 349 of that day, acquainting him that in the present state of the negotiations at Constantinople there did not appear to be any occasion for Her Majesty's squadron remaining in the immediate neighbourhood of the Dardanelles, and suggesting that the anchorage at the Mosconissi Islands might for the present be a suitable station for the squadron.

I am, &c.
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 187.

Viscount Palmerston to Sir Stratford Canning.

(No. 328.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, December 20, 1849.*

I HAVE to acquaint your Excellency in reply to your despatch No. 352 of the 24th ultimo, that Her Majesty's Government approve of the despatches which you addressed to Her Majesty's Representatives at St. Petersburgh and Vienna, on communicating to them respectively the notes addressed by the Porte on the 22nd of November to the Russian and Austrian Ministers at Constantinople, relative to the question of the Polish and Hungarian refugees.

I am, &c.
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 188.

Viscount Palmerston to Sir Stratford Canning.

(No. 330.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, December 20, 1849.*

I HAVE to acquaint your Excellency in reply to your despatch No. 353 of the 24th ultimo, that Her Majesty's Government are of opinion that it would not be advisable to make any communication to the Russian Government with the view of effecting a reduction in the amount of the Russian forces in the Principalities, until the question about the refugees now under discussion at Constantinople shall have been settled.

I am, &c.
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 189.

Sir Stratford Canning to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received December 24.)

(No. 375.)

My Lord, *Therapia, December 8, 1849.*

THE French Government steamer "Prony," commanded by a capitaine de frégate, and having on board M. de la Roquette, a gentleman employed in the office of Foreign Affairs at Paris, arrived here the morning before last in eight days and a half from Toulon with despatches for General Aupick, having communicated with the French squadron at Vourla on its passage through the Archipelago.

Soon after its arrival M. de la Roquette obligingly called and delivered to me a despatch which had been consigned to his charge by Her Majesty's Ambassador at Paris. From this despatch, dated the 23rd ultimo, a copy of which has no doubt been transmitted to your Lordship from Paris, I learnt the ostensible object of the instructions addressed on this occasion to the French Minister. His Excellency also called in the course of the day and received from me a full communication in substance of Lord Normanby's despatch, corresponding, as General Aupick's statement sufficiently showed, with the purport of his instructions from General de La Hitte.

Our brief conversation sufficed to establish a complete agreement of opinion between us respecting the squadrons, which continue for the present to occupy the stations assigned to them in the neighbouring seas.

I reckon upon receiving your Lordship's instructions, as announced by Lord Normanby, either by the next Oriental steam-packet from Southampton, or sooner, by express.

The answers expected from St. Petersburgh and Vienna are likely to reach Constantinople about the middle of the month.

The Porte meanwhile is desirous that no decided change should take place in the attitude of either of those Powers which have manifested so deep an interest in her welfare and independence.

My information, which I believe to be correct, of the reply made by Ali Pasha yesterday to General Aupick's communication, explanatory of the "Prony's" arrival, is in perfect unison with the sentiments previously expressed to me and stated to your Lordship in my preceding correspondence.

I avail myself of the steam-packet which starts to-day for Trieste to bring these circumstances to the knowledge of Her Majesty's Government, reserving for a more regular occasion whatever may remain to be stated on the subject with which they are immediately connected.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

No. 190.

Viscount Palmerston to Viscount Ponsonby.

(No. 189.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, December 25, 1849.*

WITH reference to your Excellency's despatch No. 274, of the 3rd instant, reporting what passed between your Excellency and Prince Schwarzenberg on the subject of the operations of Her Majesty's squadron in the Mediterranean, I have to inform your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government approve the course adopted by you on the above occasion.

I am, &c.

(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 191.

Lord Bloomfield to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received December 26.)

(No. 60.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, December 9, 1849.*

COUNT NESSELRODE gave a memorandum some days ago to General de Lamoricière upon the subject of a certain Pole of the name of Czaykowsky or Czaika, who has been residing for several years at Constantinople under the protection of the French Legation. M. Czaykowsky is one of the individuals whose expulsion from Turkey the Russian Government is desirous of obtaining. He is supposed by the Imperial Government to be the mainspring of many of the intrigues which are practised against Russia in that part of the world; and though frequent attempts have been made by M. Titow to effect his removal from Constantinople, they have hitherto proved fruitless, in consequence of the foreign protection under which he has resided in the Turkish dominions.

I am informed that Count Nesselrode is endeavouring to prove to the French Government that M. Czaykowsky has never obtained letters of naturalization from France, and therefore has no right to seek refuge at the Legation; that the protection given to him by General Aupick is unjustifiable, and that it ought to be withdrawn.

I have, &c.

(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 192.

Lord Bloomfield to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received December 26.)

(No. 64. Confidential.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, December 13, 1849.*

SINCE writing my despatch No. 59 of the 5th instant, I have had some further conversation with Fuad Effendi respecting his last interview with Count Nesselrode. He said that the Chancellor did not conceal from him the disappointment which was felt by the Russian Government at the late proceedings at Constantinople, and that he made strong allusions to the necessity of abiding by the stipulations of Treaties, mentioning especially those which were agreed upon by Russia and the Porte at Kainardji. Fuad Effendi assured me that he replied to Count Nesselrode that the Porte would always endeavour to abide by her treaty engagements, and that of course those contracted at Kainardji must be adhered to; but his Excellency observed to the Chancellor that if terms such as those contained in the Treaty of Kainardji were proposed to the Turkish Ministers of the present day, they would not be entertained for a moment; that the men at the head of affairs in Turkey were of too enlightened a stamp to accept such propositions; and that in addition to the natural opposition which would be raised to any proposals of this kind, the stipulations of the Treaty of Kainardji were in reality a contradiction to the spirit of the capitulations of the Porte with foreign Powers; and that as far as he himself was concerned he would never consent to put his name to a treaty which he must consider humiliating to the Turkish people.

Count Nesselrode appears to have made some remarks also on the question connected with the advance of the squadron under the command of Sir W. Parker to the outer castles of the Dardanelles, and to have stated that the Treaty of July 13, 1841, had been violated, and that the Turkish authorities were in fault for not having given the necessary orders to prevent the advance of our ships of war. His Excellency appears to have added likewise, that it was a precedent which might be turned to advantage by Russia, if she were ever disposed to do so, because she had as good a right to bring her ships from the Black Sea to the Bosphorus, and to advance as far as the castles near Buyukdéré, where the usual

firmans are delivered, as ships of war of other countries had to advance from the Mediterranean to the outer castles of the Dardanelles; and therefore the Ottoman Government must not be surprised if communications are made on the subject, and the proceedings of the British squadron commented upon.

Fuad Effendi said that Count Nesselrode appeared seriously dissatisfied with the late proceedings of his Government, and to be much vexed at the ill success that has attended his last negotiations at Constantinople. The Turkish Ambassador then observed to me with satisfaction that in his opinion a most important effect would be produced on public opinion in his country by the sudden apparition of our squadron at the Dardanelles; for that the rapidity with which England had come to the assistance of Turkey at this critical moment, has proved that, with proper foresight, aid will be at hand in the hour of need, and that it can always be obtained in ample time to meet the advance of a Russian naval force on Constantinople. This fact, he said, will shake the conviction of many of his countrymen who have hitherto looked upon the power of Russia as irresistible, and consequently the cause of their independence as almost hopeless; but that their courage will now return, and they will be the better disposed to support the Government in their efforts to carry out the systems of reform, which are already working most successfully. He added, that the favour shown by the Porte to the Christian population was also doing much good, for they began not only to feel greater security than formerly, but were now better off when simply confiding to the laws of the Turkish Empire than under the protection of Russia.

Fuad Effendi said further, that frequent remarks have been made to him on this point by the Russians who had visited him since his arrival at St. Petersburgh; and that at Constantinople the Russian Legation are extremely opposed to the new system adopted by the Porte with respect to the Christians, and, strange to say, are exerting their utmost endeavours to thwart them in the development of their plans for the improvement of the condition of the Christian population in the Turkish Empire.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 193.

Lord Bloomfield to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received December 26.)

(No. 66.)
My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, December* 14, 1849.

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that General Duhamel, who has been lately employed as Russian Commissioner at Bucharest, arrived at St. Petersburgh a few days ago. He has called on Fuad Effendi, who mentioned to me in the course of my last conversation with his Excellency, that the General had assured him that a considerable reduction in the number of Russian troops in the Principalities had already taken place; that his Government regretted that it was impossible for them, on account of the lateness of the season, to withdraw a greater number; but that all the necessary arrangements were making to reduce the force to 10,000 men, which he believed would be effected by the month of March.

General Duhamel is to return shortly to Bucharest to resume his duties. I hear on the other hand, that Fuad Effendi, after he has closed his Embassy at St. Petersburgh, which he hopes to do in five or six weeks, is to proceed to Constantinople, where I believe he expects some new appointment. It is his intention, however, to pass through Bucharest, for the purpose of terminating some yet unfinished business.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 194.

Lord Bloomfield to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received December 26.)

(No. 67.)
My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, December* 14, 1849.

HAVING been informed that the Turkish Government had not waited to hear the opinion of the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh on the note, which they proposed to address to M. Titow for the settlement of their differences with this Court (the draft of which had already been communicated to that Minister), but had actually forwarded it officially to the Russian Legation, I have been endeavouring to learn the reception which this note has met with here; but I am unable to give your Lordship any positive information on the subject.

Count Nesselrode is unwell, and I have not seen his Excellency for some days. I however met several persons belonging to the Russian Foreign Office yesterday, and the impression which I have received from their conversation is, that we may consider the affair as settled.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 195.

Lord Bloomfield to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received December 26.)

(Confidential.)
My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, December* 14, 1849.

COUNT NESSELRODE having been confined to his bed by illness since the arrival of the messenger Moore on the 10th instant, I have been unable to see his Excellency; but I took the opportunity two days ago of mentioning to M. Labensky, one of the chief employés in the Russian Foreign Office, that I hoped I should soon be able to see the Chancellor, as I wished to speak to him on the circumstances which attended the anchoring of the British squadron under Sir W. Parker inside the Dardanelles.

M. Labensky called upon me yesterday at the request of Count Nesselrode, and told me that he had been directed to read to me a despatch of Baron Brunnow dated the $\frac{13}{25}$th ultimo, in which that Minister gives an account of an interview which he had had with your Lordship, and in which he states that your Lordship had informed him of your intention to instruct me to make a communication to the Russian Government on the above subject. I told M. Labensky that I had certainly received a private letter from your Lordship of the same purport as Baron Brunnow's despatch, but that I had no official communication to make to the Imperial Government, though I could unhesitatingly confirm the accuracy of Baron Brunnow's report of the opinions of Her Majesty's Government on the question which had arison out of the advance of our squadron to the outer castles of the Dardanelles. M. Labensky replied that Count Nesselrode had received the despatch from Baron Brunnow which he had read to me a week ago, and that he had postponed replying to it, or submitting the subject to the Emperor, until the expected explanation from me had been made in a written form.

I then inquired of M. Labensky if he was empowered to say whether Count Nesselrode had any intention to address a formal protest to Her Majesty's Government on the subject, such as I was informed had been sent from Vienna; and he assured me that he was convinced that Count Nesselrode, though agreeing with the opinions entertained and expressed by the Imperial and Apostolic Government, had no intention of following their example in this respect; and that it was with a view to prevent the necessity of any such proceeding that his Excellency was desirous to obtain from me some document from which he could prepare a report to the Emperor; that my communication to his Excellency of Sir S. Canning's

letters of the 5th November explaining the matter, had at the time arrested any intention which might have existed of making a formal protest; and that it now remained with me to do what I thought advisable in the present state of the question.

I told M. Labensky that I could not address an official note to Count Nesselrode, as I had no instruction to do so, and that I was scarcely justified in making an official communication of a private letter; but that as he assured me of the intention of the Imperial Government to accept our explanation in the same spirit in which it was given, I would give him an extract of your Lordship's private letter to me, and a copy of your Lordship's despatch to Sir Stratford Canning No. 298 of the 24th ultimo, which would remove any doubt which might be entertained by the Imperial Government as to the opinions of Her Majesty's Government on the interpretation to be given to the port regulations about the Dardanelles.

I trust that your Lordship will not disapprove of my having made this communication of your Lordship's private letter of the 24th ultimo. I felt that by so doing I should bring at once to a close the more serious discussion of a question in which we appear to be in the wrong, and effectually prevent a formal protest on the subject being sent from this Court.

I felt also that I was the more justified in doing this, in order to prevent the possibility of the Russian Government taking advantage of any discussion which might arise, to attempt to suggest some modification of of the established rule respecting the passage of the Dardanelles, as any such change could not fail to be useful to Russia; whilst the strict closing of the straits and the Bosphorus, according to the spirit of the Treaty of July 1841, must be the true interest and object of Her Majesty's Government.

I cannot close this despatch without saying, that although I am in hopes that the communication which will shortly be made to Baron Brunnow on this subject will be satisfactory to your Lordship, I am apprehensive, from what I hear from different quarters, that the Russian Government will address a communication to the Porte in a different sense, and make a strong protest against the non-fulfilment of the duties which devolved on them from the stipulations of the Treaty of the 13th July, 1841.

I beg leave to inclose a copy of the extract of your Lordship's private letter which I have communicated to Count Nesselrode.

I have, &c.

(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

Inclosure in No. 195.

Viscount Palmerston to Lord Bloomfield.

(Private.)

(Extract.) *Broadlands, November* 25, 1849.

SIR STRATFORD CANNING has sent me a copy of his letter to you about the anchoring of our squadron within the outer castles of the Dardanelles, to obtain temporary shelter from bad weather, and you will have been able to explain the circumstance to Count Nesselrode; but I wish you to say to him that I do not myself agree in the interpretation given at Constantinople of the port regulations about the Dardanelles,—that it was regular and allowable for the squadron to anchor there.

The words of the regulation certainly admit of it, but I think the spirit of the regulation, coupled with the stipulations of the Treaty of July, 1841, are against it. The regulation says, that all ships of war of all nations coming to the Dardanelles are to stop and wait at the anchorage between the outer and inner castles till they know from Constantinople whether a firman will or will not be granted to allow them to proceed further on. But this regulation can, I think, in fairness be construed only as applicable to those ships of war to which, under the Treaty of 1841, the Porte reserved to itself the right to grant in time of peace

permission to pass up the Straits, that is to say, to light vessels destined for the use of the Embassies and Missions at Constantinople; but I do not think that this regulation can properly be understood as applying to heavy ships of war, which are by the Treaty of 1841 precluded from entering the Straits; and therefore I think that our squadron ought to have sought shelter elsewhere, and not to have anchored within the Straits. I have explained this to Sir Stratford Canning, and the same thing will not happen again after he gets my letter. But you may assure Count Nesselrode that there was no design on the part of our Ambassador or Admiral to infringe the Treaty, and that what has been done was the consequence of stress of weather, and of a too literal interpretation of the port regulations affecting the Dardanelles.

No. 196.

Viscount Palmerston to Viscount Ponsonby.

(No. 1.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, January* 1, 1850.

I HEREWITH transmit to your Excellency for your information, copies of a note* which has been addressed to me by the Austrian Chargé d'Affaires at this Court, and of an instruction from Prince Schwarzenberg to Baron Koller, which Baron Koller has communicated to me; both of these communications being on the subject of the entrance of the British squadron into the anchorage between the outer and inner castles of the Dardanelles; and I have to instruct your Excellency to say to the Austrian Government in reply, that the circumstance that Sir William Parker's squadron resorted for a few days for shelter to Barbers' Bay, during stormy weather, which rendered its previous anchorage in Besika Bay insecure, does not appear to Her Majesty's Government to carry with it that degree of importance which the Austrian Government seems to have attached to it.

But if Her Majesty's Government were to consider it necessary to argue the matter upon the grounds on which the Austrian Government has placed it, they might have much to say in answer to what is contained in Baron Koller's note and in Prince Schwarzenberg's despatch. For by the Treaty of July 1841, the Five Powers bound themselves to respect and conform themselves to the regulations of the Turkish Government in regard to the Straits of the Dardanelles and Bosphorus; and it appears that by the port regulations established by the Turkish Government in 1845 for the Dardanelles, ships of war of all nations are allowed to anchor in the broad bay between the outer and the inner castles; and that the Straits of the Dardanelles, properly, so called, are considered by the Turkish Government as beginning only at the town of the Dardanelles where the narrow passage commences; and it might thence be contended that this anchoring of the British squadron in Barbers' Bay, a place which, according to the standing regulations of the port, is open at all times to ships of war of all nations, was no infringement of the Treaty of July 1841.

It might further be contended, and with much show of reason, that even if the anchoring of the British squadron in Barbers' Bay were an infringement of the Treaty of 1841, yet as that Treaty not only forbids the entrance of foreign ships of war into the Dardanelles while the Porte is at peace, but also records the declared determination of the Five Powers to respect and to uphold the independence of the Porte, the appearance of the British squadron in Barbers' Bay, even if it was an infringement, was at all events not the first infringement of that Treaty. But it might well be argued that this appearance of the British squadron was in fact, under the peculiar circumstances of the moment, not altogether irreconcileable with the spirit and true meaning of that Treaty; for the independence of the Sultan having been placed in jeopardy by demands which were made on him in a threatening manner, and which were not warranted by the stipulations of treaties, the presence of Her Majesty's squadron within

* See No. 164.

reach of Constantinople had a tendency to give confidence to the Sultan, and to restore to him that faculty of independent action which it was one of the objects of the Treaty to secure.

Moreover it may fairly be contended that the true meaning of the Treaty of 1841 is, that the engagements taken thereby on the part of the Sultan on the one hand, and on that of the Five Powers on the other hand, in regard to the exclusion of ships of war from the straits, apply to a state of things in which the Porte shall be really and substantially at peace. And it might be asserted that those engagements could not equally apply to such a state of things as has lately existed at Constantinople, when, although no actual hostilities had begun, yet the Porte had nevertheless received that intimation of a possible rupture with her two powerful neighbours which a formal suspension of diplomatic relations on the part of the Ministers of those neighbours was calculated and intended to convey; and when the Porte had also been informed by the official organs of those two Powers accredited at Constantinople, that the escape of any one of the refugees—an event which the Turkish Government might be unable to prevent, and which might happen at any moment—would be considered by Austria and Russia as tantamount to a declaration of war by Turkey against them. Surely this state of things cannot be looked upon as being that condition of real peace which is contemplated by the stipulations of the Treaty of 1841; and if the Sultan, threatened in so peremptory a manner by the official organs of two Great Powers immediately adjoining to his frontiers, had actually invited into the heart of his empire the armed assistance of friendly allies to protect him against a formidable danger, the outbreak of which was made to depend upon a contingency which he might be unable to prevent, it is not the Government of Austria that could with any degree of consistency have objected to the general principle upon which such an invitation would have been founded. But Her Majesty's Government do not wish to enter in regard to this matter into a controversial correspondence with the Government of Austria; and Her Majesty's Government are ready to concur in giving the widest construction to the stipulation of the Treaty of 1841. Her Majesty's Government are therefore willing to admit that, according to the fair interpretation of that Treaty, the Straits of the Dardanelles and of the Bosphorus, as regards the admission of ships of war not being such light vessels as are destined for the service of the Embassies and Missions at Constantinople, ought to be considered to be the whole of the two passages which lie between the Sea of Marmora and the Archipelago on the one hand, and between the Sea of Marmora and the Black Sea on the other hand; and that no ships of war except such single ships as those above-mentioned ought, while the Porte is at peace, to be allowed to enter into either of those passages.

With regard to the recent occurrence to which the Austrian note and despatch relate, it is sufficient to say that Sir William Parker took shelter in Barbers' Bay, not in pursuance of any instructions from Her Majesty's Government, but in accordance with information which he had received from the British Ambassador at Constantinople and from the Consul at the Dardanelles, and also from the Turkish officers in command at the Dardanelles, that his doing so in case of need would not be an infraction of the standing regulations of the Porte; and moreover, Sir W. Parker did not not go to Barbers' Bay until he was driven by stress of weather from Besika Bay, and he did not remain in Barbers' Bay longer than the boisterous state of the weather rendered it necessary for him so to do. But Her Majesty's Government having explained to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople their wish that the Treaty should be construed in its strictest sense, the squadron will not have again returned to Barbers' Bay, but will in case of need have found shelter in some other anchorage entirely outside the straits.

Your Excellency will read this despatch to Prince Schwarzenberg and give him a copy.

I am, &c.
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 197.

Viscount Palmerston to Lord Bloomfield.

(No. 4.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, January* 1, 1850.

I INCLOSE for your Lordship's information a copy of a despatch which I have addressed to Viscount Ponsonby on the subject of a communication made to Her Majesty's Government by the Austrian Chargé d'Affaires at this Court, of which a copy is also inclosed, relative to the entrance of the British squadron under Vice-Admiral Sir William Parker within the outer castles of the Dardanelles.

I am, &c.
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 198.

Viscount Palmerston to Lord Bloomfield.

(No. 5.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, January* 1, 1850.

YOUR Lordship will perceive in Prince Schwarzenberg's despatch to M. Koller, of the 27th of November, of which a copy is inclosed in my despatch No. 4 of this day, that considerable stress is laid upon the memorandum communicated by the Porte to the foreign Missions at Constantinople in the month of February, 1845, which professes to lay down the rule for the admission of foreign vessels, whether vessels of war or merchantmen, into the Straits of the Dardanelles and Bosphorus; and which the Austrian Minister contends, notwithstanding that they were subsequently modified as regards merchant-vessels, are still in force as regards ships of war in their original extent.

I think it therefore right to furnish your Lordship with copies of the inclosed despatches from Sir Stratford Canning to this office, written about the time when the regulations were promulgated. Your Lordship will perceive from the first of these papers, No. 67, of the 20th of March, 1845, that on the regulations being communicated to the British Embassy, Sir Stratford Canning at once applied for and obtained a modification of them in regard to the Dardanelles; and the precise nature of that modification is more fully explained in his Excellency's despatch to Her Majesty's Consul at the Dardanelles, of the 22nd of March, 1845, of which an extract is herewith transmitted to you; and which states that any British vessel, whether it be a merchant vessel or vessel of war, is allowed to come within the outer castles of the Dardanelles at once, as far as the anchorage of the Kefez Bournou, or Point Barbieri, by night as well as by day.

But not satisfied with having obtained this modification of the original regulations as regarded the Dardanelles, Sir Stratford Canning, as you will see from his despatches, No. 206, of the 3rd of September, No. 217, of the 16th of September, and No. 237, of the 16th of October, all of the year 1845, induced the Porte to consent to a similar modification in regard to vessels arriving in the Bosphorus from the Black Sea. The assent of the Porte was contained in a note of the 13th of October, 1845, of which a copy is inclosed in Sir Stratford Canning's despatch No. 237; and it appears from the same despatch that the dragoman of the British Embassy having about the same time made some inquiry as to the passage of the Dardanelles, Ali Effendi assured him that the concession previously made in that respect continued in force.

The last papers which I have to transmit to your Lordship on this matter are copies of two letters from Her Majesty's Consul at the Dardanelles to Vice-Admiral Sir William Parker, dated the 26th and 30th of October last, in the first of which your Lordship will find in inverted commas the regulation now in force regarding the entrance of ships of

war into the Straits of the Dardanelles, which your Lordship will observe is in strict conformity with what is stated in Sir Stratford Canning's despatch No. 67, and in his despatch to Her Majesty's Consul at the Dardanelles of March 22, 1845.

I have however to state to your Lordship that although I have thought it right to furnish you with these particulars, Her Majesty's Government still adhere to the opinions expressed to Sir Stratford Canning in my despatches Nos. 298 and 306, of the 24th and 30th of November last, of which copies were transmitted to you in my despatches No. 37, of the 27th of November, and No. 46, of the 10th of December, namely, that it would be a forced construction of the regulations of the Porte to apply them to a squadron of line-of-battle ships; and that the natural and obvious construction of the Treaty of July 13, 1841, and the construction which Great Britain has the strongest motive of interest to contend for, would exclude such a squadron both from the anchorage within the outer castles of the Dardanelles and from the anchorage within the outer castles of the Bosphorus.

I am, &c.
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

Inclosure 1 in No. 198.

Sir Stratford Canning to the Earl of Aberdeen.

My Lord, *Constantinople, March* 20, 1845.

I AVAIL myself of the present opportunity to bring under your Lordship's notice a memorandum or note which I have received from Chekib Effendi respecting the prohibition of ships of war to enter the Bosphorus or Dardanelles, and regulating the passage of merchant-vessels through those straits. The result of some communication which I have had with the Turkish Minister upon this subject is, that vessels will be allowed to come within the entrance of the straits, both here and at the Dardanelles, in such manner as to shelter them from accidents of weather, but that in other respects the regulations will be carried into effect in the manner announced.

Conceiving that, with the above-mentioned explanation, there is nothing to be fairly objected to in the measure thus adopted by the Turkish Government, I content myself with recommending that the local authorities be instructed to abstain carefully from any unnecessary rigour in the execution of these orders, and I forward the notice to your Lordship at the same time that I communicate it to those who are more immediately concerned.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

Inclosure 2 in No. 198.

Chekib Effendi to Sir Stratford Canning.

(Traduction.) 15 *Sefer*, 1261. (27 *Février*, 1845.)

VOTRE Excellence sait que l'entrée des bâtimens de guerre des Puissances étrangères dans les Détroits de la Mer Blanche et de la Mer Noire a été de tout tems prohibée. Cette ancienne règle a acquis plus de vigueur encore par le Traité conclu le 19 Regib de l'an de l'Hégire 1257 (13 Juillet, 1841), entre la Sublime Porte et les Cinq Grandes Puissances. Ainsi, lorsque des bâtimens de guerre, grands ou petits, et quelle que soit la Puissance à laquelle ils appartiennent, voudront entrer dans les détroits susdits, on commencera par leur dire que l'entrée leur est défendue. S'ils ne font pas attention à cela, on tirera un ou deux coups de canon sans balle; et s'ils persistent encore à vouloir entrer, alors, comme un pareil procédé sera en contravention au Traité et à la règle, on les empêchera d'entrer, en tirant sur eux à balle.

Il est également connu qu'on ne permet pas aux bâtimens marchands en général, soit Ottoman, soit des nations amies, de passer les Détroits après le coucher du soleil; on voit toutefois, de tems à autre, des bâtimens marchands qui, ne voulant pas observer cette règle, cherchent à entrer; et bien que l'on tâche de les en empêcher, en tirant des coups de canon seulement pour les avertir et sans dessein de les atteindre, comme ils savent que ces coups de canon ne leur feront point de mal, il n'en résulte aucun avantage réel.

Or, cette ancienne défense à l'égard de bâtimens marchands est uniquement nécessitée par l'impossibilité de discerner si le navire qui passe pendant la nuit est un bâtiment de guerre ou de commerce. Mais les autorités nous écrivent et nous représentent que comme on attribue à une espèce de tolérance le fait qu'on n'a pas tiré des coups de canon sur les bâtimens qui ont passé jusqu'à present avec dessein de leur nuire, la plupart des bâtimens cherchent à annuler la règle en question.

C'est pourquoi il vient d'être définitivement arrêté de mettre complètement à exécution, à l'égard de tous les bâtimens qui voudront passer les détroits après le coucher du soleil, cette règle de prohibition absolue; règle qui doit être inviolablement maintenue comme partie d'un ancien système administratif de la Sublime Porte, et comme une suite nécessaire de ce qui est établi par le Traité qui a été conclu, il y a peu de tems, avec les Cinq Puissances Alliées.

En conséquence, on a fait savoir aux autorités qu'un délai de trois mois, à compter du 1er Mars de l'année courante, 1261, a été fixé; que ce terme expiré, elles devront d'abord donner à entendre par des signaux aux bâtimens qui insisteront à entrer dans les détroits, la défense qu'il y a; que s'ils ne font pas cas de cela, elles devront tirer deux ou trois coups de canon sans balle; et que s'ils ne font pas cas de cela non plus, elles, devront employer tous les moyens de les empêcher d'entrer, en tirant sur eux à balle.

Ainsi nous adressons à votre Excellence le présent mémorandum officiel pour la prier de porter dès à présent, et de la manière qui convient, les mesures dont il s'agit à la connaissance des capitaines de bâtimens marchands Anglais; pour faire savoir que si par suite de la mise en pratique du système ci-dessus énoncé, il y aura des dommages et du préjudice, on ne pourra ni réclamer, ni s'en plaindre; et enfin pour que votre Excellence ait la bonté de donner des ordres et faire les injonctions nécessaires et analogues.

Inclosure 3 in No. 198.

Sir Stratford Canning to Consul Lander.

(Extract.) *Constantinople, March* 22, 1845.

IN directing your attention to the importance of conforming strictly to the regulations adopted by the Ottoman Government, I have the satisfaction to state that any British vessel, whether it be a merchant-vessel or a vessel of war, is allowed to come within the outer castles of the Dardanelles at once, as far as the anchorage of Kefez Bournou or Point Barbieri by night as well as by day. I am assured by the Ottoman Minister that a permission to this effect including the vessels of other friendly Powers, will form a part of the instructions addressed to the commanders of the castles and other Turkish authorities of the Dardanelles.

P.S.—*March* 26, 1845.—I am assured by the chief interpreter of the Embassy, upon the authority of Chekib Effendi, that the above-mentioned instructions have already been dispatched.

Inclosure 4 in No. 198.

Sir Stratford Canning to the Earl of Aberdeen.

My Lord, *Constantinople, September 3*, 1845.

WITH my despatch No. 67 of this year, I transmitted to your Lordship a memorandum from the Porte, notifying certain regulations respecting the passage of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles by vessels, whether native or foreign, arriving at the entrance of either strait after sunset. The concession which I succeeded in obtaining from the Porte, as stated in that despatch, was found to be sufficient only with respect to the Dardanelles. The anchorage assigned to vessels arriving in the Bosphorus after dark from the Black Sea, has been since ascertained, on the testimony of experienced seamen, to be unsafe, and it was therefore necessary to request that they might be allowed to anchor at some convenient place more completely within the batteries.

The accompanying copy of a memorandum which I addressed to the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs, will explain more completely to your Lordship the grounds of my demand, which was supported by similar representations from other foreign Missions, whose national vessels had been fired at by the Turkish batteries; and I have now the satisfaction to state that after the usual proportion of delay and difficulty, the point has been conceded, as your Lordship will perceive by the reports inclosed herewith from M. Frederick Pisani.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

Inclosure 5 in No. 198.

Memorandum addressed by Sir Stratford Canning to the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Péra de Constantinople, le 13 Août, 1845.

A PEINE la Sublime Porte avait renouvelé aux bâtimens, tant indigènes qu'étrangers, la défense de passer les Détroits du Bosphore et des Dardanelles pendant la nuit, que l'Ambassade de Sa Majesté Britannique, tout en reconnaissant le principe de la mesure, signala au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères l'inconvénient et même le péril auquel le commerce de toutes les nations serait exposé si l'on refusait aux bâtimens la permission de jeter l'ancre dans les détroits, toutes les fois qu'ils arriveraient trop tard pour continuer leur voyage avant le matin. Les communications qui s'en sont suivies entre son Excellence et l'Ambassade suffisaient pour autoriser celle-ci à notifier qu'il serait permis à tout bâtiment arrivant après le coucher du soleil, de passer les forts extérieurs jusqu'à la Pointe Barbieri dans les Dardanelles, et jusqu'à Bouyouk Liman dans le Bosphore.

Tout satisfaisant que parut d'abord cet arrangement, de nouvelles informations donnaient à croire que l'on était en erreur par rapport à Bouyouk Liman, et que cette station n'était pas du tout propre à l'objet qu'on se proposait. La justesse de cette idée est maintenant confirmée par l'opinion des navigateurs les plus expérimentés. Il est constaté que la station de Bouyouk Liman, loin d'avoir les qualités requises, est positivement dangereuse, surtout en hiver, et quand le vent du nord, ou plutôt de nord-est, souffle avec violence.

La Sublime Porte, qui a toujours protégé le commerce, et qui est trop sage pour vouloir porter à l'extrême le droit le mieux fondé, comprendra sans peine l'importance d'accorder un peu plus de latitude aux bâtimens en question. La station la plus voisine, et en même temps la plus sûre, est sans contredit à Buyukdéré. Il y en a une autre à peu-près vis-à-vis du côté d'Asie, mais quoique commode par rapport à la quarantaine, cette station n'a pas l'approche entièrement dégagé.

Quoiqu'il en soit, c'est avec une parfaite confiance dans la sagesse et l'amitié du Gouvernement Ottoman, que cette matière est de nouveau recommandée à l'attention bienveillante de M. le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères.

Inclosure 6 in No. 198.

M. Pisani to Sir Stratford Canning

M. l'Ambassadeur, *Péra, ce 1 Septembre*, 1845.

J'Ai l'honneur d'informer votre Exellence, de la part d'Ali Effendi, que la Porte a chargé hier son Excellence Fethi Ahmed Pacha, Inspecteur-Général des forteresses du Bosphore, de donner des ordres aux commandans de ces forteresses de ne plus tirer du canon pour forcer les bâtimens marchands qui veulent entrer pendant la nuit dans le canal, de s'arrêter à Bouyouk Liman, mais de les laisser entrer et passer de la même manière qu'ils entraient et passaient autrefois.

J'ai l'honneur, &c.
(Signé) FREDERICK PISANI.

Inclosure 7 in No. 198.

M. Pisani to Sir Stratford Canning.

M. l'Ambassadeur, *Péra, le 3 Septembre*, 1845.

J'Ai l'honneur d'informer votre Excellence que, d'après ses ordres, j'ai demandé à Ali Effendi quelques explications sur la communication qu'il vous a faite, il y a peu de jours, relativement aux bâtimens marchands qui arrivent de nuit de la Mer Noire.

Ali Effendi a confirmé la communication officielle qu'il vous a déjà faite à cet égard, et il a déclaré de nouveau aujourd'hui que les ordres nécessaires ont été donnés par la Porte afin que l'on ne tire plus des forts de la Mer Noire des coups de canon sur les bâtimens qui veulent entrer dans le canal après le coucher du soleil; et que les bâtimens marchands pourront désormais entrer même de nuit dans le canal sans obstacle, et aussi librement qu'ils le faisaient avant la dernière défense qui est maintenant levée.

J'ai l'honneur, &c.
(Signé) FREDERICK PISANI.

Inclosure 8 in No. 198.

Sir Stratford Canning to the Earl of Aberdeen.

My Lord, *Constantinople, September 16*, 1845.

REFERRING to my former despatch concerning the entrance of the Bosphorus by vessels arriving after sunset, I have to state that, notwithstanding the assurances made to me by Aali Effendi, as reported therein, a Russian merchantman has been fired at from the batteries, and an Austrian vessel of the same description struck with a shot, since I received the official communication that the old practice maintained before the adoption of the late regulation had been re-established. These incidents, which might have occurred to a British vessel, made it incumbent upon me to bring the question again before Aali Effendi; and finding that, although his Excellency assured me that orders had been given to prevent the recurrence of such incidents, he was not at liberty to answer my application in writing, I drew up a memorandum under my signature, of what

I understood to be the declared intention of the Porte, and directed it to be placed in the Turkish Minister's hands.

Inclosed herewith is a copy of this paper, which I trust will meet with your Lordship's approval, and prevent any future misunderstanding upon a question so important to Her Majesty's subjects engaged in the navigation of the Levant seas. No particular notice of it has been hitherto taken by the Porte, nor have I heard of any further obstacles being opposed to the entrance of vessels from the Black Sea.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

Inclosure 9 in No. 198.

Memorandum.

Pera of Constantinople, September 11, 1845.

CONSIDERING the regulations notified by the Sublime Porte with respect to the navigation of the Straits of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles, whether by native or foreign vessels, after sunset, and bearing more particularly in mind the principles established by treaty with respect to the passage of foreign armed vessels through the straits, the Undersigned has received with much satisfaction the Ottoman Minister's message in reply to his representations of the dangers experienced by vessels when obliged to anchor at night in the exposed situation of Buyuk Liman. He understands that, while in the Straits of the Dardanelles British vessels may anchor at any hour within the outer castles as high up as Cape Barbieri, the former practice is re-established with respect to merchant-vessels entering those of the Bosphorus from the Black Sea after dark; and consequently that such vessels, instead of being obliged to cast anchor in the waters of Buyuk Liman, are now at liberty to seek a safer anchorage farther within the straits. This is the substance of what the Undersigned has notified to the British authorities, for the information of those concerned; and he has performed this duty in the conviction that corresponding orders have been given by the Sublime Porte to the commanders of the forts in each strait.

Inclosure 10 in No. 198.

Sir Stratford Canning to the Earl of Aberdeen.

My Lord, *Constantinople, October* 16, 1845.

THE Porte has not only acceded to my wishes respecting the admittance of British vessels to a place of safe anchorage within the Straits of the Bosphorus after dark, but a note announcing this considerate modification of the prohibitory measure has been addressed to me by Aali Effendi, and no doubt, as it is general in its application, to my colleagues also.

Your Lordship may remember that a similar indulgence was obtained in favour of vessels entering the Dardanelles from the Archipelago, and the accompanying report from M. Pisani shows that the Turkish Minister assents without difficulty to its continuance.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

Inclosure 11 in No. 198.

The Porte to Sir Stratford Canning.

(Translation.) 12 *Shewal*, 1261.

AS the natural consequences of the ancient prohibition to ships of war of foreign nations entering the Straits of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles, the entrance of all ships after sunset was, as your Excellency is already aware, some time ago prohibited, separate memorandums to that effect being sent to your Embassy and the Missions of the Allied Powers respectively, and three months' delay, reckoning from March of the current year, being accorded, notice was given that at the expiration of that time, if any ship did not conform to the prohibition, at first two or three cannon without shot to give warning, and that warning disregarded, shotted cannon, would be fired. Subsequently the execution of that practice having commenced, it was understood that there being no safe harbour on the outside of the Bosphorus, and the anchorage in Buyuk Liman appointed for ships arriving at the mouth of the Bosphorus towards evening, being from stress of weather and particularly in winter insecure, ships were likely to suffer inconvenience.

The Sublime Porte, while always careful to preserve her national rights and established system, pays at the same time every attention to the execution of every possible facility to commerce; and His Majesty the Sultan has issued his royal command that this prohibition in regard of the Black Sea only should be foregone, and permission given to ships arriving at night to enter the Bosphorus as far as Buyukdery, there to anchor; notice whereof having been given to the proper officers, the purport of the present memorandum is to convey to your Excellency the same information.

Inclosure 12 in No. 198.

M. Pisani to Sir Stratford Canning.

M. l'Ambassadeur, *Péra, ce 15 Octobre*, 1845.

J'AI l'honneur d'informer votre Excellence que, conformément aux ordres qu'elle m'avait donnés par suite du mémorandum de la Porte en date du 13 courant, par lequel la défense aux bâtimens d'entrer, après le coucher du soleil, dans le canal de la Mer Noire et de venir en-de ça de Bouyouk Liman est levée, et la permission qu'ils viennent désormais, même pendant la nuit, mouiller dans la Baie de Buyukdéré est accordée, j'ai demandé à Aali Effendi des explications sur le passage du susdit mémorandum, relatif aux bâtimens qui arrivent de l'Archipel au Détroit des Dardanelles.

Son Excellence m'a répondu qu'il est bien entendu que les bâtimens arrivant aux Dardanelles après le coucher du soleil, peuvent venir jusqu'au Cap Barbieri, pour y mouiller, et continuer leur route le lendemain.

J'ai l'honneur, &c.

(Signé) F. PISANI.

Inclosure 13 in No. 198.

Consul Calvert to Vice-Admiral Sir W. Parker.

(Private.)

Sir, *Dardanelles, October* 26, 1849.

HER Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople having requested me to communicate to your Excellency without loss of time the existing regulations regarding the entrance of the Straits of the Dardanelles by ships of war, I have the honour to inform you that

"Vessels of war of all nations arriving in these straits without the

necessary permission for their passage onwards having been received from Constantinople, are allowed to make choice of any anchorage between the outer castles and Point Nagara which their respective commanders may consider most convenient and safe, and where they will be required to remain until the arrival of the firman for them to pass on to Constantinople."

Should, therefore, your Excellency consider it desirable for the squadron under your command to take up an anchorage within these straits, which will in all respects be more protected than Besika Bay, I take leave to inform you that I am perfectly understood on this subject with the Pash commanding these forts, who has sent the requisite orders for the commanders of the outer castles to allow the squadron under your command to enter these straits without let or hindrance by day or by night, and to proceed to any anchorage between the said castles and Point Nagara. I venture to suggest the anchorage situated between Barbers' Point and the inner Asiatic castle of Sultanieh Kalessi as being the most convenient in all respects, for it is safe in all weather, and there is an excellent watering place with an abundant supply of good fresh water on the European shore about a mile below the battery of Namasia.

The anchorage of Nagara Bay would in many respects have been preferable had not the supply of water which once supplied the so-called Captain Pasha's Fountain in great abundance, now totally failed.

The present communication is made in duplicate and given in charge of two persons in whom all confidence may be placed, and who will deliver it to you either at Besika Bay or off Tenedos.

As soon as I hear of the arrival of the squadron anywhere on the coast I shall have the honour of waiting upon your Excellency, when I shall take an opportunity to communicate the substance of a private and confidential letter received to-day from Her Majesty's Ambassador, who has authorized me to show it to your Excellency.

I have, &c.
(Signed) F. W. CALVERT.

Inclosure 14 in No. 198.

Consul Calvert to Vice-Admiral Sir W. Parker.

Sir, *Dardanelles, October* 30, 1849.

AFTER seriously considering the substance of the private communication made to me yesterday by your Excellency, whilst I was on board of the "Queen," and after maturely weighing the nature of the doubts entertained by Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, as to the propriety of the squadron under your command entering the Straits of the Dardanelles, and taking up a more sheltered anchorage than that of Besika Bay, I have the honour to state that I feel now convinced that such doubts can only have arisen in consequence of the true meaning of the word *Détroits*, as contained in the original treaty signed in French on the 13th July, 1841, having been erroneously rendered in the English text by the word *Straits*. The *Straits of the Dardanelles* are always designated in French as *Le Canal des Dardanelles*, and the real sense of the word "détroit" in the present instance, would evidently have been more appropriately rendered by calling it the "narrowest passages," thus implying that of the inner castles.

This assertion will be further corroborated by the substance of the inclosed copy of a despatch received at this Consulate from Her Majesty's Embassy at Constantinople on the 27th March, 1845, together with the copy of a memorandum from the Sublime Porte which accompanied it.

Considering furthermore that the instructions of the Turkish Government to the various officers in command of the forts of the Dardanelles since the signature of the Treaty, have invariably admitted the right of all foreign vessels of war to enter within the outer castles of the Dardanelles; and also the fact that Russian, Austrian, and American vessels of war have at all times availed without hesitation of the facility

thus granted indiscriminately to ships of all nations; I am the more confirmed in the opinion expressed by me to your Excellency as to the undoubted propriety that the squadron under your command should anchor for shelter within these straits.

I have, &c.
(Signed) F. W. CALVERT.

No. 199.

Viscount Palmerston to Lord Bloomfield.

(No. 6.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, January* 1, 1850.

I HAVE received your Lordship's confidential despatch of the 14th ultimo, reporting your communications with Count Nesselrode respecting the entrance of the British squadron under Vice-Admiral Sir William Parker within the outer castles of the Dardanelles, and stating the reasons which induced you to furnish the Russian Minister with an extract of my private letter to you of the 25th of November on that subject.

I have to state to your Lordship in reply, that I entirely approve of your having communicated to Count Nesselrode the extract of my private letter; and I have to instruct your Lordship to say that Her Majesty's Government concur with the Russian Government in thinking that, according to the true intent and meaning of the Treaty of July 1841, the Straits of the Dardanelles and Bosphorus ought to be understood as being the whole extent of the passages between the Archipelago and the Sea of Marmora, and between the Sea of Marmora and the Black Sea. This opinion has been communicated to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, and will be acted upon by Her Majesty's ships of war in future.

At the same time your Lordship should assure Count Nesselrode that if Her Majesty's squadron took refuge during a few days of bad weather in Barbers' Bay, neither Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, nor Her Majesty's Consul at the Dardanelles, conceived that in informing Sir William Parker that in case of stress of weather he was at liberty to anchor in that bay, they were infringing upon the Treaty of 1841; and the Russian Government will long since have learned that the squadron did not remain in Barbers' Bay longer than the bad weather which had driven it thither continued. But if any similar bad weather shall have come on during the rest of the time that the squadron remained in those parts, it will have sought shelter elsewhere, and will not again have passed within the outer castles of the Dardanelles.

I am, &c.
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 200.

Lord Bloomfield to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received January* 3, 1850.)

(No. 68. Confidential.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, December* 18, 1849.

AT the first interview which I had with Count Nesselrode after my return from England in October last, I requested his Excellency to mention my arrival to the Emperor; and according to the usual practice at this Court under circumstances of the return of a foreign Minister from leave of absence, I begged him to ask His Imperial Majesty to grant me an audience.

Count Nesselrode said that the Emperor was at Czarskoe Celo, and that he would not fail to take His Imperial Majesty's pleasure on the subject; but weeks passed over and no notice was taken of my application.

However, on the arrival of the Court at the Winter Palace about the end of November, the Chancellor took an opportunity at one of my interviews with him, to say that he should endeavour to arrange an audience for me; but again I heard nothing further, and concluded that His Imperial Majesty had decided not to receive me in consequence of the difference of opinions which existed between the British and Russian Governments upon the affairs of Turkey, and of the discussion which had arisen upon various points connected with the question.

Indeed I was fully borne out in this impression by reports which had reached me from different quarters; and it was even said last week by persons about the Court, and believed by several of my colleagues, that the Emperor had determined that the circle usually held at the Palace on the 5th December, the fête day St. Nicholas, should not take place, because he wished to avoid seeing the English Minister, and could not help doing so upon an occasion when the whole Diplomatic Body are invited.

After all this your Lordship may imagine that I was somewhat surprised when I called, by appointment, on Count Nesselrode last Sunday, to be informed that the Emperor would give me a private audience on the following day at 1 o'clock. Accordingly I repaired to the Winter Palace yesterday at the appointed time and was received with the usual ceremonial.

After the Master of the Ceremonies who accompanied me had retired from the Imperial presence, and I was alone with the Emperor, His Imperial Majesty said,—"J'ai tardé à vous revoir plus tôt parceque nous n'aurions eu qu'à nous dire mutuellement des choses désagréables; mais maintenant que je regarde cette affaire Turque comme terminée, je suis très aise de pouvoir en causer avec vous." He then shook hands with me; his countenance, which was clouded over when I entered the room, assumed a milder expression; and he commenced a long tirade on the injustice which we had done him in supposing that we had any ulterior views on Turkey, or that he had ever conceived the idea of making his late demand for the extradition of the Poles a pretext for war. His words were—"Je n'ai demandé que ce qui m'est assuré par mes traités avec la Porte; je n'ai point ces vues d'ambition qu'on m'attribue; je réponds aussi des vues de mon fils; et je vous déclare encore que mon petit-fils sera élevé dans les mêmes principes de politique; votre Gouvernement peut donc être parfaitement tranquille à cet égard."

The Emperor then said that instead of looking always at Russia with suspicion and canvassing every move she made, and calculating that it was dictated by some deep-laid scheme of aggrandizement, he could tell me that we had much more to apprehend from the ambition of France in the East than from his empire. That, in the first place, as he had before observed, he did not covet the possession of Turkey; on the contrary, he wished her independence as much as we did. His Majesty here paused, and I said that this assurance could not fail to be highly satisfactory to Her Majesty's Government; but I added, that in England our notions of the meaning of independence were perhaps different from those entertained by Russia, because Russia had assumed a tone in her communications with Turkey which scarcely left her the freedom of action belonging to an independent State. To this His Majesty replied that he had demanded of the Porte nothing beyond what he had a right to by treaties; and he then made some violent remarks as to the conduct of Sir Stratford Canning, declaring that but for his interference at Constantinople the late differences would never have arisen.

I here remarked that I thought His Imperial Majesty was unjust in attributing to Her Majesty's Ambassador the origin of the late discussion. His opinion had been asked by the Porte in a moment of great perplexity, and he had given it conscientiously; and I could declare from my knowledge of Sir Stratford Canning's correspondence, that no man in his position could have given advice of a nature better calculated to prevent the Porte from taking any measures which could give His Majesty just cause of offence; for that he did his utmost from the commencement of the discussion to inculcate a spirit of moderation.

The Emperor then reverted to the continued suspicions which we entertained as to his projects on Turkey; and alluded to the fact of his

having had several conversations with the Duke of Wellington, Sir Robert Peel, and Lord Aberdeen, when he was in England in 1844, and in which he described himself as having given the most solemn assurances of the absence of those ambitious views on Turkey which it was then, as it is now, the fashion to attribute to him; and he added that when Count Nesselrode subsequently and in the same year visited England, he directed him to place these assurances on record in a formal manner, which had been done.

He declared to me, that after having done this he did not expect so soon to have an interpretation put upon his motives such as had just taken place. He exclaimed, "Cette malheureuse Porte ne fait que végéter, et elle n'a qu'à végéter aussi longtems que possible, car au fond c'est par nous qu'elle existe." Upon my inquiring of His Majesty what I was to understand by this expression, he replied that if he wished Turkey to fall into a state of complete anarchy and confusion, nothing would be required of him but to withdraw his influence from Bulgaria, Servia, Wallachia, and Moldavia, and these provinces would soon be joined by others as well as the Christian population in Turkey; and once freed from the restraint which he exercised on them, and by which alone their allegiance to the Porte was maintained, they would make short work of the Turkish Empire, and we should soon see it crumble to pieces.

From this subject he turned to the anchoring of our squadron in the Dardanelles, and related some anecdotes connected with the blockade of the Dardanelles, during the last war with Turkey, by the Russian fleet under the command of Admiral Ricord, which he said was effectually maintained during a whole winter without a serious accident happening to any of the ships employed on this service, and therefore he said that he could not understand how a British squadron under an Admiral of such great experience, and which was doubtless better commanded, better manned and equipped, than any fleet he could send to sea, should be forced by stress of weather to pass the entrance of the Dardanelles, and thereby to violate the Treaty of 1841.

I took advantage of a moment of silence to say that I had hoped the despatch and letter addressed to me by Sir Stratford Canning (of the 5th of November), which had been laid before His Majesty, would have satisfied him that the passing of the squadron into the straits was accidental; but I could assure him further, that the instructions under which Sir William Parker proceeded to the east end of the Mediterranean, a copy of which were in my possession, were plainly and simply to proceed towards the Dardanelles, and on his arrival there to be guided by the communications which he would receive from Sir Stratford Canning as to his further movements.

The Emperor said that he had no wish at the present moment to commence a formal discussion of the question, because he considered it was terminated by the communication of the papers which I had sent to Count Nesselrode (as reported in my despatch "confidential" of the 14th instant), and which he said contained all the explanation that was necessary; that there was ample evidence in them to show that Her Majesty's Government did not approve of what had occurred, but that on the contrary they were desirous to abide by the stipulations and the spirit of the Treaty of July 13, 1841, and therefore everything would remain on the footing established by that Treaty; and he was glad to think that no new negotiations on the subject would now be required.

The Emperor appeared to consider that he had now said all that was necessary on the Eastern question, and here closed his remarks on this subject.

He then made inquiries as to the health of Her Majesty the Queen and His Royal Highness Prince Albert, and alluded with much feeling to the intelligence which had just arrived of the lamented death of the Queen Dowager.

His Imperial Majesty afterwards spoke of the distracted state of Germany, and said that he expected that next spring matters in Prussia at all events would be in just as bad a state as they were two years ago; that as to his brother-in-law the King of Prussia, "c'était un fou," and

he had no patience with his proceedings. On the other hand, His Imperial Majesty passed a high eulogium on the Emperor of Austria, who, he said, had, notwithstanding his youth and inexperience, given strong proofs of natural talent and aptitude for government. "But," observed His Imperial Majesty, "how will he ever be able to direct that incongruous mass of people composing his empire, speaking different languages, with different habits, and having no sympathies with one another, and whom he is about to attempt to Germanise!" That, he said, however, was not a more difficult task than the favourite idea of the King of Prussia, "German unity," which he considered a senseless undertaking, the only effect of which hitherto had been to establish a jealousy, amounting almost to a quarrel, between Austria and Prussia.

"The state of Germany," said His Imperial Majesty, "causes me much anxiety, and in addition to the necessity which it imposes on me to keep a large military force ready for any emergency, it obliges me almost to close my frontiers, in order to prevent German Socialists and others from coming into the country. My position as regards my relations with foreign countries," His Majesty added, "is much the same as it was when I last saw you. I shall endeavour to be prepared, as I was then, for whatever may happen; and shall be ready, if called upon, to go to the assistance of those who may require and ask help from me."

His Imperial Majesty spoke to me about Great Britain, and on my assuring him that, with the exception of Ireland, the country was in a most prosperous condition, he said he did not conceive how we could allow such a mass of refugees to come and shelter themselves under the asylum of our laws, observing that the presence of these people must be not only a source of inconvenience to us, but the facility with which they could establish themselves in England, and were there able to continue their Socialist occupations and conspiracies, was, he thought, a circumstance much to be deplored.

I here assured His Majesty that every precaution which the laws of England admitted, was taken to prevent any cause of dissatisfaction or annoyance to our neighbours; that the inconvenience produced by the presence of this quantity of foreigners was of much less importance in England than might appear at first sight; and even if it were otherwise, we could not help it, for there was no legal power in England which could close the door of hospitality to the refugee who came to seek protection in our land. The Emperor here observed that although he might admire this system as practised in England, and was ready to admit also that our constitution worked well, still he thought that no other country was fit to be governed in the same manner, and therefore he looked upon all those attempts to imitate us as so many efforts to overthrow an old system without knowing what to establish in its place.

These allusions were followed up by a few remarks from His Imperial Majesty on the state of Switzerland, and he said he should most willingly give his moral support to any negotiation which might be set on foot to prevent that country from continuing to be the resort of refugees, and becoming a focus of intrigues and machinations against the neighbouring States; and he added that he considered the establishment of a general system of extradition ought to be attempted; that it could not fail to be advantageous, and tend greatly to the restoration of tranquillity in Europe.

The Emperor spoke on several other topics during the half-hour which I passed with His Imperial Majesty, but his remarks were not of sufficient interest to require that I should repeat them.

On taking leave of me, His Imperial Majesty again alluded to the reasons which had induced him to delay granting me an audience, and on shaking hands with me, he said—"Je suis bien aise d'avoir pu vous revoir.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 201.

Lord Bloomfield to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received January* 3, 1850.)

(No. 76.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, December* 19, 1849.

WITH reference to my despatch marked "confidential," of the 14th instant, I have the honour to inform your Lordship that at an interview which I had with Count Nesselrode on Sunday last, his Excellency told me that the communications which I had sent him containing the opinions of Her Majesty's Government on the subject of the anchoring inside the Dardanelles of the squadron under Sir William Parker, had done away with the necessity in which the Imperial Government would otherwise have been placed, of addressing to Her Majesty's Government a formal protest on the matter such as had been sent from Vienna, and which they could not have avoided doing, if I had not placed them in possession of some written document; and he added that as soon as he was sufficiently recovered from the attack of illness, under which he had been suffering for some days past, to leave the house, he should submit to the Emperor the draft of a despatch to Baron Brunnow, the object of which would be to terminate this affair.

I now hasten to report that I have this instant had an interview with the Chancellor, at which his Excellency stated that since we last met, he had seen His Imperial Majesty, and that he proposed sending a messenger to London to-morrow, who would be the bearer of a communication to Baron Brunnow, which he had no doubt would be satisfactory to your Lordship, and which he trusted would put an end to all further discussion between the two Governments of the affair of the Dardanelles.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD

No. 202.

Lord Bloomfield to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received January* 3, 1850.)

(No. 77.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, December* 19, 1849.

I HAVE just seen Count Nesselrode, who mentioned to me that he had no doubt but that the relations between the Russian Legation at Constantinople and the Porte were re-established by this time, and that he hoped to have his expectations confirmed by the first Turkish post, which would be due at the end of the week.

In reply to an inquiry which I made as to the instructions which had been sent to M. Titow, which enabled his Excellency to look forward with so much certainty to this desirable result, he replied that he had directed that Minister to accept the assurances which were given by the Porte of their readiness to expel from Turkey the refugees now there, and not to press the question affecting those who might hereafter seek an asylum in the Ottoman dominions, saying that was a matter which could be settled by negotiation at some future time.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 203.

Baron Brunnow to Viscount Palmerston.

Ashburnham House, ce $\frac{21 \text{ Décembre}}{2 \text{ Janvier}}$, 1848/49.

LE Baron de Brunnow présente ses complimens à M. le Vicomte Palmerston, et a l'honneur de lui communiquer ci-jointe une dépêche de M. le Chancelier Comte Nesselrode du $\frac{9}{21}$ Décembre, dont il a été chargé de donner lecture à son Excellence, et de lui remettre copie.

Dans l'absence de M. le Vicomte Palmerston, le Baron de Brunnow n'a pas cru devoir retarder cette communication. Il s'empresse de s'en acquitter aujourd'hui, en priant son Excellence de vouloir bien lui en accuser réception.

Il saisit, &c.

Inclosure in No. 203.

Count Nesselrode to Baron Brunnow.

M. le Baron, *St. Pétersbourg, le* $\frac{9}{21}$ *Décembre*, 1848.

J'AI reçu en son tems le rapport par lequel votre Excellence nous a rendu compte des explications qu'elle avait obtenues de Lord Palmerston au sujet de l'infraction portée au Traité du 13 Juillet, 1841, par l'entrée de l'Amiral Parker avec son escadre dans l'intérieur des Dardanelles, et je n'attendais pour y répondre que les communications que Lord Palmerston vous avait promis de nous adresser ici directement. Ces communications viennent de nous être faites. Elles consistent dans l'extrait ci-joint d'une lettre de Lord Palmerston à Lord Bloomfield, et dans la copie également ci-incluse des observations et instructions qu'il a adressées récemment à Sir Stratford Canning, relativement à la position prise par l'escadre Britannique. C'est avec satisfaction que nous avons trouvé dans ces deux pièces la confirmation des explications et des assurances qui vous avaient été données par le Principal Secrétaire d'Etat. Tout en désavouant de la part de l'Ambassadeur et de l'Amiral Anglais, l'intention d'avoir voulu enfreindre le Traité Européen qui consacre la fermeture des détroits, Lord Palmerston reconnait explicitement que le règlement Turc, établi pour les bâtimens légers de guerre que la Porte s'est réservé le droit d'y faire entrer en tems de paix, ne saurait être aucunement applicable à une escadre telle que celle de l'Amiral Parker. Il déclare ne point admettre l'interprétation forcée qu'on a donnée à Constantinople aux termes de ce règlement, et la juge incompatible avec les stipulations du Traité. Il regrette que l'Amiral Anglais n'ait point cherché quelqu'autre ancrage en-dehors de la position irrégulière qu'il a prise, et s'engage à empêcher que pareille chose ait lieu à l'avenir. Nous ne pouvons que nous féliciter d'un désaveu aussi formel et d'assurances aussi positives. Nous nous trouvons dispensés par là de l'obligation pénible où nous aurions été à leur défaut, soit de protester formellement, comme l'Autriche vient de le faire en sa qualité de co-signataire du Traité de 1841, soit de nous prévaloir, dans le Bosphore, en faveur de notre escadre de la Mer Noire, du précédent établi aux Dardanelles en faveur de la flotte Anglaise. Du moment que ce précédent est improuvé par le Cabinet Britannique, et envisagé comme contraire au principe consacré par une transaction Européenne, il ne nous reste qu'à prendre acte de cette franche déclaration et de l'engagement que contracte Lord Palmerston de faire à l'avenir observer plus strictement les obligations qui en découlent.

Quant au Gouvernement Ottoman, auquel le Traité de 1841 impose également le devoir de veiller à la mise à exécution du même principe, et qui vient récemment d'y manquer, en ouvrant librement et en tems de paix l'entrée d'un des deux détroits à des bâtimens de guerre, il nous aurait été impossible de laisser passer une pareille infraction de sa part sans protestation ou sans réserves. M. Titoff a été chargé en conséquence de lui communiquer la dépêche ci-jointe en copie, que vous porterez, M. le Baron, à la connaissance de Lord Palmerston. Il est inutile d'ajouter que du moment où le Cabinet Britannique s'engage à faire rentrer ses agens dans les strictes limites du Traité, notre intention ne saurait être de nous en départir de notre côté, et que les éventualités signalées par nous au Gouvernement Ottoman tombent par là d'elles-mêmes. Votre Excellence voudra bien donner au Principal Secrétaire d'Etat lecture et copie de la présente dépêche.

Recevez, &c.
(Signé) NESSELRODE.

Inclosure 2 in No. 203.

Count Nesselrode to M. de Titoff.

St. Pétersbourg, le 28 Novembre, 1849.

LA note que votre Excellence a adressée à Aali Pacha sur l'apparition de l'escadre Britannique dans le Détroit des Dardanelles, a obtenu l'entière approbation de l'Empereur.

Ni le prétexte du mauvais tems, ni l'interprétation insidieuse au moyen de laquelle la Porte a prétendu justifier l'incident en question, ne sauraient être admissibles en justice et en raison, lorsqu'il s'agit d'un fait aussi grave que celui d'une atteinte portée à une transaction Européenne.

Si la rade de Bésika n'offrait pas à l'Amiral Parker un abri assez sûr contre le gros tems, il pouvait parfaitement choisir à son gré un meilleur mouillage. La détermination qu'il aurait prise n'aurait donné lieu à aucune objection de notre part, s'il avait établi sa station partout ailleurs que dans l'endroit dont l'accès lui était expressément interdit par une transaction à laquelle la Russie a été partie contractante. On concevra qu'il ne saurait nous être indifférent que le Traité de 1841 s'observe ou soit bravé. Or, ce Traité a posé le principe de la fermeture des Dardanelles de la manière la plus absolue et la plus expresse, sans se préoccuper le moins du monde de l'état de la mer et de la violence des vents.

Quant aux usages locaux qu'on allègue et par suite desquels les navires de commerce, ou même isolément quelques bâtimens légers sous pavillon de guerre, sont admis sans obstacle dans l'espace compris entre les premiers châteaux et celui de Tchanak-Kalessi, ces facilités, accordées par tolérance à des navires destinés à franchir les Dardanelles, ne sauraient évidemment être invoquées en faveur des escadres entières, auxquelles nommément s'applique dans toute sa rigueur le principe de la fermeture des détroits.

De deux choses l'une, la Convention de 1841 est obligatoire, ou elle ne l'est pas. Dans tous les cas, le Bosphore, comme les Dardanelles, se ferme et s'ouvre, selon que le Traité s'exécute ou non. Sans nous engager dans une controverse oiseuse, nous ferons observer seulement que si le raisonnement de la Porte est bon pour l'escadre Anglaise, il doit l'être également pour notre flotte de la Mer Noire. Votre Excellence est donc invitée à prendre à tout événement acte du précédent établi à l'égard de l'escadre de l'Amiral Parker, et vous avertirez la Porte que si, dans des conjonctures analogues, un Amiral Russe jugeait opportun de chercher un abri dans le Bosphore, nous nous croirions parfaitement autorisés désormais à venir avec nos vaisseaux mouiller dans la Baie de Bouyoukdéré, et à nous prévaloir des raisonnemens appliqués par la Porte aux Dardanelles pour en inférer que dans le Bosphore ce n'est qu'à partir de cette baie que

commence le détroit proprement dit, auquel se rapporte la défense stipulée dans la Convention de 1841.

Votre Excellence voudra bien donner au Ministère Ottoman lecture et copie de la présente dépêche.

Recevez, &c.
(Signe) NESSELRODE.

No. 204.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received January 3, 1850.)

(No. 283. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Vienna, December 25, 1849.*

I HAVE reason to believe that the Austrian Minister has expressed a wish at St. Petersburgh for the speedy termination of the affair of the refugees in Turkey.

I have, &c.
(Signed) PONSONBY.

No. 205.

Sir Stratford Canning to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received January 4, 1850.)

(No. 376. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Therapia, December 11, 1849.*

I RECEIVED last night from Aali Pasha, in original, a despatch addressed to his Excellency by M. Musurus, the Ottoman Minister at Vienna, and I avail myself of a chance opportunity to forward a copy of it to your Lordship herewith. It gives an account of M. Musurus's communications with Prince Schwarzenberg on the subject of the pending differences, and I observe with concern that the Austrian Cabinet continues to insist on demands which the Porte has hitherto manifested, on just and reasonable grounds, a decided unwillingness to admit.

For the present I have only time enough at my disposal to remark that Aali Pasha has sent me of his own accord a positive denial of the statement attributed to him by M. Musurus respecting the return of Her Majesty's squadron from the Dardanelles to Besika Bay, and of his having been the first to propose a term for keeping open the proposed list of refugees to be detained in Asia Minor.

I am informed by M. Pisani on this latter point, that the Internuncio, on being called upon for an explanation, acknowledged that in writing to his Government he had ascribed the proposal to Aali Pasha, though it had in truth proceeded from himself; and that he had done so under an impression that the proposal would be more likely on that supposition to meet with a favourable reception from Prince Schwarzenberg.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

Inclosure in No. 205.

M. Musurus to Aali Effendi.

Monseigneur, *Vienne, le 27 Novembre, 1849.*

J'AI reçu la lettre que votre Excellence m'a fait l'honneur de m'adresser en date du 14 de ce mois, et je suis heureux de pouvoir féliciter votre Excellence de ce que par l'acceptation du projet de note responsive à adresser à M. de Titoff, la partie de la question des réfugiés à Widdin concernant la Russie, a été également résolue d'une manière définitive et aussi satisfaisante que conforme à la dignité de la Sublime Porte.

Par le projet de réponse à remettre à M. le Comte de Stürmer j'ai remarqué que dans sa note ce Ministre a mis en avant certaines demandes dont il n'avait point été question ici, et auxquelles M. le Prince de Schwarzenberg n'avait pas même fait la moindre allusion pendant tout le tems que cette affaire était traitée à Vienne. Je suis donc porté à croire que M. de Stürmer a voulu enchérir sur ce que son Gouvernement avait accepté définitivement et avec pleine satisfaction.

M. le Prince Schwarzenberg, que j'avais vu avant-hier, aussitôt après son retour de son voyage, et avec qui j'ai eu un nouvel entretien dans la journée d'hier après la réception de la dépêche précitée de votre Excellence, m'a dit qu'il était très content du choix de Kutahié pour lieu d'internement des chefs des insurgés Hongrois; que cette ville lui paraissait par sa position topographique, très propre à une telle destination; mais que quant au projet de réponse communiqué à M. de Stürmer, et dont ce dernier lui avait transmis la copie, il y avait trois points qu'il croyait devoir signaler à mon attention.

"Le premier point," a-t-il continué, "c'est que son Excellence Aali Pacha dans son projet de note ne dit point que la mesure prise à l'égard des chefs de l'insurrection Hongroise ne pourra cesser que d'un commun accord. Cette omission m'inspire, je vous l'avoue, quelques doutes sur les intentions ultérieures de votre Gouvernement."

Je lui ai fait observer que nous n'avons jamais admis que l'internement durerait à perpétuité; que nous avions au contraire entendu que le tems viendrait où cette mesure devait cesser, et que ce tems serait évidemment celui où la tranquillité serait rétablie en Hongrie sur des bases solides. "Certes," a-t-il repris, "nous n'exigeons pas que vous gardiez ces individus éternellement, mais nous ne voulons pas non plus qu'un beau jour, à notre insu, et sans notre consentement, vous les remettiez en liberté, parce que vous croiriez que la tranquillité a été rétablie chez nous. C'est nous seuls qui sommes en état de connaitre quand la mesure d'internement et de surveillance ne serait plus nécessaire pour la tranquillité de nos Etats. Il faut donc que la Sublime Porte, s'entende avec nous avant de faire cesser cette mesure. C'est pour cela que nous ne pouvons nous désister de cette condition, et que j'ai dû transmettre à M. le Comte de Stürmer des instructions en conséquence. Quoiqu'il en soit, je crois qu'à l'heure qu'il est votre Excellence a pu s'entendre sur ce point avec M. le Comte de Stürmer.

"Le second point," a-t-il poursuivi, "c'est l'objection faite par votre Gouvernement relativement aux individus qui n'ont pas été portés sur la liste présentée par M. le Comte de Stürmer, et qui pourraient être désignés plus tard." A cela j'ai répondu que j'étais étonné de cette nouvelle demande de M. l'Internonce, et que les raisons rapportées à ce sujet dans le projet de note de votre Excellence étaient d'autant plus légitimes qu'il n'avait été fait mention d'une telle proposition ni dans ma note à M. le Prince de Schwarzenberg, ni dans la réponse de ce dernier. "C'est une affaire finie," a-t-il répliqué; "M. de Stürmer m'écrit que son Excellence Aali Pacha venait de lui proposer qu'on fixât un court délai à l'expiration duquel la liste présentée par l'Internonciature serait considérée comme définitivement close. Eh bien, je l'autorise à se contenter à cet effet d'un terme de deux à trois mois. D'ailleurs ce n'est qu'une simple précaution, car je ne crois pas que dans cet intervalle un nouveau chef insurgé paraisse en Turquie.

"Le troisième point," a-t-il ajouté, "c'est pour nous d'une haute importance. Quelque rassurantes que soient les déclarations de la Sublime Porte, nous avons besoin d'une garantie particulière que ses ordres seront exécutés avec exactitude par ses délégués. Ainsi nous demandons qu'un Commissaire Autrichien soit envoyé à Kutahié pour y séjourner et s'assurer de quelle manière les chefs des insurgés y sont gardés et surveillés." Après avoir exprimé le grand étonnement que devait me causer une proposition dont jusqu'à ce moment il ne m'avait jamais parlé, et qui, comme je le présume, lui a été suggérée de Constantinople, j'ai dit au Prince que c'était une demande exorbitante, insolite, et sans précédent dans les annales des relations internationales; que, de même que je lui avais prédit que la Sublime Porte se refuserait à l'extradition, de même j'étais sûr qu'elle ne consentirait jamais à prendre un engagement si inadmissible,

et qui apprendrait à tout le monde le peu de confiance de la Cour de l'Autriche à son égard ; qu'enfin je l'engageais à renoncer à une prétention qui, sans aboutir à rien, ne servirait qu'à compliquer de nouveau la bonne intelligence heureusement existante entre les deux empires. Cette réponse ferme et péremptoire m'a semblé avoir produit de l'effet sur le Prince, et j'aime à croire qu'il se ravisera. Mais dans le cas même où M. le Comte de Stürmer formulerait une telle demande, je suis sûr que si la Sublime Porte y répond par un refus absolu, le Cabinet de Vienne se verra obligé d'y renoncer.

Pour ce qui est de Dembinski et de Zamoyski, dont les noms figurent dans la liste présentée par M. le Comte de Stürmer, et qui, après avoir été au commencement réclamés par la Russie, le sont aujourd'hui par la France comme citoyens Français, le Prince m'a dit que quant à Zamoyski la Sublime Porte pouvait l'expulser, puisqu'il savait, en effet, qu'il passait pour sujet Français et qui sait de quelle autre nation ; mais qu'il ne saurait en être de même de Dembinski, qui, sans être naturalisé Français, était au contraire sujet Autrichien, et que si la Russie l'avait réclamé au commencement, c'est parce qu'il avait autrefois servi dans son armée. Le Prince a ajouté qu'il avait déjà écrit sur ce sujet à St. Pétersbourg. Cette question reste donc à être éclaircie, et puisque le Prince admet que Zamoyski peut être expulsé, par cela même qu'il est naturalisé Français, il s'ensuit que la même mesure pourra être adoptée à l'égard de tout autre Polonais inscrit sur la liste présentée par M. le Comte de Stürmer, et qui s'est fait naturaliser en France ou ailleurs.

A l'occasion de cet entretien j'ai fait remarquer au Prince combien il me paraissait étrange que dans sa note officielle, M. le Comte de Stürmer eût donné à entendre que la reprise de ses relations diplomatiques dépendrait du règlement des demandes de la Mission de Russie. Cette remarque a produit sur le Prince une certaine impression.

Dans notre entrevue d'avant-hier le Prince m'a parlé de l'entrée de la flotte Anglaise dans les Dardanelles ; à cette occasion je lui ai lu la partie de la lettre privée de votre Excellence du 7 Novembre, qui traite de cet incident. Les argumens allégués par votre Excellence ont déconcerté le Prince, et après quelques faibles objections il s'est borné à discuter la question de savoir si la flotte pouvait avancer jusqu'à l'endroit où elle a jeté l'ancre, et si ce n'était pas là une infraction au Traité de 1841. Mais il a paru fléchir quand, par la même lettre de votre Excellence, je lui ai prouvé que l'endroit dont il s'agit avait été de tous tems considéré comme ouvert à tous les bâtimens étrangers, et que jamais les autorités des Dardanelles n'avaient empêché les navires de commerce et autres de venir y mouiller pendant la nuit. J'ai ajouté que cette question me paraissait désormais oiseuse, puisque je savais que Mr. Canning venait d'écrire à l'Amiral Anglais de quitter la place qu'il occupait. Cependant hier, après l'arrivée de la poste, le Prince m'a dit que, suivant les nouvelles récentes de Constantinople, la flotte Anglaise n'avait pas encore quitté l'endroit en question ; que d'après des informations officielles existantes entre ses mains, il était en état de prouver que les autorités des Dardanelles avaient de tout tems défendu aux navires de commerce de venir y mouiller pendant la nuit ; que dès-lors c'était une infraction au Traité de 1841 ; et que par conséquent la Cour d'Autriche, comme Puissance signataire de cet acte, allait adresser à ce sujet une note aux autres Puissances co-signataires. Après avoir développé itérativement au Prince les considérations contenues dans la lettre privée de votre Excellence, j'ai ajouté que les informations dont il me parlait ne pouvaient être assez exactes parce qu'elles ne s'accordaient pas avec ce que m'avait écrit à cet égard votre Excellence, qui est l'autorité la plus compétente en pareille matière ; que d'après l'assurance donnée à votre Excellence par Mr. Canning, la flotte Anglaise devait à l'heure qu'il est avoir quitté l'endroit en question ; que la Cour d'Autriche ne devait pas trop s'inquiéter d'un incident qui ne concernait tout au plus que la Russie ; que par conséquent j'aimais à espérer que, mieux avisé, on renoncerait à une démarche à laquelle le Cabinet de Vienne n'avait pas d'intérêt direct ou réel, et qu'en tout cas la réponse à une telle note serait bien facile.

Voici maintenant le résumé de ce que j'ai dit au Prince dans mon

entrevue d'avant-hier au sujet de l'article, publiée dans la "Gazette de Vienne" sur les réfugiés Hongrois rentrés dans leurs foyers, et sur la mission du Général Hauslab. "Votre Altesse m'avait assuré que l'article qui devait paraître dans la 'Gazette de Vienne,' serait une réfutation modérée de l'article du 'Journal de Constantinople,' et ne contiendrait rien d'offensant pour la Turquie. D'abord, bien loin de réfuter l'article du 'Journal de Constantinople,' la réponse de la 'Gazette de Vienne' en a plutôt confirmé le contenu ; et pour vous en convaincre vous n'avez qu'à lire attentivement l'un et l'autre ; mais puisque l'article de votre journal reproduit quelques assertions calomnieuses, vous voudrez bien me permettre de vous faire à mon tour quelques observations. En admettant le Général Hauslab chargé d'une mission qui n'était autorisée ni par les traités ni par le droit des gens, la Sublime Porte croyait donner à l'Autriche une nouvelle preuve de son amitié, et non pas fournir à ce Général l'occasion de débiter des imputations aussi haineuses que dénuées de fondement, contre l'Empire Ottoman. Si je dis que la mission du Général Hauslab n'était pas imposée par le droit des gens, c'est parce que je le sais par expérience. En 1834 quand je fus envoyé avec une escadre Impériale à Samos, pour coopérer à la soumission de cette île, plusieurs centaines de familles Samiennes, abusées par les promesses du Gouverneur Grec, allaient pendant la soumission de Samos émigrer en Grèce ; mais dès leur arrivée en Eubée elles manifestèrent le désir de rentrer dans leurs foyers. Le Gouvernement Grec non seulement refusa d'admettre un Commissaire Ottoman pour faciliter leur retour, mais ils les empêcha de vive force de quitter la Grèce, parce qu'il voulait en faire une colonie ; de manière que ces infortunés durent s'évader et retourner à Samos peu à peu et sans passeport. Les Trois Cours, dont la Russie était du nombre, ne désavouèrent pas cette conduite du Gouvernement Grec. La Sublime Porte, cependant, aurait pu tenir une conduite assez amicale en promettant de faciliter le retour de ceux qui voulaient se rapatrier, et en s'abstenant d'admettre le Général Hauslab. Loin de là, elle fit sans objection tout ce que l'Autriche avait désiré. En récompense, et pour prix de ce nouveau service, de cet empressement amical, on nous régala d'articles publiés, d'après les rapports du Général Hauslab, dans votre journal officiel. C'est bien pénible, bien regrettable. Le Général Hauslab prétend que c'est sur l'instigation de Bem et d'autres chefs insurgés que son Excellence Zia Pacha avait demandé une amnistie en faveur des officiers. Il se trompe ; Bem et ses adhérens n'avaient pas intérêt à assurer le retour des officiers. Le Général Hauslab lui-même assure que ces chefs voulaient retenir tout le monde. Si son Excellence Zia Pacha avait demandé cette amnistie, c'était sur la prière des officiers eux-mêmes, qui voulaient rentrer en Autriche ; c'était pour faciliter et non pour entraver la mission du Général Hauslab ; et si l'amnistie était promise, bien plus de monde aurait suivi le Général Hauslab. On parle de mauvais traitemens employés comme moyens de prosélytisme pour forcer les réfugiés de se convertir à l'Islumisme. C'est mal-imaginé ; personne n'y croira. La tolérance religieuse de la Turquie est proverbiale. Il y a dans l'Empire Ottoman des millions de Grecs, de Catholiques, d'Arméniens, de Juifs. A aucune époque il n'a été dit que les Musulmans eussent exercé un tel prosélytisme à leur égard. Et ce dont les tems reculés n'ont pas fourni d'exemple, se serait-il pratiqué aujourd'hui à l'égard de quelques malheureux réfugiés, et cela sous le règne du Sultan Abdul Medjid, le clément, le magnanime, le tolérant, et sous le ministère de Rechid Pacha, dont le nom seul est le démenti le plus formel de toutes ces imputations ? Le Général Hauslab a avancé que ces réfugiés mouraient de faim. Mais il ne dit pas que quelqu'un en soit mort ; il dit cependant que dix à douze sont morts après leur départ de Widdin, et pendant le trajet. Enfin les rapports du Général Hauslab le mettent en contradiction flagrante avec lui-même. Il avoue que son Excellence Zia Pacha a sévi contre Guyon et autres chefs insurgés, pour les empêcher de contrarier par leurs intrigues l'accomplissement de sa mission. Il avoue que ce sont les troupes Impériales qui ont mis fin au charivari donné aux réfugiés qui partaient ; et il rapporte à son Gouvernement qu'à son départ de Widdin il a salué la forteresse, en signe, sans doute, de satisfaction, car si ce n'était qu'une simple politesse, le salut aurait dû être fait dès l'arrivée

du bateau à vapeur à Widdin. Ce que je viens d'avoir l'honneur de vous dire, j'aurais pu, j'aurais dû, peut-être, vous le communiquer par écrit. Si je ne l'ai pas fait, c'est parceque je connais les dispositions personnellement amicales de mon Gouvernement envers le Cabinet actuel de Vienne."

Telle a été ma réponse à l'article de la "Gazette de Vienne." Le Prince s'est borné à quelques peu de répliques, nullement blessantes pour notre Gouvernement, et tendant à justifier la publication de l'article en question; je juge superflu de les rapporter ici.

Je suis, &c.
(Signé) C. MUSURUS.

No. 206.

Sir Stratford Canning to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received January* 4, 1850.)

(No. 377. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Therapia, December* 12, 1849.

THE paper inclosed herewith has been communicated to me in confidence by a private hand, as illustrating the kind of interference which Russia is allowed to exercise in all that relates to the administration of the Danubian Principalities. It appears either to have originated with the Russian Legation, or to have passed through that channel to the Porte. That those who exercise the influence of Russia here should take an interest in obtaining for the Hospodars, whether regularly or irregularly, the means of defraying the expenses of their late visit to Constantinople is natural enough, for there is strong reason to believe that no inconsiderable part of those expenses may be fairly set down to the account of their own avidity.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

Inclosure in No. 206.

Paper communicated to Sir Stratford Canning.

Péra, $\frac{10 \text{ Novembre}}{2 \text{ Décembre}}$, 1849.

LE Hospodar de Valachie propose de lui adresser dès à present l'ordre suivant.

Cinq piastres par 100 okes de sel seront ajoutés au prix actuel. L'adjudication sera faite pour six années avec la publicité de toutes les formes requises pardevant le Conseil Administratif Extraordinaire; le montant du prix des 5 piastres additionnelles pour les six années sera payé dans le cours des deux premières. Sur ce montant la somme de 100,000 (ducats) est allouée au Prince Stirbey pour frais d'installation.

Le surplus, s'il y en a, sera versé dans la caisse de la Vestiarie; connaissance en sera donnée au Conseil *ad hoc* tenant lieu d'assemblée générale, et toutes les pièces lui seront soumises à la première convocation qui en sera faite.

Plusieurs des argumens présentés par le Prince Stirbey donnent en vérité une apparence plausible à la proposition de procéder ainsi à l'exécution de la mesure concertée entre les deux Cours, sans attendre la convocation du Conseil *ad hoc*. Mais, d'un autre côté, les instructions du mois d'Août adressées à la Légation de Russie expriment positivement le désir que les formalités nécessaires pour l'assiette de la surtaxe à établir sur le prix du sel fassent l'objet d'une délibération préalable dans les Divans ou Conseils *ad hoc*, qui d'après le Sened de Balta Liman doivent être chargés de l'assiette des impôts et du contrôle des recettes.

En outre, le calcul présenté ici dans le tems par le Prince Stirbey sur la manière de rembourser les 100,000 ducats de frais d'installation par les 5 piastres à ajouter au prix des 100 okes de sel, se rapporte uniquement à

la Valachie. Nous manquons des notions requises sur la ferme des salines Moldaves pour savoir comment leur appliquer une surtaxe analogue.

Or, les frais d'installation étant une faveur accordée sur le même pied à chacun des deux Princes, il serait injuste de favoriser l'un plus que l'autre, et d'autoriser en Valachie une mesure qui en Moldavie resterait encore sujette à un certain délai.

Par tous ces motifs il vaut mieux ne rien presser, mais inviter Fuad Effendi à concerter là-dessus les arrangemens requis avec son collègue de Russie, soit pour en écrire à Omer Pacha et à M. Kotzebue, soit pour en activer la mise à exécution aussitôt après le retour des deux Commissaires Impériaux dans les Principautés.

Fuad Effendi ferait bien de presser en même tems, de concert avec le Général Duhamel, l'établissement des Divans ou Conseils *ad hoc* en Moldavie tout comme en Valachie, car les instructions adressées au Commissaire Ottoman sur cet objet, communiquées à la Légation de Russie au commencement d'Août, ont rencontré le plein assentiment de la Cour Impériale. Cette dernière, dans la réponse adressée au Général Duhamel pour le guider dans ses explications avec son collègue de Turquie, s'est en effet borné à faire remarquer que la révision de la comptabilité des Gouvernemens précédens par les futurs Conseils, ne peut se rapporter qu'à ceux des comptes qui n'auraient pas été revisés, réglés et cloturés par les assemblées générales, qui, en vertu du Règlement Organique, se trouvaient appelées à les contrôler. Or, la nécessité de cette restriction paraît être reconnue absolument au même degré par la Sublime Porte.

Le Prince de Moldavie ayant sur ces entrefaites soumis un mémoire qui renferme des observations sur les catégories à établir pour la révision de certaines affaires de procès jugées sous le Hospodar Stourdza, il serait utile d'inviter aussi Fuad Effendi à fixer sur ce travail l'attention mutuelle, pour tirer partie de ce qui s'y trouverait de rationnel et de plausible au profit de l'équité et de la justice.

No. 207.

Sir Stratford Canning to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received January* 4, 1850.)

(No. 380.)

My Lord, *Therapia, December* 18, 1849.

THE Porte has not yet succeeded in terminating its vexatious differences with Austria and Russia, and the suspension of diplomatic relations between the Representatives of those Powers and the Turkish Government continues to this hour. No inconsiderable progress has however been made towards a final accommodation, and there is reason to hope that the obstacles to a complete adjustment may soon be so far removed as to leave but little danger of any more serious complication. It is no unfavourable symptom that each of the Porte's antagonists, while urging his own pretension, inclines to take credit for recommending moderation to the other.

On the side of Russia there is really no further ground of dispute. Fuad Effendi has informed his Government that its modifications of the Russian demands in their second stage are accepted; and a communication made to Aali Pasha by M. de Titoff two days ago confirms that intelligence. Your Lordship will perceive, on reference to the accompanying memorandum, which forms the communication in question, that the terms in which the Russian acceptance is expressed, are even more favourable to the Porte's view than those employed in the Turkish official note.

It is however to be observed at the same time, and to be regretted, that the additional concessions thus announced by Russia should be clogged, if not by absolute conditions, by demands embarrassing to the Porte, and attaching an appearance of constraint to the act of reconciliation. M. de Titoff has explained the last paragraph but one of his

memorandum, by requiring that a formal protocol, comprising the points of agreement, should be drawn up between him and the Turkish Ministers, and that the instrument thus prepared should be signed by the Grand Vizier himself. It is also pretended that the Porte shall proceed to the execution of the measures adopted by mutual consent, before the suspension of its diplomatic relations with Russia shall be removed.

At an interview which took place yesterday, on the proposition of M. de Titoff, at the Grand Vizier's house, the Russian Envoy told that Minister and Aali Pasha, who was also present, that an agreement by protocol would be particularly acceptable to the Emperor Nicholas, and that Count Nesselrode was extremely desirous on that account to obtain its adoption by the Porte. The language and manner of the Russian Representative appear to have been free from that dictatorial character which they had formerly exhibited, and I should infer from the terms of his memorandum that he is not prepared to insist peremptorily on the signature of a protocol. The Turkish Ministers, on their side, would be glad to escape from so inconvenient and superfluous a demand. Aali Pasha, indeed, observed to the Russian interpreter with much propriety, when it was first proposed, that Count Nesselrode himself would probably abandon his idea, when he received the original of the Turkish note which had reached his hands only in draft, when he suggested the adoption of a protocol. But they shrink, nevertheless, from the consequences of creating another disappointment at St. Petersburgh, and apply for my opinion, rather for the sake of consistency, and to satisfy the Sultan's mind, than to obtain support for the purpose of resisting a misplaced pretension. Your Lordship is aware that under any difficulty of the kind, no Turkish Minister, however superior he may be in talent and character, is entirely exempt from that infirmity which ever sets expediency above principle, and looks rather to personal considerations than to political results. This general tendency among the individuals who compose the Ottoman Cabinet is a constant source of embarrassment to me in advising them, and occasionally a great disparagement to my position as acting under instructions which are directed with no less solicitude to the preservation of peace than to the maintenance of the Porte's essential interests and honourable independence. It is not unfrequently incumbent upon me to urge resistance to unreasonable demands, and to forego the credit of suggesting conciliatory expedients, because my counsels are generally more needed to discourage a dangerous subserviency than to restrain a miscalculating rashness.

In answering the present appeal to my opinion, I have endeavoured to provide for the twofold object of accommodation and consistency. Greatly as I wish to contribute, as Her Majesty's Representative, to the speedy removal of all that retards an adjustment of the still unsettled differences, I cannot shut my eyes against the objectionable tendencies and probable intention of the act by which the Court of St. Petersburgh has unexpectedly proposed to complete it. I am persuaded that the Porte will increase its entanglements with Russia and lose a portion of its present advantages, by acceding to the Russian proposal. I am also convinced that Russia would not be warranted in making a condition of that proposal, because the formality of a protocol is not required for any useful or customary purpose, and because the Porte has already granted more than Russia had a right to demand. It is no doubt desirable on the other hand to close the breach in as speedy and good humoured a manner as the real interests at stake will allow. Consequently, while advising the Porte to endeavour, by urging every reasonable argument to avoid the signature of any kind of protocol, I have suggested a form of transaction which, leaving to Russia the name, would neutralize any improper effect of an instrument calculated, like the Sened of last May, to have the air and force of a convention.

In explanation of this idea I beg to refer your Lordship to the accompanying copy of an instruction which I have just now addressed to M. Pisani, after consulting fully with the French Minister, and ascertaining that he was prepared to take a similar course in communicating with the Turkish Ministers.

With respect to the Austrian part of these affairs, it was only at a late hour to-night that I received a hurried report of what had passed at an interview held this morning at the Grand Vizier's house between his Highness, assisted by Aali Pasha, and the Internuncio. Inclosed herewith is a memorandum of the several points on which Count Stürmer continues to insist. They are open, as your Lordship will perceive with sorrow, to grave, and in one respect at least to insuperable objections. I allude more particularly to the second demand, which requires that the eventual liberation of the refugees to be detained in the interior should be preceded by an agreement previously concerted between the two Courts. The other objectionable points appear to be more susceptible of adjustment. But if Count Stürmer's instructions admit no latitude with respect to the point of mutual consent, I can only foresee an unworthy compliance on the part of the Ottoman Government, or a fresh and vexatious postponement of the renewal of diplomatic relations between the Austrian Representative and the Porte. I am assured by Aali Pasha that no reply has been given to Count Stürmer except that his terms of arrangement will be submitted to the Council. But I have reason to suppose that on this subject as well as that of the Russian protocol, the Turkish Ministers are not much disposed to stand out, although they reserve their final decision until they are made acquainted with my opinion and the opinion of my French colleague, which perfectly agrees with mine.

In the course of to-morrow they will probably be put in possession of both opinions, and your Lordship need not be assured that while the sanction of my approval will be given to no arrangement prejudicial to the honour and independence of the Porte, our joint exertions will be used to assist the Grand Vizier in trying to effect an immediate and satisfactory solution of the whole dispute.

I have, &.
(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

Inclosure 1 in No. 207.

Russian Demands.

D'APRES le projet de la note responsive de la Porte et les instructions d'Aali Pacha, communiquées par Fuad Effendi, la Porte consent :

1. A chasser de ses Etats tous les Polonais, sujets Russes, qui se sont réfugiés en Turquie par suite des événemens de Hongrie et dont la Mission de Russie indiquerait les noms, et à leur défendre la rentrée dans l'Empire Ottoman.

2. A reléguer à Alep ou à Koniah ceux d'entr'eux qui ont embrassé l'Islamisme.

3. A prendre l'engagement de demander positivement et avec instance aux Légations dont ils ressortissent, l'expulsion des Polonais qui pourraient à l'avenir arriver en Turquie avec des passeports étrangers, toutes les fois qu'il sera constaté que ces individus s'y livrent à des intrigues contre la Russie.

La Mission de Russie prendra acte de cette promesse et pourra renouer ses relations avec la Porte dès que le Gouvernement Ottoman procédera à l'exécution des mesures convenues de part et d'autre à l'égard des Polonais réfugiés en Turquie par suite de la pacification de la Hongrie.

La Porte, dans son intérêt bien entendu, nous promettrait aussi d'aviser plus tard aux moyens de mettre dans ses Etats un terme aux protections abusives.

Inclosure 2 in No. 207.

Sir Stratford Canning to M. Pisani.

Sir, *Therapia, December* 18, 1849.

THOUGH late in the day, I must call upon you to wait upon the Grand Vizier and Aali Pasha as soon as you receive this instruction. The first interpreter of the French Legation will be directed to make a similar communication to their Excellencies in the course of the afternoon.

I have learnt with sincere satisfaction that the Court of St. Petersburgh has accepted the Porte's modifications of its last proposals respecting the Polish refugees. It appears to me that the terms of the Russian acceptance are even more favourable than those of the Porte's note, to the views of the Turkish Government.

Nothing, therefore, as it would seem, remains for consideration but the proposition of a protocol, the renewal of diplomatic relations, and the execution of the Porte's engagement.

However desirable it may be for the Porte to meet the wishes of a neighbour with whom she necessarily has many important relations to maintain, she cannot be expected to overlook the inconveniences which her compliance may entail in any particular instance. The proposed protocol is obviously not required for any necessary or even for any useful object, and its adoption would manifestly have the effect of assigning to the transaction, of which it would be the index, a character neither properly nor conveniently belonging to it. It would constitute a formal agreement, wholly destitute of reciprocity, and comprising no matter substantially new. It would virtually acknowledge the right of a foreign Power to stipulate measures which are in the exclusive competency of the Porte. It would in short establish a very objectionable precedent.

On these grounds alone, without reference to others, the Turkish Ministers are fairly entitled to decline the proposed formality; and in the interest of their Government they will do well to impress their objections firmly, though calmly, on the Russian Envoy, whose own good sense and friendly disposition will enable him to appreciate their force.

Should their exertions unfortunately not produce the desired effect, and the whole arrangement be thereby exposed to failure or further delay, it might become advisable for them to relax so far in their resistance as to assent to a protocol in its simplest possible form. An act of this description might certainly be applied to the notes which contain on one side the proffered engagements of the Porte, and on the other the terms in which the Court of St. Petersburgh has expressed its acceptance of them. Such a protocol would be little more than a *procès-verbal*. It would record an official act of exchange, without extending to the insertion, either literally or otherwise, of the notes themselves, which would continue to be the sole objects of reference if any question were to arise hereafter on the subject of the Polish refugees. This concession, though by no means necessary or desirable in itself, would serve to provide for every ostensible object entertained by the requiring party, with the lowest degree of inconvenience to the complying one. It might be eventually adopted. It ought not to be exceeded without a clear necessity.

With respect to the renewal of diplomatic relations I am of opinion that a written declaration ought not to be required. Although the menace was given in writing, the execution of it was declared verbally by the respective dragomans. Now it is obvious that the renewal is sufficiently declared by the same form which accompanied the actual interruption. The oral declaration of the Russian Envoy would therefore be more than sufficient. Even the reappearance of the Russian interpreters at the Porte, as before the interruption, would of itself constitute a return to the former state of relations between the two Governments. What appears to be of real importance in the question is this: The renewal of the Porte's diplomatic relations with Russia ought to follow immediately on the exchange of the notes; and the Russian Envoy should be given distinctly

to understand that such is the expectation of the Porte. The difference with Austria rest upon grounds of their own; and the renewal of diplomatic relations with Russia cannot with any show of fairness be made to depend on a similar renewal of those with Austria.

It cannot be necessary to add that the fulfilment of the promise given by the Turkish Government with respect to the refugees, comprised in its agreement with Russia, ought, in prudence as in honour, to commence without any unnecessary delay, and to be carried out in perfect good faith. But the measures required for that purpose devolve of right upon the Porte alone; and assuming all due responsibility, the Turkish Government, in proceeding to their execution, is justly entitled to the usual share of confidence and respect.

I am, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

Inclosure 3 in No. 207.

Austrian Demands.

DEMANDES faites aujourd'hui, 18 Décembre, par le Comte Stürmer au Grand Vizir et au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères.

La note sera donnée avec la signature et le cachet du Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, et la liste signée par lui sera incluse et acceptée.*

2. Il est essentiel que la clause, "que la délivrance des réfugiés devra être concertée et arrêtée d'avance entre les deux Cours," soit insérée dans la note. L'affaire ne peut pas être terminée d'une autre manière.

3. La liste sera susceptible de changemens et de modifications jusqu'à l'expiration de deux mois de terme.

4. Lors du transport des réfugiés à Kutahia, un Commissaire de la part de l'Internonciature se trouvera ensemble. Aussitôt qu'arrivés à Kutahia ils auront été consignés aux autorités de la Sublime Porte, le Commissaire s'en retournera.

5. Pendant le séjour des réfugiés à Kutahia, de tems en tems un Commissaire pourra être envoyé par l'Internonciature pour qu'il voie s'ils sont bien gardés ou non; et la Porte donnera à ce Commissaire des lettres de recommandation pour le Mécmour chargé de la garde des réfugiés, ainsi que pour le Caïmakam de Kutahia.

Il n'y a pas de mal à ce que ceux que ont embrassé l'Islamisme soient envoyés à un autre endroit; seulement on aura soin de les garder aussi comme les autres.

No. 208.

Sir Stratford Canning to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received January 4, 1850.)

(No. 381.)

My Lord, *Therapia, December* 18, 1849.

I HAVE written to Sir William Parker in the sense required by your Lordship's instructions, replying to my confidential despatch of the 7th ultimo; and I have the honour to inclose herewith a copy of my despatch to his Excellency for your Lordship's more complete information.

It is unnecessary for me under existing circumstances to refer more at length to that correspondence, except to express my sincere concern that the entrance of Her Majesty's squadron, however explained by the exigences of the moment, should have occasioned any degree of regret to Her Majesty's Government.

I have; &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

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* Aali Pacha dit que pour comprendre cette clause, il faut savoir que le Comte Stürmer avait proposé une pièce à être signée par Aali Pacha et par lui. A présent il se contente d'une note officielle d'Aali Pacha dont le Comte accusera réception.

Inclosure in No. 208.

Sir Stratford Canning to Vice-Admiral Sir W. Parker.

Sir, *Therapia, December* 15, 1849.

A PACKET of despatches from the Admiralty to your address will be forwarded to-day, by means of the French steam-packet, under cover to Her Majesty's Consul at the Dardanelles, who is directed either to send them to your Excellency at Besika Bay, or in case the squadron should have left that anchorage, to consign them to the commander of any one of Her Majesty's steam-vessels stationed at the Dardanelles, with a request that he will convey them to you without loss of time.

The latest instructions which I have myself received from Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs inform me that the squadron under Excellency's command is not to retire from that part of the Archipelago to which imperious circumstances have recently called it, until I apprize you of my opinion that its continuance there is no longer required for the object with which they are connected.

Though I do not yet feel myself at liberty to adopt such an opinion, I trust that the remaining obstacles to its adoption will be removed at no distant period; and I shall then lose no time in apprizing you of that more complete change of circumstances which I am no less anxious to hasten than I should be happy to announce to you.

In the meantime I venture to entertain a confident persuasion that nothing will occur to require your return to the more immediate neighbourhood of the Dardanelles; and even if such a necessity were again unexpectedly to arise, it would not be desirable for Her Majesty's squadron to re-enter the mouth of the straits; some other place of shelter in that neighbourhood being preferable under stress of weather, in consideration of the treaty which regulates and restricts the passage of the Dardanelles by ships of war while the Porte is at peace.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

No. 209.

Sir Stratford Canning to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received January* 4, 1850.)

(Private and Confidential.)

My dear Lord, *Therapia, December* 18, 1849.

THE copies inclosed herewith of two despatches addressed to Aali Pasha by M. Musurus, and communicated confidentially to me by the former, contain particulars which your Lordship will probably read with interest. I must reserve for another occasion the remarks which I may have to offer on two or three passages of this correspondence. The despatch No. 79 has been communicated to General Aupick also, the other, as I am informed by Aali Pasha, to myself alone. I have not thought it necessary to forward copies of the inclosures, as they have no doubt been presented to your Lordship by the Austrian Chargé d'Affaires in London.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

Inclosure 1 in No. 209.

M. Musurus to Aali Pasha.

Monseigneur, *Vienne, le 4 Décembre,* 1849.

AINSI que votre Excellence a pu le préjuger par mon précédent respectueux rapport, M. le Prince de Schwarzenberg vient d'adresser au Cabinet de Londres une protestation contre l'entrée de la flotte Anglaise dans les Dardanelles. Dans une entrevue que j'ai eu dernièrement avec lui il m'a donné lecture de sa dépêche au Chargé d'Affaires d'Autriche à Londres du projet de protestation à remettre à Lord Palmerston et de la traduction d'une note de la Sublime Porte à l'Internonciature datée du 15 Safer, 1261, et annexée à la dépêche précitée. Après cette lecture, il m'a remis les copies lithographiés des trois pièces en question, que je me fais à mon tour un devoir de transmettre ci-jointes à votre Excellence. Le Prince a ajouté que la flotte Française ne s'étant rendue que jusqu'à Ourlac, il n'a pas cru devoir adresser une semblable protestation au Cabinet de Paris, et que M. le Comte de Stürmer recevrait l'ordre de faire auprès de la Sublime Porte une démarche analogue dès la reprise de ses relations diplomatiques.

J'ai fait observer au Prince, quel que fût le véritable but de cette démarche, je la regrettais d'autant plus vivement qu'elle pourrait provoquer des répliques et des récriminations sur un passé qu'il valait mieux couvrir à tout jamais d'un voile; que l'apparition de la flotte Anglaise devant les Dardanelles était une conséquence de l'attitude menaçante et peu pacifique des Représentans d'Autriche et de Russie à Constantinople, de la conduite inqualifiable du Prince Radzivil; et que, d'après ce que je savais positivement, c'était le mauvais tems qui avait forcé la flotte d'aller jeter l'ancre dans la Baie des Barbiers. "Par le Traité de 1841," a-t-il repris, "la Sublime Porte s'est engagée à n'admettre aucun bâtiment de guerre étranger dans les Dardanelles, tant qu'elle se trouve en paix; est-ce qu'il y avait déclaration de guerre, je vous le demande?" "Comme cà, comme cà, ai-je réparti: si nous n'étions pas en état de guerre déclarée, nous n'étions pas non plus en état parfait normal de paix; c'était une situation exceptionnelle, un cas imprévu. D'ailleurs, la flotte Anglaise ayant été forcée par le mauvais tems de se réfugier dans la Baie des Barbiers, n'est pas censée être entrée dans le détroit, au point qu'il en résultât une violation réelle, sérieuse du Traité de 1841. Le véritable canal commence là où commence la partie essentielle des fortifications qui en défendent l'entrée, et de même qu'on n'est censé être entré dans une maison défendue que quand on a dépassé l'endroit où reste le portier, de même le droit où se trouve l'autorité à laquelle les bâtimens doivent exhiber leurs firmans et leurs expéditions, doit être considéré comme le point qu'on ne saurait franchir sans commettre une violation grave du Traité de 1841. Or, cet endroit ce sont les deux châteaux situés plusieurs milles au-delà de la Baie des Barbiers. La note de la Sublime Porte citée par votre Altesse comme un document à l'appui de sa protestation, ne prouve rien. Elle ne concerne que les bâtimens de commerce, qui, bien loin de s'arrêter dans la Baie des Barbiers, franchissaient tout le détroit; tandis que dans l'incident qui nous occupe il ne s'agit point du passage des Dardanelles. En assimilant tantôt le Détroit des Dardanelles au Détroit du Bosphore, tantôt les bâtimens de guerre aux navires de commerce, votre Altesse en conclut que, de même que la flotte Anglaise s'est avancée jusqu'à la Baie des Barbiers, où il est permis aux navires de commerce de mouiller pendant la nuit, de même les bâtimens de guerre Russes pourraient s'avancer jusqu'à Buyukdéré, où la même permission est accordée aux bâtimens de commerce venant de la Mer Noire. Je regrette, permettez-moi de vous le dire, qu'une telle interprétation ait pu figurer dans une dépêche du Cabinet de Vienne. Cependant l'assimilation n'est pas bien exacte. Si les Dardanelles sont la porte de la maison, le Bosphore est la porte de la Chambre. Le Gouvernement Impérial, en permettant aux navires de commerce naviguant pendant la nuit, d'avancer jusqu'à Buyukdéré, ne fait que céder à une nécessité, puisqu'il est notoire que ces navires ne peuvent s'arrêter sans danger devant l'entrée du Bosphore, ni se mettre surtout à l'abri du mauvais tems. Par

la même raison il est permis aux bâtimens de commerce venant de l'Archipel de mouiller pendant la nuit dans la Baie des Barbiers, où ils sont également à l'abri du mauvais tems. Mais cette permission, qui ne concerne que des bâtimens de commerce inoffensifs, et qui n'a rien de commun avec le but et le texte du Traité de 1841. Ne saurait être appliquée de la même manière aux bâtimens de guerre. Un vaisseau de guerre qui s'avancerait jusque dans la Baie des Barbiers n'a pas encore franchi l'endroit où commence la partie essentielle des fortifications, et où se trouve l'autorité chargée de permettre ou de défendre l'entrée des Dardanelles; tandis que le vaisseau de guerre qui venant de la Mer Noire irait jeter l'ancre à Buyukdéré non seulement a déjà franchi et les principales fortifications qui défendent l'entrée du Bosphore, et l'endroit où les firmans doivent être exhibés, mais il se trouve presque devant Constantinople.

Le Prince m'a répondu que les distinctions que je faisais lui paraissaient des subtilités qui n'étaient pas fondées sur le texte du Traité, dont la teneur était explicite; que d'ailleurs la protestation du Cabinet de Vienne avait pour but de prévenir les conséquences qui pourraient être tirées de l'incident de la flotte Anglaise, et d'empêcher qu'aucune Puissance ne puisse s'en prévaloir comme d'un précédent pour porter atteinte aux droits de la Sublime Porte. Tel est le but que M. le Prince de Schwarzenberg dit s'être proposé par sa démarche. Il est vrai que cette intention est clairement exprimée dans le projet de protestation à remettre à Lord Palmerston. Mais il se peut que le Prince se soit concerté sur cette demande avec M. le Comte de Médem, quoiqu'il m'ait assuré qu'il n'avait point consulté le Cabinet de Russie, et qu'il ignorait même ce qu'on ferait à St. Pétersbourg dans cette occurrence.

Le Prince m'a dit, en outre, qu'il résultait des nouvelles tout récemment reçues de Londres, que Lord Palmerston avait déclaré désapprouver l'entrée de l'Amiral Parker dans les Dardanelles.

Dans la dépêche précitée du Prince de Schwarzenberg au Chargé d'Affaires d'Autriche à Londres, il est dit que l'apparition de la flotte Anglaise aux Dardanelles a eu pour effet immédiat de retarder la solution définitive de la question des réfugiés. On est porté à inférer de là que c'est pour fournir à leurs Cours l'occasion d'attribuer à ce motif la nonreprise de relations diplomatiques, que MM. de Stürmer et de Titoff sont parvenus à force de tergiversations à laisser en suspens une affaire qui du moins à Vienne était résolue.

Pour ce qui est de la question des réfugiés, le Prince m'a dit, que cédant à mes observations, il avait renoncé au projet d'envoyer à Kutahié un Commissaire Autrichien pour y séjourner, afin de mieux s'assurer de la manière dont les chefs insurgés seront surveillés; mais qu'il venait de donner l'ordre à M. le Comte de Stürmer d'obtenir une promesse par écrit, d'après laquelle l'Internonciature aurait la faculté, quand elle le jugerait à propos, d'envoyer quelqu'un de ses employés à Kutahié pour voir ce qui s'y passe. J'ai fait observer au Prince, que M. de Stürmer devait tout au plus s'entendre avec votre Excellence sur ce point, de vive voix, et éviter toute demande ou correspondance par écrit.

Quant à la liste des individus à interner, le Prince m'a répété ce qui j'ai déjà eu l'honneur de soumettre à votre Excellence par mon précédent respectueux rapport. Mais sur certaines observations que je lui avais faites, il a dû me déclarer qu'il considérait la liste des individus réfugiés à Widdin comme définitivement close; que le complément pour lequel votre Excellence aurait proposé un délai ne concernait que les chefs de l'insurrection qui se présenteraient sur quelque autre point de l'empire, ou qui, cachés aujourd'hui en Hongrie, se réfugieraient sur le territoire Ottoman; et que quant aux individus dont les noms ne se trouvent pas inscrits sur la liste présentée par M. le Comte de Stürmer, la Sublime Porte pouvait agir à leur égard comme elle l'entendait, et les admettre même à son service.

Le Prince m'a dit enfin qu'il avait écrit au Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg pour l'engager à se contenter, conformément à l'offre de la Sublime Porte de l'expulsion des Polonais qui ont pris part à l'insurrection, à ne pas insister sur l'expulsion des autres, et à hâter l'arrangement définitif de cette question. (Signé) C. MUSURUS.

Inclosure 2 in No. 209.

M. Musurus to Aali Pacha.

Monseigneur, *Vienne, le 4 Décembre*, 1849.

AUSSITOT que j'ai reçu ce matin la dépêche que votre Excellence m'a fait l'honneur de m'écrire en date du 21 Novembre, je me suis rendu chez M. le Prince de Schwarzenberg pour conférer avec lui sur son contenu. Il m'a exprimé ses regrets de ce que la Sublime Porte, en même tems que, dans ses communications verbales, elle déclarait tenir à la décision arrêtée à Vienne entre sa Légation et le Cabinet Impérial, et reconnaître que la constatation du rétablissement de la tranquillité en Hongrie était du ressort du Gouvernement Autrichien, elle évitait de s'expliquer sur ce point, et d'une manière précise, dans sa note officielle. Il a ajouté que plus la Sublime Porte persévérait dans une omission qui, selon lui, était en opposition avec les assurances contenues dans la lettre de Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan à Sa Majesté l'Empereur d'Autriche, plus la Cour de Vienne avait raison de douter des intentions ultérieures du Cabinet Ottoman, et plus elle était résolue d'insister sur ce point. Enfin, il m'a dit que la question des réfugiés ne serait définitivement terminée que quand votre Excellence se serait servie dans sa note, soit de l'expression "commun accord," soit de l'expression "entente préalable." Toutes les observations que j'ai dû lui faire pour le convaincre de la suffisance de la rédaction de votre Excellence, n'ont produit aucun effet sur le Prince, qui a terminé la discussion, en me répétant qu'il avait déjà donné à cet égard à M. le Comte de Stürmer des instructions précises et positives. Quoiqu'il en soit, j'espère que si votre Excellence le jugeait à propos, il lui serait facile, tout en ajoutant l'idée de l'entente préalable dans sa note, de le faire de manière à limiter toute prétention du Cabinet de Vienne, qui ne serait pas fondée sur la nécessité réelle de la continuation de la mesure d'internement.

A cette occasion je dois faire connaître à votre Excellence que Lord Ponsonby, qui, pendant que cette question était traitée à Vienne, était d'avis que je ne devais pas rompre la négociation et laisser la question en suspens, par le refus d'une condition sur laquelle insistait tant le Cabinet de Vienne, puisque la Sublime Porte ne saurait se refuser à cette demande, selon lui légitime, de M. le Prince de Schwarzenberg, sans lui donner motif de soupçonner quelque arrière-pensée.

Quant à M. de Beaumont, que j'avais également consulté avant de signer ma note à M. le Prince de Schwarzenberg, il m'avait, dès-lors, conseillé d'accepter cette condition qu'il regardait aussi admissible que justifiée, et de ne pas prendre sur ma responsabilité d'ajourner par mon refus l'arrangement d'une question qui menaçait de compromettre la paix générale, et dont la prompte solution intéressait autant la Sublime Porte que les Gouvernemens qui avaient épousé sa cause.

Pour ce qui est de la clôture de la liste des individus à interner, comme ce que votre Excellence m'écrit par rapport à ce point, n'est pas d'accord avec les informations données à M. le Prince de Schwarzenberg par M. le Comte de Stürmer, qui prétend que votre Excellence a proposé qu'un court délai fût fixé à cet effet, cette affaire, d'après ce que le Prince m'a dit, reste à être arrangé à Constantinople entre la Sublime Porte et l'Internonciature, à laquelle les instructions nécessaires ont été déjà transmises.

Quant aux individus portés dans la liste présentée par M. le Comte de Stürmer, et qui ont changé de croyance, j'ai rencontré beaucoup de résistance du Prince sur ce point. Mais après une longue discussion, mes observations m'ont paru avoir produit sur lui un certain effet; et il a fini par me dire qu'il donnerait à M. le Comte de Stürmer des instructions à cet égard.

Pour moi, je pense que comme dans les notes échangées à Vienne il est dit que les chefs de l'insurrection Hongroise seront internés, non pas dans un seul lieu, mais dans des lieux convenables, la Sublime Porte, si elle ne parvient pas à mieux s'entendre avec M. le Comte de Stürmer, pourrait, en séparant les Musulmans de leurs camarades Chrétiens qui seront gardés à Kutahia, les envoyer dans des provinces lointaines et les

traiter sur un pied différent, tout en prenant, ainsi qu'il est dit dans la dépêche de votre Excellence, les précautions nécessaires pour les empêcher de s'enfuir et d'ourdir des intrigues contre la sécurité des États Autrichiens. Le Gouvernement d'Autriche qui ne peut revenir sur ce qui a été convenu ici, n'aurait rien à objecter à une telle décision de la Sublime Porte.

J'ai lieu de croire que l'arrangement final de ces différens points ne sera obtenu, et MM. de Stürmer et de Titoff ne reprendront leurs relations diplomatiques, que quand ce dernier aura reçu les instructions qu'il attend de St. Pétersbourg; et comme le Prince de Schwarzenberg m'a assuré qu'il avait écrit au Cabinet de Russie pour l'engager à se contenter des offres de la Sublime Porte, j'aime à espérer que la question de l'apparition de la flotte Anglaise aux Dardanelles ne provoquera pas de nouveaux incidens propres à prolonger de plus en plus la solution complète de ce fâcheux différend.

Je suis, &c.
(Signé) C. MUSURUS.

No. 210.

Sir Stratford Canning to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received January 4, 1850.)

(Private and Confidential.)

My dear Lord, *Therapia, December* 18, 1849.

INCLOSED herewith is the copy of a letter marked "private and confidential," which I addressed to Sir William Parker in more complete execution of your Lordship's despatch respecting the entrance of Her Majesty's squadron within the outer castles of the Dardanelles. I trust your Lordship will approve my having used all practicable delicacy in making the Vice-Admiral sensible of the objections to that proceeding, in consideration of the Treaty as interpreted in its stricter sense. Your Lordship is too just not to make every fair allowance for the pressure of circumstances; and with respect to the Treaty, whatever responsibility may have been incurred, devolves—I must in fairness admit it—rather upon me than upon the Admiral.

I am, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

Inclosure in No. 210.

Sir Stratford Canning to Vice-Admiral Sir W. Parker.

(Private and Confidential.)

My dear Sir, *Therapia, December* 15, 1849.

REFERRING to the last paragraph of my ostensible despatch of this date, I wish to explain to you that I introduced the final clause of it in consequence of a despatch from Lord Palmerston intimating that, to avoid cavil with respect to the Treaty, it would have been better if you had sought a more sheltered anchorage in the neighbourhood of the Dardanelles, at Enos or at Saros for instance, he says, than give occasion for raising a doubt as to our respect for the precise terms of the Treaty, by entering within the outer castles.

His Lordship had not, when he wrote, received a confidential despatch which I addressed to him in explanation of the circumstances. I am however of opinion that without some positive instruction from England, modifying the view which has been taken of the squadron's former entrance, it will be advisable for you to make no distinction between the outer and the inner castles of the Dardanelles, which latter there never was any question of passing by the squadron without a distinct requisition from the Porte, transmitted through Her Majesty's Embassy; or positive instructions from home.

In further explanation of this matter I send you in this confidential form for your own personal information, such passages of Lord Palmerston's instructions as it may be satisfactory for you to see.

Believe me, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

No. 211.

Viscount Palmerston to Baron Brunnow.

Foreign Office, January 7, 1850.

VISCOUNT PALMERSTON presents his compliments to Baron Brunnow, and has the honour to acknowledge the receipt of his note of the 2nd instant, inclosing copies of two despatches addressed by Count Nesselrode to Baron Brunnow and M. Titoff, dated respectively the $\frac{9}{21}$ of December and $\frac{28 \text{ November}}{10 \text{ December}}$ on the subject of the entrance of the British squadron under Vice-Admiral Sir William Parker within the outer castles of the Dardanell s.

Viscount Pa merston has the honour to express to Baron Brunnow the gratification of Her Majesty's Government at finding that the explanations and the declarations of Her Majesty's Government in regard to the incident to which these communications relate, have been satisfactory to the Imperial Government.

Viscount Palmerston requests Baron Brunnow to accept, &c.

No. 212.

Viscount Palmerston to Lord Bloomfield.

(No. 13.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, January* 7, 1850.

I HAVE received your Lordship's despatch No. 68 of the 18th of December, marked confidential, giving an account of what passed at an audience to which you were admitted by the Emperor of Russia on the previous day.

I have to acquaint your Lordship that Her Majesty's Government entirely approve the language held by you in this conversation; and if you should again have occasion to converse with His Imperial Majesty on these matters, you should express to him the sincere gratification with which Her Majesty's Government have read your report of the friendly sentiments towards England, and of the disinterested and generous intentions towards Turkey, which His Imperial Majesty expressed in this conversation; and you should assure His Imperial Majesty that the British Government attaches the greatest value to the maintenance of the most cordial relations with the Imperial Government; and, moreover, that Her Majesty's Government see no reason whatever why the differences which exist between the internal and constitutional organization of the two countries, should prevent the two Governments from co-operating heartily and sincerely in that which is their common object, namely, the maintenance of peace wherever their political influence may extend.

I am, &c.
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 213.

Sir Stratford Canning to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received January 10, 1850.)

(No. 384.)

My Lord, *Therapia, December 24, 1849.*

I KNOW not whether it be owing to the nature of the questions themselves, to the overbearing temper of one party, to the vacillating character of another, or, what is most probable, to a mixture of these causes, but the difficulty, be it how it may, of bringing the Porte's differences with Russia and Austria to a satisfactory settlement appears to be nearly interminable. Their approach towards a conclusion might be imagined to proceed on the principle of those mathematical lines which, though continually approximating, never meet.

It is already well known to your Lordship that the Cabinets of Vienna and St. Petersburgh, after relinquishing the demand of extradition, put forward proposals not warranted by treaty, unbecoming and discreditable for the Porte to accept, and, if accepted, threatening to produce much future altercation and embarrassment. The firm but temperate objections which the Sultan's Ministers, with my concurrence and that of General Aupick, opposed to such overweening pretensions, were fairly appreciated by the Russian Government, and repelled for the most part by that of Austria. Yet Russia was not satisfied without requiring a new and unnecessary concession, in appearance a formality, but even in that character showing a mistrust of the Porte, and lying open to the suspicion of ulterior views.

This state of things is the more perplexing, because it inverts the rule of Turkish policy, making Austria an object of estrangement, and Russia, for a time at least, the more complying neighbour of the two.

My advice to the Porte has uniformly been of that tenour which your Lordship's instruction of the 30th ultimo so pointedly inculcates. I have never ceased to recommend a faithful execution of treaties, a willing fulfilment of the duties of good neighbourhood, and a steady unobtrusive maintenance of the Sultan's honour, dignity, and independence. These principles would justify the Porte, if it were worth while, in declining the Russian demand of a protocol. They engage the Porte to persist in repelling those Austrian conditions which would interfere with the free exercise of her sovereignty. But although the right and the duty are alike acknowledged by the Sultan's principal Ministers, various motives of a less rigid character incline them to give way after a decent show of resistance, and would in all likelihood hurry them to an inconsiderate and unworthy conclusion, if they had not also to consult the public opinion of Europe, and to preserve the goodwill of England and France.

Of these important considerations they seemed, however, a few days ago, to have so much lost sight, that I was obliged to enter into a warm expostulation with the Grand Vizier, who finally expressed his readiness to abide by my counsels, directed as they were to the permanent welfare of this empire, and agreeing as they do in the present instance with those of my French colleague.

The advice which I tendered, in consequence, to Aali Pasha, who does not always perceive where firmness is safer than concession, was anything but repulsive or exaggerated. In substance, with respect to Russia, I recommended that the protocol should be signed with M. de Titoff, if the measure could not be avoided without a fresh period of delay, but in that simplest possible form, which would give it rather the character of a *procès verbal* than that of a *sened* or convention; taking care to have it understood that the renewal of diplomatic relations should follow at once. With respect to Austria, I approved the Porte's intention, as well to preclude any Austrian inspection over the refugees, when detained in Asia Minor, as to accept the Internuncio's amended proposal of keeping open the list for two months. As to the main requisition of making the eventual liberation of the refugees dependent on Austria's consent, I suggested terms

of agreement which bordered so closely on Prince Schwarzenberg's demand as barely to reserve the Sultan's right.

To make this more clear, I beg to refer your Lordship to the accompanying memorandum, which exhibits the very terms of my suggestion, and to the copies inclosed herewith, of two instructions addressed by me to the first interpreter of Her Majesty's Embassy. An extract of M. Pisani's intermediate report, and a project submitted to Aali Pasha by Count Stürmer, are also inclosed for your Lordship's additional information.

The actual state of the whole affair, as resulting from these communications, may be thus described. A meeting is to take place to-morrow, at the Grand Vizier's house, between that Minister, Aali Pasha, and M. de Titoff. A protocol will no doubt be signed, and probably in the form inclosed herewith, which is based on my suggestion, and contains no addition which I think it worth while to resist; but it is by no means impossible that the Russian Envoy may require and carry amendments less admissible, and withhold the renewal of his diplomatic relations with the Porte until Count Stürmer is also satisfied.

As to the Austrian part of the difficulty, supposing the statement of M. Musurus to be correct, and the language of Count Stürmer sincere, there is little prospect of an immediate accommodation, with the consequent renewal of diplomatic relations, except by means of an unqualified submission to the most objectionable of Prince Schwarzenberg's demands.

However regrettable the continuance of this disagreement may be, I confess that, whether I look to your Lordship's instructions, or to my own personal convictions, I hold that inconvenience to be a less evil than the surrender of the Porte's independence and dignity to a requisition grounded on no treaty right, and likely to be productive hereafter of much vexatious intermeddling and unnecessary suffering.

It is manifest at the same time that I should travel out of my province, if I ventured on this occasion to control the free judgment of the Porte. The two leading Ministers are fully acquainted with my opinions and with those of the French Representative. I despair of striking out any fresh expedient for reconciling the pretensions of Austria with the fair and rightful objections of the Porte. The only sort of menace I could by possibility employ, would be the immediate withdrawal of Her Majesty's squadron from the neighbourhood of Turkey, and the application of such a lever would be almost equally objectionable, whether it succeeded, or whether it failed.

So much during the protracted struggle has been accomplished in favour of Turkish independence, and, consequently of that pacific system which in the East is so intimately connected with its progressive establishment, that it is impossible not to watch with a deep and anxious interest over the terms of final accommodation. But, deeply as the Porte would compromise its essential interests by any unnecessary weakness or inconsistency in the closing act of these negotiations, and much as the Powers friendly to this empire would have to deplore such an ill-timed compliance, the most useful and best-intentioned interference has its limits. Our's, I conceive, has reached them under the present circumstances.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

Inclosure 1 in No. 213.

Memorandum.

LA Porte ne pouvant pas garder ces individus à perpétuité se réserve la faculté de les faire sortir de ses Etats aussitôt que la tranquillité sera rétablie en Hongrie; mais désirant s'entendre là-dessus *au préalable* avec la Cour d'Autriche, elle lui donnera avis de son intention, et l'invitera à l'agréer.

Inclosure 2 in No. 213.

Sir Stratford Canning to M. Pisani.

Sir, *Therapia, December 23, 1849.*

WITH reference to your report dated yesterday, I understand that the pending negotiations between the Porte, on one side, and the Austrian and Russian Representatives on the other, respectively, are in the following state; namely, that Count Stürmer has not accepted the Porte's modification of his proposition concerning the "entente préalable;" that the clause touching the list of Hungarian refugee chiefs to be detained is mutually arranged, with the addition communicated to you by Aali Pasha; that the two proposals giving a right of inspection over them to Austria are rejected by the Porte; and with regard to Russia, that M. de Titoff, while insisting positively on the adoption of a protocol, does not object to that form of protocol which the Porte has finally delivered to him through his interpreter, with my concurrence.

Now, my opinion in answer to Aali Pasha's message is, that his Excellency will do well to sign the intended protocol, in concert with M. de Titoff, as soon as he obtains the Sultan's permission, which ought not to be delayed; that the difficulties with Count Stürmer, submitted meanwhile to the Council, and therefore necessarily kept in suspense for two or three days, should then, and not till then, if possible, be brought to a final result, by his Excellency's informing Count Stürmer that the Porte has gone to the utmost extent of concession, in accepting his proposal touching the "entente préalable" in the limited form of expression last communicated to him; and that if he is unable to accept it with the renewal of diplomatic relations, nothing will remain for the Porte but to execute fairly and conscientiously what she has offered; unless the Austrian Government should be disposed to exchange the intended detention of the refugee chiefs for their expulsion from Turkey, in the manner agreed upon with Russia as to the Emperor's Polish subjects at Shumla.

Understanding that the Sultan is pledged to the "internement," but not to the "entente," I perceive no other mode of proceeding, consistent with His Majesty's honour and the rights of the Porte as an independent Government.

In submitting to the Grand Vizier and Aali Pasha the paragraph accepted by them and objected to by Count Stürmer, I exhausted what little ingenuity and diplomatic experience I possess, in trying to satisfy Austria without humiliating the Porte. In so far as my counsels are concerned, nothing further remains for me to suggest, unless I determine to set aside my instructions as well as my own personal convictions. No one can possibly be more anxious than I am to witness and to promote the settlement of these vexatious differences; but the settlement, to be at all satisfactory, or consistent with preceding circumstances, must be not only conciliatory but honourable too. To anything short of that I can never be a party.

You will read the whole of this to Aali Pasha before the Council meets, and if time allows of it you will also read it to General Aupick, who I have no doubt will be ready to express a similar view of the question to his Excellency.

You are at liberty, should it appear advisable, to make this communication to the Grand Vizier himself, and notes, if wanted, may be taken for the consideration of the Council.

I am, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

Inclosure 3 in No. 213.

Sir Stratford Canning to M. Pisani.

Sir, *Therapia, December 23, 1849.*

I LEARN from your report of to-day, that although Aali Pasha did not make a direct communication to M. de Titoff of the draft of a protocol, as transmitted to me, he has made him acquainted with its substance; that the Grand Vizier went to take the Sultan's commands respecting it to-day; and that Tuesday is fixed for the meeting at which it is to be considered, and, I presume, concluded. I also collect from your report that Aali Pasha manifests a decided inclination to concede the main point of difference with Count Stürmer, while he is prepared to give in experimentally a new version of the clause respecting that question, namely, the "entente préalable."

Under these circumstances, I must direct you to tell Aali Pasha before he sees M. Schwarzhuber, that I see no reason to change my opinion, which is founded, not on Prince Schwarzenberg's tenaciousness, but on my instructions and personal convictions. I have no objection to offer to the Porte's amended version,* which differs in no essential respect from the former one; but if Count Stürmer was sincere in rejecting the original, it is to be expected that he will equally reject the substitute. You will add, that with respect to Russia, I hope the meeting on Tuesday will end, if a protocol be unavoidable, in the adoption of that one which has been prepared by the Porte, though the present uncertainty carries with it a doubtful appearance.

It is my desire that you should read this instruction and the preceding one, both to General Aupick and to the Grand Vizier, if possible before you wait on Aali Pasha. The French Minister is an early riser, and I have no doubt that he will receive you at any hour, on learning that you come from me. If he approves of my proceeding, as he had previously approved of the opinions on which it is founded, he will probably not object to signify his concurrence to Aali Pasha.

I am, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

[General Aupick expressed his full concurrence, and sent corresponding instructions to his interpreter.]

Inclosure 4 in No. 213.

M. Pisani to Sir Stratford Canning.

(Extrait.) *Pera, le 23 Décembre, 1849.*

IL est établi que la réunion avec M. Titoff aura lieu chez le Grand Vizir Mardi.

J'ai lu exactement vos instructions d'aujourd'hui à Aali Pacha. Son Excellence a fait voir clairement par ses réponses sur le point de l'entente préalable, qu'il ne peut pas s'adapter à vos conseils. M. Musurus dit dans une dépêche qu'Aali Pacha a reçue aujourd'hui, que Lord Ponsonby lui a dit qu'il avait été chargé par Lord Palmerston de demander officieusement au Prince Schwarzenberg de changer l'internement des Hongrois à l'expulsion; mais que le Prince lui a répondu que cela était impossible. Le Comte Stürmer a aussi communiquée à Aali Pacha une dépêche qu'il a reçue aujourd'hui; il est dit dans cette dépêche que sans l'entente préalable les relations diplomatiques ne peuvent pas être renouvelées.

Aali Pacha n'a aucune idée sur les intentions de M. Titoff quant à la reprise de ses relations; c'est-à-dire, s'il veut différer ses relations

* This paper was cancelled in consequence of its having been ascertained that the Internuncio would not agree to it.

jusqu'à ce que la question Autrichienne soit arrangée. Je ne doute pas que cette question sera arrangée tout-à-fait comme l'Autriche le demande.

Aali Pacha, chez qui l'interprète Autrichien doit aller prendre une réponse de lui demain à 10 heures, compte lui remettre une nouvelle rédaction de l'article telle qu'elle a été combinée hier au soir entre le Grand Vizir et lui.

Inclosure 5 in No. 213.

Count Sturmer's Project.

22 Décembre, 1849.

ARTICLE fourni par le Comte Stürmer à Aali Pacha en Turc, et déclaré par Aali Pacha inadmissible quant à lui; mais en ajoutant qu'il va le soumettre à ses collègues.

(Traduction.)

"Comme cette question concerne la tranquillité de l'empire, il est tout naturel que ce soit à l'Autriche à décider du temps convenable. Ainsi, la Sublime Porte s'engage à ne prendre, à l'égard des réfugiés gardés ci-dessus mentionnés, aucune mesure nouvelle qu'elle n'ait au préalable communiqué là-dessus avec la Cour d'Autriche, et obtenu son adhésion."

Aali Pacha va insérer dans la note qu'il donnera au Comte, en parlant de la liste, ce qui suit:

"La Sublime Porte a accepté la déclaration que votre Excellence a faite verbalement, de l'avertir dans un délai de deux mois, à dater de ce jour, si des chefs réfugiés surviennent dont les noms ne se trouvent pas sur la liste dont une copie confirmée par le cachet du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères est transmise ci-joint à votre Excellence, et qui sont des sujets du Gouvernement Autrichien."

Inclosure 6 in No. 213.

Projet de Protocole.

(Traduit du Turc.)

CE jourd'hui le de Safer, de l'année de l'Hégire 1266, et le de Décembre de l'ère Chrétienne 1849, les Soussignés, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères de la Sublime Porte, et l'Envoyé Extraordinaire et Plénipotentiaire de l'illustre Cour de Russie, s'étant réunis dans le Palais de son Altesse le Grand Vizir, M. l'Envoyé a déclaré dans une note officielle, que le Gouvernement Impérial a accepté complètement les points insérés dans la note officielle que la Sublime Porte a donnée en date du 9 Moharrem, 1266, relativement aux Polonais qui se sont réfugiés dans les Etats Ottomans par suite des événemens de la Hongrie; et la Sublime Porte aussi a déclaré qu'elle va sans le moindre délai procéder à l'exécution des points insérés dans la susdite note. En foi de quoi, les relations officielles qui étaient interrompues entre la Sublime Porte et la Légation de Russie, se trouvant renouvelées, le Ministre et l'Envoyé susmentionnés ont mis ici leurs signatures et apposé leurs cachets; et son Altesse le Grand Vizir s'étant trouvé présent lui aussi a mis sa signature et apposé son cachet.

No. 214.

Sir Stratford Canning to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received January* 18, 1850.)

(No. 385.)

My Lord, *Therapia, December* 26, 1849.

A PROTOCOL, as intended by the Turkish Ministers, was signed yesterday at the Grand Vizier's house, with a view to settling the long-pending differences between Russia and the Porte. A copy of the agreement is inclosed herewith, and annexed to it are notes for the memorandum therein mentioned. I observe with some degree of regret that the measures of execution are described in the protocol as having been adopted by common consent. Russia is thus placed on the same line with Turkey in a matter which falls within the exclusive competency of the Porte. In other respects the dignity and independence of the Turkish Government appear to be sufficiently guarded.

I am informed by Aali Pasha that the protocol was not signed without a long and animated discussion. Its signature was accompanied with a reservation of no very clear meaning on the part of M. de Titoff. In consideration of the remaining differences with Austria, that Envoy has deferred the exchange of the protocols, signed as they were in duplicate, and the resumption of his relations with the Porte, though declared in the protocol, until the exchange shall be effected.

It appears that Count Stürmer, on learning the day before, that Aali Pasha was unprepared to accept his demand relative to the Porte's engaging not to liberate the Hungarian refugees without the consent of Austria, had threatened to invite M. de Titoff officially to continue the interruption of his relations until he, Count Stürmer, had come to a better understanding with the Porte. I presume that M. de Titoff's reservation was a consequence of this proceeding on the part of the Internuncio. It remains to be seen whether the support thus given by the former to his Austrian colleague will induce the Turkish Minister to give way to the Internuncio's demands, and whether, in the event of another reference to Vienna, the Russian Representative will persist in maintaining his present attitude.

Regarding the difficulties with Austria, I have already apprized your Lordship of my inability to contribute further to their removal, without acquiescing in an act of weakness which I do not feel myself at liberty to sanction, and to which at the same time I can only oppose my opinion, strengthened by your Lordship's instructions and the concurrence of the French Representative.

In this state of things I can only wait for a final decision from the Porte, or such additional information as may remove the uncertainty which still hangs over the intentions of Russia.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

Inclosure 1 in No. 214.

Protocol signed by Aali Pasha and M. de Titoff.

CE jourd'hui le 10 du mois de Safer de l'Hégire 1266, et le $\frac{13}{25}$ du mois de Décembre de l'année Chrétienne 1849, les Soussignés, le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères de la Sublime Porte, et l'Envoyé Extraordinaire et Ministre Plénipotentiaire de Sa Majesté l'Empereur de toutes les Russies, s'étant réunis dans l'hôtel de son Altesse le Grand Vizir, M. l'Envoyé a déclaré par une note officielle, que la Cour Impériale de Russie a complètement accepté les points et pris acte des assurances contenues dans la note officielle relative aux Polonais qui par suite des événemens de la Hongrie se sont réfugiés dans les Etats Ottomans, que la Sublime Porte a remise en date du 9 Moharrem, 1266; et la Sublime Porte, de son côté, a déclaré aussi qu'elle va immédiatement procéder, d'après l'arrangement verbal

arrêté de commun accord, à mettre à exécution les points que sa susdite note renferme.

Ainsi les relations officielles qui ont été interrompues entre la Sublime Porte et la Légation Impériale de Russie étant renouvelées, les Soussignés ont signé ce Protocole et y ont apposé leurs cachets; et le Grand Vizir se trouvant présent dans cette réunion, l'a également révêtu de sa signature et de son cachet.

(Signé) RESCHID. (L.S.) AALI. (L.S.) TITOFF. (L.S.)

Inclosure 2 in No. 214.

Points agreed upon between Aali Pasha and M. de Titoff.

POINTS convenus et arrêtés le 25 Décembre, 1849, n.s., entre Aali Pacha et M. de Titoff, et qui doivent être mis dans la forme d'un mémorandum portant le cachet du Pacha susmentionné seul, et remis à M. de Titoff.

Un Commissaire *ad hoc* partira d'ici pour aller séparer les Polonais sujets du Gouvernement Russe qui se sont réfugiés dans les Etats Ottomans par suite des événemens de la Hongrie, et qui se trouvent actuellement à Shumla, et dont les noms sont inscrits sur la liste qui a été fournie par la Légation.

La séparation faite, ils seront envoyés à Varna et embarqués sur un bateau à vapeur de la marine Impériale Turque, qui les y attendra, et ils seront expédiés directement à l'Ile de Malte.

Ceux parmi les individus dont les noms se trouvent inscrits dans la dite liste, qui ont embrassé l'Islamisme, seront également séparés par l'entremise du Commissaire susmentionné, et envoyés à Varna, où ils seront embarqués sur un bateau à vapeur de la Sublime Porte, et envoyés à l'échelle d'Alexandrette et de là expédiés à Alep. On aura soin de les empêcher de commettre des actes, ou d'entretenir des correspondances, contre la tranquillité des Etats Russes.

La Sublime Porte informera la Légation Impériale qui sont ceux parmi les individus inscrits sur la liste qui, pour s'être fait Musulmans, auront été envoyés à Alep, et qui sont ceux qui auront été envoyés à Malte; et cette information lui sera donnée dès que cette mesure aura été mise en exécution.

Si parmi les réfugiés dont les noms se trouvent sur la dite liste il y a des individus qui ne se sont pas fait Musulmans, qui ne sont pas des sujets du Gouvernement d'Autriche, et dont la qualité de sujet est en quelque sorte douteuse, ceux-ci aussi seront, comme les autres, expulsés des Etats Ottomans.

La Sublime Porte informera sans perte de tems la Légation des avis qu'elle aura reçus de la séparation et de l'expédition des réfugiés dont il s'agit, de l'endroit où ils se trouvent, et de leur arrivée aux lieux de leur destination.

No. 215.

Sir Stratford Canning to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received January 18, 1850.)

(No. 386.)

My Lord, *Therapia, December 26, 1849.*

I HAVE reason to know that the French Minister has lately received instructions from his Government, not indeed altering the previous ones, but expressing an earnest desire that the squadron at Vourla should not be retained on its present service a moment longer than is strictly necessary. My communications with General Aupick have established between us a perfect agreement of opinion as to the expediency of dismissing the squadrons without any unnecessary delay, and of adopting that measure

simultaneously with respect to both of them. The only doubtful question is whether we are yet arrived at the proper period of execution.

It may be said, and such appears to be my colleague's impression, that the renewal of diplomatic intercourse between the Porte and its two Imperial antagonists would be the most satisfactory point of time for the retirement of the squadrons. This view of the subject is no doubt formally correct, and I should be glad to see the interrupted relations resumed before the Porte is deprived of that moral support which she derives from the continued presence of the squadrons on her coast. But supposing the degree of danger which that interruption implies to be so manifestly diminished by other circumstances, that all remains of serious apprehension must reasonably give way, I conceive that the concerted instructions respecting the departure of the squadrons might be carried into effect without waiting for the complete fulfilment of the above-mentioned condition. The Russian differences being once conclusively adjusted, and the customary relations resumed between M. de Titoff and the Porte, there would surely be no sufficient motive on the score of Austria alone, for keeping the squadron within reach. Such actually is now the case on paper; but so much of a conditional character appears in the transaction which took place yesterday, that the Porte may still entertain a reasonable doubt as to the intentions of Russia, and hesitate in deciding whether the protocol is a reality or a feint.

This position is evidently a perplexing one; and though I am more inclined to ascribe it to a wish in M. de Titoff's mind to save appearances towards Austria, while arranging in earnest his differences with the Porte, I cannot with prudence venture to take part in a decisive and irrevocable proceeding before some clearer light is thrown upon the real state of the case. I have addressed myself to Aali Pasha for further information, and it may be deemed a favourable circumstance that the Russian Envoy has promised to speak to his Austrian colleague in a manner which, if sincere, would indicate a spirit of accommodation on his part.

The lapse of a few days may be expected to remove the present uncertainty; but I think it desirable for your Lordship to know without delay in what circumstances I am placed as to the retirement of the squadrons, both with respect to my French colleague and to the execution of your Lordship's instruction on its own grounds.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRBTFORD CANNING.

No. 216.

Sir Stratford Canning to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received January 18, 1850.

(No. 387. Secret and Confidential.)

My Lord, *Therapia, December 26, 1849.*

IT is now more than a fortnight since one of my colleagues, the Representative of an Italian Government, came on purpose from town to inform me that a plan had been formed to assassinate Count Batthyani, Kossuth, and two others of the principal Hungarian refugees. Intelligence to this effect, he said, had been secretly given to him by a man named Bardi, who had served in the Sardinian army against Austria, in the rank of a corporal or sergeant, and had emigrated to Turkey after its discomfiture at Novara. This man, it appeared, being of Hungarian extraction, had been selected by two emissaries dispatched from Vienna, as a fit instrument for carrying proposals and means of escape to the intended victims at Shumla. They had communicated with him through the channel of a Frenchman, whose name is unknown to my informant. Bardi undertook the commission, and was only waiting for the letters, money and passports, with which he was to be furnished, when he suddenly found to his great surprise and dismay that assassination and not deliverance was the real object of his employers. The way in which this plot had come to his knowledge, if true, was singular enough. A person

employed under the Austrian Legation frequented the house of an Hungarian gentleman, with whose daughter he was in habits of familiar intercourse. To this young lady in a moment of confidence the secret was divulged. She hastened to confide it to her father, and by him it was communicated to Bardi. My informant added that the assassins, engaged to waylay Kossuth and his companions in the event of their attempting to escape, were Croatians, subjects of Austria; and that finding the execution of the plot so far prepared, he had lost no time in apprizing Aali Pasha of the circumstances, and urging him to adopt immediate measures of prevention. In answer to my remarks on the improbability of an enterprise so detestable in every point of view, and of intelligence so completely dependent on the veracity of a single individual, he said that his own repugnance to believe it was not inferior to mine; but that the earnest recital of Bardi and his solemn assurances bore every appearance of truth.

As the Ottoman Secretary of State had promised to put the Governor of Shumla on his guard, and to admonish the refugees themselves of the impending danger, I only endeavoured to obtain information privately respecting the names and circumstances that figured in Bardi's statement. But while this very slow and imperfect operation was going on, I received a despatch from Her Majesty's Consul at Varna informing me that a plot of the nature already described, had been disclosed to him by a person named Pardy, or Bardi; that two parties of armed Croatians, accompanied by Austrian agents, had arrived at Varna and Bourgas; and that while he shrunk from giving credit to so monstrous an iniquity, he could not but admit that appearances corroborated the assertion of his informant.

Such being the case, it would hardly be reasonable to dismiss the whole story as an idle invention; but it is a relief to imagine that, supposing the circumstances true, the object in contemplation may nevertheless be rather to discourage the refugees from availing themselves of the proffered means of escape, than to betray them into an ambuscade prepared for their destruction.

Be that as it may, I think your Lordship ought not to be left in ignorance of assertions and facts having so serious a character and so important a tendency. I trust that they will eventually be found to admit of a less odious explanation than the one originally suggested. But what has happened before may happen again; and the records of history are not without examples of crimes treacherously perpetrated under the clandestine sanction of authority. I therefore beg leave to refer your Lordship to the accompanying copies of Colonel Neale's despatch, and of some reports addressed to me confidentially by the agent whom I directed to make inquiry in private.

For the present I will only add an extract of one of M. Pisani's reports, describing the language of Aali Pasha on hearing the statement transmitted by Colonel Neale from Varna, and a paragraph of the "Journal de Constantinople," announcing that one Civinis, employed in the Turkish Passport Office, and known to have taken part in drawing attention to the hired Croatians sent to Shumla, had been murderously attacked by a man supposed to be of that race, who waylaid him in the streets of Pera less than a week ago.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

P.S., *December* 28.—For your Lordship's further information I add an extract of another letter, just received, on the subject-matter of this despatch.

S. C.

Inclosure 1 in No. 216.

Colonel Neale to Sir Stratford Canning.

Sir, *Varna, December* 15, 1849.

I HASTEN to bring to the knowledge of your Excellency the following secret and confidential communication which has been made to me by Rodolf Pardy, late an Hungarian officer, who arrived here from Constantinople last night by the Austrian steamer. Having at once come to me, he stated that he had been dispatched in all speed from Constantinople for the purpose of proceeding to Shumla and of warning Kossuth, Count Batthyani, Generals Dembinski and Messaros, that a plan had been combined at Constantinople for their assassination by some hired Croats, and that it was his object to depart immediately for Shumla with that intention.

So far in confirmation of the above statement, seven armed Croats in fact arrived in Varna by the same steamer last evening.

The following are the particulars of the plan for the assassination of Kossuth and the other chiefs named, and the manner in which it had been discovered, as detailed to me by M. Pardy.

M. Turazi, of the Austrian Embassy at Constantinople, being, it appears, extremely intimate with the Baron Michael Orban, and being pressed by the latter on all occasions to communicate to him what measures had been adopted respecting the refugees at Shumla, secretly betrayed to the Baron that two plans had just been combined by the Austrian authorities (that is to say, by the Austrian Consul-General, who is himself a Croat, as M. Pardy especially stated), for the assassination of Kossuth and his companions; and that those plans were as follows.

1st. That fifteen armed Croats should be dispatched to Shumla, who were to avail themselves of whatever opportunity should present itself to accomplish their purpose when at Shumla; and with a view of lessening suspicion, that half of the above-mentioned Croats should be landed at Bourgas, and proceed from thence to Shumla. 2nd. That two individuals, who lately arrived in Constantinople from Trieste, and who had formerly been in the Hungarian police, but now in the service of Austria, and personally known to Kossuth, and supposed by him to be friendly to him, should proceed to Shumla with the Croats, provided with passports and Turkish teskérés, and offer their services by means of these passports to effect the escape of Kossuth, Count Batthyani, Dembinsky, and Messaros. This plan, it was deemed, was the most easy of accomplishment, and if accomplished, these agents were charged with the assassination of Kossuth and his companions during their flight from Shumla.

Such is the statement solemnly made to me by M. Bardy. He added that he believed that your Excellency had been made acquainted with the purport of his statement upon the moment of his departure from Constantinople; but upon this point he was not certain.

I have deemed it to be my duty to facilitate the departure of M. Bardy for Shumla, as he found some difficulty in obtaining horses; and in so serious a conjuncture I have also deemed it to be my bounden duty to apprize his Excellency the Pasha of Varna, confidentially and in guarded terms, that I had obtained information from a private source, that some armed Croats, accompanied by two superior agents of police, had arrived in Varna, in the intention of proceeding to Shumla with the evil designs which I have above related to your Excellency, but without any detailed particulars; and I added from myself, in making this communication to the Pasha, that in doing so I had discharged myself of what both my conscience and duty dictated, and that his Excellency would be the best judge of the credit which could be attached to information of such an astounding nature, and the measures to be adopted in consequence. The Pasha, in reply, conveyed to me his thanks for this communication; and I have reason to believe that his Excellency will communicate upon the purport of it, with the Governor of Shumla.

The statement of M. Bardy, which I have the honour in this despatch to bring to the knowledge of your Excellency, is of so serious and delicate a nature, that had it not been made to me by M. Bardy, in all its minute details, and accompanied by the most solemn assurances of its veracity, I would have

hardly ventured to have communicated the same to your Excellency in an official form.

It remains for me only to add with reference to this subject, that from my own positive information and knowledge, seven armed Croats, as I have already had the honour to state, did arrive here by the Austrian steamer yesterday, as also an Austrian agent of superior rank to themselves, which latter has taken up his residence at the Austrian Vice-Consulate, and is the person pointed out by M. Bardy as the police agent referred to in his statement. Eight Croats, accompanied by another individual, were likewise positively landed at Bourgas. The Austrian Vice-Consul at Bourgas also came on to Varna by the same steamer.

I have, &c.
(Signed) EDWARD S. JNO. NEALE.

P.S.—*December* 16.—I have not deemed it to be prudent to forward this despatch to your Excellency by the Austrian steamer which returned last night to Constantinople, and I regret that no speedier conveyance presents itself than the Turkish land-post which leaves this day.

M. Bardy left for Shumla at daylight this morning, and six hours after, the Croats who had arrived by the steamer accompanied by the traveller, said to be a police agent, left likewise for the same destination.

Inclosure 2 in No. 216.

Report from a Confidential Agent.

Pera, December 18, 1849.

IN regard to the person named Bardi about whom your Excellency desired information, I beg to say that after having lost all hopes of learning anything about him, I think I have just succeeded through the accidental call of two Hungarians at the office, named François Gara and Andrea Lehotsky.

They say that they knew a man of that name very well. That he came here several months ago from Italy; that he is of a rich family in that country; that he had served about eight years in the Austrian service, in a Hungarian regiment; that he was here as a Hungarian refugee; that his rank was that of a lieutenant. He remained here only a few days and left, with a Sardinian passport, with the hopes of reaching Hungary again; but on arriving at Widdin found it too difficult, and returned here. That he left again a short time since for Shumla, and is expected back in a few days. They spoke very favourably of him, but said he had been reduced to great distress whilst here.

I have made inquiry respecting the Lieutenant-Colonel mentioned in your Excellency's last note; but cannot learn anything, although it should have been easily learnt if he had been at the Austrian Palace as stated. Don Agostino says he does not know him from my description.

I have seen M. di Civinis. I had not made the acquaintance of Neshet Bey, present director of the Passport Office, and this was an excellent motive for calling. He was absent, and I was received by M. Civinis, who, after the usual compliments, began to speak of the present position of the Austro-Russian question; and taking our side of it, launched out against the Internuncio, and told me explicitly what I had before heard and mentioned to your Excellency about the Croats.

He spoke openly as to Count —— being the mover of the scheme; and stated that one day last week an Austrian dragoman came to their office late in the day, when he knew that he (Civinis) would be gone, and finding the good man (Neshet Bey) alone, ordered twelve teskérés for so many Austian subjects (Croats), and came for them early the next morning before Civinis could be there. He (Civinis) said the plan laid was for an agent to represent to Kossuth, Bem, &c., that they were going to be given up to the Russians, and to recommend them to escape from the place as quickly as possible; and if they should do so, they were then to be made away with on the road. Civinis added that the Porte had taken precautions against the success of the plan; but he mentioned it as showing the turpitude of the parties.

In regard to the chiefs in the affair, I could only learn from him that there

are two or more Austrians, lately arrived from Vienna, in the confidence of Count ——, and, as he insinuated, are here for any such kind of service. These are very bold things to state so freely, but I think it my duty to tell your Excellency exactly what he said. . . . .

Pera, December 25, 1849.

This morning I have obtained some information that may be relied on, and which I should have got yesterday had the person I sought not been absent from home.

I was not aware of the Baron's name until your Excellency gave it me, although, if my informant is correct, it is not Michael by Giovanni Urban.

I have not learnt yet all your Excellency wishes to know, but I think it may be relied on that I have obtained his exact name. He is, I am told, a Transylvanian. He is a military man. He lives in a disreputable part of Pera called Tarlabashi, and he is visited by an Austrian employé; but who he is, or of what *grade*, I have not yet learnt. This person is however stated to be constant in his visits, indeed every morning, as I am told; and Urban goes frequently to the Internuncio.

I have not heard from this source anything about the females of the family; but I had previously heard that there are a daughter and a wife; also that Urban has been here for perhaps two years past, looking after the inheritance of his wife's mother who died here about two years ago.

. . . . I have been down to see M. Civinis. He confirmed to me the report of his having been waylaid on Friday night, nearly in the terms in which I have since seen it reported in the journal of to-day. He had been passing the evening with M. Sommaripa, the correspondent of the "Impartial." The conversation passed very easily to what I wanted to learn, and he confirmed to me all I had previously learnt about Baron Urban or Orban, whose Christian name he however did not know, so that whether it was Michael or Giovanni I could not learn. All the circumstances he mentioned prove him to be the same person; and he gave me the name of the Austrian who visits the family as Turassi, not an attaché of the Embassy, but an inferior employé in the Cancellerie.

Civinis says that he himself met the Baron once at the house of Count Andrassy, and then told the Count that he thought it very simple of him to receive such a person, who was a known spy of the other party.

Inclosure 3 in No. 216.

M. Pisani to Sir Stratford Canning.

(Extrait.) 26 *Décembre*, 1849.

J'AI lu à Aali Pacha la lettre de Varna. Il m'a dit que le Pacha de Varna n'a pas écrit sur cela, mais que la Porte ayant appris avec la plus grande indignation cet infâme complot par une voie très-secrète, a immédiatement écrit à Halim Pacha de Shoumla pour l'informer de ce qui se tramait, et le mettre sur ses gardes pour la protection des individus en question.

Inclosure 4 in No. 216.

Extract from the "Journal de Constantinople" of December 24, 1849.

VENDREDI soir, une tentative d'assassinat a eu lieu sur la personne de M. Civini, employé aux bureaux des passeports. Au moment où il sortait d'une maison située derrière le palais d'Angleterre, où il avait passé la soirée, il a été assailli par un homme qui lui a porté un coup de bâton sur la tête, et dont la violence a été amortie par le chapeau. M. Civini, armé d'un poignard depuis une première tentative d'assassinat dont il fut l'objet il y a plusieurs mois, en a frappé dans le bas-ventre l'assassin, qui a poussé aussitôt un grand cri de douleur, tandis que M. Civini s'enfuyait, dans la crainte que l'assaillant n'eût des complices qui vinssent lui prêter main forte.

Inclosure 5 in No. 216.

Confidential Report addressed to Sir Stratford Canning.

(Extract.) *Pera, December* 28, 1849.

M. DE CIVINIS called upon me this morning to say that he thought it his duty to state, in reference to the Baron Urban, that he (the Baron) having heard of the plot in reference to the refugees, made a communication of it to the Turkish authorities.

Civinis added that he did not know what may have been his real object in doing this, whether from remorse at having done them and others an ill turn in other ways, and not liking to see them exposed to so serious a danger, or from any private interested motive in taking credit to himself in communicating what he might have been aware had been already communicated from other quarters. He merely thought it his duty not to conceal this circumstance, and apologised for not having thought of it in our conversation at the time.

No. 217.

Sir Stratford Canning to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received January* 18, 1850.)

(No. 388.)

My Lord; *Therapia, December* 28, 1849.

I CANNOT yet have the satisfaction of announcing the conclusion of the Porte's differences with Austria and Russia. The Internuncio continues to stand out for the *entente préalable*, and M. de Titoff hesitates to resume his official relations with the Porte before the remaining demand of Count Stürmer is accepted. The consequences in prospect are a fresh reference to Vienna, and a prolonged term of coldness between the Sultan and the two Emperors.

To clear up the uncertainty which still prevailed, notwithstanding the agreement concluded between M. de Titoff and the Turkish Minister, I directed M. Pisani to make some inquiries of Aali Pasha. The accompanying paper contains his Excellency's replies, together with the questions which drew them out. They were reported on the 26th instant at a late hour of the evening, and M. Pisani transmitted to me at the same time a special message from the Grand Vizier, describing the state of the negotiation, and inviting me to declare whether the British and French squadrons would go or stay, if the Russian and Austrian Representatives persisted in pursuing their present course. A copy of M. Pisani's report communicating this message is inclosed herewith.

Perceiving in the councils of the Turkish Ministers a degree of embarrassment which it was most desirable to remove, I determined to see the Grand Vizier myself, and accordingly went on the following day to Constantinople, where I had an interview with his Highness and the Secretary for Foreign Affairs. I declared to them frankly my persuasion that the time was come for taking a final resolution, and that the present equivocal situation could not be prolonged without much inconvenience and disparagement. I reminded them that your Lordship's opinion, no less than my own, was opposed to the concession demanded by Austria; nor did I conceal my belief that M. de Titoff's pretension to make common cause with Count Stürmer, notwithstanding the separate agreement which he had signed and sealed, was a mere demonstration, not resting on positive instructions. I assured them that our friendly counsels were by no means offered in a spirit of dictation, but founded, as I had clearly shown already, on distinct views of the Sultan's permanent interests, dignity, and independence, of which however they were able to judge themselves. I added that, as far as I knew, they were not bound either by treaty or by any other kind of engagement, to yield the point in dispute.

The Grand Vizier and Aali Pasha acquiesced in these remarks. They also assured me that the Russian Envoy had not declared the protocol to be a

provisional agreement, and they moreover expressed a persuasion that his Excellency, in making the resumption of his official intercourse with the Porte to depend upon Count Stürmer, was not acting in obedience to any specific orders from his Court.

With respect to the squadrons, which had been the express object of Reshid Pasha's message to me, I thought it advisable to avoid any distinct declaration; and this I was able to do without difficulty, as his Highness only alluded to the question, and appeared to be satisfied when I remarked that the danger, whatever it might have been, had ceased with the relinquishment of the original demand; that the succeeding questions had been treated on diplomatic grounds; and that the squadrons had continued within reach only to give a certain degree of moral support to the Turkish Government in its negotiations with the Russian and Austrian Envoys.

Our interview closed with an understanding that another proposal, drawn up in terms more agreeable to Austria, though still reserving the Sultan's right, should be submitted to Count Stürmer, and that M. de Titoff should be called upon to declare his intentions as to the execution of the protocol and the renewal of diplomatic intercourse in the event of a fresh reference to Vienna.

On leaving the Turkish Ministers I went to see General Aupick, whom I found more than ever anxious to hasten the departure of the squadrons, and inclined to look upon the remaining point of difference between the Porte and Austria through the medium of his last very urgent instructions on that head. He agreed with me however in thinking that it would be premature to come to any final determination until the intentions of M. de Titoff were more completely ascertained, which could hardly fail to occur within a very few days.

With a faint hope of accelerating the completion of the desired settlement, and removing every contingent obstacle to a thorough agreement between the French Representative and myself respecting the early and simultaneous retirement of the squadrons, I sought an interview with Count Stürmer and subsequently with M. de Titoff also. My visit appeared to be taken in good part by each of them; and though I cannot boast of any ostensible success, I found no difficulty in obtaining a courteous and friendly attention to my remarks and arguments.

To the Internuncio I made a frank avowal of my opinions as to the point at issue. I denied his having any treaty stipulation or other kind of engagement wherewith to make good his demand. I affirmed that he had no reason to mistrust the intentions of the Porte, and no right to require that kind of security against any future machinations of the Hungarian refugees, which the Sultan could not accord without an embarrassing surrender of what was due to his dignity and character as an independent Sovereign. I submitted that it was not more the interest of Austria than of England to manifest any disregard of those considerations which were the Porte's most natural barriers against the encroachment of a too powerful neighbour, and I concluded by giving Count Stürmer to understand that if he wished to obtain the assistance of those who might be supposed to exercise some degree of influence at the Porte, and to re-establish relations of confidence with the Turkish Government, he would not persist in requiring that single concession which it would be unwise in the Porte to make, and unfair in its friends to recommend. The principal objections urged by Count Stürmer were the engagement contracted, as he said, by M. Musurus at Vienna, the importance to Austria of having a real security against the premature enlargement of the refugees, and the milder feeling adopted of late by his Government with respect to those who had been compromised in the recent revolutionary conflicts. He stated, moreover, that his instructions were peremptory; that he had shown his good-will by making every concession in his power; and that the only remaining point of difference was one as to which he had positively no discretion to exercise.

To the Russian Envoy I offered my congratulations on the conclusion of his separate agreement with the Porte, and submitted how greatly it would redound to his credit if he were to complete the work of accommodation by overcoming the scruples of his Austrian colleague, and closing the breach unfortunately made in those relations between the Porte and its more immediate neighbours, which tend so powerfully to maintain the peace of the East. M. de Titoff did not give me the idea of attaching any great importance to the success of his colleague's pretension; but he argued in favour of it as Count Stürmer himself had argued,

and left on my mind a confirmation of the impression I had previously entertained as to the motives of his perseverance in so vexatious a course of conduct.

It remains to be seen whether the last conclusive step to be taken by Aali Pasha will produce any advantageous result. According to present appearances it is most likely that another reference to Vienna will be found unavoidable.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING

Inclosure 1 in No. 217.

Questions put to Aali Pasha, with his Excellency's Replies.

Queries.

1. AM I to consider the difference with Russia as being in substance definitively settled?

Answers.

1. NON; car M. Titoff s'est servi hier d'une infinité d'argumens pour persuader la Porte qu'il n'y a pour elle rien de mieux à faire que de céder sur l'entente préalable; il a dit assez de choses pour nous convaincre que M. Titoff n'a pas l'intention de renouveler ses relations diplomatiques si la question avec l'Autriche n'est pas résolue d'une manière favorable. Sur la demande que je lui ai faite sur ce qu'il fera si la réponse de la Porte n'est pas satisfaisante, il a dit qu'il y pensera.

2. If no agreement at present takes place with Austria, but a fresh reference to Vienna, is it understood that the expulsion of the Poles and the renewal of relations with Russia will continue in suspense?

2. Si la Russie continue d'avoir ses relations suspendues, l'expulsion des Polonais n'aura pas lieu.

3. In that case will the question with Russia remain open, notwithstanding the signature of yesterday's protocol?

3. Oui.

4. What has been settled with M. de Titoff respecting the Poles claimed by Russia, but having passports from other Powers?

4. Tous les Polonais qui seront désignés par M. Titoff dans la liste qu'il va donner, seront expulsés; même ceux qui parmi eux pourraient avoir des passeports de Puissances Etrangères. Tous seront envoyés à Malte.

5. What decision, if any, has the Porte taken, or does it contemplate, with respect to the remaining points of difference with Count Stürmer, namely, the "entente préalable," and the inspection by Austrian agents of the Hungarian refugees to be detained in Asia Minor?

5. La nomination d'agens Autrichiens pour surveiller les réfugiés a été rejetée par le Conseil à l'unanimité, et le Comte Stürmer a renoncé à cette demande. Mais le Conseil ne trouvant pas de bons argumens pour combattre la demande de l'entente préalable, ce point va être débattu de nouveau au Conseil aujourd'hui pour être décidé, m'a dit Aali Pacha.

Inclosure 2 in No. 217.

M. Pisani to Sir Stratford Canning.

Excellence, *Péra, 26 Décembre*, 1849.

AALI PACHA m'avait promis de m'informer du résultat des délibérations du Conseil d'aujourd'hui au sujet de l'entente préalable avec l'Autriche.

Mais le Grand Vizir m'a fait entrer dans le Conseil qui s'est trouvé composé de son Altesse, du Seraskier Pacha, de Tahir Pacha, et d'Aali Pacha.

Le Grand Vizir, après m'avoir fait prendre place, m'a parlé dans les termes suivans: "Notre position est toujours la même. Nous espérions qu'une fois le protocole signé, notre question avec la Russie serait terminée. Restait la question Autrichienne, qui est d'une importance secondaire. Mais malgré la signature d'un protocole notre position envers la Russie n'a pas changé, car bien que le Protocole d'hier établisse la manière dont la question des réfugiés Polonais sera arrangée, M. Titoff fait dépendre le renouvellement de ses relations diplomatiques avec la Porte de la solution de la question des réfugiés Hongrois. Or, si la Porte refuse l'entente préalable, le Comte Stürmer, qui ne peut s'écarter de la lettre de ses instructions, s'en référera à sa Cour. Nous ne savons pas si M. Titoff en agira de même, mais tout porte à croire qu'il le fera. Ainsi voilà la Porte replongée dans le même état de perplexité et d'incertitude. Cela étant, la Porte désire savoir de son Excellence Mr. Canning si dans cet état de choses les flottes resteront ou s'éloigneront. Je vous prie de rapporter fidèlement à son Excellence tout cela, et de m'apporter une réponse demain."

J'ai appris dans le Conseil que le Comte Stürmer doit demander une réponse catégorique à la Porte ce soir, et M. Titoff demain matin.

J'ai l'honneur, &c.

(Signé) FRED. PISANI.

No. 218.

Sir Stratford Canning to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received January* 18, 1850.)

(No. 389.)

My Lord, *Therapia, December* 29, 1849.

I HAD an audience of the Sultan to-day and presented Her Majesty's congratulatory letters on the birth of the two Princes who have lately been added to the Imperial family, with such expressions of interest as I thought best suited to the occasion.

The Sultan availed himself of the opportunity to repeat his thanks for the support which he had received from Her Majesty and from Her Majesty's Government, under the late trying circumstances of disagreement with Austria and Russia. His Highness was pleased to make his acknowledgments in very emphatic terms; and he seems to feel sincerely what he owes to England, not only under recent circumstances but on former occasions also. He was more particularly anxious that I should convey the expression of his gratitude and confidence to Her Majesty the Queen.

The opening thus afforded for reverting to the urgency of strengthening the defenses of the empire, particularly those of the Bosphorus, and carrying out the principles of administrative improvement with more activity, was not to be neglected; and I had the satisfaction to observe that the Sultan appeared to receive with approbation my suggestions respecting those objects.

I had the honour on this occasion to present the Earl of Lincoln and other English gentlemen to His Imperial Majesty, who was pleased to give them a gracious reception.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

No. 219.

Sir Stratford Canning to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received January 18, 1850.)

(No. 390.)

My Lord, *Therapia, December 29, 1849.*

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith, for your Lordship's information, several letters or extracts of letters addressed to me on subjects connected with the proceedings of Russia in the Danubian Principalities, and the supposed designs of that Power in other parts of the Ottoman dominions.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

Inclosure 1 in No. 219.

Her Majesty's Consul at Jassy to Sir Stratford Canning.

(Extract.) *December 10, 1849.*

THE city of Jassy is laid under contribution for military quarters, each house paying in proportion to its extent, from three ducats to twelve piastres monthly, with option of providing quarters in lieu of payment. It is a prevalent belief of the Russian officers, that orders will be received in the spring for the advance of their troops into Turkey. Galatz is free from a Russian garrison, but at Ibraila a regiment of Russian pontooniers 1500 strong is at present cantoned. In some of the district towns large quantities of provisions and forage are collected. The district towns, thirteen in number, have hitherto had a Starost or Consular Agent of Austria in each of them, appointed by the Austrian agency. Their nomination is now made by the Minister at Vienna, and their functions have become more important; Austria in fact exercises a police surveillance over the country, which is at the same time occupied by the forces of Russia.

A new levy of recruits has been ordered in the Bucovina and Gallicia as in Russia. This information had however previously reached us, and it is a measure to which the Government have recourse annually.

The Government of the Principalities is pursuing the path traced out for it. It has completely lost the character of self-action. A Commission has been named to revise the Organic Regulations, the members have met for the purpose; but nothing, according to the Hospodar, has been yet done.

Inclosure 2 in No. 219.

Private Letter from Galatz.

Excellence,

JE me fais un devoir de lui apprendre que contre le désir des gens de bien nous avons dans le pays à notre grand étonnement à la commission qui doit revoir et reformer le Règlement, majorité Russe; cause que j'attribue à l'absence de Fouad Effendi, et davantage encore à la politique trop prudente de la Cour souveraine, dont l'influence ne se fait pas trop sentir vis-à-vis celle de la Russie, qui ne trouvant pas de contrepoids, impose au Gouvernement Moldave, comme dans cette occasion, sa volonté. J'avais prévu, Excellence, cette erreur de la politique souveraine, et j'en avais avisé son Excellence Aali Pacha qui fera tracer, je le pense, cette conduite dans ses instructions aux agens de la Sublime Porte. Les conséquences de ce fait peuvent rendre illusoires les espérances pour l'avenir du pays, et sans votre généreux concours je dirai qu'avec raison on pourrait désespérer d'une amélioration qui relèverait les habitans de ce malheureux pays; mais je regarde avec courage les ténèbres dont on tache d'envelopper le ciel de notre avenir, car j'ai l'honneur de vous connaître et je sais tout ce que vous avez fait et vous êtes disposé de faire pour ma malheureuse patrie.

Les Russes à côté d'autres intrigues pour se donner, du consentement des habitans de la Principauté, un prétexte qui leur permettrait l'occupation de la

ville de Galatz, par de sourdes menées tâchent de faire solliciter les habitans l'appui d'une troupe Russe censée de sûreté. A Ibraila ils ont atteint ce but, et cette ville se trouve sous la protection menaçante d'une garnison de pontonniers Russes. On dit qu'on est à la recherche du bois pour la construction des pontons.

Voilà, Excellence, l'état critique de la Moldavie, qui demande un remède prompt et peut être pas impossible, pour sortir de la crise dont elle est menacée.

Je finis, &c.

Inclosure 3 in No. 219.

Letter from Belgrade.

Belgrade, le 7 Décembre, 1849.

LE Général Levshine, Consul Russe, a annoncé au Prince et aux Ministres Serbes, qu'il a reçu des avis de St. Pétersbourg que le différend entre la Russie et la Turquie provoqué par la question des réfugiés, sera bientôt terminé par un arrangement entre l'Empereur et le Sultan, sans participation, ni de l'Angleterre ni de la France; que les flottes Anglaise et Française s'en iront comme elles sont venues, sans autre résultat qu'une dépense d'argent Anglais et Français sur les côtes de l'Empire Ottoman, mais qu'un jour ceux qui ont provoqué l'arrivée de ces flottes répondront amèrement devant l'Empereur.

Après quoi il a commencé à parler confidentiellement de la Turquie; que cette Puissance ne fait rien pour ses sujets Chrétiens; qu'elle s'obstine de les tenir dans une privation complète du droit civil et politique, et qu'il craint qu'elle ne subisse le même sort qu'ont subi les Magyares; il a dit ces paroles—"La Turquie peut briller un instant d'un désespoir héroïque, mais après cela elle tombera pour ne plus se relever." Ces conversations du Consul Russe relèvent l'espoir et l'activité des Panslavistes, et ébranle la confiance dans le Gouvernement Ottoman des Serbes, qui lui ont été jusqu'à présent le plus attachés. J'ai entendu l'autre jour M. Garaschanine se désespérer, et dire ces mots: "La Turquie ne veut et ne fera rien pour nous, mais si la Turquie a le désir sincère d'exister, qu'elle agisse à l'instant, car au printemis il sera trop tard." Les Serbes sont mécontens du Palatinat que l'Autriche leur a octroyé. Les Magyares et les Roumans de la Batchka et du Banat n'appartiennent plus à la Voïvodine, et le Général Meyerhoffer, l'Allemand le plus détesté des Slaves, est nommé Vice-Palatin de la Serbie.

En Hongrie la population des campagnes est en fermentation. La lettre d'adieu de Kossuth circule partout, on invoque son retour, et on l'attend accompagné de troupes Turques et de canons Anglais.

Les Slovaques sont mécontens du Gouvernement Autrichien, ils n'ont pu obtenir l'abolition de la peine corporelle, et la Légion Slovaque a refusé d'entrer au service de l'Autriche; sur les 3000 volontaires qui la composaient, il n'y a eu que cinq hommes qui ont voulu servir l'Empereur François-Joseph.

Les agens de la Russie parcourent la Hongrie, ils travaillent les Slaves, mais ils ne dédaignent pas les Magyares. Le Général Levschine lui-même est entré en relations intimes avec M. Carosini, ex-agent Magyar en Serbie, et qui réside toujours à Belgrade.

Le crédit financier à Vienne est aux abois; l'Autriche voudrait bien se séparer de la Russie, mais elle est sous une telle pression de cette Puissance, qu'elle n'ose pas le mécontenter pour ne pas avancer sa chûte. Les lettres de Vienne disent que la Russie fera toutes les concessions à la Turquie, pourvu qu'elle parvienne à éloigner les flottes Anglaise et Française des eaux de la Turquie.

Inclosure 4 in No. 219.

Private Letter addressed to Sir Stratford Canning.

Excellence,

J'AI reçu une correspondance de Belgrade qui me semble offrir assez d'intêret pour être communiquée à votre Excellence. Je la lui soumets en traduction litérale; je ne me permets pas de faire des réflexions, mais j'attire l'attention de votre Excellence sur le mouvement Panslave. Il n'y a que les Polonais qui peuvent contrecarrer l'action Russe parmi les Slaves. Si on les expulse de la Turquie, si on les repousse de l'Europe, une partie va en Amérique, mais une autre sera forcée de se jeter entre les bras de la Russie, et celle-là attirera la nation Polonaise entière. La Russie alors deviendra maîtresse toute puissante des Slaves, et l'Occident perdra toute son influence sur cette race nombreuse et belliqueuse. C'est un danger d'une grande gravité et dont le développement est peut-être plus proche qu'on ne le croit. C'est aux hommes d'Etat éminens comme votre Excellence qu'appartient la discussion et la décision de cette question. Elle n'est pas Polonaise mais elle est Européenne; on peut encore repousser le danger, mais il faut s'y prendre à tems.

Que votre Excellence excuse la liberté que j'ai prise de l'importuner, et qu'elle daigne ne voir dans cette démarche que l'accomplissement de mon devoir et l'hommage de ma considération très vive et très profonde pour sa personne.

Inclosure 5 in No. 219.

M. J. Ghika to Sir Stratford Canning.

Excellence, *Constantinople*, 19 *Décembre*, 1849.

LES Agens Russes dans les Principautés ont annoncé aux Gouvernemens respectifs que le différend Turco-Russe au sujet des réfugiés est entièrement terminé, et que les flottes Anglaise et Française auront quitté avant peu les eaux du Sultan. La situation actuelle de mon pays me fait un devoir impérieux d'appeler l'attention de votre Excellence sur la question des Principautés, et de lui rappeler que cette partie de la Turquie est encore occupée, à l'heure qu'il est, par 40,000 Russes. J'avais espéré que la présence des flottes aux Dardanelles serait aussi un moyen puissant pour la Porte d'obtenir quelques garanties pour l'avenir des Roumans de la Turquie, pour cette partie de l'empire qui compte plus de quatre millions d'habitans que la Russie pressure depuis plus d'un siècle afin de la réduire par le desespoir. Sans une action forte et efficace de la part de votre Excellence, sans nul doute les Principautés seront de nouveau abandonnées à la discrétion du Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg. Depuis grand nombre d'années, des agitations, des troubles, des révolutions même éclatent périodiquement au sein de ces provinces, et n'ont pour tout résultat que d'amener des changemens dans la personne des Princes, sans atténuer en rien le mal, sans établir un ordre de choses de nature à faire rentrer le pays dans la voie normale qui lui serait propre. Dans l'état où se trouvent depuis quelque tems les Principautés, il suffit de telle ou telle circonstance à l'extérieur, d'un homme hardi à l'intérieur, pour soulever les populations et renverser les institutions existantes, sauf réserve de rentrer dans l'ancien système par l'action puissante d'une intervention étrangère. Cependant jamais les deux Cours n'ont manqué d'attribuer ces troubles à la véritable cause qui les fait naître,—à la souffrance du peuple. Pour ne remonter qu'au Traité d'Akermann, les deux Cours Contractantes reconnaissent que les événemens de 1821 avaient été provoqués par les vices de l'administration de cette époque; et dans le Senet de Balta Liman il est dit que l'on procedèra aux améliorations organiques que réclame la situation actuelle des Principautés et les abus qui s'y sont introduits. Mais pour avoir reconnu le mal et en être convenu ouvertement, il n'est pas moins vrai que l'on n'a rien fait pour le déraciner. Et en effet, depuis la conclusion des Traités d'Akermann et d'Andrinople, on a doté le pays du Règlement Organique, institution pompeuse en apparence et dans la forme, mais abusive quant au fond, et établie sur des

principes erronés et des bases sans fondemens. Aujourd'hui on vient encore proclamer dans le Sened du 1er Mai que l'expérience a prouvé la nécessité d'apporter des changemens et des modifications au Règlement de 1831. Mais de bonne foi, le Règlement n'avait pas besoin d'être soumis à une expérience de dix-huit années pour en laisser voir les vices, et aujourd'hui encore que l'on avoue la nécessité de la reviser, on se borne à changer la rédaction de quelques articles sans détruire le germe du mal. On ne veut pas examiner attentivement les bases de ce Règlement, ni remonter aux influences qui l'on dicté.

Quand on s'est arrogé le droit de s'occuper du sort d'un peuple comme l'ont fait pour les Principautés les Gouvernemens de Constantinople de St. Pétersbourg, et qu'on neutralise surtout l'action de ce peuple sur lui-même, outre qu'on s'impose un devoir bien dur, on assume en même tems une immense responsabilité pardevant Dieu et les hommes.

Lorsque les flottes auront quitté les eaux du Sultan les Valaques verront disparaître pour très longtems l'espoir d'obtenir un soulagement à leurs maux. En présence des conséquences de l'arrangement de Balta Liman et de son inefficacité, des nombreux abus commis sous le Caïmacam, et qui continuent sous le Gouvernement actuel comme par le passé, tant dans l'administration que dans la jurisdiction du pays, des impositions établies sur la propriété foncière nommément pour subvenir aux frais de l'occupation Russe, des vexations continuelles de certain boyards, que le triomphe de la Russie a rendu omnipotens; toutes ces considérations entretiennent chez les Valaques un mécontentement qui tend toujours à s'accroître. De deux choses l'une: ou à la moindre chance de succès il seront poussés à un nouveau mouvement, ce qui ne manquera d'amener de nouvelles complications, et c'est même le but probable dans lequel la Russie veut tenir le pays dans un état d'agitation continuelle; ou bien ils se jetteront entièrement dans les bras de la Russie, qui leur montrera cette alternative comme le seul moyen d'obtenir quelque soulagement à leur maux. Tandis que les Principautés, une fois soustraites à l'action incessant de la Russie, deviendraient par leur position topographique et par les ressources matérielles qu'elles possèdent, un élément de force pour la Turquie et une garantie de plus pour l'intégrité de l'empire, de même qu'elles ont servi pendant plusieurs siècles de boulevard au Christianisme.

Il appartient à votre Excellence, qui avez soutenu les droits de la Turquie dans des circonstances bien difficiles, et qui avez donné tant de preuves de sympathie et de bienveillance à toutes les populations souffrantes; il appartient à votre Excellence, qui avez aujourd'hui des moyens efficaces à votre disposition, d'aider et de pousser le Ministère de la Porte à régler une fois pour toutes le sort de la population Roumaine de l'Empire Ottoman. Vous aurez acquis un nouveau titre à la reconnaissance éternelle de l'Europe civilisé.

Agréez, &c.

(Signé) JON GHICA.

No. 220.

Sir Stratford Canning to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received January 14, 1850.)

(No. 391.)

My Lord, *Therapia, December* 31, 1849.

IT is with the liveliest feelings of satisfaction that I find myself authorized at length to inform your Lordship that the long-pending and vexatious dispute between Russia and the Porte is finally set at rest by the open resumption of M. de Titoff's official relations with the Turkish Government. Another interview between the Russian Envoy and the Grand Vizier is to take place at noon to-day in his Highness' house expressly for that purpose, which is to be accomplished by a formal delivery of the protocol signed, as your Lordship already knows, on the 25th instant.

The tenacity with which this negotiation has been drawn out on the side of Russia, and its conclusion sought to be invested with formalities and ceremony, is not a little remarkable.

The remaining difference with Austria is reduced to a mere point, the Sultan's ultimate right to determine at what period the Hungarian refugees may

be safely dismissed, independent of Austria's consent, being alone reserved. Another reference will consequently be made to Vienna with a fair prospect of settlement favourable to the Porte's view, and the Internuncio will have to decide whether his official relations with the Porte may be provisionally resumed during the interval.

This state of things, imperfect as it is with respect to Austria, has not been obtained without some additional exertions on behalf of the Porte. Such as it is, I cannot hesitate to consider it as fully authorizing the application of your Lordship's eventual instructions to Her Majesty's squadron at Mosconissi, which is the more desirable, as the simultaneous retirement of the two squadrons, British and French, may be thus secured, agreeably to the desire of both Governments.

A proper understanding already exists between General Aupick and myself on this subject, and the French steamer "Prony," which is appointed to convey his Excellency's correspondence to Vourla and Toulon, will also take charge of this despatch to your Lordship's address.

I propose to forward by an express under British colours, my communications to Sir William Parker, informing him that his continuance on the coasts of Turkey is no longer required. The performance of this duty will only be delayed until I shall have received an official confirmation of M. de Titoff's reconcilement with the Porte, and apprized the Turkish Ministers of my intention respecting the squadron.

It is doubtful at this distance from town whether I shall be able to receive my interpreter's report of the intended meeting at the Grand Vizier's house in time to forward its contents by the present opportunity. I do not however apprehend any fresh delay or difficulty; and one of the Queen's messengers being still at my disposal, I shall not have to detain my next despatches to your Lordship for the means of a safe and expeditious conveyances to England.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

No. 221.

Sir Stratford Canning to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received January* 14, 1850.)

(No. 392. Private and Confidential.)

My dear Lord, *Therapia, December* 31, 1849.

IT is solely with a view to your Lordship's information that I forward the copies inclosed herewith of a correspondence which took place yesterday between the French Minister and myself respecting the immediate retirement of the two squadrons.

I had scarcely completed my reply to General Aupick's letter when a message from Aali Pasha arrived to inform me that the Russian Envoy had agreed to resume without further delay his official relations with the Porte. This intelligence placed the matter under our consideration on a far clearer and more substantial ground than before; and it was a real gratification to me that I was thereby enabled to meet, without a shade of difference, the wishes and intentions of my French colleague, believing them to be founded on the anxious desire of his Government to call its squadron home with the least possible delay.

My previous communications with General Aupick on this subject sufficiently explain any slight appearance of abruptness that may strike your Lordship in his manner of announcing an intention which, with reference to the considerations stated in my reply, seemed rather premature.

I lost no time in acquainting him with my decision, as suggested by the improved aspect of our question, and a copy of my last confidential note is inclosed herewith.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

Inclosure 1 in No. 221.

General Aupick to Sir Stratford Canning.

Mon cher Collègue, *Péra, le* 30 *Décembre*, 1849.

JE voulais vous aller voir aujourd'hui; j'en suis empêché par un triste devoir—le service funèbre de notre vénérable M. Rizos. Je me décide donc à vous faire connaître par écrit le but de ma visite projetée.

M. de Stürmer, avec lequel j'ai eu une longue causerie dans laquelle j'ai exprimé et développé l'opinion que je ne trouvais pas juste la condition qu'il veut imposer à la Porte, m'a positivement déclaré qu'il n'agissait qu'en vertu d'ordres péremptoires de sa Cour, et qu'il ne pouvait accepter moins que ce qui avait été consenti à Vienne par M. Musurus.

D'un autre côté, M. Titoff déclare que toutes les pièces requises pour rétablir ses rapports officiels sont pleinement convenues et signées. Il ajoute qu'il est étranger à la négociation pendante; mais sans s'expliquer positivement, il laisse pressentir que dans l'état des choses il se croit obligé, quelque regret qu'il en éprouve, d'ajourner la reprise de ses relations.

Il n'est pas douteux que M. de Stürmer n'en réfère à Vienne. La conséquence, c'est le prolongement inévitable de la situation.

Vis-à-vis des instructions précises de mon Gouvernement, c'est dès-lors pour moi un devoir de me demander si le moment n'est pas venu de prendre un parti à l'égard de son escadre? La réponse est positive. Tout en regrettant l'incident qui s'oppose à la conclusion immédiate et complète d'un différend qui a donné lieu à de si vives inquiétudes, je suis obligé de reconnaître que de la part de la Russie, devenue étrangère au débat, il n'y a plus rien à craindre pour la Turquie, et que le retard apporté à la reprise des relations de M. Titoff, ne peut être attribué qu'à un procédé, qu'à son point de vue vis-à-vis de son collègue d'Autriche, je ne pourrais blâmer. Il ne s'agit donc plus pour la Russie que d'une affaire de forme dont la solution favorable ne saurait être douteuse, et quant à la difficulté soulevée par l'Autriche, sa solution, quelle qu'elle soit, ne peut devenir un danger pour la Porte.

Certes je ne saurais approuver l'obstination du Cabinet de Vienne et je plaindrais sincèrement le Divan, si, de conviction, ou parcequ'il se regarde comme lié par l'engagement de son Représentant, ce dont il est juge, il croit devoir souscrire une condition dans laquelle il n'y a point de réciprocité; mais évidemment, cela ne peut en rien compromettre le fond de la question désormais gagné, et dans cette conviction je manquerais à ce que je dois à la confiance de mon Gouvernement, si je ne me rendais à son vœu pressant, en renvoyant son escadre à Toulon.

Je ne crois pas nécessaire, mon cher collègue, de revenir, pour vous en convaincre, sur le désir sincère que j'éprouve que nos escadres s'éloignent en même tems; je serais donc heureux, je me plais à vous en renouveler l'assurance, de vous voir partager mon opinion sur l'opportunité, venue selon moi, de leur donner des ordres à ce sujet; mais quoiqu'il en puisse être, je ne dois point différer plus longtems. J'ai donc l'honneur de vous prévenir que le "Prony" partira demain, 31 de ce mois, dans la soirée, de 6 à 8 heures au plus tard. Pour le public, il partira directement pour Marseille, mais en mer M. de la Roquette remettra au commandant l'ordre de se rendre d'abord à Ourlac, où ma dépêche sera remise à l'Amiral, par laquelle il sera autorisé à quitter son mouillage pour rejoindre Toulon dès que le tems le lui permettra. J'éviterai ainsi la publicité prévue du départ de l'escadre Française.

Veuillez ne pas m'envoyer trop tard demain vos dépêches; elles seront d'ailleurs attendues.

Je ne puis me défendre, j'en conviens, d'un sentiment de vive humeur contre l'Autriche; mais je dois aussi avouer que je cherche et trouve une satisfaction qui n'est pas sans prix, dans le peu d'importance que nous paraîtrons attacher aux difficultés qu'elle se plait à faire naître en ce moment.

Agréez, &c.
Le Général de Division, Ministre de France,
(Signé) J. AUPICK.

Inclosure 2 in No. 221.

Sir Stratford Canning to General Aupick.

(Réservée)
Mon cher Collègue, *Thérapia, le 30 Décembre,* 1849.

LE triste devoir qui vous a retenu en ville m'y aurait amené malgré la pluie, si j'en avais été prévenu à tems. En allant y participer j'aurais été bien aise de vous épargner la peine de m'écrire. Puisqu'il en est autrement, je me sers aussi de la plume pour répondre au plutôt à la lettre que vous avez bien voulu m'écrire aujourd'hui.

Vous savez déjà jusqu'à quel point nous sommes d'accord relativement au départ des escadres de leurs mouillages actuels. En cherchant à nous entendre sur le moment le plus convenable de les mettre en liberté, nous faisons ce que je crois nous être prescrit par les instructions de nos Gouvernemens respectifs. Il est donc inutile de vous assurer que je désire pouvoir apprécier la situation actuelle comme vous l'appréciez, et arriver de concert avec vous à la même conclusion. En effet, mes pourpariers avec les négociateurs de part et d'autre m'ont laissé une impression qui semble ne différer de la vôtre en rien d'essentiel.

A juger de son attitude, nous devons supposer que M. de Titoff n'ajourne la reprise de ses communications officielles avec la Porte, que par considération pour un collègue moins heureux que lui. Cette conjecture est d'autant plus fondée que l'invitation du Comte Stürmer est censée avoir précédé la réserve déclarée par M. de Titoff.

Quoiqu'il en soit, c'est une simple conjecture n'ayant rien de positif pour base. Si une nouvelle référence se faisait à Vienne, pendant que le Protocole Turco-Russe demeurait sans effet, les conséquences éventuelles seraient difficiles à prévoir. Dans cette hypothèse la Porte, malgré son bon droit et les motifs raisonnables de sa conduite, se trouverait exposée de nouveau à un état de gêne et de fâcheuse complication, que non-seulement l'insistance de l'Autriche mais encore les sympathies de la Russie pourraient lui causer.

Quoique je n'y voie pas la perspective d'un retour de danger capable de menacer la paix de la Turquie, il y a néanmoins assez d'incertitude pour me faire désirer que toutes les chances de succès soient ménagées pour la Porte, qui cherche dans ce moment-ci à réaliser son accommodement avec la Russie au profit de sa négociation séparée avec l'Autriche.

Il va sans dire que l'effet moral et diplomatique qui devait résulter de la présence prolongée des deux escadres dans les eaux supérieures de l'Archipel, serait perdu pour cet objet, si nous leur faisions le signal d'éloignement avant que la question qui se débat encore ne fût décidée, si non définitivement, du moins par une nouvelle référence à Vienne.

Selon toute apparence un délai de trois à quatre jours suffirait pour atteindre ce but. Je suis toujours prêt à réunir mes efforts aux vôtres pour déterminer la Porte à accélérer le dénouement que je ne cesse d'appeler de tous mes vœux. Nul motif raisonnable de l'ajourner n'existe à présent, et si la Porte ne fait pas droit à nos instances, et laisse traîner l'affaire encore en longueur, je n'hésiterai pas à prendre un parti analogue à celui qui vous semble déjà nécessaire.

Voilà, mon cher collègue, une franche exposition de mes idées dans cette conjoncture, et j'espère que vous y verrez les moyens de consulter en même tems l'intérêt de votre Gouvernement et le désir que nous partageons de maintenir sans relâche le parfait concours dont nos démarches relatives à la question des réfugiés ont porté jusqu'ici l'empreinte.

Je ne veux pas terminer cette lettre sans vous remercier de l'offre obligeante que vous avez bien voulu me faire de l'expédition que vous préparez pour la France. Je compte en profiter avec empressement, mais, toutefois, en espérant que le "Prony" attendra encore un couple de jours l'éclaircissement qui me paraît fort à désirer, afin que nous puissions satisfaire, autant que les circonstances le permettront, à toutes les exigences de la situation.

Je vous prie, &c.
(Signé) STRATFORD CANNING.

Inclosure 3 in No. 221.

Sir Stratford Canning to General Aupick.

Mon cher Collègue, *Thérapia, Dimanche soir, 30 Décembre,* 1849.

J'ETAIS au moment de donner ma lettre responsive à copier lorsque la nouvelle m'est parvenue que M. de Titoff devait se rendre chez le Grand Vizir demain pour échanger ses protocoles et renouveler ses relations. Nous voilà donc sur un terrain bien autre que celui du matin, et je vous expédie ma lettre parcequ'elle est déjà faite, et nullement dans l'idée qu'elle puisse servir à quelque chose à présent.

Je suis d'avis que la référence à Vienne ne doit pas nous arrêter, et je compte écrire à notre Amiral après que j'aurai reçu la nouvelle officielle de la reprise des relations normales entre la Porte et M. de Titoff. Je compte expédier un exprès pour cet objet. Ce sont mes dépêches pour Londres que je vous prierai de faire passer avec les vôtres par le "Prony."

Sincèrement, &c.
(Signé) STRATFORD CANNING.

No. 222.

Sir Stratford Canning to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received January 14, 1850.)

(No. 393.)
My Lord, *Therapia, December* 31, 1849.

UNCERTAIN as I am whether the report of M. de Titoff's conclusive transaction with the Turkish Ministers will reach me in time to be forwarded by present opportunity, I transmit herewith a copy of M. Pisani's report of yesterday, that your Lordship may be acquainted with the exact terms of Aali Pasha's communication on this subject.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

Inclosure in No. 222.

M. Pisani to Sir Stratford Canning.

Excellence, *Péra, le 30 Décembre,* 1849.

J'AI l'honneur de vous informer de la part d'Aali Pacha, que ce matin M. Titoff lui a fait savoir que comme le dernier projet de la Porte sur la question Autrichienne lui paraît se rapprocher de la demande de l'Autriche, il espère qu'il sera accepté à Vienne; qu'en attendant, et dans cet état de choses, il propose une réunion pour procéder à l'échange du protocole et pour reprendre ses relations officielles avec la Porte. La réunion aura lieu demain dans l'hôtel de son Altesse le Grand Vizir, à Midi.

J'ai l'honneur, &c.
(Signé) FREDERICK PISANI.

No. 223.

Sir Stratford Canning to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received January 14, 1850.)

(No. 394.)
My Lord, *Therapia, December* 31, 1849.

INCLOSED herewith is the last version of the intended clause for insertion in the Porte's official note to the Internuncio, with the view of satisfying the Government of Vienna without surrendering the Sultan's independent right as

to the eventual liberation of the Hungarian refugees. I was led to sanction its communication to Count Stürmer by an earnest desire to offer no obstacle to an immediate accommodation, not absolutely required for the maintenance of the disputed principle and for the most obvious considerations of justice and humanity.

It is manifest that the sole difference between this version and the preceding one of the same clause consists in the turn of verbal expression.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

Inclosure in No. 223.

Clause to be inserted in the Porte's Note to the Austrian Minister, as proposed by Aali Pasha.

PROJET d'Aali Pacha sur l'entente avec l'Autriche.

Cet Article finit ainsi: "C'est pourquoi la Sublime Porte établira et gardera les réfugiés à Kutahia, pour l'espace de . . . . à compter de la date de la présente note officielle. Au bout de ce terme, et la tranquillité une fois établie en Hongrie, on ne verra plus de nécessité réelle de les détenir, et la Porte aura alors le droit de les expulser de ses Etats. Seulement, lorsque le temps en sera venu, la Porte, conformément à ce que les principes de bon voisinage et d'amitié exigent, désirant s'entendre avec la Cour d'Autriche, elle lui fera connaître son intention, avant de les éloigner de ses Etats, et tâchera d'obtenir son adhésion.

No. 224.

Lord Bloomfield to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received January 19.)

(No. 1.)
My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, January 2, 1850.*

IN consequence of the port of Odessa being frozen, the Turkish post now passes through the Principalities, and the communication with Constantinople is very tedious.

Count Nesselrode, whom I have just seen, informed me that the only intelligence which had arrived from M. Titoff, since I last called on him, is an acknowledgment of instructions sent from hence, and the announcement that he had made a communication to the Porte which he hoped would be the precursor of the renewal of diplomatic relations.

Count Nesselrode seemed to be so much vexed at not having received the intelligence he expected, that I apprehend he may have had some greater reason for dissatisfaction than the mere delay of the post; but he said that he was without news; and upon my inquiring of his Excellency if there had been an indication of any unwillingness on the part of the Porte to close the affair, he replied that until M. Titoff reported the resumption of his official intercourse he should not consider the matter at an end, because the mass of intriguers, especially Frenchmen and others in the interest of France who infested Pera, rendered the usual course of diplomatic negotiations impossible, as every communication which was made to the Turkish Government transpired five minutes afterwards; "therefore," he said, "I am unable to make any calculation on the subject, and it is the fault of the Porte for not having given greater powers to Fuad Effendi, who might have closed the whole affair at St. Petersburgh: for we were ready to abide by the original terms which he had recommended to the acceptance of his Government, whereas now the details of the affair were a subject for the discussion of all the busy politicians of Constantinople."

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 225.

Lord Bloomfield to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received January 19.)

(No. 3.)
My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, January 2, 1850.*

I HAVE reason to believe that previous to the departure of General de Lamoricière from St. Petersburgh he had several conversations with Count Nesselrode upon the expulsion of refugees, and that the French Minister listened with much favour to the Chancellor's arguments that it would be desirable for the European Powers to come to a general understanding on the subject.

General de Lamoricière will doubtless carry these impressions to Paris; but I am at a loss to understand in what way the question can possibly, or with any chance of success, be brought forward for discussion with the French Government.

I inquired of Count Nesselrode, with whom I lately exchanged a few words on the subject, whether the rumour which had reached me was true, that the Russian Government were desirous to open negotiations with foreign countries for establishing a general system of extradition or expulsion of refugees; and was told by his Excellency that he thought an arrangement of the kind would be very useful, and greatly contribute to the happiness of the well-disposed portion of the population of Europe; but he said, "We must not now talk of *extradition*, because we have had enough of that word for a long time to come, and must content ourselves with *expulsion*, if even that can be obtained."

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 226.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received January 19.)

(No. 4.)
My Lord, *Vienna, January 7, 1850.*

CONSIDERING the matter contained in your Lordship's instructions No. 2 of this year to be important, and not being authorized to read it to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, I have drawn up a note, copy of which I inclose, to serve as a memorandum of the substance of what I said more diffusely to him by word of mouth.

I have, &c.
(Signed) PONSONBY.

Inclosure in No. 226.

Viscount Ponsonby to Prince Schwarzenberg.

Vienna, January 7, 1850.

THE Undersigned, &c., has the honour to subject to the knowledge of his Highness Prince Schwarzenberg, an observation upon the memorandum communicated by the Sublime Porte to the foreign Missions at Constantinople in the month of February 1845, and which professes to lay down the rule for the admission of foreign vessels, whether vessels of war or merchantmen, into the Straits of the Dardanelles and Bosphorus.

The Undersigned takes the liberty to direct the attention of his Highness the Prince to a fact which he will certainly find recorded in the correspondence of the Imperial Government with the Austrian Internuncio; namely, that the British Ambassador at Constantinople, upon receiving the communication above adverted to, applied to the Ottoman Ministers for a modification of the rule, and obtained it. The modification desired and obtained was to the effect that any British merchant-vessel or vessel of war should be allowed to

come within the outer castles of the Dardanelles at once, as far as Barbers' Point, by night as well as by day; and further, the Ambassador, early in October 1845, applied to the Porte for permission to be granted to vessels to pass up at night from the Black Sea and anchor in the Bay of Buyukdery, which permission was granted.

The Undersigned thinks it unnecessary to trouble his Highness with a recapitulation of more facts connected with this matter, as his Highness will no doubt be in possession of full information respecting it in the correspondence of the Austrian Internuncio with the Foreign Office of the Imperial Government, and the Undersigned will conclude with the statement, that it is the opinion of the British Government, "That it would be a forced construction of the regulations of the Porte to apply them to a squadron of line-of-battle ships, and that the proper construction of the Treaty of July 13, 1841, and the construction for which Great Britain will contend, excludes such a squadron both from the anchorage within the castles of the Dardanelles and from the anchorage within the outer castles of the Bosphorus."

The Undersigned, &c. (Signed) PONSONBY.

No. 227.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received January 19.)

(No. 5.)

My Lord, *Vienna, January 7, 1850.*

IN Lord Bloomfield's despatch No. 64, December 15, 1849, confidential, his Lordship reports the statement made by Fuad Effendi, of the great effect produced upon the feelings and opinions of many Turks, by the prompt support which was given to their country by the British Government and squadron on the late occasion.

I take the liberty to trouble your Lordship with this despatch, to inform you that I have heard the same thing stated in very strong terms by M. Musurus, the Ottoman Minister here; but, knowing his great attachment to the connection between England and Turkey, I was not quite certain that his opinions might not be a little biassed by partialities.

I have, &c.

(Signed) PONSONBY.

No. 228.

Sir Stratford Canning to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received January 20, 1850.)

(No. 402.)

My Lord, *Therapia, December 31, 1849.*

IN consequence of assertions which have been hazarded in the public prints and elsewhere during the course of our late transactions here, I have thought it advisable to obtain a clear declaration from the Ottoman Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs respecting two points of leading importance.

For this purpose I directed M. Pisani to put the two following questions to his Excellency:—

1. Have the Turkish Ministers ever been seriously admonished, either by the Internuncio or by the Russian Envoy, that the approach of the squadrons prevented or retarded the final adjustment of the pending differences and the renewal of diplomatic relations?

2. Did Aali Pasha, in reply to a formal inquiry addressed to him by those Ministers, ever deny officially or positively, that the Porte had authorized the entrance of the British ships of war under Vice-Admiral Parker within the outer castles of the Dardanelles?

To the former of these questions Aali Pasha is reported by M. Pisani to have replied, that M. de Titoff and Count Stürmer had remarked to him, on learning the arrival of Her Majesty's squadron and its entrance within the outer

castles at the Dardanelles, that if the circumstance had been known when the Emperor of Russia first gave a favourable answer to the Porte, it might have raised new difficulties in the way of arrangement.

To the second question he replied that when the two Representatives had made inquiry as to the entrance of the squadron, his answer to each of them had been that the ships had entered in consequence of bad weather; that there had not been time for soliciting a formal permission; that as ships of war had been habitually allowed to come to the same anchorage, the Turkish commanders did not think it necessary, even had there been time, to receive instructions from the Porte; and that a continuation of bad weather had detained the ships. In short, the Pasha declared that not knowing if the squadron had been called in, he had neither affirmed nor denied the authorization of the Porte.

The fact is, that the Turkish Minister, not knowing what to expect under the intimidating circumstances of the moment, from the resentment of Russia and her Austrian confederate, had no doubt secretly prepared their officers at the Dardanelles for the eventual passage of the squadron, and those officers did not therefore require any further reference to Constantinople for the mere entrance of the ships within the outer castles according to the regulations applied to other vessels of war.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

No. 229.

Sir Stratford Canning to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received January 20.)

(No. 3.)

My Lord, *Therapia, January 5, 1850.*

THE curiosity of the public at Constantinople was excited two days ago by the arrival of an Austrian officer with despatches for the Internuncio.

Count Stürmer having visited Aali Pasha at his house in the course of yesterday, M. Pisani saw the Ottoman Minister at a later hour and was informed by his Excellency in what manner Count Stürmer had explained the officer's arrival.

It appears from what he stated, that the officer in question had been sent from the frontier with a packet of despatches which had been accidentally left at Vienna, and was subsequently forwarded too late to overtake the post.

It appears further that Count Stürmer communicated to Aali Pasha a despatch from Prince Schwarzenberg, announcing that the Court of St. Petersburgh had instructed M. de Titoff to finish his question with the Porte, and repeating that he considered the *entente préalable* between Austria and the Porte as an indispensable condition of the resumption of their official relations.

A new list of about fivescore Hungarians designed for detention in Turkey has been sent under instructions from Vienna by the Austrian Consul at Rustchuk from Shumla, where he is residing at present; and Count Stürmer in communicating it to Aali Pasha expressed his readiness to strike out some of the names as being too insignificant to interest his Government, while he proposed that the remainder should be added to the list of thirty-six individuals already given in, whose intended mode of conveyance to Kutaya was reported in my preceding number.

I have reason to believe that another question personal to Count Stürmer, and not mentioned by Aali Pasha, was the principal cause of his Excellency's visit to that Minister.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

No. 230.

Sir Stratford Canning to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received January 20.)

(No. 4.)

My Lord, *Therapia, January 5, 1850.*

INCLOSED herewith in copy for your Lordship's information is a despatch which I have addressed to Viscount Ponsonby, with the view of acquainting his Excellency with the manner in which the negotiation between Count Stürmer and the Porte has terminated for the present.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

Inclosure in No. 230.

Sir Stratford Canning to Viscount Ponsonby.

My Lord, *Therapia, January 3, 1850.*

I BEG to inclose herewith for your Excellency's information the terms of the Porte's last proposal to Count Stürmer on the subject of the *entente préalable* hitherto required by that Minister in execution of his instructions.

Your Lordship will observe that the Porte has gone to the utmost length of compliance consistent with a reservation of the Sultan's ultimate right to determine the period at which the refugees may be fairly liberated. Lord Palmerston's instructions as well as my own convictions forbid to advise a concession which the one party was not entitled to require, and the other was precluded from making by several obvious and important considerations.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

No. 231.

Viscount Palmerston to Sir Stratford Canning.

(No. 6.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, January 22, 1850.*

WITH reference to your despatch No. 391 of the 31st of December, I have to acquaint your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government approve of your having decided to inform Vice-Admiral Sir William Parker that the presence of his squadron in the Levant was no longer necessary for the purposes for which it was sent thither.

I am, &c.

(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 232.

Viscount Palmerston to Sir Stratford Canning.

(No. 7.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, January 25, 1850.*

I HAVE received your despatch No. 384 of the 24th of December, respecting the discussions between Austria and Russia on the one side and the Porte on the other, on the question of the Hungarian and Polish refugees now in Turkey; and I have to state to your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government entirely approve of your proceedings as detailed in that despatch, and quite concur in the views and reasoning therein stated.

I am, &c.

(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 233.

Viscount Palmerston to Sir Stratford Canning.

(No. 8.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, January 25, 1850.*

I HAVE to state to your Excellency, with reference to your despatch No. 4 of the 5th instant, that you were quite right in not advising the Porte to consent to make the duration of its detention of the Hungarian refugees dependent on the good-will and pleasure of the Austrian Government. The Porte had already gone in the way of concession to Austria, to the full extent of what is consistent with a due regard to the independence of the Sultan, if indeed it may not be said to have in some degree overstepped that limit; but the demand that the Porte should go further was entirely unreasonable.

I am, &c.

(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 234.

Sir Stratford Canning to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received January 29, 1850.)

(No. 396.)

My Lord, *Therapia, December 31, 1849.*

I HAVE the satisfaction to confirm the statement which I addressed to your Lordship this morning. At the interview which took place in the course of the day between M. de Titoff and the Turkish Ministers, the arrangement previously signed was formally confirmed, and the official relations between the Porte and the Russian Legation declared to be actually resumed.

Inclosed herewith is a copy of a note addressed to Aali Pasha by the Russian Envoy, and referred to in the protocol concluded between them on the 25th instant, together with a list, kept open for additions, of the Polish refugees whose expulsion from Turkey is the immediate object of agreement.

That clause in the Russian note which provides for a similar course of proceeding in future cases of the same description will not escape your Lordship's observation.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

Inclosure 1 in No. 234.

M. de Titoff to Aali Pasha.

M. le Ministre, *Péra, le 1/13 Décembre, 1849.*

JE n'ai pas manqué de placer sous les yeux du Ministère Impérial la réponse qui m'avait d'abord été communiquée en projet, et que votre Excellence a bien voulu me remettre ensuite sous la forme d'une note officielle, en date 9 Moharem (1/13 Novembre), concernant l'affaire des réfugiés et les mesures à prendre à leur égard.

D'après le contenu de la dite réponse et les informations données par l'Ambassadeur Extraordinaire de Sa Majesté le Sultan à St. Pétersbourg sur les instructions qu'il a reçues de Constantinople, la Sublime Porte s'engage,—

1. A expulser de ses Etats tous les Polonais, sujets de l'Empereur, qui se sont réfugiés en Turquie par suite des événemens de la Hongrie, et dont la Légation de Russie donnera les noms, et à leur défendre la rentrée dans les Etats Ottomans.

2. A reléguer à Alep ceux d'entre eux qui ont embrassé l'Islamisme.

3. A réclamer positivement et avec instance auprès des Légations Etrangères dont ils ressortissent, l'expulsion des Polonais qui pourraient à l'avenir arriver en Turquie avec des passeports étrangers, toutes les fois qu'il sera constaté que ces individus s'y livrent à des intrigues contre la Russie.

Fidèle à la politique amicale et conciliante qu'il s'est tracée, l'Empereur mon auguste Maître a résolu d'offrir de nouvelles facilités pour la solution de la question soulevée entre nous et la Sublime Porte.

Sa Majesté Impériale a daigné m'autoriser en conséquence à accepter la réponse précitée de la Sublime Porte, et sans préjudice des droits fondés sur les Traités, à prendre acte des assurances qu'elle contient sur la marche que le Gouvernement Ottoman s'engage à suivre désormais, à l'effet de mettre un frein aux intrigues des agens révolutionnaires.

Heureux d'avoir à notifier à votre Excellence une adhésion aussi bienveillante et spontanée de mon auguste Cour, je m'empresse d'ajouter qu'elle m'a conféré en même tems la faculté de rétablir les relations diplomatiques momentanément interrompues, dès que la Sublime Porte procédera à l'exécution des mesures spécifiées dans la note susmentionnée à l'égard des Polonais réfugiés en Turquie par suite de la pacification de la Hongrie.

En m'acquittant ainsi des ordres que la Cour Impériale vient de transmettre pour ma gouverne, je vous prie, &c.

(Signé) TITOFF.

Inclosure 2 in No. 234.

List of Polish Refugees.

Le $\frac{17}{29}$ *Décembre*, 1849.

LISTE nominale des Polonais signalés jusqu'ici par les autorités Russes comme réfugiés en Turquie par suite de la guerre de Hongrie :

1. Bem.
2. Wysocki.
3. Zamoyski.
4. Severin Korsersky.
5. Maïn Sazinsky.
6. Stanislas Schimansky.
7. Eduard Denarsky.
8. Stanislas Hondzesky.
9. Adam Donatchosky.
10. Jules Zabadinsky.
11. Jacques Miastianowitch.
12. Stanislas Grigensky.
13. François Daschkewitch.

N. B.—S'il s'en trouvait encore, la Mission de Russie se réserve de les signaler plus tard.

(Signé) TITOFF.

No. 235.

Sir Stratford Canning to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received January 29, 1850.)

(No. 397.)

My Lord, *Therapia, December* 31, 1849.

THE official relations between the Austrian Legation and the Ottoman Porte are not to be resumed till after the acceptance at Vienna of Aali Pasha's last proposal, as already communicated to your Lordship, for arranging the question of the *entente préalable*.

It may be hoped that no serious objection will be continued to its adoption by the Austrian Cabinet. It would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, for the Turkish Government to go further without submitting to a condition which your Lordship's instruction of the 30th ultimo has represented in its true colours. I am assured that the Russian Envoy has expressed himself in favour of the Turkish proposition.

The Porte inclines to execute the intended arrangement without waiting for an answer from Vienna, by proceeding at once to the removal of the Hungarian refugees from Shumla to Kutahia.

The Internuncio may perhaps be induced to consent to this measure. At all events there is reason to think that it would be the most advisable course of proceeding for the Porte to adopt.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

No. 236.

Sir Stratford Canning to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received January 29, 1850.)

(No. 398.)

My Lord, *Therapia, December* 31, 1849.

INCLOSED herewith in copy is another despatch addressed to me by Her Majesty's Consul at Varna on the subject of the plot for assassinating Count Batthyany, M. Kossuth, and two other principal Hungarian leaders at Shumla, as confidently imputed to the Austrian authorities.

I propose to communicate this despatch confidentially to Aali Pasha, and I hope to obtain some oral information of importance on the same subject in the course of two or three days.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

Inclosure in No. 236.

Colonel Neale to Sir Stratford Canning.

Sir, *Varna, December* 23, 1849.

WITH reference to my despatch of the 15th instant, and by which I had the honour to bring to the knowledge of your Excellency the confidential communication which had been made to me by M. Bardi, it is my duty now to acquaint your Excellency that a French merchant residing in Varna called upon me yesterday; and, totally unaware that I was in any degree already aware of the subject of his communication, he stated to me that he had heard from a Croat residing in Varna, that his countrymen, the other Croats, who had arrived by the Austrian steamer, had proceeded to Shumla in the intention of assassinating one or more of the refugee chiefs who were in Shumla, and whose persons would be pointed out to them by the agent who had accompanied them from Constantinople. One of the Croats who arrived from Constantinople had remained in Varna as the cavass of the Austrian Vice-Consul, and it is from him the informant of the gentlemen who called upon me heard what he related. I am informed that some remonstrance has been made by the Pasha of Varna against this cavass and the others who accompanied him bearing arms, as they are foreigners; but this difficulty appears to have been overcome, as the cavass remains armed, and his companions have proceeded armed as they arrived to Shumla. The ostensible motives assigned for the arrival of these Croats, as stated by themselves, are various: one is, that they are proceeding to the frontiers of Servia for the purpose of purchasing swine; and another, that they have been sent by the Austrian Chancellerie at Constantinople to act as cavasses in the various Austrian Consulates at Widdin, Varna, Rustchuk, and other places. But it would appear unnecessary that eight of their number should have been landed at Bourgas, if such be the object of their arrival.

(Signed) E. NEALE.

P.S.—The Polish Count Kioscielski has just arrived from Shumla, having a Prussian passport, and being the bearer, as he states, to me of important despatches from Constantinople. The Count states that at Yanushkoi, a village four hours from Shumla, he found the eight armed Croats who had left Varna for Shumla, together with their chief, named Davidovich; they were stationed at that village, and stated to the persons who accompanied the Count, that one of their chiefs had gone on to Shumla, and that they awaited his orders to proceed themselves, as they supposed, in four or five days, to accomplish the mission for which they were paid. Kossuth, who has been warned by M. Bardi of the danger which menaced himself and the other chiefs named, had taken such precautions for their safety as was in their power. Count Kioscielski states that besides the Croats he found at Yanushkoi, three or four other Croats of the same party were in Shumla, where there were also a considerable number of Germans, unconnected with the emigration, who represented themselves as artisans and travellers.

E. NEALE.

No. 237.

Sir Stratford Canning to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received January 29.)

(No. 1.)

My Lord, *Therapia, January 3, 1850.*

COPIES of two despatches which I have addressed to Vice-Admiral Sir William Parker, are inclosed herewith for your Lordship's information. On the receipt of these despatches the Admiral will be at liberty to leave the station of Mosconisi, where the ships under his command have been anchored since their departure from Besika Bay, and to enter upon the execution of any other instructions which he may have received from the Lords of the Admiralty. Her Majesty's steamship "Ardent" proceeded this afternoon from Constantinople, having Captain Slade, the bearer of my despatches to the Admiral, on board. The "Ardent" was to have started on my invitation yesterday, but I was unexpectedly obliged to detain her for twenty-four hours.

The Grand Vizier, on learning from me that the squadron was about to retire, requested that I would allow him to inform the Sultan of that intention before my despatches were actually sent off to Sir William Parker. I was subsequently informed by his Highness that the Sultan had acquiesced in the propriety of the Admiral's departure, and again expressed his gracious acknowledgment for the support he had received.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

Inclosure 1 in No. 237.

Sir Stratford Canning to Vice-Admiral Sir W. Parker.

Sir, *Therapia, January 1, 1850.*

IN pursuance of instructions addressed to me for eventual execution by Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, I have the honour to inform you that the presence of Her Majesty's Mediterranean squadron in the neighbourhood of the Dardanelles being no longer required with a view to the negotiations at Constantinople now happily concluded between the Porte and one of the Imperial Governments, and in progress towards an amicable adjustment with the other, you are at liberty to quit your present station and to proceed elsewhere with the ships under your command, according to such other instructions as you may receive from the Lords of the Admiralty.

A communication of similar purport is addressed by my colleague, the French Representative at the Porte, to the Admiral in command of the French squadron at Vourla; and I have reason to believe that the squadron will get under sail immediately on the arrival of the "Prony" with General Aupick's despatch.

That vessel left the port of Constantinople about 8 o'clock yesterday evening.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

Inclosure 2 in No. 237.

Sir Stratford Canning to Vice-Admiral Sir W. Parker.

Sir, *Therapia, January 2, 1850.*

CAPTAIN SLADE, to whom you entrusted your despatches announcing the arrival of Her Majesty's squadron under your command in the neighbourhood of the Dardanelles, returns to you by the present opportunity. He has made himself useful by obtaining information of the state of the Turkish navy, and

impressing the officers of that department with a sense of those deficiencies in the service which it is of essential importance for the Sultan's interests to supply with the least practicable delay. He now takes charge of my despatches for your Excellency.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

No. 238.

Sir Stratford Canning to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received January 29.)

(No. 2.)

My Lord, *Therapia, January 3, 1850.*

I LEARN from Aali Pasha that Count Stürmer has consented to the immediate execution of the measures adopted with respect to the Hungarian refugees at Shumla.

Hearing that the treatment of those unfortunate men was not as considerate as their claims to commiseration and the general rules of humanity would seem to prescribe, I brought the complaints which had reached me on that subject, though doubtless they were in some respects exaggerated and misjudged, to the notice of Aali Pasha and the Grand Vizier. A few days later I addressed a written instruction on the same subject to M. Pisani, requesting that he would submit its contents, with a Turkish translation, to the consideration of those Ministers. A copy of the instruction is inclosed herewith, and M. Pisani reports that it was favourably received by the Grand Vizier.

This morning I have received from Aali Pasha a statement of the measures adopted by the Porte for the conveyance of the refugees to Kutaya, and the improvement of their condition, as well on the road as afterwards. I fear, nevertheless, that their privations will be very considerable, as well during the journey as in the place of residence to which they are about to be temporarily consigned. For your Lordship's more complete information, I inclose herewith an extract of M. Pisani's report.

Ahmed Effendi, who is charged with the separation of the refugees at Shumla, may be expected, from his character for liberality and intelligence, to execute his instructions in a becoming spirit of humanity.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

Inclosure 1 in No. 238.

Sir Stratford Canning to M. Pisani.

Sir, *Therapia, December 28, 1849.*

AS the time for removing the unfortunate refugees from Shumla appears to be at hand, well knowing to what privations and hardships they must be exposed in this country and at this season, while proceeding, whether by land or by sea, to their respective destinations, I hope to be excused for wishing to draw the Porte's attention emphatically to the subject of their wants. Persons circumstanced as they are, must no doubt be content to endure many severe trials with fortitude. They cannot expect that degree of indulgence which would enable them to evade the vigilance of those who are responsible for their safe custody. There must also be some kind of limit to the charge which their maintenance imposes on the State in whose territory they have taken refuge. But as soon as due provision is made for these indispensable restraints, the duty of supplying their wants with liberality, and alleviating the rigours of their detention, commences, and ought not to cease while any unnecessary suffering calls for relief.

The Turkish Government cannot be justly reproached with insensibility to these duties. In more respects than one, and on several occasions, the Porte has displayed a degree of generosity which might serve for an example to other Powers. The Government, however, cannot exercise an immediate superintendence over numerous refugees detained at a distance from the capital. The

enforcement of its commands must depend on the obedience, good will, and humanity of those on the spot. It is easy to imagine how much unnecessary annoyance and distress may be occasioned by the carelessness, the avarice, the impatience, and natural coarseness of subaltern agents in authority, and to what a degree their vices may embitter a painful situation, and defeat the benevolent intentions of the Porte. Among the refugees there are no doubt some whose personal resources save them from much of the privation and annoyance to which they would otherwise be exposed. By far the greater number of them, however, are destitute of such advantages, and must be altogether dependent upon the local authority and its subordinate officers and soldiers. It may therefore be expected that the Porte will take measures to impose a strict attention to its orders, and secure their full execution by means of judicious regulations and a careful selection of responsible agents. The superintendent, in particular, should be a man of intelligence, steadiness, and humanity. Warm clothing, wholesome food, clean lodging, medical assistance, and supplies to provide for petty wants are indispensable. Liberty of religious worship, occasional privacy, access to the means of cleanliness, and free exercise in the open air, ought also to be allowed. In short, the Turkish Government cannot better consult its own interests and honour than by attending carefully to these humanities, and thereby securing the attachment of men who have thrown themselves on its protection, and who at no distant period may discharge the debt of gratitude by devoting their lives and talents to its service.

You will explain the contents of this instruction to the Grand Vizier and Aáli Pasha, leaving a Turkish translation in the hands of the former.

I am, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

Inclosure 2 in No. 238.

M. Pisani to Sir Stratford Canning.

(Extract.) *Péra, 3 Janvier*, 1850.

LE Comte Stürmer a consenti à ce que la Porte commence immédiatement l'exécution des mesures qui regardent les Hongrois. Voilà ce que m'a dit Aali Pacha, qui a ajouté: "dans quelques jours d'ici le Colonel Suleiman Bey sera expédié avec Ahmed Effendi à Varna sur un bateau à vapeur. Après la séparation faite par Ahmed Effendi, les Hongrois à interner seront envoyés de Shoumla à Varna, accompagnés de Suleiman Bey qui les embarquera sur le bateau, et ils iront tout droit à Ghenlik, où ils seront debarqués et acheminés vers Kutahié. A leur départ de Shoumla ils recevront 150,000 piastres; tous les frais de voyage seront à la charge de la Porte; à Kutahié ils recevront une pension chacun selon son rang; ils seront logés dans une caserne réparée exprès et bien meublée, et chacun aura à sa disposition deux ou trois chambres. Suleiman Bey doit rester à Kutahié; c'est lui qui aura soin d'eux."

No. 239.

Lord Bloomfield to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received January 29.)

(No. 19.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, January 16, 1850.*

FUAD EFFENDI received a messenger a few days ago from Constantinople. His Excellency informed me at the time of the arrival of his despatches, that the only communication of importance which had reached him, was the authority to return home whenever it suited his convenience, as the object of his embassy had been obtained; but he said that previously to taking leave of the Imperial Government, he was ordered to direct their attention to the question of reducing the Russian force in the Danubian Principalities.

The Turkish Ambassador has communicated with Count Nesselrode on this subject, and been informed by his Excellency that orders to this effect had already been given.

This intelligence was confirmed to me yesterday by the Chancellor, who assured me that the Minister of War had sent the necessary instructions to General Lüders to reduce the Russian occupying force to 10,000 men, and on my inquiring in what part of the Empire the troops that were withdrawn would be stationed, his Excellency said that he believed they would be scattered along the frontier.

In fact, it is evident that Russia has recalled her troops out of deference to her engagements with the Porte, but she has done so in the expectation that it will not be long before their services may be again required, and therefore places them in such a position that they may be available at a moment's warning.

The season of the year is nevertheless so unfavorable for the dislocation of troops, that one may be surprised at this early decision; and the Chancellor, in mentioning the fact to me, said that the original intention had been to leave them in the Principalities till the spring.

Fuad Effendi purposes setting out for Constantinople in about a fortnight. He will stay some little time at Bucharest on his way to the Turkish capital.

I have, &c.

(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 240.

Lord Bloomfield to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received January 29.)

(No. 23.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, January 17, 1850.*

I HAVE had the honour to receive your Lordship's despatches Nos. 5 and 6 of the 1st instant; the first inclosing copies of some of Sir Stratford Canning's despatches of the year 1845, and of two letters from Mr. Consul Calvert to Vice-Admiral Sir William Parker, announcing the regulations established by the Porte for the passage of ships of war through the Dardanelles and Bosphorus; and the second approving my conduct in having communicated to Count Nesselrode an extract of your Lordship's private letter of the 25th November last on this subject, and directing me to say that Her Majesty's Government concur with the Russian Government in thinking that according to the true intent and meaning of the Treaty of July 1841, the Straits of the Dardanelles and Bosphorus ought to be understood as being the whole extent of the passages between the Archipelago and the Sea of Marmora, and between the Sea of Marmora and the Black Sea.

In fulfilment of your Lordship's instructions, I have thought it advisable to communicate to Count Nesselrode your Lordship's despatch to me No. 6, and I accordingly left it with his Excellency. He has since returned it to me, and expressed his entire satisfaction with its contents.

I have, &c.

(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 241.

Lord Bloomfield to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received January 29.)

(No. 25.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, January 17, 1850.*

COUNT NESSELRODE has not received any late intelligence from Constantinople; and up to the present moment he is not informed that M. Titoff has renewed his diplomatic relations with the Porte. He however considers that the differences between Russia and Turkey are settled, and that the ostensible announcement of this fact is delayed solely in consequence of the difficulties raised by Austria, and of her continuing to insist on the exact fulfilment by the Porte of the conditions which are to be found in M. Musurus's note to Prince Schwarzenberg of the 22nd of October last.

The Russian Government is I believe very desirous for the re-establishment of their usual intercourse with the Turkish Government, but will not resume

their official relations until such time as the differences with Austria shall be arranged.

In the course of my last conversation with Count Nesselrode on this subject, I urged his Excellency to consider whether, with a view to the interests of his own country in Turkey, it would not be well to leave Austria to fight out her own battle at Constantinople; that the negotiations had already lasted too long; and that Russia had nothing more to demand of the Porte. The Chancellor replied, that much as he should like to hear of the re-establishment of their relations with the Porte, the Russian Government could not abandon Austria. "Besides," added his Excellency, "the Ottoman Government have been playing a very crooked game lately; we are much out of humour with them; and I have not concealed from Fuad Effendi our feelings of dissatisfaction with his Government."

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 242.

Viscount Palmerston to Sir Stratford Canning.

(No. 20.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, February 2, 1850.*

I HAVE received your Excellency's secret and confidential despatch No. 387, of the 26th of December, respecting an alleged plot to assassinate some of the Hungarian refugees at Shumla; and I have to state to your Excellency in reply, that you should impress upon the Porte that the honour of the Sultan is pledged for the safety of these Hungarian refugees while they are detained in his dominions; and if the Sultan should find that they are threatened with dangers against which he may find it difficult to protect them, that circumstance might furnish a good ground for explaining to the Austrian Government that he felt himself compelled to send them away to some other country, where they might reside in greater safety.

I am, &c.
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 243.

Viscount Palmerston to Baron Brunnow.

Foreign Office, February 4, 1850.

THE Undersigned, &c., duly received the notes which Baron Brunnow, &c., did him the honour to address to him on the 30th of November and 7th of December last, requesting to be informed whether the order had been already sent to Vice-Admiral Sir William Parker to withdraw the British squadron from the Straits of the Dardanelles.

The Undersigned has the honour to state to Baron Brunnow that if no detailed answer was given at the time to those notes it was because Her Majesty's Government were in communication upon the matters to which they related with the Imperial Government, through Her Majesty's Minister at St. Petersburgh. But Lord Bloomfield was instructed to say to Count Nesselrode that Her Majesty's Government entirely concur with the Government of Russia in considering that for the purposes and with reference to the meaning of the Treaty of July 1841, the Straits of the Dardanelles and Bosphorus ought to be held to be the whole of the channels which lie between the Archipelago and the Sea of Marmora on the one hand, and between the Sea of Marmora and the Black Sea on the other.

And with regard to the accidental entry of Sir William Parker's squadron into Barbers' Bay, between the outer and inner castles of the Dardanelles, Baron Brunnow will no doubt have learnt that the squadron having arrived in that bay on the 1st of November, in consequence of stress of weather and by reason

of a misconception as to the regulations established for the Straits of the Dardanelles, that squadron left that anchorage on the 13th of November and returned to Besika Bay.

I am, &c.
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 244.

Lord Bloomfield to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received February 7.)

(No. 32.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, January 23, 1850.*

UPON the receipt of your Lordship's despatch No. 13 of the 7th instant, signifying to me the approval of Her Majesty's Government of the language which I held to the Emperor of Russia at an audience granted to me on the 17th of December, and directing me, in the event of my having occasion again to converse with His Imperial Majesty, to express the sincere gratification felt by Her Majesty's Government at my report of what passed at that audience; I lost no time in communicating its contents to Count Nesselrode, and as I did not foresee an early prospect of fulfilling your Lordship's instructions without asking for an audience, I left the despatch with his Excellency.

I have since seen the Chancellor, who informed me that he had read the despatch to the Emperor, and that His Imperial Majesty was much gratified at the communication which had been thus made to him; his Excellency's words to me were, "L'Empereur en est enchanté."

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 245.

Lord Bloomfield to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received February 7.)

(No. 34.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, January 23, 1850.*

WITH reference to the despatch addressed by Count Nesselrode to M. Titoff on the $\frac{19 \text{ November}}{1 \text{ December}}$ last (a copy of which was transmitted to me in your Lordship's despatch No. 11 of the 7th instant), directing that Minister to address a note to the Porte, and to claim for a Russian fleet coming from the Black Sea the same right to advance to Buyukdéré which had been accorded to the British squadron under the command of Vice-Admiral Sir W. Parker to anchor within the outer castles of the Dardanelles, I have the honour to report that in a conversation which I have just had with Count Nesselrode on this subject, his Excellency informed me that orders have been already sent to Constantinople to revoke the instructions of the $\frac{19 \text{ November}}{1 \text{ December}}$ 1849; and that this claim on the part of Russia thus falls to the ground.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 246.

Lord Bloomfield to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received February 7.)

(No. 35.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, January 23, 1850.*

THE feldjäger who has been expected here overland from Constantinople for a fortnight past has not yet arrived, but Count Nesselrode mentioned to me to-day that he has nevertheless received by way of Odessa a short despatch, unaccompanied however by details, from M. Titoff, announcing that he has at

last renewed his diplomatic relations with the Porte, and has done so without waiting for the Austrian Internuncio; but that the latter also would soon receive authority from Vienna to enter into official intercourse with the Turkish Government.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 247.

Lord Bloomfield to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received February 7.)

(No. 36. Confidential.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, January 23, 1850.*

WITH reference to Viscount Ponsonby's despatch No. 276, a copy of which was transmitted for my information in your Lordship's despatch No. 67 of the 22nd ultimo, respecting the influence which the Russian Government is supposed to have acquired over the inhabitants of Transylvania, I have the honour to state that intelligence of the same tendency has reached me here from quarters generally well informed; and I think it cannot be doubted, although the Emperor of Russia may have no intention of taking advantage at the present moment of the favourable impression which has been made by his army on the inhabitants of Transylvania, that the Imperial Government will not lose sight of the influence which has been thus established on the Slavonic population of that country and of other parts of the Austrian Empire.

I have lately conversed with several officers of the staff of the Russian army who were employed in the Hungarian war, and all have given a like account of the good feeling with which the Russian forces were generally received in that kingdom. They have described the peasantry as welcoming them as liberators from the tyranny of the Magyars, affording them the most willing assistance, and giving them supplies of every kind.

One of these officers mentioned to me, as a proof of the good feelings which existed towards them, that a deputation had waited upon the Grand Duke Constantine, and actually proposed to him to accept the Crown of Hungary. My informant said likewise that similar proposals had been made in several districts; that they not only caused the greatest annoyance to His Imperial Highness, but were totally disregarded by him, for he had come to Hungary from no other motive than that of acquiring military experience; and the immediate consequence of these unsought-for deputations was, that it was found expedient to remove him, without loss of time, from the scene of more active duty in which he was at first employed, to places where his presence was scarcely known, and where he had to his great sorrow much less chance of distinguishing himself. I heard from the same officer that whilst General Georgey was in the Russian camp, he had expressed his disapproval of these proceedings of the Hungarian peasantry, and censured them most severely.

A circumstance connected with the submission of General Georgey has lately come to my knowledge, and I beg leave to mention it, as it may possibly be unknown to your Lordship. When the reply to the first communication of his surrender was received from Vienna by the Russian Commander-in-chief, it seemed evident that the wish of the Austrian Government was, that Georgey and the principal officers who had acted under his commands should be brought to a court-martial and shot. To this an answer was immediately returned that, according to the terms of the capitulation, such a proceeding would be unjustifiable, and the Emperor Francis Joseph was requested to reconsider the matter. The Austrian Government still insisted, and it was only on the Emperor of Russia declaring that unless he received the most positive assurances that Georgey's life would be spared, and that the only punishment inflicted on him would be a removal to some distant spot in the Austrian dominions, where, though placed under the surveillance of the police, he would still have his liberty, he should give him an honourable exile in Russia. Upon the arrival of this communication the Austrian Government at length agreed to the Russian suggestion; but so much delay again occurred in forwarding their reply, that the Emperor actually sent off a feldjäger to

Moscow, with orders to the Governor-General to prepare apartments for the reception of a distinguished Hungarian officer whom he should place under an recommend to his special care and attention.

I have thought it right to mention this anecdote to your Lordship, as it serves to demonstrate the character of the Emperor of Russia, and to explain at the same time the just reasons of dissatisfaction which he had with the Austrian Government.

I have been assured that the total loss of men killed in battle in the Russian army during the war in Hungary last year, did not exceed 700 men: and that the expenses incurred by the War Department for this campaign, amounted to about forty millions of roubles, or about six and three-quarters millions sterling.

I have of late had frequent occasion in my correspondence to allude to the supposed objects of Russia in the East, and of the opinion which exists generally in this country, that Turkey must infallibly, sooner or later, be annexed to the Russian Empire; and the only doubt which exists in the minds of many Russians upon the question appears to be the period at which this incorporation is to be effected.

This subject is in fact one upon which I may say that the nation is united; and I have reason to believe that the only two persons who at this present moment are aware of the folly of entertaining this project, and are desirous to restrain all expressions of public feeling on the subject, are the Emperor and Count Nesselrode. They see the impossibility of attempting such a thing in the present temper of Europe, and wish at all events to leave the work in the hands of future generations.

With reference to the Hungarian deputations which were sent to the Grand Duke Constantine, it may not be irrelevant to allude also to a circumstance which happened some years ago upon the occasion of His Imperial Highness' visit to Constantinople.

On his arrival there he was surrounded by a mob of the Christian population of that capital, and naturally by all who professed the Greek religion. The unanimous feeling of this mob, as described to me, was to rise in favour of the Grand Duke, their conviction being that he had not come there on a merely complimentary visit to the Sultan, but for the purpose of feeling his way as to the means of planting the Cross again at Constantinople. So great indeed I am assured was the enthusiasm expressed by all the Christian inhabitants of the city and of the Turkish Empire generally, at that time, that the Russian Minister to the Porte was alarmed for the consequences, and feared an insurrection among the populace.

These facts are probably all known to your Lordship, but it may not be without interest to repeat them at the present moment, for they show the power possessed by Russia of extending her influence in the countries on her south-eastern frontier, and the care which appears to be devoted by those who now direct her policy to prevent too early an explosion which might mar her projects. At the same time we may arrive at another conclusion, which cannot fail to be satisfactory to Her Majesty's Government, that they have by their late measures at all events arrested the progress of Russian power, and gained time so as to enable the Porte to give a greater development to her system of reform, and to raise further barriers against inroads from this country.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 248.

Lord Bloomfield to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received February 7.)

(No. 37. Confidential.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, January 24, 1850.*

FUAD EFFENDI had an audience of the Emperor of Russia at 1 o'clock this day, when he took leave of His Imperial Majesty; and the following is the account which his Excellency has given me of what passed upon this occasion.

After a few civil expressions from the Emperor, the Turkish Ambassador endeavoured to explain the difficult position in which the Sultan was placed at the commencement of the differences that had arisen between the two Courts, and attempted to excuse the conduct of the Porte, stating that the honour of the Sultan was at stake, and would have been seriously compromised if the Emperor had insisted on the fulfilment of the stipulations of the Treaty of Kainardji; and that he had been charged with the mission of appealing entirely to His Imperial Majesty's friendship to waive his rights in the matter.

The Emperor appears at these words to have interrupted Fuad Effendi, who was probably going to deliver a speech which he had prepared for the occasion, and to have said that he did not wish to reopen a question which he considered closed, and that he had only to observe thereupon, that he should expect the Porte in future to adhere more strictly to her treaty engagements, especially to those concerning the Dardanelles; for if any misunderstanding might have once existed as to the spirit of the Treaty, all doubt as to its true meaning was now removed, and no other interpretation could ever again be put on it than that which resulted from the late explanations of the British Government on the subject.

The Emperor gave Fuad Effendi the assurance, in his usual emphatic manner, of his desire to maintain the most cordial and friendly relations with the Sultan, and trusted that the late events would not cause any estrangement of that good understanding which he wished always to cultivate with the Porte; adding that he was most anxious for the welfare of the Turkish Empire; that he should be ever ready to co-operate with the Sultan in the Danubian Principalities, or in whatever part of his dominions he had a right by treaty to interfere, for the maintenance of the sovereign rights of the Sultan; and he wished it always to be borne in mind that he should do this solely with a view to increase and strengthen the Sultan's means of Government, and not for any purposes of his own.

His Imperial Majesty then remarked to Fuad Effendi that he had just given a proof of his desire to meet the wishes of the Sultan on the question of the military occupation of the Principalities, by ordering General Lüders to retire from them with all the troops exceeding 10,000 men, which would soon be the whole amount of the Russian forces in Moldavia and Wallachia.

The Emperor seems to have made but one allusion to the question of the refugees, when he expressed his dissatisfaction at the manner in which they had been treated by the Turkish authorities at Shumla, where he understood they had been received with honours that ought not to have been shown to persons under the surveillance of the police.

Fuad Effendi declared to me that he had every reason to be pleased with the Emperor's reception of him, and that His Imperial Majesty's assurances of good will to the Porte were given in a tone which left no doubt on his mind as to their perfect sincerity.

The language of the Emperor to the Turkish Ambassador has so much resemblance to that held to myself by His Imperial Majesty five weeks ago, that one cannot entertain the least doubt as to the truth of his present intentions; and indeed it appears to me impossible, after these solemn declarations, and the pledging of his Imperial word, that he can depart from them unless the Porte gives just cause of provocation; and therefore I think we may reasonably expect that at all events during the reign of the Emperor Nicholas, no attempt will be made by Russia to subvert the Ottoman Empire.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 249.

Viscount Palmerston to Sir Stratford Canning.

(No. 31.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, February 7, 1850.*

I HAVE to acquaint your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government approve of the despatches which you addressed to Vice-Admiral Sir William Parker on the 1st and 2nd of January, and of which copies are inclosed in your despatch No. 1 of the 3rd of that month, acquainting him that he was at liberty to depart with his squadron from the neighbourhood of the Dardanelles.

I am, &c.
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 250.

Viscount Palmerston to Sir Stratford Canning.

(No. 32.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, February 7, 1850.*

I HAVE to acquaint your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government entirely approve the representations which you have made to the Turkish Government, as reported in your despatch No. 2 of the 3rd ultimo, with the view of securing humane treatment for the Hungarian refugees about to be removed from Shumla to Kutahia.

I am, &c.
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 251.

Prince Schwarzenberg to Baron Koller.—(Communicated to Viscount Palmerston by Baron Koller.)

M. le Baron, *Vienne, le 19 Janvier, 1850.*

LORD PONSONBY m'a remis en copie une dépêche que M. le Principal Secrétaire d'Etat de Sa Majesté Britannique lui a adressée à la date du 1er de ce mois. Ci-joint, M. le Baron, vous trouverez le texte de cette pièce, destinée à servir de réponse aux communications que vous avez été chargé de faire à Lord Palmerston à propos de l'entrée dans le Détroit des Dardanelles de l'escadre commandée par Sir William Parker.

Dans ce travail, Lord Palmerston, considérant la question sous ses différentes phases, prend à tâche de contester que l'entrée dans les Dardanelles de l'escadre Britannique, entrée qui a donné lieu à une protestation de notre part, constitue une violation du Traité du 13 Juillet, 1841. Après avoir développé cette thèse, il passe à établir que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique ne désire pas entrer avec celui de Sa Majesté l'Empereur en controverse sur cette matière; et il finit par conclure que selon l'interprétation que le Gouvernement Anglais donne de son côté au Traité en question, les Détroits des Dardanelles et du Bosphore doivent dans toute leur étendue, tant que la Porte est en paix, rester fermés aux vaisseaux de guerre étrangers, à l'exception des bâtimens légers destinés au service des Légations résidant à Constantinople. Le Principal Secrétaire d'Etat ajoute, de plus, que ce n'était pas en obéissant aux instructions de son Gouvernement que Sir William Parker était entré dans le détroit, qu'il n'avait au contraire choisi ce mouillage que par suite du mauvais temps, et parce que l'Ambassadeur de Sa Majesté Britannique à Constantinople, d'accord avec le Consul Anglais et avec les officiers Turcs supérieurs résidant aux Dardanelles, ne considérait pas cet acte comme contraire aux règlemens de port en vigueur; qu'enfin l'Amiral Anglais ne rentrerait plus dans le détroit, vû la stricte interprétation dont le Traité de 1841 avait été l'objet de la part du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique.

Nous nous félicitons d'avoir obtenu ces explications, qui concordent avec l'interprétation que donnent au Traité de 1841 l'Autriche aussi bien que la France, la Prusse, et la Russie. Ce sera maintenant à toutes ces Puissances à exhorter en commun la Porte à veiller à ce que les règlemens de port, quels qu'ils puissent être, ne soient dans aucun cas appliqués d'une façon attentatoire aux stipulations du Traité susdit. Cela fait, il n'y aura entre les Puissances signataires, il faut l'espérer, plus de divergence d'opinion quant à la portée du Traité de 1841. Si, par les réserves que nous avons faites à l'égard d'un incident qui dans notre opinion portait atteinte aux stipulations d'un Traité Européen, nous avons contribué à écarter toute espèce de doute sur la valeur de ce Traité, auquel se rattachent tant d'intérêts majeurs, ce résultat a trop de prix à nos yeux, pour ne pas nous absoudre complètement du reproche que semble nous adresser Lord Palmerston, d'avoir attaché à ce fait plus d'importance qu'il n'en mérite.

En nous associant, du reste, au désir que sa Seigneurie a énoncé au nom de son Gouvernement, d'éviter sur cette question toute controverse ultérieure, nous nous abstiendrons de réfuter un à un les argumens que Lord Palmerston a apportés à ceux que nous avions développés à l'appui de notre protestation. Nous nous imposons d'autant plus volontiers le silence à ce sujet, qu'il est facile à prévoir, que tout en continuant la discussion, nous ne réussirions pas à convertir le Principal Secrétaire d'Etat au point de vue sous lequel se présente à nos yeux l'ensemble de la question, dont l'entrée de l'escadre dans les Dardanelles ne forme qu'une épisode.

Cette prévision est justifiée par la conviction que nous avons à notre regret puisée dans la dépêche de Lord Palmerston, qu'il n'y a pas jusqu'aux renseignemens sur les faits servant de base aux argumens de l'un et de l'autre Gouvernement, qui ne diffèrent du tout au tout. Il suffira de ne citer qu'un seul exemple à l'appui de cette assertion. Dans le but de démontrer que lors de l'apparition de l'escadre Anglaise dans les Dardanelles, la Porte n'était au fond point en état de parfaite paix, Lord Palmerston prétend qu'elle avait reçu de la part des Représentans d'Autriche et de Russie l'intimation que l'évasion ne fût-ce que d'un seul des réfugiés Hongrois serait envisagée par ces Puissances comme équivalant à une déclaration de guerre de la part de la Turquie. Nous ignorons à quelle source Lord Palmerston a puisé les notions de cette espèce ; ce qu'il y a de certain c'est que pareil langage n'a jamais été prescrit à M. l'Internonce, et que nous nous sommes efforcés en vain d'en découvrir la moindre trace dans notre correspondance diplomatique.

Vous être chargé, M. le Baron, de donner à Lord Palmerston lecture de cette dépêche et d'en remettre copie à sa Seigneurie.

Recevez, &c.

(Signé) F. SCHWARZENBERG.

No. 252.

Sir Stratford Canning to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received February 9.)

(No. 8.)

My Lord, *Therapia, January 15, 1850.*

INCLOSED herewith for your Lordship's information is copy of the despatch by which Vice-Admiral Sir William Parker acknowledged mine of the 1st instant, and announced to me in consequence his intention of quitting his anchorage at Mosconisi and proceeding to the execution of his further instructions from the Admiralty as soon as the weather permitted.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

Inclosure in No. 252.

Vice-Admiral Sir W. Parker to Sir Stratford Canning.

Sir, *"Queen," Mosconisi Islands, January 5, 1850.*

I HAVE this morning had the honour of receiving by Captain Slade, who arrived in the "Tartarus," your Excellency's letter of the 1st instant, apprizing me that the presence of Her Majesty's squadron in the neighbourhood of the Dardanelles is no longer required with a view to the negotiations at Constantinople, which I sincerely rejoice are in such a state of amicable adjustment; and I beg to inform your Excellency that I propose to leave this anchorage as soon as the weather permits, with the intention of proceed into Salamis Bay, to carry out, in concert with his Excellency Mr. Wyse, instructions which I have received from the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty.

The "Tartarus" will be ordered to deliver this despatch to Lieutenant Nowell of the "Ardent," for conveyance to your Excellency, and the former vessel will then repair to the Ionian station to replace the "Sharpshooter," which, as soon as she can be got ready for sea, must proceed direct to Malta, to be taken into dock, and repair the damage which she has sustained in her machinery during the late bad weather.

I shall not fail to communicate to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty your Excellency's observations with regard to the late mission of Captain Slade, and

I have, &c.

(Signed) W. PARKER.

No. 253.

Sir Stratford Canning to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received February 9.)

(No. 9. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Therapia, January 17, 1850.*

AFTER the repeated communications by which General Aupick had manifested his anxiety to hasten the return of the French Mediterranean squadron to Toulon, and our joint understanding, on the resumption of official relations between Russia and the Porte, that we should concur without further delay in releasing the two squadrons from their continued presence on the coast of Turkey, by writing respectively in that sense to each of the Admirals in command, I was not prepared for learning by a despatch from Her Majesty's Consul at Smyrna, that the entire French squadron was at anchor on the 10th instant in the bay before that city, with the appearance of meaning to remain there.

On the receipt of this intelligence I addressed a few lines of inquiry to the French Minister, and on the following day received from his Excellency an answer in explanation of the incident to which I had invited his attention.

The want of provisions mentioned by General Aupick may be sufficient to account for any change in the plans of the French Admiral, but I do not remember to have heard a syllable of it in any of my previous communications with that Minister; and it is not unworthy of notice, that the "Impartial" newspaper published at Smyrna, states in its last number, that two French vessels with provisions on board, which had been detached from Toulon, were subsequently countermanded by orders from the squadron.

Copies of Mr. Brant's despatch, of my letter to General Aupick, and of his Excellency's reply, are inclosed herewith for your Lordship's more complete information. It is not impossible that the allusion made in the last to Sir William Parker's supposed destination for Greece, may furnish a clue to the real motive of Admiral Purseval-Deschênes' detention at Smyrna.

To prevent the possibility of any misunderstanding founded on this unexpected difference in the proceedings of the two squadrons, notwithstanding the efforts which I made to produce their almost simultaneous departure, I have

communicated confidentially to Aali Pasha and the Grand Vizier the letters which had passed on that subject between General Aupick and myself. The answer which I have received from those Ministers, contains an assurance that they had received no other information respecting the French squadron either from the authorities at Smyrna or from the French Legation here.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

Inclosure 1 in No. 253.

Consul Brant to Sir Stratford Canning.

Sir, *Smyrna, January* 10, 1850.

I HAVE the honour to report to your Excellency that the French three-decker "Friedland," bearing the flag of Vice-Admiral Parseval-Deschènes, arrived at this anchorage from Vourla Bay on the 5th instant, and was followed by the rest of the French squadron, consisting of five ships of the line, a frigate and three steamers of war, on the 6th. They all remain.

The Hellenic schooner "My-Kali" sailed on the 7th instant, and the Austrian corvette "Veloce" on the 8th; the former destined for Syra, and the latter on a cruize in the Archipelago.

I have been informed by Her Majesty's Vice-Consul at Mytilene that Sir William Parker's squadron passed through the channel between that island and the mainland on the 8th instant in tow of five steamers, steering to the southward. Yesterday two other steamers passed the town of Mytilene proceeding in the same direction.

(Signed) R. W. BRANT.

Inclosure 2 in No. 253.

Sir Stratford Canning to General Aupick.

ervée.)

Mon cher Collègue, *Thérapia, 14 Janvier*, 1850.

UNE dépêche que je viens de parcourir m'annonce officiellement que toute l'escadre Française se trouvait le 10 du courant à l'ancre dans le port de Smyrne, avec l'air de vouloir y rester. La même dépêche ajoute qu'on avait vu l'escadre de Sir William Parker dans le canal de l'Ile de Mytilène le 8, se dirigeant vers le sud.

Je n'ai pas besoin de rappeler à votre souvenir les communications qui ont eu lieu entre vous et moi par rapport à l'éloignement éventuel des deux escadres, et qui m'ont autorisé à croire que M. l'Amiral Français n'attendait que votre dépêche, expédiée par le "Prony" le 31 Décembre, pour quitter son mouillage à Ourlac et s'en retourner avec le premier vent favorable à Toulon. C'est dans cette persuasion que je me suis adressé le 1er Janvier à Sir William Parker, pour lui faire savoir que la présence de son escadre sur les côtes de la Turquie n'était plus nécessaire.

Si vous avez des informations propres à m'éclairer sur les faits que j'ai eu l'honneur de vous signaler dans le commencement de cette lettre, je ne doute pas que vous ne jugiez à propos de m'en faire part.

En attendant, je vous prie, &c.
(Signé) STRATFORD CANNING.

Inclosure 3 in No. 253.

General Aupick to Sir Stratford Canning.

(Réservée.)

Mon cher Collègue, *Péra, le 15 Janvier*, 1850.

VOTRE lettre datée d'hier me parvient à l'instant avec votre billet de ce jour. Ce qu'on vous a écrit au sujet de l'escadre Française est exact. Ainsi que je vous l'ai écrit, mon invitation à l'Amiral de retourner à Toulon est partie le 31 Décembre par le "Prony," qui est arrivé à Ourlac dans la nuit du 1er au 2. Je devais donc croire l'escadre sous voile depuis longtems. Je savais cependant que l'Amiral attendait des vivres de Toulon. Il m'écrit de Smyrne sous la date du 10, ce qui suit:

"L'absence des vivres, rechanges, &c., que j'attendais de Toulon, m'a forcé de venir à Smyrne chercher ce qui nous manque. Dans peu de jours nous serons prêts, et si le vent nous seconde, nous ne tarderons pas à rentrer à Toulon."

Il n'a pas moins fallu qu'une circonstance de force majeure pour empêcher le départ de l'escadre si impatiemment attendue à Toulon, comme le sait l'Amiral. Je lui écris quelques lignes pour lui rappeler les intentions du Gouvernement et ce qui a été convenu ici entre nous.

Il ajoute dans sa dépêche, que l'Amiral Parker paraît s'être rendu à Athènes pour de là se diriger sur Malte.

Agréez, &c.
(Signé) J. AUPICK.

No. 254.

Sir Stratford Canning to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received February 9.)

(No. 11.)

My Lord, *Therapia, January* 17, 1850.

SINCE the resumption of its official relations with the Russian Envoy, the Porte, agreeably to the annual practice here, has dismantled the squadron which lately returned from its anchorage in the Bosphorus to the port of Constantinople, and a large proportion of the militia which had been retained in this neighbourhood after the grand review in October, has been dismissed.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

No. 235.

Sir Stratford Canning to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received February 9.)

(No. 19.)

My Lord, *Therapia, January* 19, 1850.

INCLOSED herewith is the list of Hungarians and other Austrian subjects retained at Shumla, and about to be conveyed to Kutahia in execution of the Porte's engagement towards Austria. Of the thirty-six individuals whose names are comprised in this list, I understand that only fifteen are now at Shumla.

The Internuncio continues to talk of making additions to the number.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

P.S.—I am informed that Etienne (Count) Batthyany, whose name stands second in the Austrian list, is now here, and in friendly communication with the Austrian Legation.

S. C.

Inclosure in No. 255.

List of Refugees claimed by the Austrian Government.

LISTE des chefs de l'insurrection Hongroise qui d'après l'engagement contracté de la part de la Sublime Porte, devront être internés et surveillés de manière à ce qu'ils ne puissent désormais plus se livrer à une entreprise quelconque qui serait dirigée contre l'ordre légal dans les Etats Autrichiens.

1. Kossuth, Louis;
   Président du Gouvernement Hongrois.
2 et 3. Batthyany; Etienne et Casimir;
   Ce dernier remplissait les fonctions de Ministre des Relations Extérieures.
4. Meszaros, Lazare;
   Ministre de la Guerre.
5 et 6. Perczel, Maurice et Nicolas;
   Le premier a servi comme Général.
7 et 8. Madarass, Ladislas et Joseph;
   Le premier était Directeur de la Police.
9. Gyurmann, Adolphe;
   Rédacteur d'un journal appelé "Kôslony."
10. Somsich.
11. Grimm;
   Ecrivain de pamphlets à Pesth.
12. Barony;
   Devenu Musulman.
13. Zamoyski,
   En relations avec Lenoir et Carossini, actifs entre Belgrade (le Consul de Sardaigne Ceruti) et Widdin.
14. Dembinski,
   Général.
15. Chojecki.
16. Tedro, Alexandre.
17. Matezynski.
18. Briganti, Stanislas.
19. Woronicki.
20. Latkowsky.
21. Pezyemshi;
   Colonel, devenu Musulman.

Ces vingt-et-un individus ci-dessus nommés se trouvent présentement à Widdin.

22 et 23. Szemere, Barthélémi et Constantin;
   Le premier, qui a été Ministre de l'Intérieur, est à Constantinople.
24. Horwath, Michel;
   Ministre du Culte.
25. Stein,
   Général.
26. Kmety,
   Général, devenu Musulman.
27. Szöllössy,
   Principal faiseur de Kossuth et ancien Drogman de la quarantine de Semlin.
28 et 29. Ullman, Ladislas et Bernard.
30. Zerfis, Gustave;
   (Auprès du Consul Sarde Ceruti à Belgrade, ancien rédacteur.)
31 et 32. Balogh, Jean;
   Avec son fils Gustave.
33. Haynich,
   (Avec Szemere, Pauling et Philippi, à Constantinople.)
34. Wisoczky.
35. Beothy, Eugène;
   Plénipotentiaire en Turquie.
36. Tanesics, Michel, de Baranya.

No. 256.

Sir Stratford Canning to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received February 9.)

(No. 20.)

Therapia, January 19, 1850.

My Lord,

AMONG the number of younger Mussulmans educated abroad and employed at the Porte is Ahmed Effendi, whose talents and literary attainments have long distinguished him, but whose independence of character and uncompromising national feelings, though at present free from bigotry, have hitherto retarded the advancement to which he was otherwise entitled. The grandfather of this promising candidate for high office was originally a Christian. The young man himself received his education at Paris. He is now on the point of leaving Constantinople, in order, first, to superintend the removal of the Polish and Hungarian refugees from Shumla, and their embarkation at Varna for the several places to which they are destined to proceed; and secondly, to act in the Danubian Principalities as successor to Fuad Effendi, who, after his return from St. Petersburgh, will be employed at the Porte as a member of the Government. He came to take leave of me yesterday, and will probably embark for Varna in two or three days; the Porte, as far as I can make out, being desirous of removing the refugees without further delay, but hesitating at the same time to act before a more complete understanding is effected with the Austrian Minister.

The appointment of Ahmed Effendi is significant in more than one respect. Giving him credit for consistency, a man of his opinions, talents, and character cannot be acceptable either to Austria or to Russia. It would be the height of imprudence to employ him either at Shumla or at Bucharest, unless the Porte is prepared to maintain that respect for its rights and independence which has lately been asserted in so signal a manner. The Porte itself has already found that it cannot command his services without attending to his suggestions for their efficient application. He insists upon having explicit instructions for the regulation of his conduct in the Principalities; and he has declined going to Varna if an Austrian Commissary is allowed to proceed, as required by Count Stürmer, on board the Government steam-vessel which is to convey him to Varna.

I am thus particular in drawing your Lordship's attention to Ahmed Effendi's character, and to the circumstances under which he starts on his first important political mission, because I think his proceedings in Wallachia and Moldavia likely to be attended with consequences more or less important; and because, if his discretion proves equal to his ability and resolution, he will not improbably have to sustain a prominent part in the approaching events of this empire.

For the moment I have only to add with respect to Austria that Prince Schwarzenberg is not expected to give up the *entente préalable*; that Count Stürmer's pertinacity in insisting on points of vexatious detail is deeply felt and resisted by the Porte; and with respect to Russia, that M. de Titoff's facility of manner contrasts remarkably with the harshness of Count Stürmer; and that although he has talked about coming to an agreement with the Porte for reducing the army of occupation in the two Principalities, he has given no answer to Aali Pasha's very natural remark that all the conditions prescribed for its reduction having already taken place, beyond a shadow of doubt there is no occasion for any fresh argument to give effect to the Sened of Balta Liman.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

No. 257.

Sir Stratford Canning to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received February 9.)

(No. 21.)

My Lord, *Therapia, January 19, 1850.*

IN addition to the intelligence which I have already transmitted confidentially to your Lordship, with respect to the supposed plan of assassination directed from Vienna against the principal Hungarian refugees at Shumla, I have now the honour to forward another despatch addressed to me on the subject by Her Majesty's Consul at Varna, and to state, on the authority of an English gentleman residing here, that an individual employed in the Austrian Chancery, and whose name he has given me, had personally confirmed to him the leading facts related in my preceding correspondence, and declared his readiness to depose formally to the truth of them on being secured from the consequences of his information by an official assurance of protection.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

Inclosure in No. 257.

Colonel Neale to Sir Stratford Canning.

Sir, *Varna, January 9, 1850.*

WITH reference to the subject of the arrival here from Constantinople of the Croats who had proceeded towards Shumla, as detailed in my despatches Nos. 41 and 44 of last month, I have to acquaint your Excellency that I am informed, upon good authority, that they had been summoned to Shumla from Yonoskoi, the village where they were stationed, by Hulim Pasha, in order to remove the alarm, well or ill-founded, which their presence on the road to Shumla had occasioned to travellers coming from or proceeding to that place. I am also informed that since their arrival in Shumla they were acting as guards to the Austrian Vice-Consul, who is for the present resident there.

During the course of last week Colonel Talli, one of the Hungarian refugees who had arrived in Varna some days before, was sent back to Shumla under the following circumstances. Colonel Talli, upon his arrival here, having been arrested by the Turkish authorities, claimed the protection of the Austrian Vice-Consul, stating that he was one of the officers included in the capitulation of Comorn, and therefore considered himself entitled to his liberty; and that he anticipated no danger even in returning to Austria. But the Austrian Vice-Consul declined to take any steps on his behalf, or to receive him in the Consulate under restraint, as Colonel Talli proposed, until the correctness of his statement was ascertained.

Upon the arrival of the last steamer, however, from Constantinople, the Pasha of Varna, as it is presumed, acting upon instructions he had received by that occasion, announced to Colonel Talli that he must immediately return to Shumla; which was effected in the midst of some resistance and much altercation and remonstrance on the part of Colonel Talli.

It is understood that cavalry videttes are now placed at intervals on the roads round Shumla to prevent for the future the escape of the refugees, among whom, however, a rumour prevails, in consequence of letters received from Constantinople, that a portion of them would very shortly be removed to some other destination.

I beg to add, for the information of your Excellency, that the Austrian agent who accompanied the Croats from Constantinople, and alluded to in my previous despatches upon that subject, has returned to Varna, and proceeds to Constantinople by the present steamer. This agent, upon his arrival here from Constantinople, declared his intention of proceeding to Rustchuk; but it is now understood that he went only to Shumla. He was accompanied on his return here by M. Berte, the private agent at Constantinople of the ex-Prince Milosh of Servia.

I have, &c.

(Signed) EDWARD ST. JNO. NEALE.

No. 258.

Sir Stratford Canning to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received February 14.)

(No. 24.)

My Lord, *Therapia, January 21, 1850.*

IN your instruction No. 307 of November the 30th, there is a passage wherein it is stated that Christians who embrace the Mahometan faith in Turkey, become thereby subjects of the Sultan. Respecting this proposition, I think it my duty to submit a few remarks for your Lordship's mature consideration.

The pretension of the Porte is no doubt such as your Lordship has described it, and there are two Articles in the Capitulations which appear to warrant its application to British subjects. But the pretension is founded on so monstrous a principle, that it may be doubted whether anything short of an express engagement could fairly bind a Christian Government to its observance. A mere change of creed is held to cancel the obligations of natural allegiance, and the Commander of the Faithful virtually claims every orthodox Mussulman for his subject. Now the 61st and 71st Articles of the Capitulations provide for the case of a British subject turning Turk, and taking advantage of his apostacy to keep possession of property belonging to his countrymen. The arrangement clearly implies that the renegade has ceased to be amenable to British jurisdiction; but no such admission is distinctly expressed, and a tacit acquiescence, the result most probably of commercial interest or political expediency, may surely cease without a breach of good faith, when those motives no longer operate.

Exclusive of what is exceptionable and contrary to English law in the principle, objections of practical importance are not wanting. A large Mussulman population is now placed under British jurisdiction, and individuals so circumstanced in faith and allegiance not unfrequently come into this country. According to Turkish principles, any person of that description would forfeit his right to British protection on passing into the Sultan's dominions. Russia, too, has Mussulman subjects, and they probably would not look in vain to any Russian Consul in this country for protection. A continued compliance on our side would therefore be attended not only with injustice to those who might claim our protection, but also with the disparagement of yielding what another Government is prepared to maintain. The point would seem to be conceded by the Treaty of Kainardji, but there the concession is reciprocal, and stronger for Russia than the Porte, as the doctrines of Christianity afford no plea for the counter-claim.

Though I would not willingly raise an idle question, or exaggerate the importance of one already mooted, I cannot lose sight of the bearing which too much respect for the remains of Turkish pretension, manifested by a Government like that of England, may have upon the progress of Administrative improvement in this empire. We have now reached a point where progress is too likely to be at a stand. In order to move forward, the forms and maxims of an old exclusive system of bigotry and arrogance, rotten at the core but hardened externally, must be made to give way. But this will never be done while foreign Governments show more respect for those absurd pretensions, than for their own enlightened principles and the rightful interests of their subjects. The question of Christian evidence is an instance in point. The Turkish law in that respect is a perfect barrier against the further amalgamation of Turks and Christians. It is so understood and secretly condemned by the leading Turkish Ministers. Its religious character, nevertheless, continues to sustain it, and the greatest interests of this empire, whether social, administrative, commercial, or political, stagnate in its shade. The question in which this despatch originated is not indeed of the same magnitude, but it belongs to the same class.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

No. 259.

Lord Bloomfield to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received February 16.)

(No. 41.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, January 30, 1850.*

IN my despatch No. 37 of the 23rd instant, I reported that Fuad Effendi had had an audience of the Emperor. He has since received from His Imperial Majesty a diamond snuff-box, and each of the persons composing his suite have received some mark of Imperial favour.

To-day the Turkish Ambassador took leave of Count Nesselrode, and to-morrow he sets out for Jassy, by the way of Moscow and Kieff. He is to be accompanied by a feldjäger, and will be shown every possible attention by the Russian authorities on his journey to the Principalities.

Fuad Effendi has just called on me for the purpose of taking leave, when, after thanking me for the support I had given him during his mission to this Court, he told me that nothing of any importance had occurred at his interview with Count Nesselrode, except that his Excellency had delivered to his care a letter which the Emperor has addressed to the Sultan in answer to the one of which he had been the bearer; and on my inquiring if he knew the purport of this communication, Fuad Effendi said that it contained the usual professions of friendship for the Sultan, and of readiness to meet his wishes, and to establish the most cordial relations with his Government; but that the Emperor had warned His Majesty not to permit the interference of foreign Powers in the affairs of Turkey, and that this was the only point worthy of remark in the whole letter.

I asked his Excellency if he had had any conversation with Count Nesselrode about the Principalities, and he told me that he had not; that he expected to meet that portion of the Russian troops who are to retire from them, on their march homewards; that General Duhamel would immediately proceed to Jassy, where he probably should find him; that his chief business in the Principalities would be to examine the report of the Commissioners of Revision; and that what he had most at heart in terminating his connection with those provinces was to establish some system by which their future government would insure the gradual improvement of the condition of the peasantry, for which purpose it was essential that the corvées should be removed as far as possible; but that there were many difficulties to contend with in effecting this and other improvements, and none greater than the necessity under which the Porte found itself of not granting too much to Wallachia and Moldavia, in order not to raise a spirit of disaffection in Bulgaria and the provinces south of the Danube, which would have a right to be dissatisfied, if concessions of a similar kind were refused them.

Fuad Effendi added that after he had settled the appointment of the Council of Government, and prepared instructions for his successor, whom he expects to find at Bucharest, he shall proceed to Constantinople, and enter upon his new duties; and that he hopes to be on the shores of the Bosphorus in the month of March.

I have, &c.

(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 260.

Sir Stratford Canning to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received February 24.)

(No. 28. Secret and Confidential.)

My Lord, *Therapia, January 29, 1850.*

BY way of sequel to my former despatches concerning the plan of assassination alleged to have been directed by the Austrian police against the principal Hungarian refugees at Shumla, I forward herewith for your Lordship's information, two confidential statements which I have recently received on the same subject from very different quarters.

Although the plot, if true, appears to have failed, whether its object was to murder or to carry off the intended victims, I think it desirable that your Lordship, whatever opinion may be entertained of its reality, should be put in possession of all the circumstances respecting it, which have come to my knowledge from any creditable source. The Turkish Ministers, contented as it would seem with having frustrated the intentions of the Austrian agents, are not inclined to take an active part in exposing their alleged iniquity, though they indicate by their manner and language a belief in its existence. No one indeed can be insensible to the extreme delicacy of the subject. For my own part I confess that a deep sense of duty has alone overcome my natural repugnance to bring so disgusting an affair under your Lordship's notice; and whatever criminality may attach to the Austrian police, I am willing to believe it impossible either that the Austrian Government has sanctioned, or that Count Stürmer has knowingly connived at, a transaction of such atrocious infamy.

I cannot dismiss the subject without explaining to your Lordship in strict confidence, that the anonymous statement inclosed herewith proceeds from an Ionian named Civinis, who is employed in the Turkish passport office; that Mr. Longworth, whose name is subscribed to the other, is a respectable English gentleman of literary reputation, in correspondence with some of the leading London journals, and an eye-witness of the late disastrous struggle in Hungary; that Turassi, whose name appears in both statements, is ready, as I am assured, to give evidence of the truth of his assertions, if certain of protection; and that the Baron is an Hungarian nobleman under Austrian protection, already mentioned in my correspondence, and who has himself confirmed to me the principal circumstances which Bardi related to Her Majesty's Consul at Varna.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

Inclosure 1 in No. 260.

Statement by Mr. Longworth.

Constantinople, January 26, 1850.

ON Sunday the 6th of January two persons paid a visit to General Guyon, and in the course of conversation alluded at some length to a report then in circulation that a party of Croatians had been dispatched from the Austrian Chancery to Shumla for the purpose of assassinating M. Kossuth and other chiefs of the Hungarian emigration. I was not then acquainted with the names of either of the individuals in question, but taking some interest in the subject I asked one of them, a respectable-looking man apparently about the age of five or six-and-twenty, if he really believed these reports, as they seemed to me incredible from their atrocity. To this he replied that he not only believed, but knew them to be true; that to his certain knowledge these Croatians had been hired and brought here in the steamer from Trieste for the purpose of trepanning and assassinating the Hungarian refugees; that he had spoken to them himself, and entertained in consequence not the slightest doubt as to the nature of their errand; that they were twelve in number, and were placed under the orders of a certain Gabriel Saznadgi, a person of this country but now in the employment of the police at Vienna, and who had come out with them from Trieste. The second in command was a man of the name of Davidovitch, and they were accompanied by a woman of disreputable character, who passed for the wife of one of these emissaries; she was to be used he believed as a decoy to ensnare the refugees, and it was reported she had been formerly kept by General Perczel, one of the détenus at Shumla. All these Croatians, with M. Saznadgi at their head, had been embarked in an Austrian steamer bound to the Black Sea, and six of them landed at Bourgas and six at Varna. This is in substance what was communicated to me by one of the persons who visited General Guyon on the 6th of January, and whose name I learnt on his departure was M. Turassi, an employé of the Austrian Chancery of this place.

To these particulars I may perhaps be permitted to add some further information which has come subsequently to my knowledge, and may not be deemed altogether irrelevant. The M. Saznadgi above referred to, after an

absence of some weeks, and baffled it appears in his attempts by the vigilance of the Turkish authorities, returned to Constantinople, leaving his accomplices at Varna. He has since, I understand, made a formal complaint through the Austrian Chancery to the Porte against the conduct of the Government functionaries, whom he accuses of thwarting and persecuting his agents while carrying on his business, which was of a commercial nature, in the interior. I cannot say what the effect of these representations may have been, but it is certain that only a few days ago M. Suzmadgi took a second trip in the Austrian steamer to Varna. We have some means, however, of judging how far his statements are deserving of credit, and it would certainly seem hard to reconcile them with the fact that he should have been selected by the Internuncio as a political agent, and specially recommended by him to the Porte as colleague to Ahmed Effendi, the Turkish Commissioner appointed to superintend the removal of the Hungarian refugees to Shumla. But the latter, as he himself has assured me, most positively declined the honour of his company, and told the Grand Vizier he could not undertake to execute the commission entrusted to him, if it was to be shared with such an associate. It was in consequence probably of this declaration of Ahmed Effendi that M. Suzmadgi returned alone to Varna, in order I presume to pursue his commercial operations in that neighbourhood. (Signed) J. A. LONGWORTH.

Inclosure 2 in No. 260.

Confidential Statement made to Sir Stratford Canning.

(Confidentielle.)

LES employés de l'Internonciature ayant fait courir le bruit que le Baron et M. Turassi sont accusés d'avoir prêté main aux Hongrois, je n'ai pas cru superflu de reproduire même ici ces quelques observations y relatives ; car après toutes les horreurs qui se sont tramées, qui peut nous garantir de nouveaux pièges ?

Le Baron, pour se ménager les bons offices de l'Internonciature dans la succession que sa femme (fille de la célèbre Pepè Maritza) réclame, le Baron, quoique Hongrois, a plus d'une fois fait l'espoir de l'Internonciature. C'est sur les renseignemens qu'il lui a fournis que des dépêches adressées à M. d'Andrassy furent saisies. Il est vrai pourtant d'ajouter qu'il a rendu aussi des services à ses compatriotes, surtout dans l'exécrable dernière trâme. Enfin, quand on considère qu'il tolère (et ceci est très-positif) la continuation d'un amour illicite entre sa fille (non-mariée) et M. Turassi, marié depuis deux ans à une Hongroise aussi, on peut dire qu'il est homme à se prêter à tout et au plus offrant.

M. Turassi est de Smyrne. Il a fait ses études à Corfou et sert depuis plusieurs années dans la Chancellerie d'Autriche pour la partie des passeports. Il a épousé depuis deux ans, à Constantinople, une Hongroise d'assez bonne famille, dont les frères sont au service d'Autriche ; l'un surtout occupe une place distinguée à Vienne. M. Turassi aime beaucoup l'argent. Il est accusé au Bureau des Passeports d'avoir pris d'un Juif, sujet Moldave, une certaine somme et l'avoir ainsi fait passer pour Autrichien.

Les teskérés envoyés aux vingt Croates envoyés à Varna avec l'exécrable mission dont l'idée seule révolte, l'ont été au Bureau des Passeports en mon absence et par ordre exprès du Directeur-Général, que le drogman de l'Internonciature n'ayant pas trouvé au bureau alla chercher dans sa maison à Constantinople, et tout cela vers les 4 heures de l'après-midi. Les demandes (Inlia) de la Chancellerie d'Autriche pour ces teskérés portent que les titulaires se rendaient à Varna et de là à leur patrie pour des affaires de commerce. Il n'y avait guères question d'armes ; et moyennant les teskérés accordés à seuls douze mentionnés dans les demandes précitées, on en a fait partir vingt. C'est un employé de la Chancellerie d'Autriche qui me le confia.

Je ne terminerai point sans consigner ici (sous le plus grand mystère), que sur l'observation confidentielle faite à MM. Mihanowitz et Weekbeker, par des amis à eux, de tout le noir que jetait sur l'Internonciature la trâme ourdie contre les réfugiés, ces Messieurs répondirent à peu près en ces termes (croyant peut-être pallier l'horreur d'une semblable infâmie, car Réchid et son Ministère ne sont pas faits pour cela) : "Que voulez-vous? Nous avons agi dans cette

affaire d'accord avec le Gouvernement Ottoman, qui, sans paraître, nous laissait faire ; nous voulions nous en rendre maîtres et les envoyer en Autriche. En agissant ainsi nous ne dépassions pas le cercle de nos droits, puisque tout sujet Autrichien est en Turquie sous la jurisdiction exclusive des autorités Autrichiennes. Le secret a été trahi, et l'affaire ayant manqué, on en crie ; réussie, on en aurait applaudi et l'on se serait tû."

No. 261.

Sir Stratford Canning to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received February* 24.)

(No. 29.)

My Lord, *Therapia, January* 29, 1850.

BY a despatch which reached me the day before yesterday, I learned from Her Majesty's Acting Consul at Bucharest, that General Lüders, accompanied by M. de Kotzebue, had called on Omer Pasha, and remonstrated with him on account of the number of Austrian subjects recently enlisted into the Ottoman army under his command. Mr. Grant describes the Russian Commander-in-chief as having declared to the Pasha that his Sovereign the Emperor Nicholas would not tolerate a continuance of that proceeding ; and he adds, on the authority of a traveller, that an Austrian detachment at Cronstadt was preparing to march into Wallachia.

I lost no time in conveying this intelligence to Aali Pasha, affording him thereby an opportunity of telling me whatever he knew and thought of the matter in question. His Excellency's reply, as reported to me by M. Pisani, amounts in substance to what follows :—

The Russian Envoy had sent him a message announcing that he had received despatches by an express from M. de Kotzebue, apprizing him of his having complained to Omer Pasha of the large number of Austrian subjects disposed to embrace Islamism and to enter the military service of the Porte under the command of General Bem, and of his having remarked that as the Emperor of Russia was the protector of Christianity in the Principalities of the Danube, an end must be put to the practice ; for although the recruits were neither Moldavians nor Wallachians, proselytism was evidently encouraged in those provinces. It was further stated that Omer Pasha had denied his having endeavoured to make proselytes ; that the Mahometan religion did not warrant the rejection of voluntary converts ; that indigence and misery were the real causes of apostacy ; and that he should propose to the Austrian Consul to check the tendency complained of by supplying means of relief to his destitute dependents.

Aali Pasha appears from his own statement to have added in reply to M. de Titoff, who pressed for an immediate answer, that the Porte had hitherto received no direct intelligence of what had occurred in Wallachia ; that the conduct of Omer Pasha as described would be approved by the Porte ; and that he would be instructed to require the presence of some one from the Austrian Consulate, as often as an Austrian subject should of his own accord announce his wish to embrace the faith of Mahomet.

Any attempt to make proselytes received as strong a disclaimer from the Ottoman Secretary of State as from the Commander of the Turkish army in Wallachia.

I have &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

No. 262.

Sir Stratford Canning to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received February* 24.)

(No. 30.)

My Lord, *Therapia, January* 29, 1850.

INCLOSED herewith for your Lordship's information is a copy of the memorandum addressed by Aali Pasha to M. de Titoff, on the subject of protections. It relates more particularly to the case of such individuals residing in Turkey as are protected by the passports of some third Power, though

regarded by Russia as originally at least her subjects, and by the Porte as liable to be sent away on conviction of plotting against the peace of any neighbouring State. There is much truth in the Pasha's remarks on the inconvenience resulting to Turkey from the extent to which the right of foreign protection is carried under treaty within the Sultan's dominions; but it is also true that the administration of this empire is not yet sufficiently improved to admit of any decided change in that respect, without an imminent risk of letting in more evils than those to be remedied by a surrender of the existing privilege.

The note was communicated to me confidentially before its final adoption.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

Inclosure in No. 262.

Aali Pasha to M. de Titoff.

(Traduction.) 31 *Janvier*, 1850.

EN conséquence des représentations que l'illustre Cour de Russie nous a faites avec bienveillance, par le passé et dernièrement encore, à l'égard des individus qui, étant originairement sujets d'une Puissance, mettent à profit les passeports qu'ils ont pris contre les règles qu'il y a à observer, et d'une manière ou d'autre prétendent être sous la protection d'une autre Puissance; c'est-à-dire, sur la nécessité de songer au moyen de faire cesser les abus qui existent dans la protection étrangère dans les États de Sa Hautesse, mesure réclamée par les intérêts de la Sublime Porte elle-même; et attendu que cette mesure intéresse en effet la sûreté intérieure et les relations extérieures de la Sublime Porte, nous y avons réfléchi mûrement, et voici le résumé de nos réflexions.

D'abord, le principal et véritable objet que l'on se propose par la mesure dont il s'agit, c'est de mettre nombre d'individus, naturellement intrigans, dans l'impuissance d'exécuter de mauvais desseins sous les auspices de la protection étrangère qu'ils se sont procurée sans en avoir le droit; et certes, la Sublime Porte n'a rien tant à cœur que d'obtenir cet heureux résultat.

Mais tant que les véritables sujets d'une nation étrangère qui viennent en Turquie sous la protection, bien ou mal acquise, d'une autre Puissance étrangère, se comportent paisiblement, la Sublime Porte n'a aucune raison de s'enquérir de leur protection et de leur nationalité. C'est lorsqu'il a été prouvé que des sujets étrangers ont osé se livrer à des intrigues et à des menées que l'autorité locale est en devoir et qu'elle a le droit incontestable d'exiger de la Mission protectrice, qu'elle les expulse et les éloigne du pays.

Si en Turquie, ainsi comme cela se pratique dans les autres pays de l'Europe, les sujets des Puissances étrangères étaient soumis, à l'instar des indigènes, aux lois du pays, un grand avantage en résulterait incontestablement. Mais il est superflu de dire que les traités placent les sujets étrangers qui viennent en Turquie, sous la juridiction des Ministres et des Consuls respectifs; et voilà la véritable cause, la vraie source des abus passés et présens, en fait de protection, et de l'impossibilité pour la Porte d'exercer une surveillance active sur quelques intrigans.

Si l'on voulait faire en sorte que le Gouvernement Turc aussi, comme les autres Gouvernemens, eût le pouvoir d'appliquer ses propres lois aux étrangers, aussi bien qu'à ses propres sujets, il est clair qu'il n'y aurait plus lieu à des plaintes, et que la Sublime Porte gagnerait beaucoup, et sous le rapport de sa sûreté intérieure et sous celui de ses relations extérieures.

Il y a seulement ceci à dire, c'est que changer et modifier les traités existans n'est pas une chose qui dépend de la volonté d'une seule partie; il faut le concours et le consentement des deux Parties Contractantes. Si la Sublime Porte voyait dans les Puissances qui jouissent du privilége de la juridiction, quelque bonne disposition à un changement, elle entrerait en négociations à cet égard avec la plus grande satisfaction.

Bref, l'heureux résultat que l'illustre Cour de Russie espère de la mise en pratique de ses représentations amicales et bienveillantes relativement aux abus de

la protection, est entièrement subordonné à la condition de soumettre les étrangers dans les Etats de Sa Hautesse aux règlemens intérieurs du pays. Voilà, à notre avis, ce qu'il faudrait faire pour obtenir le résultat qu'on a en vue.

No. 263.

Sir Stratford Canning to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received February* 24.)

(No. 31.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, February* 5, 1850.

REFERRING to the subject of my despatch No. 29 of this year, I avail myself of the present opportunity to forward, for your Lordship's additional information, a copy of a despatch addressed to me by Her Majesty's Acting Consul at Bucharest, and the translation of an instruction addressed by the Porte to Omer Pasha and Ahmed Effendi concerning such Hungarians and other Christians in the Principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia as may spontaneously declare their wish to embrace Islamism and to enter the Turkish service.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

P.S.—I add to the papers forwarded with this despatch an instruction addressed to M. Musurus by Aali Pasha, on the subject of Omer Pasha's proceedings towards the proselytes to Islamism.

S. C.

Inclosure 1 in No. 263.

Mr. Grant to Sir Stratford Canning.

Sir, *Bucharest, January* 18, 1850.

FOR some days past great numbers of young artisans and workmen to various trades have presented themselves before the Turkish military authorities here, requesting to be allowed to embrace Islamism and to be enrolled in the Turkish service.

Omer Pasha called on me a few days since, and communicated to me the application of these individuals, who are principally Hungarians and Germans under the protection of the Austrian Agency here, and told me that he had informed M. Timoni officially of the fact, and requested him to send a delegate from his Agency, to persuade himself that these proposed proselytes acted of their own free will.

I understand M. Timoni feels confident that these persons, many of whom he declares to be minors, have been induced by the glittering promises held out to them through M. Kossuth's emissaries here to take this step, under the belief that a fresh rise will shortly take place in Hungary and Transylvania; and that Turkish agents have likewise seduced them with promises of rapid promotion, &c. This opinion, however, is not that of the Russian or French Agents, who, like myself, acquit Omer Pasha on this score of conversion of anything like missionary efforts.

Yet I confess it is difficult to imagine what can have thus suddenly induced these persons to desire to abjure their faith. I have endeavoured to ascertain whether any premium has been offered to or received by these individuals; but I cannot learn that any other sum has been given to them, than what may be considered as bounty-money granted to voluntary recruits, and equivalent to about 2*l.* sterling. Now this to persons gaining at the minimum that amount per month when working at their trades and employments, surely cannot be the allurement.

I told Omer Pasha frankly that I regretted the steps taken by these individuals, and that I felt sure their conduct would be severely censured in Europe; and that moreover I considered the incident in itself would

greatly tend to retard the renewal of the friendly relations between Austria and the Porte.

Omer Pasha remarked that he had not sought to effect these conversions, but that when these persons addressed themselves to him, desiring to be received into the faith of the Prophet, he could not refuse to comply.

Up to this day I learn that upwards of 150 have been sent across the Danube.

(Signed) EFFINGHAM GRANT.

Inclosure 2 in No. 263.

Instructions to Ahmed Effendi and Omer Pasha.

(Traduction.)

D'APRES ce que nous venons d'apprendre, nombre de Hongrois qui se trouvent à Bucharest veulent se faire Musulmans et prendre service dans l'armée Impériale Turque.

Le système qu'Omer Pacha a adopté à l'égard de ces Hongrois est très convenable et très bon. La Sublime Porte s'empresse seulement de faire connaître succinctement de quelle manière il faudra en agir désormais à l'égard d'individus de cette catégorie.

Il est superflu de dire que lorsqu'un Chrétien, sain d'esprit et maître de ses actions, vient trouver un Musulman, et lui déclare qu'il veut embrasser l'Islamisme, il n'est nullement permis de le rebuter et de le chasser. Mais voici, cependant, ce qu'il y a; c'est qu'il faut faire voir à tout le monde que si les gens dont il s'agit veulent à cause de la situation dans laquelle ils se trouvent par suite des événemens de la Hongrie, changer de religion, ce n'est pas nous qui les avons excités à faire cette démarche, et que nous ne la leur avons suggérée en aucune manière.

Or, les Consuls de Russie et d'Autriche à Bucharest se sont imaginés que pour exciter les Hongrois à se faire Musulmans, les autorités Ottomanes ont donné de l'argent à quelques-uns parmi eux, et leur ont fait des promesses que s'ils se font Musulmans ils seront employés sous les ordres de Mourad Beni.

Il est certain que ni son Excellence Omer Pacha, ni aucune autre autorité Ottomane à Bucharest ne se sont permis de faire une chose pareille, et qu'à l'avenir non plus ils ne le feront pas. Cependant il est nécessaire qu'il ne soit absolument rien fait qui soit de nature à confirmer pour ainsi dire les soupçons des Consuls sus-mentionnés. C'est pourquoi, lorsque des individus se présentent pour avoir la gloire d'accepter l'Islamisme, il faut avant tout leur donner lieu à entendre que s'ils veulent se faire Musulmans dans l'espoir d'être employés auprès du Général Bem, ou pour obtenir quelque avantage prompt et sans délai, ils doivent se détromper; et qu'ils ne doivent pas espérer non plus qu'il leur sera permis de venir en-deça du Danube pour rejoindre leurs concitoyens qui s'y trouvent. Il faut leur demander et s'enquérir et vérifier s'ils ont, ou n'ont pas, été excités par des exhortations à changer de religion; s'ils on les y a, ou on ne les y a pas forcés. Et conformément au principe reçu et pratiqué, ces individus seront amplement et minutieusement interrogés en présence des Consuls, ou de leurs délégués dont ils relèvent suivant leur nationalité; et après que toutes les circonstances auront été bien constatées, on leur fera prononcer les paroles de la foi, et puis on les fera immédiatement passer sur la rive droite du Danube, et ils seront détenus et surveillés à Roustchouk. Un rapport sera envoyé sans délai à la Sublime Porte sur leur nombre et sur l'état et la profession de chacun d'eux, pour les envoyer aux endroits qu'il faut.

On dit que la plupart de ces gens étant très-pauvres, ils ne savent que devenir, ni quel métier exercer. Les sentimens de l'humanité exigent donc qu'on leur donne des secours: aussi son Excellence Omer Pasha a-t-il proposé une quête pour eux, au Prince Stirbey, ainsi qu'à MM. les Consuls. En effet, une quête dans ce but étant on ne peut plus convenable, Ahmed Effendi aussi aura soin de l'encourager.

Inclosure 3 in No. 263.

Aali Pasha to M. Musurus.

M. l'Envoyé, 21 Janvier / 2 Février 1850.

ON vous parlera peut-être à Vienne du prosélytisme Musulman exercé en dernier lieu à Bucharest par nos soldats. Je m'empresse de vous donner des renseignemens exacts sur cet incident, pour que vous puissiez repousser, s'il y a lieu, toute insinuation calomnieuse.

Depuis l'insurrection Hongroise il y a à Bucharest une grande quantité de Hongrois, de Transylvaniens, et de sectaires, sans travail, sans pain et sans asyle. Quelques-uns de ces individus se présentèrent dernièrement chez son Excellence Omer Pacha, pour lui déclarer leur résolution de changer de religion et de se faire enrôler comme soldats dans les armées de Sa Majesté le Sultan.

Omer Pacha voyant que leur nombre allait en augmentant, et que l'on ne manquera pas de l'accuser de prosélytisme, déclara loyalement aux Consuls des Grandes Puissances et au Prince de Valachie, l'extrême embarras où cette circonstance le mettait, et leur proposa en même tems de créer un comité de secours pour empêcher ces gens là de mourir de faim, ou de chercher les moyens de leur existence dans le changement de croyance. Il ajouta, en outre, qu'il était décidé à n'accepter aucune conversion ultérieure jusqu'à ce qu'il ait reçu des instructions de son Gouvernement à cet égard.

Cette déclaration si franche de notre Commandant-Général, l'évidence qu'il y a que la Sublime Porte ni sa religion ne peuvent avoir le moindre intérêt de chercher à convertir des gens qui ni lui rapportent que des embarras et des dépenses; le manque absolu de moyens de nos soldats pour pouvoir les encourager à embrasser l'Islamisme, c'est-à-dire, leur ignorance absolu de toutes les langues qu'on parle dans ces pays; l'état de misère qui les pousse; n'ont pas suffi à empêcher les accusations prévues.

On a prétendu avoir appris que quelques individus d'entre eux avaient dit à leurs compatriotes qu'ils avaient la promesse d'être employés sous le commandement de Bem; que comme engagement ou encouragement ils recevraient de l'argent de la part des autorités Musulmanes; on s'est enfin indiqué de ce que la Principauté de Valachie était convertie en un foyer de prosélytisme Mahometan.

Heureusement toutes ces fausses alarmes et toutes ces accusations ont échoué devant le bons sens des honnêtes gens.

J'ai demandé à faire une enquête afin de découvrir et de punir ceux qui se seraient permis d'offrir de l'argent à ces Chrétiens, ou de leur promettre de les mettre sous les ordres de Général Bem, dans le but de les décider à abandonner la religion de leurs pères. On n'a pas voulu aller si loin, et on a fini par avouer que la quote-part de chacun de l'argent distribué, ne dépassait pas 5 piastres Turques, et que ce n'était qu'à titre de charité que cette distribution avait eu lieu.

Cet aveu répond d'une manière triomphante à toute imputation de propagande religieuse, et me dispense à chercher d'autres argumens pour la démentir.

No. 264.

Sir Stratford Canning to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received February 24.)

(No. 35.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, February 5, 1850.*

BEFORE the receipt of your Lordship's despatch communicating a copy of Count Nesselrode's instruction to Baron Brunnow on the subject of Sir William Parker's entrance within the outer castles of the Dardanelles, I had concurred with the Porte in thinking it necessary that an answer should be given to the instruction previously addressed by Count Nesselrode to M. de Titoff, and communicated by the latter to Aali Pasha. The Ottoman Minister, after consulting me upon the subject, prepared the draft of an answer in the form of a circular to the Sultan's Representatives at St. Petersburgh, Vienna, Berlin, London, and Paris. On my suggesting as a preferable course, that an

instruction explaining the circumstances of the case, and repelling the pretension of Russia's right to send a squadron into the Bay of Buyukdery, should be addressed to Fuad Effendi for communication to Count Nesselrode; and that the two instructions should be transmitted to the Turkish Representatives in the four last-mentioned capitals, for communication to the respective Ministers there. Aali Pasha preferred an official note to M. de Titoff, on the ground of Fuad Effendi's presumed departure from St. Petersburgh; and I had only just succeeded in persuading him to desist from a mode of proceeding so unnecessarily formal, when the receipt of Count Nesselrode's declared withdrawal of his pretension removed the only motive for replying at all to the instruction received from him by M. de Titoff; and consequently I recommended that the question should be allowed to drop without further correspondence between the two Governments.

To this suggestion Aali Pasha and the Grand Vizier, who were much gratified by the purport of Baron Brunnow's communication to your Lordship, were willing enough to assent; but they found themselves obliged to give some kind of answer to the Russian Envoy here, in consequence of his having obtained from them a promise to that effect some time before.

Such being the state of the case, I recurred to my previous suggestion, which was accepted by the two Ministers; and I have now the honour to forward herewith to your Lordship a copy of Aali Pasha's instruction to Fuad Effendi, such as it was finally adopted after the admission of some of the amendments which I thought it advisable to propose.

I trust that the Porte's declaration will now appear to your Lordship, both in form and substance, as little objectionable as the delicate circumstances of the case could possibly allow.

The circular to be addressed to the Turkish Ministers at the Courts of the other Powers immediately concerned in the Treaty of 1841, will be limited to a few words, merely authorizing the communication of the two instructions.

I learn from the Grand Vizier that no intelligence has yet been received of Fuad Effendi's departure from St. Petersburgh, and that he may be expected to remain there some weeks longer.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

Inclosure in No. 264.

Aali Pasha to Fuad Effendi.

(Traduction.)

M. TITOFF a remis à la Sublime Porte copie d'une dépêche du Comte Nesselrode en date du 28 Novembre, 1840, dans laquelle il est dit que comme la flotte Anglaise venue dernièrement dans le voisinage du Détroit des Dardanelles est entrée, à cause de la violence du vent, jusqu'à un endroit appelé "Havouzlar," qui serait situé dans le détroit même, cela pourrait être considéré comme une contravention au Traité conclu le 13 Juillet, 1841, de l'ère Chrétienne, entre la Sublime Porte et les Cinq Grandes Puissances, touchant la fermeture des détroits. La dite dépêche a été mise sous les yeux de Sa Majesté Impériale, et une copie de la même est transmise ci-jointe à votre Excellence.

Ainsi que nous l'avons dit dès le commencement, la venue de la flotte Anglaise jusqu'à l'endroit qui est devenu un sujet de contestation, n'a eu absolument d'autre motif que le grand danger qui résulterait de gros temps, et de l'extrême difficulté de se tenir à Besica Baie; et aux yeux de la Sublime Porte la venue de la flotte Anglaise jusque là ne constitue point une contravention au Traité; car jusqu'à présent il était devenu une règle, un principe, de ne rien dire quand des bâtimens de quelque espèce qu'ils fussent, entraient dans le détroit même pendant la nuit, et venaient jusque là; à cause de cela le détroit était censé commencer en-deçà. Dès que le tems s'est mis au beau, l'Amiral Parker est parti; ce qui prouve évidemment aussi la vérité de ce que je viens de dire.

Quoiqu'il en soit, attendu que la Sublime Porte, chose superflue à dire, met tous ses soins et l'attention la plus scrupuleuse à maintenir inviolablement ses traités avec les Puissances amies, et que dans cette occasion-ci la manière de voir des Puissances signataires du Traité susdit sur la véritable entrée du Détroit de Dardanelles a été comprise, elle vient de faire savoir à ses autorités qui commandent aux détroits, de ne pas permettre dorénavant aux bâtimens de guerre des Puissances étrangères, à l'exception des bâtimens légers destinés au service des Légations, de dépasser les fortifications les plus avancées des embouchures des détroits de la Mer Blanche et de la Mer Noire; et cela enfin de maintenir le Traité susdit.

Et afin qu'il ne reste plus aucun doute, aucun malentendu sur cette question, Sa Majesté le Sultan ordonne que vous portiez cette résolution à la connaissance de l'illustre Cour de Russie, et que vous lui remettiez aussi copie de cette dépêche.

No. 265.

Sir Stratford Canning to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received February 21.)

(No. 36.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, February 5, 1850.*

ON the receipt of your instructions by the last messenger from Malta I sent Mr. Alison to communicate confidentially to the Grand Vizier such parts of the correspondence transmitted to me as I thought likely to produce a favourable and useful impression. Both His Highness and Aali Pasha were particularly pleased with your Lordship's instructions to Viscount Ponsonby in reply to Prince Schwarzenberg's protest respecting the Dardanelles and the Treaty of 1841. The latter expressed so strong a wish to be allowed to lay its contents before the Sultan, that anticipating your Lordship's permission, I ventured to comply with his request, by allowing a Turkish translation of the principal passages to be made for His Majesty's perusal.

I have since taken occasion to communicate to the Grand Vizier your Lordship's instruction to me respecting the most advisable means of improving the army and other essential defences of this empire, more particularly of the capital. His Highness listened to the whole of it with unabated attention, and at his particular request I have directed the despatch to be translated into Turkish in the form of a memorandum, and placed in his hands for maturer consideration, and as I hope for eventual execution.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

No. 266.

Sir Stratford Canning to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received February 24.)

(No. 38.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, February 5, 1850.*

IT will be satisfactory, I think, to your Lordship to know that I have continued my endeavours to obtain for the refugees at Shumla as much consideration and indulgence as the circumstances of their situation and the Porte's engagements towards Russia and Austria can possibly allow. I have already transmitted for your Lordship's information a memorandum respecting their treatment which I sent in to the Turkish Ministers several weeks ago, and through them to the Sultan himself, who appears to have adopted the suggestions contained in it. I have since represented the necessity of protecting the refugees by an adequate number of guards on their passage from Shumla to Varna; and I have requested that they might be allowed to halt for twenty-four hours in the port of Constantinople, and to communicate under proper precautions with their friends, leaving Madame Batthyany, and consequently any other lady in similar circumstances, at liberty to disembark. I have also pointed out the superfluous cruelty of compelling them to cross the mountains to Kutahia at this inclement season, and requested that they might be allowed to wait at Brussa till the beginning of spring.

My efforts have not been fruitless, but neither have they been so successful as I wished. The ladies will be allowed to disembark, but not till after they have landed their husbands in Asia Minor. The steam-vessel which conveys

them from Varna will pass on without stopping in the Bosphorus; a promise to that effect having been given, as I learn, from Aali Pasha to M. de Titoff. The permission to wait for a milder season at Brussa has not been refused; but as much emphasis is laid by Aali Pasha on the orders given to provide accommodation on the road to Kutahia, it may be presumed that, if the weather be tolerable, the whole journey will be completed at once. Kutahia is situated at a distance of three days' journey from the place of disembarkation.

I avail myself of this opportunity to mention that the American Chargé d'Affaires has spoken to me of a petition to the Sultan transmitted to him from Shumla with the signatures of a very considerable number of Hungarians not included in the Austrian list. The petitioners request to be allowed either to accompany Kossuth to Kutahia, or to be furnished with the means of leaving the country. I advised Mr. Brown to submit the matter to the Grand Vizier, observing that the first alternative could not be granted. I have also myself spoken to his Highness on the subject, and I am happy to find that the second alternative is not likely to meet with any serious difficulty. I had already obtained an instruction to Ahmed Effendi on behalf of two young Germans of respectable education, who wrote to me from Shumla requesting that they might be permitted to embark for America.

The whole party is probably by this time in movement from Shumla, and it will soon appear in what degree the considerations of humanity and self-respect are made to give way to the dictates of a resentful policy.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

No. 267.

Sir Stratford Canning to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received February* 24.)

(No. 39.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, February* 5, 1850.

THE Ottoman Secretary of State and the Austrian Internuncio have received answers from Vienna, the one to his instruction acquainting M. Musurus with the remaining points of difference concerning the Hungarian refugees, the other to his report of the latest discussions at Constantinople on the same subject. Both are in substance the same. Prince Schwarzenberg accepts the Porte's last version of the note to be addressed to Count Stürmer, but insists upon the blank being filled up with at least five years of unreconsidered detention, instead of a few months. Your Lordship is already in possession of the amended draft to which I allude*. Inclosed herewith is a copy of M. Musurus's despatch to Aali Pasha. The Internuncio in a conference which he had some days ago with that Minister and the Grand Vizier, began by demanding a term of twelve years. He gradually came down to five, with an opening for reconsideration during that period; and the difference thus reduced awaits the decision of the Council.

The Turkish Ministers have meanwhile applied to me for an opinion, and I have not hesitated to advise a firm resistance to any pretension exceeding the ample measure of deference already offered to the wishes of Austria. The Porte is bound neither by treaty nor by the rules of good neighbourhood to go further. Already indeed she has offered to pledge herself to more than the obligations of any treaty imposed upon her, and by so doing, she has unnecessarily incurred the hazard of much future embarrassment. Prince Schwarzenberg's present demand, if meant to be really stringent on the Porte, is I conceive inadmissible on grounds of humanity with respect to the refugees, and on those of honour, of prudence, and of national independence, with respect to this empire; and if illusive, serving no purpose but that of humiliating the Porte and complicating the terms of agreement. After all that has passed, the Sultan's Ministers are fairly entitled to say that they have reached the final point of concession, that they are ready to redeem the pledge already given, but that, if more be insisted upon, however they may regret the groundless dissatisfaction of Austria, they are content to abide the consequences.

It would then remain for them to consider whether it would be more

* See Inclosure in No. 293.

advisable, in the absence of any agreement with Austria, to execute their previous intention, or to send the Hungarian refugees out of the country at once.

In either case it is presumable that the interruption of official relations between the Porte and the Austrian Legation would be prolonged. I understand from Aali Pasha that the same mark of estrangement is adopted at Vienna, though I do not perceive any distinct trace of it in the Turkish Envoy's report.

It cannot be necessary for me to add that I have given to my own opinions on this subject, the full advantage of your Lordship's instructions, and of the powerful arguments by which they are enforced.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

Inclosure in No. 267.

M. Musurus to Aali Pasha.

Monseigneur, *Vienne, le* 22 *Janvier*, 1850.

DEPUIS la réception de la dépêche de votre Excellence en date du 11 de ce mois, j'ai eu deux entrevues avec M. le Prince de Schwarzenberg, l'une le 18 de ce mois et l'autre aujourd'hui même.

Le Prince m'a reçu assez amicalement. J'ai mis sous ses yeux la traduction de la nouvelle proposition de la Sublime Porte qu'il prétendait n'avoir pas reçu de M. le Comte de Stürmer. Après l'avoir lue avec attention et sans faire aucune objection sérieuse, il a voulu savoir quel serait le terme que la Sublime Porte se proposait de fixer. Je lui ai dit que la fixation du terme ne devait pas donner lieu à de longues discussions, vû qu'il était subordonné au rétablissement de la tranquillité en Hongrie; que de plus, la Sublime Porte dans son désir de s'entendre au préalable avec le Cabinet de Vienne, offrait non seulement de tâcher d'obtenir son adhésion avant de faire cesser l'internement, mais d'expulser même de ses Etats les individus internés; que néanmoins ce délai pouvait s'étendre jusque vers les derniers mois de l'année courante. Le Prince a accueilli cette offre avec un vif mécontentement. Il m'a dit qu'un tel terme serait tout-à-fait dérisoire, qu'il ne voulait pas discuter ce point avec moi, et que par le courrier qui part aujourd'hui même il allait expédier à M. de Stürmer des instructions catégoriques.

Entre autres observations que j'ai dû faire au Prince, je lui ai déclaré que je regrettais de le voir ajourner indéfiniment la reprise des relations diplomatiques, dans le but évidemment de renchérir de plus en plus sur ce qui avait été décidé ici; car la seule interprétation que tout homme impartial pût donner à l'expression d'entente préalable dont je m'étais servi dans ma note, c'était qu'après six mois tout au plus, la Sublime Porte aurait la faculté de prendre l'initiative de s'entendre avec le Cabinet de Vienne sur la cessation de l'internement. J'ai ajouté que dans ma note cette entente n'était pas subordonnée au rétablissement de la tranquillité en Hongrie, que je n'avais pas promis qu'à l'internement succéderait l'expulsion qui en est l'équivalent, et que je ne m'étais point servi du mot adhésion. Enfin j'ai dit au Prince, que quelle que fût l'insistance de M. le Comte de Stürmer, je ne croyais pas qu'il pût obtenir un délai plus long que celui que je venais d'offrir.

Le Prince est resté inflexible et a mis fin à notre entretien en me disant que M. le Comte de Stürmer était muni des instructions nécessaires, et que bientôt j'aurais des nouvelles de Constantinople, sans me donner pourtant à entendre de quelle nature seraient ces nouvelles.

(Signé) C. MUSURUS.

No. 268.

Sir Stratford Canning to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received February* 24.)

(No. 40.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, February* 5, 1850.

THE reduction of the Turkish army collected around the capital is still in operation, and I am informed that the number of soldiers dismissed to their respective homes will finally amount to between 30,000 and 40,000. These

troops are Rediff, or militia drafts from the country, attached to the garrison of Constantinople and the Imperial Guard. The system of which they form a part is similar to that adopted in Prussia and in the States of Piedmont. It is to be extended to the other four armies, constituting, with those already mentioned, the military force of the Turkish army. Your Lordship is aware that each of these armies, as they are called, amount on paper to 30,000 men, though I doubt whether more than two-thirds of the number are effective. The army of Arabia, which is the last of the six, has no existence as yet but in name. The first extension of the Rediff will be to the armies of Anatolia and Roumelia; that is, of Asia Minor and of the Turkish provinces in Europe. This plan of organization fully carried out would finally place at the Sultan's disposal a moveable force of 300,000 men, deducting however the troops necessary for garrisons and the maintenance of internal order. The obstacles to its complete development are the limited resources of the Treasury and the diminished number of the Mussulman population. These difficulties are far from being insurmountable, but it may be doubted whether the more enlightened portion of the Government is yet sufficiently strong to carry the decisive measures necessary for their removal.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

No. 269.

Lord Bloomfield to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received February 25.)

(No. 46.)
My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, February 13, 1850.*

AT an interview which I had yesterday with Count Nesselrode, his Excellency said, that he had read with satisfaction that part of the Queen's speech at the opening of Parliament which alluded to the late differences between Russia and Austria and the Porte; and he gave me to understand that the question had been turned in such a manner that no remark whatever could be made on it from hence.

The Chancellor observed, whilst speaking on that subject, that he had lately received a copy of your Lordship's answer to the protest of the Austrian Government upon the entrance of the squadron under the command of Vice-Admiral Sir William Parker inside the outer castles of the Dardanelles, and that he was sorry to observe the tone in which it was written; that a copy of Prince Schwarzenberg's rejoinder had also been sent to him from Vienna, and that he now sincerely hoped that this correspondence would be altogether closed.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 270.

Viscount Palmerston to Sir Stratford Canning.

(No. 58.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, February 25, 1850.*

I HAVE received your Excellency's despatch No. 24 of the 21st of January, calling my attention to that passage in my despatch No. 307 of the 30th of November, in which it is stated that "Christians who in Turkey embrace the Mahomedan faith become thereby subjects of the Sultan," and stating the inconvenience which might result from the recognition of such a principle by Her Majesty's Government.

I have to state to your Excellency, in reply, that the passage in my despatch of the 30th of November, to which you refer, related rather to the question then pending at Constantinople as to Russian subjects who had become Mussulmans, and the bearing of existing treaties upon those persons, than to the general question mooted in your Excellency's despatch No. 24, and treated

of in the Earl of Aberdeen's despatch to your Excellency, No. 138, of the 4th of September, 1844. Your Excellency was however quite right to draw my attention to this matter, and I have no hesitation in saying that the instruction contained in the Earl of Aberdeen's despatch of the 4th of September, 1844, is to be considered as still holding good. That instruction stated that a British subject turning Mussulman "would still be bound by his original allegiance to the British Crown, and be still entitled, in common with all other persons under the like obligation, to the protection and support in all lawful matters of the Representative of his Sovereign."

I am, &c.
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 271.

Viscount Palmerston to Sir Stratford Canning.

(No. 65.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, February 26, 1850.*

I HAVE to acquaint your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government entirely approve the steps which you have taken, as reported in your despatch No. 38 of the 5th instant, in favour of the refugees at Shumla.

I am, &c.
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 272.

Viscount Palmerston to Sir Stratford Canning.

(No. 66.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, February 26, 1850.*

I HAVE to acquaint your Excellency, in reply to your despatch No. 39 of the 5th instant, that Her Majesty's Government approve the advice which you have given to the Porte with reference to the continued requirements of the Austrian Government in regard to the period to be fixed for the detention of the Hungarian refugees.

I am, &c.
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 273.

Viscount Palmerston to Sir Stratford Canning.

(No. 67.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, February 26, 1850.*

I HAVE to acquaint your Excellency, in reply to your despatch No. 36 of the 5th instant, that I approve of your having communicated to the Grand Vizier portions of my instructions to Viscount Ponsonby No. 1 of the 1st of January, respecting the entrance of the British squadron into the Dardanelles, and of my instruction to your Excellency No. 332 of the 20th of December last, respecting the measures which the Porte should take with a view to the defence of the capital.

I am, &c.
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 274.

Viscount Palmerston to Sir Stratford Canning.

(No. 69.)

Foreign Office, February 26, 1850.

Sir,

I HAVE to acquaint your Excellency, in reply to your despatch No. 35 of the 5th instant, that Her Majesty's Government approve the advice which you gave to Aali Pasha relative to the form in which the answer of the Porte to the communication made to it by M. Titoff, respecting the entrance of the British squadron into the Dardanelles, should be conveyed to the Russian Government.

I am, &c.

(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 275.

Sir Stratford Canning to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received March 8.)

(No. 49.)

Constantinople, February 15, 1850.

My Lord,

I AM informed by Her Majesty's Acting Consul at Bucharest, that orders have been received, and that preparations were making for the reduction of the Russian army of occupation in Wallachia and Moldavia. I forward herewith a copy of Mr. Grant's despatch.

The Porte has received information to the same effect from Fuad Effendi, and also, I believe, from Omer Pasha.

M. de Titoff, in reply to the inquiries of Aali Pasha, has stated that he expects instructions from St. Petersburgh by the next mail on that subject, as well as on others.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

Inclosure in No. 275.

Acting Consul Grant to Sir Stratford Canning.

Bucharest, February 1, 1850.

Sir,

I UNDERSTAND that orders have been received by General Lüders to prepare for the reduction of the army of occupation in the provinces; and that the dispositions in regard to this measure have been likewise received by his Excellency.

General Lüders has communicated to the local Government the tenor of his instructions, and has named the end of February (o.s.) as the period at which this dislocation of the Russian forces will probably take place. His Excellency and staff will, I believe, withdraw entirely from the Principalities, leaving, it is reported, the brigade of lancers and the infantry under the command of General Hasford, who is to be appointed chief.

My last letter from Giurgevo informs me that 2000 Ottoman troops were expected there from Rustchuk, to complete, I presume, the stipulated Turkish army of occupation, and which at present does not consist of more than 8000 strong.

The same letter adds that about 5000 troops were to be stationed at Rustchuk, I suppose as a corps of observation.

I have, &c.

(Signed) E. GRANT.

No. 276.

Sir Stratford Canning to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received March 8.)

(No. 50.)

Constantinople, February 16, 1850.

My Lord,

THE Ottoman Council has deliberated on the only remaining point of difference with Austria respecting the Hungarian refugees; and in virtue of its decision the Minister for Foreign Affairs has proposed to the Internuncio to insert a term of twelve months as the period of their detention, subject to the contingency of public tranquillity being completely re-established in Hungary.

Aali Pasha had received a conditional authority to extend the period to two years. He consulted me upon the subject, and I told him that I did not feel myself at liberty to depart from the opinion which I had already expressed; namely, that the Porte would best consult its own dignity and interests by adhering to the last proposition which had been offered to Count Stürmer at the end of December. That proposition involved a question of months, and not of years.

I am informed that Count Stürmer's dissatisfaction on this account has been strongly declared to Aali Pasha, by means of a written instruction to his interpreter; that he urges a fuller compliance with his present demand of five years' detention, and that he intimates the possibility of some further diminution of the period being accepted at Vienna.

His Excellency's relations with the Porte offer little apparent prospect of being immediately resumed.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

No. 277.

Sir Stratford Canning to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received March 8.)

(No. 51. Confidential.)

Constantinople, February 16, 1850.

My Lord,

A COPY of the Internuncio's instruction mentioned in my despatch No. 50 is inclosed herewith. Should neither party make any further concession, the Porte will either proceed to execute its proposed, though unaccepted, agreement without further delay, or it will adopt the course which would have been preferable from the first, of sending the Hungarian, in like manner as the Polish, refugees out of the Sultan's dominions. Judging from the Grand Vizier's language when I last saw him, the Porte is at present inclined towards the latter mode of proceeding.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

Inclosure in No. 277.

Count Stürmer to Baron Testa.

Péra, le 13 *Février*, 1850.

M. le Baron,

JE ne veux point vous exprimer ici les sentimens que m'a fait éprouver le message d'Aali Pacha; ce serait aigrir des relations que je serais si heureux au contraire de rendre aussi amicales et aussi confiantes que possible. Après la concession que nous avons faite à la Sublime Porte, en renonçant aux termes si explicites d'un engagement contracté par son Envoyé à Vienne, nous devions croire qu'elle s'en témoignerait reconnaissante, et qu'elle mettrait dès-lors tous ses soins à écarter tout ce qui pourrait encore retarder un rapprochement si désirable. Comment donc qualifier aujourd'hui son refus à accepter la proposition si équitable que je lui ai faite au nom du Gouvernement Impérial.

Ne serait-on pas induit à croire qu'elle a les mains liées, soit par des engagemens pris directement avec les réfugiés en question, soit avec ceux qui ne cessent clandestinement de plaider leur cause auprès d'elle? Kossuth et ses acolytes le disent hautement à qui veut l'entendre. Il appartient à la Sublime Porte aujourd'hui de démentir ces assertions, si elle ne veut point laisser planer sur elle un soupçon injurieux.

Si, en dépit de tous nos raisonnemens, elle persiste à trouver trop long le terme de cinq ans, libre à elle d'en demander une diminution raisonnable. Peut-être le Gouvernement Impérial cette fois-ci encore chercherait-il à la satisfaire; mais la proposition de réduire le terme à une seule année est non seulement inadmissible, mais blessante. Je regrette vivement, pour ma part, de devoir par la poste de ce jour la porter à la connaissance du Gouvernement Impérial; elle produira sur lui, j'en ai la conviction, un effet que la Sublime Porte dans son propre intérêt aurait dû chercher à prévenir.

Tous les raisonnemens que le Ministre Ottoman nous a faits ne pourront atténuer cet effet, et ne sont d'ailleurs qu'une répétition de tout ce qui a été dit et redit à ce sujet. La Sublime Porte ne peut oublier que la question du terme à fixer a été soulevée par elle-même. Toutes les autres difficultés ayant été surmontées ou écartées, grâce à l'esprit de conciliation qui anime le Cabinet Impérial, il ne s'agit plus maintenant que de s'entendre sur ce terme. La Porte voudra-t-elle, ou non, tomber d'accord avec nous là-dessus, ou bien prolonger à l'infini l'état de tension existant entre les deux pays?

C'est dans ce sens, M. le Baron, que vous aurez à vous expliquer dès demain envers M. le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères.

Recevez, &c.
(Signé) STURMER.

No. 278.

Sir Stratford Canning to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received March 8.)

(No. 58.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, February* 19, 1850.

THE Russian Envoy has sent in a reply to Aali Pasha's memorandum relating to the question of protection explained in my despatch No. 30 of this year. It is thrown into the shape of an instruction to his interpreter, and I have the honour to forward a copy of it inclosed herewith. Its more immediate object is the expulsion from Turkey of two Polish emigrants, Tchayka and Lenoir, long resident in this country with French passports and acting for, if not paid by, Prince Adam Czartoryski. The former is here, the latter at Belgrade.

The Porte would be well pleased if General Aupick were to obtain their spontaneous retirement from the country, and I am inclined to think that in the present state of affairs their absence from this quarter, where M. Tchayka no doubt employs an active though secret influence for the promotion of objects hostile to Russia, would be rather advantageous than otherwise to the Porte. It appears, however, that there is little probability of any such accommodation being afforded; and it remains to be seen how far Russia is prepared to urge a demand which M. de Titoff describes as resting on the engagements contracted by the IInd Article of the Treaty of Kainardji.

Not having been invited by Aali Pasha to express an opinion on the merits of the case, I have merely advised his Excellency to consider well whether the Article appealed to by M. de Titoff has really a general and permanent character; whether it is fairly applicable to the case of the two individuals in question; and what may be the ultimate views of Russia in pressing her demand on that ground?

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

Inclosure 1 in No. 278.

M. de Titoff to M. Chirico.

$\frac{8}{15}$ *Janvier*, 1850.

EN renouvelant aujourd'hui la demande que le Gouvernement Impérial m'a chargé de poursuivre auprès de la Sublime Porte relativement à l'expulsion des Sieurs Czaykowski et Lenoir, vous voudrez bien rappeler à son Excellence Aali Pacha les explications verbales où je me flatte de lui avoir fait apprécier le bon droit et les motifs de notre réclamation.

Quant aux motifs, les Ministres Ottomans sont trop clairvoyans pour en récuser la gravité et la justesse. Dès leur apparition en Turquie ces deux individus n'ont point exercé d'autre profession que l'intrigue politique. Ils n'y mettent surtout depuis quelque tems ancune réserve. Que ces intrigues révolutionnaires sont hostiles à la Russie et nuisibles à la Turquie elle-même, c'est notoire; et indépendamment de la certitude morale, les preuves matérielles ne manqueraient point, si, pour les produire, il ne nous répugnait d'inculper des tiers et de multiplier des compromis fâcheux.

Quant au droit, je tiens à répéter ici comme je l'ai dit en conférence, que l'Article II du Traité de Kaïnardji, qui sert de base à notre demande, n'impose aux Parties Contractantes aucun devoir de prouver la culpabilité des transfuges dont elles auraient à requérir l'extradition ou l'expulsion. Czaykowski et Lenoir (Zwarkowski) sont natifs des Etats Russes, par conséquent sujets de l'Empereur. Cela suffit à rendre l'application du Traité obligatoire à leur égard, vû que l'Article précité, sauf le cas du changement de religion, s'applique à tous les sujets respectifs qui pour quelque cause que ce soit, passeraient d'un empire dans l'autre, dès une réquisition en sera faite; et cela, dit le même Article, afin que pour de tels malfaiteurs il ne s'élève aucun refroidissement ou contestation inutile entre les deux empires.

La Sublime Porte reconnaîtra que loin de marcher au but salutaire du Traité en évitant les contestations gratuites, c'est leur donner une source perpétuelle que d'établir un précédent d'après lequel chaque fois que le Gouvernement Impérial invoquerait l'Article II du Traité de Kaïnardji à l'égard de l'un de ses sujets réfugié en Turquie pour se soustraire aux lois, il suffirait à une Légation ou même à un Consul étranger de déclarer cet individu son protégé, moyennant la simple signature d'un passeport.

Le Cabinet Impérial ne saurait se résigner à croire qu'il entrât dans la pensée de la Sublime Porte et d'aucune Puissance bienveillante pour le bon ordre et le repos dans l'Orient, de vouloir ainsi réduire au néant nos légitimes réclamations, et convertir en lettre morte nos stipulations consacrées par nos Traités avec la Turquie.

Czaykowski et Lenoir, selon leur origine, n'ont d'autre nationalité légale que la nationalité Polonaise. A l'appui de cette assertion, plus amplement développée dans nos entrevues avec Aali Pacha, je prendrai la liberté de lui communiquer la notice ci-jointe, résumant ce que l'on sait d'essentiel sur les lois en matière de naturalisation. Je dois abandonner à la sagesse de M. le Ministre le parti à tirer de ces données. Mais je ne saurais dissimuler combien ce serait manquer à la dignité et aux intérêts de la Sublime Porte, si, contre toute justice, on voulait, au moyen d'une protection prépotente et arbitraire, empêcher l'exécution de ses traités avec une Puissance amie et limitrophe.

Veuillez, Monsieur, placer la présente sous les yeux de M. le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, et en laissant copie à son Excellence.

Inclosure 2 in No. 278.

Extrait des Commentaires du Code Civil.—Lois sur la Naturalisation.

LA Législation Française à cet égard. L'acte des Constitutions de l'Empire du 22 Frimaire, an 8, Article III, est conçu en ces termes:

"Un étranger devient citoyen Français lorsqu'après avoir atteint l'âge de 21 ans accomplis et avoir déclaré l'intention de se fixer en France, et y avoir résidé pendant 10 années consécutives."

Les formalités relatives à l'exécution de cet article ont été réglées par le Décret du 17 Mars, 1809, ainsi qu'il suit :

"Art. 1. Lorsqu'un étranger en se conformant aux dispositions de l'Acte des Constitutions du 22 Frimaire, an 8, aura rempli les conditions exigées pour devenir citoyen Français, sa naturalisation sera prononcée par nous.

"2. La demande en naturalisation et les pièces à l'appui seront transmises par le maire du domicile du pétitionnaire au préfet, qui les adressera avec son avis au Ministre de la Justice."

C'est à la suite de cette procédure que le requérant obtient des lettres de nationalité.

Sous le régime de la République on s'occupe aujourd'hui ainsi que tout le monde l'a vu par les discussions récentes de l'Assemblée Législative, à rendre la nationalité Française encore moins accessible aux étrangers.

No. 279.

Viscount Palmerston to Sir Stratford Canning.

(No. 80.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, March* 11, 1850.

I HAVE received your Excellency's despatches Nos. 50 and 51 of the 16th ultimo, reporting on the discussions still pending between Austria and the Porte in regard to the disposal of the Hungarian refugees; and I have to observe to your Excellency that if the state of the negotiation should leave the Porte at liberty to choose the last of the two alternatives mentioned by your Excellency, namely, that of sending the Hungarian, in like manner as the Polish refugees, out of the Sultan's dominions, such a course would no doubt be the best, as it would preclude all further discussion as to subsequent proceedings with respect to these refugees.

This observation applies of course to those among the Hungarians who are desirous of leaving Turkey, and who are in the list presented by the Austrian Minister. To expel the others who are poor and without means of subsistence, and who have not been named by the Austrian Government, would be a harsh measure, and not required by any uneasiness expressed by the Austrian Government with respect to those persons.

I have further to state to your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government approve of your having recommended the Porte, as stated in your despatch No. 50, to adhere to the last proposal which it had made to Austria in December last as to the period for the detention of the Hungarians.

I am, &c.

(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 280.

Viscount Palmerston to Sir Stratford Canning.

(No. 81.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, March* 11, 1850.

I HAVE received your Excellency's despatch No. 58 of the 19th ultimo, respecting a demand made by the Russian Minister for the expulsion of two persons named Czayka or Czaykowski, and Lenoir or Zwarkowski, residing at Constantinople under French passports, but claimed by M. Titoff as Russian subjects.

I have to state to your Excellency that you were quite right not to mix yourself up with the discussion of a question which concerns the French Government more immediately than the British.

I am, &c.

(Signed) PALMERSTON.